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Abstract
Using argumentation to debate and reach conclusions is a particularly human activity relevant to many 
professions and applications. Debates exist not only in the Houses of Parliament, but also in such disci­
plines as medicine and law. In this theoretical thesis I explore three new logical constructs for realistic 
debate modelling, namely: confirmation, preclusion and reflection. Confirmation is two or more argu­
ments for a claim, used to provide corroboration of evidence. Preclusion is an attacking argument that 
says ‘one or other of your arguments is wrong’; an argumentation technique used adeptly by Sherlock 
Holmes and many politicians. Reflection is a way of identifying logical redundancies (i.e. predictable 
patterns) in the argument data structure of a debate. A reflection originates from an unpredictable ‘re­
flector’ argument and gives rise to the predictable or ‘reflected’ argument. One type of reflection can be 
said to ‘flow down’ a tree of arguments, where the reflector is nearer the root and the reflected arguments 
further from the root, while another kind ‘flows up’ the tree in the reverse direction. Incorporating preclu­
sion into the model of reflection increases this to four distinct types of reflection, two up-tree and two 
down-tree. The value of identifying and removing reflections is to ensure intuitive, or arguably ‘correct’, 
results when judging debates, be that judgement based on the existence or number of arguments. Re­
moving reflection also aids human comprehension of the debate as it reduces the number of arguments 
involved. This logical analysis o f reflection and preclusion leads to the definition of a reflection-free, 
preclusion-aware, debate-tracking tree. Finally, the framework addresses judging the tree to determine 
who won the debate, with a proposal that takes confirmation into account when reaching conclusions. 
Confirmation assessment is helpful in resolving inconsistencies. Out of scope are notions of alternating 
moves by competing players and computational complexity.
Acknowledgements
1 wish to thank my tutor and supervisor Dr Anthony Hunter and my second supervisor Dr Robin Hirsh 
for their support and teaching. I also wish to acknowledge that I first observed the logical approach 
of confirmation and judgement presented herein (including the approaches of confirmation thresholds 
for acceptable levels of evidence, judges that resolve inconsistency by counting arguments and by the 
notion of decomposition) in the ancient Indian astrology system known as Jyotish. The Sanskrit texts, 
with English translations and commentaries, by Parasara, Vrahamira and others, provided me with the 
first inspiration for this approach to debate tracking and judgement. I am grateful to Pundit Vishwanath 
Sharma, Sri Sri Ravi Shankar and Maharishi Mahesh Yogi for explaining this ancient system of logic 
to me. I am also grateful to the software engineer who sought me out me, because of my book Putting 
Expert Systems into Practice, to ask me how a Jyotish expert system should handle inconsistency and 
redundancy in its processing. I did not know the answer at that time, however, this thesis is now an 
answer to that question. I would also like to thank Dr John Fox and his team at Cancer Research UK 
for explaining to me how this approach to debate tracking and judgement would be helpful in modem 
medicine. I am grateful to my wife Liz and my children Nadine, Gaia, Julia and Niel for their patience 
over the last six years of my work on this thesis.
Contents
1 Introduction 13
1.1 Problem S ta te m e n t ........................................................................................................................  15
1.2 My Solution in the Context of the L ite ra tu re ............................................................................  17
1.3 My Contributions: Confirmation, Preclusion and R eflection...................................................  18
2 Basic Argumentation Framework 22
2.1 Overview of the C h a p te r ..............................................................................................................  22
2.1.1 Six Steps to the Basic F ra m e w o rk .................................................................................  22
2.1.2 Context Within the Literature ........................................................................................  22
2.2 Knowledgebase of Labelled A ssu m p tio n s ................................................................................. 23
2.3 Propagating Labels During the Process of D e d u c tio n ............................................................. 27
2.4 Arguments from the K now ledgebase........................................................................................... 29
2.4.1 Catenate Inferences............................................................................................................  30
2.4.2 Argument P ro p e rtie s .........................................................................................................  32
2.5 Introducing C onfirm ation ..............................................................................................................  35
2.5.1 Inconsistent C onfirm ations..............................................................................................  39
2.5.2 Cardinality of C onfirm ations...........................................................................................  40
2.5.3 Maximum Cardinality of C onfirm ations....................................................................... 41
2.6 Introducing C ontradiction...............................................................................................................  42
2.6.1 Maximum Cardinality of C ontradictions.......................................................................  45
2.6.2 R ebu tta l.................................................................................................................................  46
2.6.3 Confirmation R e b u t ta l ......................................................................................................  48
2.7 Judging the Outcome of D e b a te s .................................................................................................. 49
2.7.1 Definition of Pro and Con F u n c tio n s..............................................................................  50
2.7.2 Illustrative Judges .............................................................................................................  51
2.8 Worked Example of the Basic Argumentation Fram ew ork ......................................................  52
2.8.1 A ssu m p tio n s .......................................................................................................................  52
2.8.2 D e d u c tio n s ........................................................................................................................... 52
2.8.3 A rg u m e n ts ........................................................................................................................... 52
2.8.4 Confirm ations.......................................................................................................................  53
Contents 6
2.8.5 C o n tra d ic tio n s ....................................................................................................................  53
2.8.6 Judgement ........................................................................................................................... 54
2.9 Conclusions for Basic Argumentation F ram ew ork ...................................................................  55
3 Undercut Framework 56
3.1 Overview of the C h a p te r ................................................................................................................ 56
3.2 The Concept of U n d e rc u t...............................................................................................................  57
3.2.1 Wigmore U n d e rc u t.............................................................................................................  58
3.2.2 Undercuts Can Change Debate O u tc o m e s .....................................................................  59
3.2.3 Undercuts, Confirmations and Rebuttals Resolve Inconsistency................................  61
3.2.4 Pollock U n d e rc u t................................................................................................................. 62
3.3 Canonical U n d e rcu t.......................................................................................................................  64
3.3.1 The Effect on Labels in Canonical U ndercut..................................................................  6 8
3.3.2 Reflexivity and Canonical U n d e rc u t................................................................................ 6 8
3.4 Introducing and Defining Preclusive U n d ercu t.........................................................................  69
3.5 Practical Motivation for Preclusive U ndercut............................................................................. 72
3.5.1 Incompatibilities due to Unsatisfied C onstrain ts...........................................................  72
3.5.2 Sherlock Holmes Relies on Preclusive U n d e rcu ts ........................................................  73
3.5.3 Cross Examination Uses Tautological Preclusive Undercuts .................................... 74
3.5.4 Tautological Preclusions are ‘Just Asking Questions’ .................................................  75
3.6 Preclusive Undercut Generalises Canonical U n d e rc u t............................................................  76
3.7 Tautological Preclusions Attack Inconsistent Confirm ations....................................................  78
3.8 Non-unique Formulae, Labels and Preclusive U n d e rc u t..........................................................  81
3.8.1 Growing Claims and In v a lid a tio n .................................................................................. 82
3.9 Attack, Abstract Attack and Attack Graphs .............................................................................  83
3.9.1 Argument Graphs, Confirmation Graphs and Contradiction G raphs.........................  85
3.10 Conclusions for Undercut F ra m e w o rk .......................................................................................  87
4 Reflected and Direct Arguments 89
4.1 Overview of the C h a p te r ............................................................................................................... 89
4.1.1 Sections on Reflected and Direct Arguments ..............................................................  89
4.2 Introducing Attack and R e f le c t io n .............................................................................................. 90
4.2.1 Base Proposition One: Rebuttal Engenders U n d e rc u t...............................................  90
4.2.2 Base Proposition Two: Undercut Engenders R e b u tta l................................................ 91
4.2.3 Attack Engenders A tta c k ...................................................................................................  91
4.2.4 Type I Reflection -  The Reflected Attacks F unction ....................................................  92
4.2.5 Seeing What is R eflec ted .................................................................................................... 94
4.2.6 Base Proposition Three: Rebuttal Engenders R ebu tta l................................................ 95
4.2.7 Base Proposition Four: Undercut Engenders U n d e rc u t ............................................. 96
Contents 7
4.2.8 Reflexive Arguments and R eflec tio n ..............................................................................  97
4.3 Reflection in Other Argumentation F ram ew orks.......................................................................  98
4.4 Reflected Canonical U n d e rcu ts ....................................................................................................... 102
4.4.1 Properties of Reflected Canonical Undercuts ..............................................................103
4.4.2 A Motivational Example of Reflected U n d e rc u t.......................................................... 105
4.5 Direct Canonical U ndercuts..............................................................................................................106
4.6 Mono-Pair Enlarged R e f le c tio n s ....................................................................................................108
4.6.1 Reflection has an Inexact S y m m etry .............................................................................. I l l
4.7 Reflected Argument R e b u t ta l s .......................................................................................................112
4.7.1 A Motivational Example of Reflected R e b u t ta l ............................................................ 113
4.7.2 Properties of Reflected Argument R eb u tta ls .................................................................... 114
4.8 Direct Argument R e b u tta ls ..............................................................................................................118
4.9 Conclusion for Reflected and Direct A rg u m en ts .........................................................................120
5 Reflected and Direct Confirmations 122
5.1 Overview of the C h a p te r ................................................................................................................. 122
5.2 Reflected Preclusive U ndercu ts....................................................................................................... 123
5.2.1 Properties of Reflected Preclusive U n d e rc u ts .................................................................124
5.3 Direct Preclusive Undercuts ........................................................................................................... 127
5.3.1 Properties of Direct Preclusive U n d e rc u ts ....................................................................... 128
5.3.2 Maximal Direct Preclusive U ndercut................................................................................. 129
5.4 Mixed Preclusive Undercuts and In v a lid a tio n ............................................................................. 131
5.5 Type II Reflection -  Reflected Confirmation R ebuttals................................................................ 133
5.5.1 Properties of Reflected Confirmation R e b u tta ls .............................................................134
5.6 Direct Confirmation R e b u t ta l s ....................................................................................................... 136
5.6.1 Maximal Direct Confirmation Rebuttal .......................................................................... 137
5.7 Scaled and Distorted R e fle c tio n s ..................................................................................................... 138
5.7.1 Reduced R eflec tion ................................................................................................................140
5.7.2 Exact R e f le c t io n ................................................................................................................... 141
5.7.3 Enlarged Reflection................................................................................................................141
5.7.4 Multi-Pair Enlarged Preclusive R eflec tio n ....................................................................... 142
5.7.5 Distorted R eflec tio n s.............................................................................................................145
5.8 Type III Reflection -  Reflected Confirming A rg u m e n ts .............................................................147
5.8.1 Properties of Reflected Confirming A rg u m e n ts ............................................................. 148
5.9 Type IV Reflection -  Reflected Confirming Confirmations .......................................................151
5.9.1 Properties of Reflected Confirming Confirmations ...................................................... 152
5.9.2 Scaling and Reflected Confirming C o n firm atio n s...........................................................153
5.9.3 Direct Confirming Confirmations ......................................................................................155
5.10 Conclusion for Reflected and Direct C o n firm a tio n s ................................................................... 155
Contents 8
6 How to Track a Debate 158
6.1 Overview of the C h a p te r ...................................................................................................................158
6.2 Debate Tracking in the L itera tu re ......................................................................................................159
6.2.1 Argument Trees and Argument Structures -  Classical Logic F o r e s ts ....................... 163
6.3 Argument Trees are Incom plete.........................................................................................................166
6.3.1 Type A Incomplete - Non-root Rebuttals E x c lu d e d .......................................................166
6.3.2 Type B Incomplete - Reduced Reflections from Excluded Direct Rebuttals . . . . 166
6.3.3 Type C Incomplete - Premise Reuse Prohibition............................................................. 168
6.4 Argument Trees are In o rd in a te .......................................................................................................169
6.4.1 Type A Inordinate - Root Reflected Canonical U n d ercu ts .............................................169
6.4.2 Type B Inordinate - Mono-Pair Enlarged Canonical R e flec tio n ...................................170
6.4.3 Type C Inordinate - Multi-Pair Enlarged Canonical R e fle c tio n ...................................171
6.4.4 Type D Inordinate - Reflected Confirming A rg u m e n t....................................................171
6.5 Three Further B ehaviours.................................................................................................................172
6.5.1 Argument Trees are In ch o ate .............................................................................................. 172
6.5.2 Sensitivity To The Way the Knowledgebase is W r i t t e n ................................................174
6.5.3 Pro and Con Reflections Do Not C a n c e l .......................................................................... 175
6 .6  Rationale for Matt Opaque Contradiction T r e e s ......................................................................... 175
6.7 Definition of Debate T r e e s .............................................................................................................. 178
6 .8  Properties of Debate T r e e s .............................................................................................................. 184
6.8.1 Introductory O b se rv a tio n s ..................................................................................................184
6.8.2 Vertex S i z e .............................................................................................................................186
6.8.3 Branching F a c to r .................................................................................................................. 187
6.8.4 Path L e n g th .............................................................................................................................187
6.8.5 Debate Trees are F in i te ........................................................................................................ 188
6.9 Conclusion for How To Track a Debate ...................................................................................... 188
7 How To Judge a Debate 190
7.1 Overview of C h a p te r ........................................................................................................................ 190
7.2 Judge S e le c tio n ...................................................................................................................................191
7.3 Judge P roperties...................................................................................................................................192
7.3.1 Rebuttal A w a re .......................................................................................................................193
7.3.2 Existential ............................................................................................................................. 193
7.3.3 Q uantitative............................................................................................................................. 193
7.3.4 Undercut Aware ................................................................................................................... 194
7.3.5 Reflection A w a re ................................................................................................................... 195
7.3.6 Confirmation A w a r e .............................................................................................................195
7.3.7 C u m u la tiv ity .......................................................................................................................... 195
7.3.8 B ip o la r .................................................................................................................................... 195
Contents 9
7.3.9 Metaknowledge A w a re ......................................................................................................... 196
7.4 Reflection and Judge O utcom es........................................................................................................ 196
7.4.1 Steps for Examining Debate Outcomes With and Without R eflection.......................... 199
7.5 Reflection and Existential Judge Outcomes ................................................................................ 200
7.5.1 Situation with Reflection and Existential Judgement ................................................... 201
7.5.2 Situation without Reflection and Existential Judgem en t................................................201
7.6 Judging a Debate Tree .....................................................................................................................203
7.6.1 Undercut Aware Quantitative Judgement in the L iterature .............................................204
7.6.2 Quantitative Judge Aware of Confirmation, Preclusion and R e f le c tio n ...................... 204
7.7 Reflection and Quantitative Judge O utcom es.................................................................................207
7.7.1 Situation with Reflection and Quantitative Judgem ent..................................................207
7.7.2 Situation without Reflection and Quantitative Ju d g em en t...........................................208
7.8 Closing Remarks and Conclusion for How To Judge a D ebate .................................................. 208
8 Conclusion and Discussion 210
8.1 Overview of C h a p te r .........................................................................................................................210
8.2 Areas for Further R e se a rc h ............................................................................................................... 211
8.3 Further Research Shortlist ............................................................................................................... 215
8.4 Assisting A rg u m e n ts ......................................................................................................................... 216
8.5 Im plem enta tion ................................................................................................................................... 218
8.5.1 System Exterior - Use C a s e s ...............................................................................................219
8.5.2 System Interior - P ack ag es ..................................................................................................222
8.5.3 Implementation - Next S te p s .............................................................................................. 227
8 .6  Decision and Design Rationale and T ra d e -o f f ............................................................................. 227
8 .6 .1 Design Rationale within Private Finance Initiatives ( P F I s ) .........................................232
8.7 Contributions: Strengths and L im itations....................................................................................... 232
8 .8  Closing Remarks and Conclusion for Discussion .......................................................................236
List of Functions 239
Bibliography 242
List of Figures
4.1 Type I Reflection is Provided by reflectedAttacks( J  :(3,I :a . A ) .........................................  93
4.2 Reflected Canonical Undercuts Shown in an Argument Graph ................................................106
4.3 Motivational Example of Reflected Rebuttal Shown in an Argument G rap h .........................114
5.1 Reflected Preclusive Undercut is a Form of Type I R eflec tion .............................................. 123
5.2 Reflectors to Consider for the Maximal Direct Preclusive Undercut Z :< p .......................... 129
5.3 Type II Reflection is Provided by reflectedConfirmationRebuttals(Y: f3, V, X : a ,  A) . . . 133
5.4 Reduced Preclusive Undercut Reflection Shown in a Contradiction G r a p h .......................... 140
5.5 Exact Preclusive Undercut Reflection Shown in a Contradiction G ra p h ..............................141
5.6 Enlarged Preclusive Undercut Reflection Shown in a Contradiction G r a p h ........................142
5.7 Multi-Pair Enlarged Reflection Shown in a Contradiction G r a p h ........................................ 145
5.8 Distorted Reflection Shown in a Contradiction G r a p h ............................................................... 146
5.9 Type HI Reflection is Provided by reflectedConfirmingArguments(K : ->$. J : j3 .1 : a ,  A ) . 147
5.10 Type IV Reflection is reflectedConfirmingConfirmations(U:-'^,Y:/3 .W .X : a .  A) . . .  151
6.1 Repeated Vertices in an Argument Tree ...................................................................................... 164
6.2 Type A Incomplete - Non-root Rebuttals Excluded ..................................................................166
6.3 Type B Incomplete - Reduced Reflections from Excluded Direct R eb u tta ls .......................... 167
6.4 Type C Incomplete - Premise Reuse P ro h ib itio n .........................................................................168
6.5 Type A Inordinate - Root Reflected Canonical U n d e rc u ts ........................................................ 169
6 .6  Type B Inordinate - Mono-Pair Enlarged Canonical R e f le c tio n .............................................. 171
6.7 Type C Inordinate - Multi-Pair Enlarged Canonical Reflection .............................................. 172
6 .8  Inchoate - Present Arguments Do Not Represent Absent Ones ...............................................173
6.9 Asymmetry - of Reflected Cardinality in an Argument S t ru c tu re ........................................... 175
7.1 Marked Argument Tree - Contains Reflection - Outcome a .....................................................201
7.2 Marked Argument Tree - Without Reflection - Outcome 0 ........................................................ 203
7.3 Argument Structure cast by Cast Two - Contains Reflection - Outcome a ..............................207
7.4 Debate Tree - Without Reflection - Outcome 0 .............................................................................208
8.1 Use Case Diagram of a Debate Facilitation T o o l ......................................................................... 220
8.2 Package Diagram of a Debate Facilitation Tool ......................................................................... 222
List o f  Figures
8.3 Debate Tree of the Buying WarmHouse Debate
List of Tables
2.1 Summary of Key Argument Aggregation F u n c tio n s ............................................................... 55
3.1 Summary of Key Undercut Functions ......................................................................................  87
3.2 Summary of Key Attacks F u n c t io n s .........................................................................................  8 8
3.3 Summary of Three Attacks G ra p h s ............................................................................................. 8 8
4.1 Motivational Example of Reflected Undercut ............................................................................105
4.2 Motivational Example of Reflected R e b u tta l ............................................................................... 113
4.3 Summary of Reflected and Direct Argument Attacking Functions........................................... 121
4.4 Summary of Scaling Factors Found With Argument Reflections...............................................121
5.1 Summary of Reflected and Direct Confirmation Attacking F u n c tio n s .....................................156
5.2 Summary of Scaling Factors Found With Confirmation R eflections........................................157
6 .1 Candidates Forms for Vertices in Debate Tracking G raphs........................................................ 159
6.2 Candidates Forms for Edges in Debate Tracking G raphs............................................................ 160
6.3 Summary of Debate Tracking Graphs or T re e s ............................................................................160
6.4 Summary of Comparison of Argument Trees with Professional D e b a te ..............................189
7.1 Analysis Showing that Reflection Changes Debate O u tcom es................................................. 199
7.2 Tree Nomenclature: An Arbitrary Vertex v in a Debate Tree .................................................202
7.3 Tree Nomenclature: Attacks on an Arbitrary Vertex v in a Debate T r e e ................................ 205
7.4 Judge Functions in Thesis; 1.0 and 2.0 are Undercut U naw are................................................. 209
8.1 Summary of Bipolar F u n c tio n s ....................................................................................................... 216
8.2 Atomic Formulae and their Linguistic Equivalents for W arm H ouse....................................... 229
8.3 Arguments Derived from Knowledgebase for W a rm H o u se .....................................................231
Chapter 1
Introduction
In common usage the word ‘argument’ tends to have two meanings; one is a single argument where a set 
of premises are used to infer a claim; the second meaning is a set of many of these single arguments that 
interact with each other in various ways allowing a final or overall conclusion about a particular claim to 
be drawn. I call the second usage a ‘debate’. Debates occur in many professional walks of life, not just 
in the formal debates in the Houses of Parliament or the Oxford Union. Professional debates occur, for 
example, in medicine, journalism, economics, business management, systems engineering, law, politics, 
forensic science, detective work and investment banking.
The underlying goal of this thesis is to allow a computer to have a deep and rich understanding 
of a debate, but not to actively participate. Although I hold up ‘professional debate’ as the guide and 
motivation o f the formalisms in this thesis I can offer no gold standard that defines professional debate in 
its own right. By professional debate I am implying one conducted by courteous individuals in an orderly 
and precise way with no tolerance for ambiguity or carelessness. I assume an emphasis on avoiding errors 
and thereby on reaching as logically correct a conclusion as possible. I would suggest that in such debates 
there is rarely a single absolute truth to be located, however, application of these principles will provide 
outcomes that are more helpful than if such an approach were not used. This thesis examines professional 
debate in two steps; one is tracking or recording the form of the debate in some kind of data structure; 
the other is judging the outcome or conclusion of the debate, given that data structure. My approach is 
to analyse the completed debate data structure as a whole and not to consider the sequence or temporal 
build up of moves by individual players. Hence my approach is monological in nature. Dialectical 
considerations, of alternating moves by competing players, are outside the scope of this thesis. There is 
a developing literature on how to track and judge debates in the field of artificial intelligence (AI), with 
some overlap into at least business administration, politics, jurisprudence, medicine, mathematics and 
philosophy. However, I present evidence and reasoning in the thesis that there is no published debate 
formalism that is definitely necessary and sufficient, i.e. that covers the whole debate and nothing but 
the debate. As I use the phrase ’whole debate’ later I should be clear that I am meaning all of the unique 
arguments that can be constructed with a) a minimal consistent set of premises taken from the overall set 
of available premises and b) which use classical logic to deduce their claim. I do not refer to informal 
aspects such as a video tape of the proceedings or the body language of speakers.
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Consequently, this thesis proposes a new formalism to track and judge professional debates in a 
way that is necessary and sufficient. So when I propose that a debate should be conducted in a certain 
way, that is at the same time a) my claiming to know something of how professional debate is practised 
in the world (based primarily on my 30 years of information technology experience in industry analysing 
and designing systems for these professions), b) my own views on how a debate should be conducted to 
yield an accurate result and last but not least c) the formal framework defined in this thesis.
To track a debate is to populate a data structure or record of the evidence, arguments and interactions 
between those arguments that comprise the debate. In the body of this thesis I assume that all arguments 
are of equal weight and come from reputable sources so that only logic can be used to distinguish 
between them. The challenge here is to record each relevant argument once and only once, and also not 
to include any superfluous arguments. Hence the data structure should only be as large and as complex 
as necessary to keep track of the debate and no more. Any missing or excessive argumentation in the 
tracking, which would or could lead to errors or changes in the judgement outcome, is of importance. 
The data structure does not have to be fully populated, for example at some interim point in the progress 
of the debate, for the judge function to provide an outcome. Only when the debate is complete, however, 
will the judgement be conclusive. Forming this data structure of related arguments is commonly referred 
to as ‘argument aggregation’; some authors include judgement within argument aggregation, but I would 
recommend making that step distinct.
To judge a debate is to decide the overall outcome to all of the arguments presented in the debate. 
A debate will have a motion (regardless of whether that is formally declared or not), which could be 
phrased as ‘this house believes such and such’. A motion can be represented as a logical proposition, a . 
At the outset o f the debate the motion is an open question that could be true or false. Once the debate has 
run its course, judgement occurs and the question of the motion is answered. The outcome will either 
be a , ->q or possibly the empty set 0. If  the outcome is ->a it is commonly said that the motion was 
defeated. If  a , then the motion carried. The empty set may arise for a variety of reasons including either
i) there was a stalemate with equal evidence, support or weight for both a  or ->q, or ii) there could be 
not enough compelling evidence to say definitively whether a  or ~^a is the case, or iii) some technical or 
procedural problem occurred.
A debate may be judged by a vote or poll of some kind (e.g. in Parliament, Oxford Union or a jury) 
or it may be judged by an individual (e.g. a judge, a senior doctor or a newspaper editor). The aim of this 
thesis, and of related work in the AI literature, is to empower a computer to track and judge a debate and 
hence determine the outcome. Most authors believe that such an automated judge should be logical and 
methodical, free from arbitrary or random judgements and able to explain why it reached a particular 
conclusion. Note that not all AI judges use argumentation or even logic, for example neural networks 
can be said to judge outcomes and their inner workings are typically free from logic. They usually also 
lack any form of explanation facility to show why a particular conclusion was reached. Judges based on 
argumentation are formally introduced in Chapter 2 and revisited in Chapter 7.
Any debate is driven by its knowledgebase, which is a single repository of all of the assumptions
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available to be reasoned with. Within this knowledgebase may be i) domain-specific knowledge (for 
example the contents of medical text books), ii) facts or evidence specific to the current case being con­
sidered and iii) world knowledge, which is generally known as common sense information, but which is 
often not written down. In addition to the purely logical knowledgebase, a debate may also have access 
to metaknowledge, meaning any additional knowledge available about the knowledge in the knowledge­
base. Metaknowledge can include such things as priorities between assumptions, thresholds for evidence 
and domain specific ontologies.
1.1 Problem Statement
The problem taken up by this thesis, of debate tracking and judging, was well summarised as long ago 
as 1937 by the legal expert Professor John H. Wigmore in the following paragraph.
‘ What is wanted is simple enough in purpose, namely, some method which will enable us to 
lift into consciousness and state in words the reasons why a total mass o f evidence does or 
does not persuade us to a given conclusion and why our conclusion would or should have 
been different or identical i f  some part o f that total mass o f evidence had been different.’ 
(Wigmore, 1937; Twining, 1985)
This quotation draws out two facets of the problem, firstly to track the debate, i.e. ‘to lift into 
consciousness or state in words’, and secondly to judge the outcome of the debate, i.e. ‘persuade u s’ 
or ‘our conclusion ’. In tracking a debate, my view is that the whole debate and nothing but the debate 
should be captured in some formal and visible structure. If the whole debate is not tracked, tracking 
is incomplete. If  something other than the debate is captured, tracking is excessive or inordinate. This 
problem thus has five parts or steps, i) the ‘total mass o f evidence’ or knowledgebase, which is the input
ii) the ‘reasons ’ or individual arguments that follow from this evidence, iii) capturing the relevant set of 
arguments and their interactions in some formal structure, i.e. ‘some m ethod’ or tracking the debate, iv) 
the process of judgement of the motion under debate and v) the output which is ‘our conclusion ’ .
Inherent in this problem are six key challenges, namely:
1. Inconsistency. The evidence is usually inconsistent. Classical logic collapses in the face of incon­
sistency, a phenomena known as ‘ex falso quodlibet’. Anything can be inferred from an inconsis­
tency (including erroneous conclusions). Inconsistency is also useful as it captures the two sides 
of the debate around the motion and also around subservient points argued over in the debate.
2. Repetition. Repetition in the evidence and reasons is also common. Such repetition clutters 
presentation thereby hampering judgement. More problematic, however, is that any judgement 
scheme which analyses the existence of arguments (i.e. existential judges) or counts arguments 
(i.e. quantitative judges) can be skewed by repetition to reach a different answer. On the other 
hand, repetition can be useful as it provides confirmation which is helpful for resolving inconsis­
tency, filtering out noise and establishing judge outcomes.
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3. Vital arguments excluded. Sufficient or complete versus incomplete -  it is necessary to capture 
the whole debate including all of the legitimate ways that arguments interact, with the main two 
kinds of interaction known as undercut (where one argument attacks or negates the premises of 
another argument) and rebuttal (where one argument attacks the claim of another argument).
4. Superfluous arguments included. Necessary or ordinate versus inordinate -  nothing but the 
debate must be tracked. Anything that is utterly predictable or redundant adds nothing and must 
be excluded.
5. Non-monotonic. The knowledgebase can be subject to revision and a different or revised judge­
ment must be possible, as pointed out by Wigmore. I take this challenge as related to the notion of 
appeal in courts of law, whereby the total mass of evidence may be augmented or reduced, even in 
minor ways. Certainly the legal notion of appeal is broader than just revision of the knowledgebase 
as it can also cover errors in due process, which I touch on in Section 7.2.
6 . Computational complexity. The issue of deducing an inference from a set of assumptions is a 
computer science problem known to be at least as hard as non-deterministic polynomial time (NP) 
problems (Cook, 1971). The computation complexity of argument aggregation is an active area of 
research (Eiter & Gottlob, 1995; Dunne & Bench-Capon, 2002; Parsons et al., 2003; Wooldridge 
et al., 2006) with a growing consensus that it is even harder than the problems described by Cook. 
Thus practical applications may require heuristics to reach approximate conclusions in a reason­
able time. The computational complexity of debate tracking and judging, together with algorithms 
and heuristics, are outside the scope of this thesis and left as an area for future research.
These six challenges are not unique to this thesis, but rather are well known in the fields of logic, 
mathematics and computer science. This problem of tracking and judging debates is found in a large 
number of application areas. These applications fall broadly into the two areas of i) professional debate 
and ii) intra-system decision making. Professional debate needs this problem solved particularly in the 
areas of law, medicine, journalism, politics and systems engineering. More advanced instances of the 
problem occur within systems, such as AI agents, that are involved in perception, learning, planning or 
taking action. Given a mass of inconsistent evidence these system may be presented with questions such 
as: What do I perceive? Given what I know and what I perceive what do I believe? Given what I believe 
what should I do now? What should my plan be? What do we believe? What is our plan? Addressing this 
problem of how to correctly track and judge debates is essential so that correct, rather than erroneous, 
conclusions can be drawn for these questions. An automated solution is especially needed in areas 
where the mass of evidence is large and complex enough to make manual processing (i.e. generating 
the complete set of arguments from the given premises, tracking the debate interactions as a whole and 
judging the outcome) time consuming and error prone. Consequently, in these situations, automation 
ought to save time, reduce errors and render the outcome more plausible and thus dependable.
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1.2 My Solution in the Context of the Literature
This thesis employs a theoretical formal approach and falls within that part of AI known as argumenta­
tion. Such an approach ensures that different implementations will obtain the same results; something 
not established by the informal and applied branches of argumentation. Argumentation is one approach 
to inconsistency and is found not just in AI, but being logical is also in philosophy and mathematics, dat­
ing back at least to Aristotle. Modem interest in argumentation arises with (Wigmore, 1937; Toulmin, 
1958).
In this field there are four main formal approaches to defining an individual argument, namely i) 
minimal consistent subset (mincons) arguments following classical propositional logic (Doyle, 1979), ii) 
defeasible logic argumentation schemes (Nute, 1988), iii) semi-abstract (Bondarenko et al., 1997) and 
iv) fully abstract arguments from (Dung, 1993). I employ mincons (comprising a minimal consistent set 
of assumptions, classical logic and an inference or claim), and augment them with a labelled deduction 
system (Gabbay, 1991) so as to track the contributions of multiple experts or agents.
Arguments in the literature interact by attacking each other, either with an abstract (Dung, 1993), 
semi-abstract (Bondarenko et al., 1997) or a concrete approach. A concrete attack is either a rebuttal or 
an undercut (Pollock, 1970). I extend argument interaction by including confirmation, also known as 
corroboration, (Wigmore, 1937)), as a core relationship. I extend undercut by generalising the work of 
(Pollock, 1970) and (Besnard & Hunter, 2001) to bring undercut closer to professional debate. A minor, 
but useful, construct I introduce is the contradiction which is an aggregation of arguments for and against 
a claim.
The variety of approaches in the literature to tracking a debate almost all use some form of graph or 
tree to show how the arguments in the debate interact. These graphs and trees are directed as attacks are 
drawn as edges with an arrow head on them indicating the direction of attack. In trees the direction of 
attack is always from leaf towards root. Proposers of formal argument aggregation trees include (Pollock, 
1992; Simari et al., 1994; Prakken & Sartor, 1997; Besnard & Hunter, 2001; Amgoud & Cayrol, 2002; 
Garcia & Simari, 2004; Dung et al., 2006). In contrast, the more abstract approaches of (Dung, 1993; 
Dung, 1995; Bondarenko et al., 1997) can be represented as graphs, but those representations are not 
explicitly relied upon in the way that trees are in the other schemes. My analysis suggests that none of 
these trees or graphs captures ‘the whole debate and nothing but the debate’. I prove that finding for 
one leading tree and show an indication for other trees in the literature. My research finding is that a 
category of redundant arguments, which I call reflected arguments, are present in these trees from the 
literature, making them inordinate. Some of the trees appear to aim to exclude reflected arguments, 
but with excessive success, making them incomplete. The representative tree from the literature I have 
picked for detailed analysis is in (Besnard & Hunter, 2001), allowing me to establish several ways that 
these argument trees are incomplete and inordinate. I then respond to these issues by proposing a tree 
that is both complete and ordinate -  the matt opaque contradiction tree or debate tree for short.
Finally, in the literature and this thesis, the outcome or conclusion of a debate is drawn through the 
act of judgement. There have been a number of proposals forjudge functions including (Pollock, 1992;
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Benferhat et al., 1993), with useful elaborations including those from (Elvang-Gdransson & Hunter, 
1995; Prakken & Sartor, 1997; Bondarenko et al., 1997; Besnard & Hunter, 2001; Amgoud & Cayrol, 
2002; Garcia & Simari, 2004; Dung et al., 2006). Conceptually, the input to a judge is the debate 
tracking argument aggregation, and the output is the debate conclusion. In practice, the input to my 
judge functions is i) the motion, ii) the knowledgebase and iii) optional judge-specific metaknowledge. 
In this way each unique judge can compute the debate tracking data structure it requires, be that a single 
contradiction, a tree, or some other form, prior to then performing its deliberations and outputting the 
conclusion. I hold that judges in the literature, whether based on existential or quantitative methods are 
likely to give skewed results when applied to inordinate or incomplete trees, demonstrating my point by 
a set of examples.
The broad approach of tracking and judging debates found in the literature is applicable to many 
areas of professional debate. O f particular potential utility are applications in medicine (Fox & Das, 
2000) and law (Prakken, 1997). This thesis suggests the systems engineering applications of design 
rationale and design trade-off as particular fruitful ones -  building on the work of (Buckingham-Shum, 
1994).
1.3 My Contributions: Confirmation, Preclusion and Reflection
In this section I touch on a) the structure of this thesis and b) its novel concepts not covered elsewhere 
in the literature. Clearly a central theme running though the majority of the literature on argumentation 
is that of attack - where one argument attacks another. The distinction that an attack is either abstract 
or concrete is also widespread in the literature, where the abstract approach builds on (Dung, 1993) and 
the concrete approach covers most of the rest of the literature. My focus is on the particular form of the 
concrete approach that uses minimal consistent subsets and classical propositional logic together with 
rebuttal and undercut, as is summarised in, for example, (Besnard & Hunter, 2001) and detailed in my 
Chapter 2.
The main point of my thesis is that this form of argumentative attack exhibits a phenomena I call 
reflection. I establish, given a knowledgebase of assumptions, plus the attacks and arguments derivable 
from it, that the existence of some arguments is utterly predictable from the existence of other arguments. 
So, given their prerequisites, reflected arguments always exist. Likewise, I establish that the existence of 
some attacks is predictable from the existence of other attacks. I call the predictable arguments reflected 
arguments and the predictable attacks reflected attacks, while the unpredictable arguments and attacks I 
call direct. I present the case that the direct arguments and attacks are the useful ones and reflected ones 
are akin to noise (e.g. in an analogue hi-fi music system) or waste (e.g. in the crafts of woodwork or 
sculpture) which should be eliminated or dismissed.
Included within this thesis is an analysis showing that reflection is not unique to this mincon ap­
proach, but rather also exists within other argumentation frameworks and is therefore a more general 
problem in the argumentation literature. This analysis looks at the assumption-based argumentation ap­
proach of (Dung et al., 2006). While the semi-abstract approach began with (Bondarenko et al., 1997) 
and is often referred to as the BDKT (Bondarenko, Dung, Kowalski and Toni) approach (see for exam-
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pie the review of (Prakken & Vreeswijk, 2002)), I have chosen to base my analysis on the subsequent 
paper (Dung et al., 2006) as it has slightly evolved its basic definitions to provide a somewhat clearer 
description of what they call assumption-based argumentation or ABA for short. I show ABA as being 
concrete enough to establish that it allows reflection. I examine one instance of ABA showing that it can 
contain reflection; what happens in other instances is an open question. With the fully abstract approach 
of (Dung, 1993), however, it is not possible to say whether it does or does not contain reflection. Any 
implementation in software of the fully abstract approach that determines what arguments exist and what 
arguments attack each other could contain reflection and consequently consideration of the possibility of 
reflection in such an implementation would be prudent.
In summary so far, an attack is either concrete or abstract and concrete attacks are either reflected 
or direct. This thesis then makes further distinctions as follows. In many places in the literature there is 
clarity that a concrete attack is either a rebuttal or an undercut. I am consequently able to show that there 
exist reflected rebuttals, reflected undercuts, direct rebuttals and direct undercuts. I analyse the properties 
of these reflected and direct functions in Chapter 4. Undercuts can be reflected off other undercuts or off 
rebuttals. Likewise rebuttals can be reflected off other rebuttals or off undercuts.
A second theme, in addition to reflection, running through this thesis is that of confirmation; that 
arguments can be logically aggregated into sets of arguments all with the same claim. A simple enough 
idea in essence, confirmation is introduced, motivated and illustrated in Chapter 2. While confirmation 
is definitely not a novel introduction to the literature, see for example (Wigmore, 1937; Twining, 1985; 
Amgoud et al., 2004; Reed & Rowe, 2006), I would argue that my presentation and analysis provides a 
convenient set o f basic argument aggregation tools not found elsewhere. The heart o f the novelty of this 
thesis is the use of confirmation to deepen the analysis of reflection; but first one other distinction.
Just as arguments can attack each other, I establish that confirmations can attack each other. Con­
firmation is employed in professional debate and is useful for reaching sound debate outcomes. Attack 
between confirmations can take two forms: undercut or rebuttal. An undercutting attack between con­
firmations I call a preclusive undercut, or preclusion for short. Similarly rebuttal attacks exist between 
confirmations, which I call confirmation rebuttals. Chapter 3, introduces the concept of preclusive un­
dercut. When a confirmation is subject to a preclusive undercut, the attack is effectively saying ‘one or 
other o f  your arguments is wrong', in contrast to the canonical undercut (Besnard & Hunter, 2001) be­
tween arguments which says ‘one or other o f  your premises is wrong’. Consequently a use of preclusive 
undercuts is for attacking sets of arguments with mutually inconsistent supports. A preclusive undercut 
can attack many arguments or it can just attack one. Likewise the attacking confirmation can contain 
one or many arguments. Given preclusive undercut and confirmation rebuttal it is also possible to define 
confirmation attack with reflected and direct forms.
Combining the notion of attacks between confirmations with that of reflection provides access to 
a number of interesting behaviours. I discuss this area of reflected and direct confirmations in Chap­
ter 5. My analysis follows the same pattern as the previous chapter, but on the level of confirmations 
rather than on the level of individual arguments. Thus there exist reflected preclusive undercuts, reflected
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confirmation rebuttals, direct preclusive undercuts, direct confirmation rebuttals, reflected confirmation 
attacks and direct confirmation attacks. A feature of these reflections is that the actual number of re­
flections often does not match what might intuitively be expected. There are two mechanisms involved 
that can make the number of reflections more than might be anticipated and a further mechanism that 
can lead to the number of reflections being fewer than might be anticipated. Consequently reflections 
can be enlarged, reduced or exact. I call the ratio between the anticipated number of arguments and the 
actual number o f reflected arguments the reflection scaling factor. Distorted reflections may occur with 
different parts of a reflection having different reflection scaling factors. It is also the case that different 
kinds of reflection have different possible ranges for their reflection scaling factors.
A growing part of the literature that is not just on attack addresses the question of bipolar frame­
works where arguments can have an assisting or positive relationship in addition to the more common 
attacking or negative relationship. My confirmation functions venture into this bipolar territory. I show 
that reflections occur with these positive relationships in a similar, but different way from attack. The 
remainder of this paragraph introduces reflections of a positive or assisting nature. All of the reflections 
described so far have in common that an attack is engendering an attack, causing what is commonly 
called reinstatement. I define a nomenclature of a chain of arguments with a head (attacked but not 
attacking) and a tail (attacking but not attacked), showing that these reinstatement type reflections have 
the reflector at the head of the chain and the reflected argument at the tail. Other kinds of reflection exist 
within sets of interacting arguments. I have identified another form where the reflector is at the tail of 
chain and the reflected argument is at the head - these I call reflected confirming arguments. As above the 
symmetry continues with these reflections existing not only at the level of individual arguments but also 
at the level of confirmations. Hence, I also introduce the reflected confirming confirmation. Likewise 
these tail-to-head forms show that there exist direct confirming arguments and direct confirming confir­
mations which are free from reflection. These tail-to-head reflections are subject to scaled reflections 
and have their own pattern of scaling factors. The final chapter, Chapter 8 , touches on a further form of 
assisting arguments and shows that they too can contain reflections.
The last two chapters of the thesis build on the understanding of confirmation, preclusion and reflec­
tion to tackle the questions of how best to track and judge debates. My analysis leads to the conclusion 
that reflected arguments are not good candidates or proxies to represent the arguments they are reflected 
off. Hence I advocate using only direct arguments within the tracking of debates. Building on my anal­
ysis of trees in the literature, showing them to be incomplete, inordinate and inchoate, I propose the 
debate tree to track ‘the debate, the whole debate and nothing but the debate’. The vertices of a debate 
tree map to direct contradictions, while the edges map to direct preclusions. Debate trees are finite. In 
the penultimate chapter, Chapter 7 ,1 define a judge function that assesses debate trees using quantitative 
methods. This judge is the only one I know of that takes reflection into account and is thus, I believe, 
likely to give more intuitive results for professional debates than judges skewed by reflection.
The novelty of contributions is high in the middle of the thesis (particularly Chapters 4 and 5) and 
lower in the early (Chapters 1 to 3) and late material (Chapters 7 and 8 ). The utility of the material,
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however, rises steadily as the thesis progresses. The key formal definitions are in Chapters 2 through
6 . There is no separate literature review chapter as strong links to the literature exist in almost most 
chapters, except for the more novel Chapters 4 and 5 where such links are rare.
An outline system design for a tool to help facilitate professional debates is described in Chapter 8 . 
This design covers virtually all of the theory introduced in this thesis. The tool differs from existing tools 
in that it automates three things i) construction of arguments from premises, ii) building of the debate 
tracking structure (which is a single tree) and iii) judging the outcome of the debate. Layered on top 
of this automation is argumentation visualisation, allowing users to understand more clearly the state of 
play in the debate tracking and judging and thus participate more actively in progressing the debate.
Chapter 2
Basic Argumentation Framework
2.1 Overview of the Chapter
This chapter formally introduces my basic argumentation framework. The chapter proceeds in six steps 
that build on one another, here is a quick overview:
2.1.1 Six Steps to the Basic Framework
Step 1 - Knowledgebase Section 2.2, the initial knowledgebase of labelled assumption formu­
lae, this finite set is denoted A. It may come from multiple experts or agents.
Step 2 - Deductions Section 2.3, the set of everything that can be deduced from the knowledge­
base, denoted deductions(A), contains labelled deduction formulae.
Step 3 - Arguments Section 2.4, those deductions with consistent and minimal premises, are 
called arguments and denoted arguments(A). The premises must be consistent to counter the 
problem of ex falso quodlibet.
Step 4 - Confirmations Section 2.5, I then perform a further aggregation of all arguments for 
each claim. I call these sets of arguments confirmations and denote the set of all confirmations, 
denoted 0 (A ). I contribute the inconsistent confirmation to the literature.
Step 5 - Contradictions Section 2.6, a further aggregation that I call contradiction identifies the 
sets of arguments for and against each claim and is denoted ♦ (A ).
Step 6 - Judgement Section 2.7, the judge function provides a ‘useful’ subset of the claims. The 
choice of what is useful depends upon the application, but must include resolving inconsistencies. 
The judge() function has many possible forms, a number of which are explored in subsequent 
chapters.
At the end of the chapter is a comprehensive worked example, Section 2.8, retracing the same six 
steps as above, this time with specific formulae. Finally comes the conclusion, Section 2.9.
2.1.2 Context Within the Literature
Steps one, two and three, from the above list of six steps, are broadly shared by many authors, e.g. (Doyle, 
1979; Pollock, 1992; Benferhat et al., 1993; Elvang-Gdransson & Hunter, 1995; Bondarenko et al.,
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1997; Pollock, 2000; Amgoud & Cayrol, 2002). The use of labels to formally track and distinguish the 
contributions of multiple experts or agents during argument aggregation is a relatively underdeveloped 
part of the literature, e.g. (Walton, 1999; Chesnevar & Simari, 2005). The basic ideas of argument ag­
gregation steps four and five are tangentially touched on in the literature, e.g. (Fox et al., 1993a; Krause 
et al., 1995; Besnard & Hunter, 2001; Amgoud et al., 2004; Walton & Reed, 2006), but not in the 
form stated here. They are sometimes less formally stated, sometimes more formally, however there is 
no consensus between argumentation authors on representation, nor on a way to handle multiple experts. 
With step six I return to common ground with many authors, e.g. (Manor & Rescher, 1970; Cayrol et al., 
1992; Pollock, 1992; Benferhat et al., 1993; Elvang-Gpransson & Hunter, 1995; Bondarenko et al., 
1997; Prakken & Sartor, 1997; Krause et al., 1998; Bourne & Parsons, 1999; Fox & McBumey, 2002; 
Konieczny & P6rez, 2002; Dung et al., 2006). While there is consensus on the conceptual goal there is 
little consensus on nomenclature nor on how to get there. I will show that my framework provides a) a 
formal notation for subsuming the past work of many authors and b) a convenient way of exploring fresh 
and useful ground for future Al research and applications in the area of inconsistency.
Readers may feel that the framework of this chapter is overly complex, however it helps to simplify 
the work of subsequent chapters. This chapter, in isolation, adds nothing significant to the literature; its 
value will become clear later in the thesis.
2.2 Knowledgebase of Labelled Assumptions
My approach is to use classical deduction and augment it with the labelled deductive system (LDS) 
approach of (Gabbay, 1991; Gabbay et al., 2000). My framework is limited to propositional calculus, 
leaving the complications of first order predicate calculus, higher order and other logics as areas for 
future research.
Ordinary set theory and notation are also employed, in particular: if X  and y  are arbitrary sets then 
p ( X )  is the power set o f X \  X  x y  is the Cartesian product of X  and y  \ \X\  is the cardinality of X , X \ y  
is set difference giving elements that belong to X  but not to y \  and 0 is the empty set. N is the set of 
natural numbers (the non-negative integers), R  is the set of real numbers and N+ is the set of natural 
numbers greater than zero. _L is inconsistency and T  is tautology. I now use a recursive definition to 
define my starting point, the language £.
Definition 2.2.1. I  employ classical propositional logic in defining a language C. Let lower case Greek 
letters be formulae a, 0 , 1 , . . .  in £. I  assume £ contains a finite set o f  atoms (or equivalently atomic 
formulae). Furthermore let C use the standard classical connectives, -> negation, A conjunction, V 
disjunction and —> implication. I f  a is a form ula then -i a is also a formula. I f  a and 0  are form ulae  
then a  A 0, c* V 0  and a —► 0  are also formulae.
Although the number of atomic formulae is finite, the classical propositional proof rules, such as 
VI and Al, ensure that any number of compound formulae can be built up and thus that the language 
C is infinite. Consequently, £  allows formulae of arbitrary complexity thereby providing the set of all 
possible formulae. The biconditional symbol *-+ can also be constructed following the standard definition
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a  <-> 0  iff a  —> 0  and 0  —> a . I use I- as classical deduction with the standard classical propositional 
proof rules.
Example 2.2.1. Formulae. a , 0 , 7,aV<5, 7tA->A, ~i(CA(C —► £)),ujV  pV<jVot,0 ~  ^ - ' ( C A (C  ~ >
£ )  A 7r A (-i7T V £ ) ) , . . .  ^  C .
Three kinds of labels are used in this framework for i) assumptions, ii) deductions and iii) confir­
mations.
Definition 2.2.2. Labels. Let A  =  {a, b, c , . . .  } be assumption labels, B  — p ( A )  be deduction labels 
and C =  p{B)  be confirmation labels.
I use the following nomenclature: B  =  {0, {a}, {&}, {c}, {a, &}, {a, c}, {6 , c}, {a, 6 , c } , . . . ,  A }  
with equivalent set names of B = {0, / ,  J , i f ,  L, M , N , O , . . .  ,.4}. Consequently 
C = { V ) , { ( t l } , { I } , { J } , { K } , { I , J } , { I , K } , { J , K } , { J , K , L } , . . . , { A } , B } ,  with equivalent set 
names of C — {0, {0}, S, T , U, V, W , X, Y , . . . ,  B) .  This detailing of the collection C is partial as many 
of its members contain 0. Where necessary I also use expansions such as X =  { / i ,  Y =
{ J i , . . . ,  J m} to show the deduction labels that are members of a confirmation label. All of these labels 
are unique as they are set members. The empty set is a necessary member of B  for labelling tautologies 
and of C for showing the absence of evidence. It follows that 0 ^  A ,  i.e. assumption labels can never be 
the empty set.
Definition 2.2.3. Labelled formulae I f  a  G C is a formula and a e  A  is an assumption label, then 
a : a  is a labelled assumption. I f  0  e  C is a formula and I  e  B  is a deduction label, then 1 : 0  is a 
labelled deduction. I f  0  6  C is a formula and X G C is a confirmation label, then X : 0  is a labelled 
confirmation.
It follows that if 0  e  £  is a formula and b €  A  is an assumption label, then b : 0  is a labelled 
assumption. If I  e  B  is a deduction label, where I  =  {6}, then 1 :0  and {6}: 0  are labelled deductions. If 
X  e  C is a confirmation label, where X =  { /}  then X : 0 , { /} : 0  and {{&}}: 0  are labelled confirmations. 
Hence 1 : 0 =  {6 } : 0  and X : 0  = { /}  : 0  =  {{6 }} : 0. However b: 0  ^  1 : 0  ^  X : 0  as the first is a 
labelled assumption, the second is a labelled deduction and the third is a labelled confirmation.
Example 2.2.2. Labelled formulae, a : a , b : 0 , c : 0 , d : 0  A tt are labelled assumptions. Let I  =  {a}. 
So I : a , {6} : 0 , {a, b} : a  A 0, {a, c} : a  A 0  are labelled deductions. Let X =  { /} . Thus X : a , { / }  : 
M W }  : 0 , {{a, i)} ,{o ,c}}:a A (3  are labelled confirmations.
Clearly these labels have an algebra which could be explored in more detail. I will not be ma­
nipulating the labels directly, but rather have them follow, or track, the processes of classical logic and 
argument aggregation as described below. I also require some housekeeping functions to isolate the parts 
of labelled formulae. The label function returns just the label and not the formula.
Definition 2.2.4. Let a : a  be a labelled assumption, I : a  be a labelled deduction and X : a  be a labelled 
confirmation. The label function, denoted labelQ, returns just the label o f an assumption, deduction or
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confirmation, such that:
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label(a:a) =  a. Iabel(/:a) =  I .  label(X:a) =  X.
Strip does the opposite of label, giving just the formula and not the label. Clearly here a € A  is an 
assumption label, I  & B  is a deduction label and X € C is a confirmation label.
Definition 2.2.5. Let a : a  be a labelled assumption, I  : a  a labelled deduction and X : a  a labelled 
confirmation. The s trip  functions remove the labels from labelled assumptions, labelled deductions and  
labelled confirmations, such that:
stripAssumption(a:a) =  a. 
stripDeduction (I:  a ) = a.
7 / X ^ 0
then stripConfirmation(X:a) =  a , 
otherwise stripConfirmation(X:a) =  0.
I will be exploring confirmations labelled with the empty set in Definition 2.5.2 et seq. (where I call 
them unfounded confirmations). Given the strip functions for single formulae, I now extend them to sets 
of formulae.
Definition 2.2.6. Let $  be a set o f  labelled assumption formulae, a set o f  labelled deduction form ulae  
or a set o f  labelled confirmation formulae. The following strip functions remove the label or labels from  
sets o f  labelled formulae, such that:
stripAssumptions(^) =  (stripAssumption(a:a) | a : a  G $ } ,  
where $  is a set o f  labelled assumptions. 
stripDeductions(^) =  {stripDeduction(/:a) \ I : a  e  ^ } , 
where is a set o f  labelled deductions. 
stripConfirmations(T) =  {stripConfirmation(X:a) | X : a  € T }, 
where T  is a set o f  labelled confirmations.
If strip is applied to a set that already lacks labels, then the result is the same set, so e.g. 
stripDeductions(stripDeductions(<I>)) =  stripDeductions(^). If any member of T is labelled with the 
empty set then that stripped confirmation is the empty set and the rest of e.g. stripDeductions(T) is 
unaffected as, of course, for any set A  U 0 =  A. Now for a simple example of stripping off labels.
Example 2 .23 . Stripping off labels. Let {a : a ,b  : 0 }  be a set o f labelled assumption formula, {{a} : 
a , {6} : /3} be a set o f labelled deduction formulae and {{{a } }  : a , {{b}}  : (3} be a set o f  labelled 
confirmation formula. It thus follows that stripAssumptions({a : a , 6 : /?}) =  stripDeductions({{a} : 
a , {6}:/?}) =  stripConfirmations({{{a}}: a , {{& }}:/3}) =  {a,/3}.
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In the above example, set names could be substituted for the sets, that is for the deduction I  =  {a} 
and the confirmation X =  { /}  =  {{a}}. The resultant stripped formulae would be unchanged as the 
labels are removed regardless of whether they are sets or set names.
A popular starting point in the argumentation literature is to assume a knowledgebase of formulae 
that can be used as assumptions in arguments. I have the same starting point, with the addition of unique 
labels to the assumption formulae.
I will use the upper case Greek letters to denote possibly-infinite sets of labelled formulae
ft, 'I', <I>, T ,  I will assume the initial knowledgebase, denoted A, to be finite, where all the members
of A  are labelled assumption formulae. Thus I have fixed the definition of A  to be the starting-point 
knowledgebase of labelled assumptions, a convention that holds throughout this thesis. If the nature of 
the set o f labelled formulae is different then a different capital Greek letter from A will be used. In some 
examples in this thesis I also explore the effect of changing or adding to the contents of A.
Proposition 2.2.1. Let A b e  a knowledgebase o f  labelled assumption formulae.
I f  |stripAssumptions(A) | <  |A|
then there exists a : a , b : 0  e  A  s.t. a : a  ±  b:(3, stripAssumption(a:a) =  stripAssumption(6:/?).
Proof If  stripping the labels off A  reduces its cardinality then at least two members have 
merged. So if |stripAssumptions(A)| <  |A | it is because an A ,B  e  A  with A  ^  B  have be­
come stripAssumption(A),stripAssumption(B) e  stripAssumptions(A) with stripAssumption(A) =  
strip Assumption (.£?). A labelled formula a : a  has only two parts, label a and formula a , so if the 
label is removed only the formula remains. Therefore it must be the case that if a : a  /  b : (3, but 
stripAssumption(a: a ) =  stripAssumption(6: /3) then a  =  /3. Hence the cardinality reduction. □
So as 0 ^  A  and 0 is not a formula, if |strip Assumptions(A)| <  |A | then |A | >  2 .
P roposition 2.2.2. Let A b e  a knowledgebase o f  labelled assumption formulae.
0 <  |stripAssumptions(A)| <  |label(A)| =  |A | <  oo.
Proof. Labels in the knowledgebase are by Definition 2.2.2 unique so |label(A)| =  |A |. A  is by 
definition finite and can be empty, so 0 <  j A  | <  oo. Formulae in the knowledgebase have no 
uniqueness constraint so |stripAssumptions(A)| <  |A |. Hence the number of formulae in A, i.e. 
|stripAssumptions(A)| is less than or equal to the number of labels in A, i.e. |stripAssumptions(A)|, 
hence |stripAssumptions(A)| <  |label(A)|. □
The unique assumption labels thus allow otherwise indistinguishable formulae to be distinguished. 
The combination of unique label and non-unique formula allows multiple occurrences of the same for­
mula in the same set. This non-uniqueness, or repetition, of formulae is an interesting feature that is 
explored throughout the thesis. It is used, for example, to allow the observations of two witnesses a and 
b, who both saw the same event o , to be denoted as a : a  and b : a . The assumption labels on a set of 
labelled deductions may be non-unique, as a natural consequence of classical deduction, for example,
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the assumption a : a  A /3 yields deductions {a} : a  and {a} : (3. An area for further research is to use a 
part of each assumption label to track which agent or expert originated that assumption.
2.3 Propagating Labels During the Process of Deduction
This section on labelled deduction addresses the behaviour of labels during the process of classical 
deduction. I propagate the assumption labels through the process of deduction to give labelled deduction 
formulae. While I could have created an augmented form of b ,  such as b * ,  to propagate labels, the 
notation is lighter if I simply extend the standard definition of I- in the style of (Gabbay, 1996).
Definition 2.3.1. Label propagation. Let the standard definition o f  I- be extended so that b propagates 
labels, such that:
{stripAssumption(ai : a i ) , . . . ,  stripAssumption(an :a n)} h [3 
iff { a i : a i , . . . , a „ : a n} b  { a i , . . .  ,a„}:/3 , where n > 0 .
I now show this propagation of labels during the process of deduction using a set-based notation, 
an approach I will continue to use throughout the thesis. Here is the set of all deductions which contains 
every I  :a , J:(3, K : 7 , . . .  that can be deduced from A.
Definition 23.2. Let A  be a knowledgebase o f labelled assumption formulae. The set of labelled 
deductions, denoted deductions( A) that can be deduced from  A using classical logic is:
deductions(A) =  { I :  a  | A b  I :  a } .
The number of assumptions for a deduction is n, where n  =  0 for tautologies. Although later in 
this thesis unfounded confirmations are discussed, there are no unfounded deductions, nor unfounded 
arguments. Unfounded means that there is no evidence to know whether a  is true or false. Unfounded 
confirmations always exist for every formula in C. The last two deductions in the following example are 
tautologies; I call them tautological deductions.
Example 23.1. Deductions and tautologies. Let A =  {a:a , b:a  —* 0 }  and I  =  {a}, J  =  {a, b} then 
it follows that {a} : a ,  {6 } : a  —> /?, {6 } : ->a V  (3, {6 } : V (3 V 7 , {a, b} : (3,1: a ,  J  : (3,0 : a  V ->a: £
deductions(A).
The only deductions which are labelled with the empty set are where the deduced formula is a 
tautology. No assumptions are needed to deduce a tautology; some authors write a tautology specifically 
with no set of supporting assumptions, e.g. just b a V  -<a. All of the deduction labels, that is members 
of the set B, are useful, with the empty set label having the use of labelling tautologies. Note also that 
the strip function behaves as normal for the case of stripping a deduction where the label is the empty 
set, i.e. stripDeduction(0:c*) =  a.
In all cases the set of deductions is infinite, whether A b 1  or A b 1 , as I now show.
Proposition 2.3.1. Let A b e  a knowledgebase o f  labelled assumption formulae.
|deductions(A)| =  0 0 .
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Proof. Even if A  =  0 ,0  b T  so there are an infinite number of tautologies such as 0 : a  V ->a, 0 : 
a  V ->a V (3 V -1/0,0 : a  V -ia V 7 , . . .  £  deductions(0). Furthermore as additional formulae are added to 
A, beyond 0, they can only increase |deductions(A)|. So in all cases |deductions(A)| =  oo. □
If the knowledgebase is inconsistent then at least one deduction will have inconsistent premises.
Example 2.3.2. Let A =  {o : (f>, b : ?/>, c : -<V> A  {<f> —> a)}. Certainly there are many deductions from  
A with consistent premises, such as {a ,c} : a , {c} : However because there exists at least one
deduction with inconsistent premises, {6, c}:tp  A (-i </> V a), it follows that A t- 1 .
I now need a helper function to give the assumption formulae represented by a deduction label. 
Whilst defining this function I make it general enough to work with either deduction labels or confirma­
tion labels.
Definition 2 3 3 .  Let A  be a knowledgebase o f labelled assumption formulae, I  be a deduction label 
and X be a confirmation label. The formulae function, denoted formulae(7, A), obtains the labelled 
assumption formulae that are labelled by I, from  A, such that:
formulae(7, A ) =  {a :a  | a £ I  a n d a :a  £  A }.
Similarly the formulae function formulae(X, A) obtains the labelled assumption formulae that are 
labelled by the confirmation label X, from  A, such that:
formulae(X, A ) =  { a : a  | a g 7 ,7  £  X and a : a  £  A }.
Example 2 3 3 . Formulae function. Let {a : a , h: a  —» (3, c : £} C A, then {a, b} :(3 £  deductions(A). 
Let I  = {a,b}, then I  : (3 £  deductions(A). Therefore formulae(7, A) =  {a : a ,b  : a  —► (3} and 
stripAssumptions(formulae(7, A )) =  {a, a: —► (3}. While c : (  £  A it is not in the formulae needed fo r  I.
So now given the formulae helper function I can establish the property that if the knowledgebase is 
inconsistent then at least one deduction will have inconsistent premises.
Proposition 23 .2 . Let A b e  a knowledgebase o f  labelled assumption formulae.
I f  A  b _L then there exists an I : a  £ deductions(A) such that formulae(7, A ) b ±.
Proof. deductions(A) is the set of all possible deductions. Any $  C A can be the premises of a 
deduction. Thus at least one deduction will have inconsistent premises $  b  _L given A b _L. So given an 
inconsistent knowledgebase, there exists a deduction I  :a  £  deductions(A) with inconsistent premises, 
that is <J> =  formulae(7, A ) C A with formulae(7, A ) b i ,  □
If the knowledgebase is inconsistent then every formula possible in the language C can be inferred. 
This is ‘ex falso quodlibet’, from falsehood anything follows, i.e. {ip, b  <fi, also commonly known 
as the principle of explosion.
Proposition 2.3.3. Let A  be a knowledgebase o f labelled assumption formulae.
I f  A  b 1  then stripDeductions(deductions(A)) =  C.
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Proof. Consider A =  {a : c*, b : ~>a},I — {a, 6 }. So by disjunction introduction it follows that 
deductions(A) will contain at least the following members: {a} : a , {6 } : { 6 } : ->a V 7 .  Now
apply disjunctive syllogism on { a } : a , {&}: ->a V 7  to see that / : 7  € deductions(A). Here 7  could be 
any formula 7  £ C so given a A h _L it follows that stripDeductions(deductions(A)) =  C. □
The formalisation of assumptions without labels renders confirmation invisible, as 
{a} U  {a} =  {a}. I make these multiple occurrences of a  distinguishable through the use of labels: 
{ a : a }  U {6 : a }  =  { a : a ,  b : a} , which is my primary reason for using labels. In the related situation, 
{c*} U {->a} =  {a , ->a}, contradictory formula are visible without the use of labels. A set of labelled 
formulae can have a formula and its negation as members and thus be inconsistent. For more information 
on labelling of formulae see chapter five of (Gabbay, 1998) or in greater detail (Gabbay, 1996; Gabbay 
et al., 2 0 0 0 ).
A second reason for using labels is to support an explanation feature, so that the user can see how 
a certain conclusion was reached. The set of formulae used to deduce a formula, 0 , is known as the 
‘provenance’ of 0 . The user can examine the label to see the provenance. The proof rules used however 
cannot be directly seen by this approach, a constraint which is acceptable for most applications. Note that 
while a set of proof rules that imply a deduction can be determined, it is not always possible to determine 
the proof rules actually used. For example, one route might be via modus ponens and another via modus 
tollens. A third benefit o f labels is that they can track which agent contributed which formulae.
2.4 Arguments from the Knowledgebase
Arguments are a special case of deductions. All arguments are deductions, but not necessarily vice 
versa. Deduction labels are also used as argument labels. There are no unfounded arguments, but there 
are tautological arguments. The strip function works for arguments as it does for deductions. I now 
explain the motivation and formalisation for arguments.
Not all deductions are sensible or useful, from the perspective of practical debates. Two types of 
deductions that are not useful are i) where the premises are inconsistent and ii) where the premises are 
not the minimal subset of A  necessary for the deduction. As the knowledgebase may not be consistent, 
it is important to avoid the classical logic problem of ‘ex falso quodlibet’.
Example 2.4.1. Ex falso quodlibet Let A =  { a: a , b :  -iq}. The following deductions can be inferred: 
{ { a } : a , {a} : a V / 3, {a, 6 } : ->a A ( a  V 0 ), {a, 6 } : 0 }  £ deductions(A). So from an inconsistency purely 
in a, 0  is derivable. Thus out o f inconsistency anything can be inferred.
I therefore follow the approach of reasoning with minimal consistent subsets (which is a standard 
approach in much of the literature, e.g. (Doyle, 1979; Benferhat et al., 1993; Elvang-Gdransson & 
Hunter, 1995; Besnard & Hunter, 2001; Amgoud & Cayrol, 2002)) and augment it with label propa­
gation. Arguments based on this minimal consistent subset approach are quite commonly referred to as 
mincons.
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Definition 2.4.1. Let A  be a knowledgebase o f  labelled assumption formulae. The labelled consistent 
subsets o f  A , denoted consistent (A ) are:
consistent(A) =  {II | II C  A  and II ¥■ ± } .
I now define the set of all of the arguments, I:a,  J :0, K : 7 , . . that follow from A:
Definition 2.4.2. Let A b e  a knowledgebase o f labelled assumption formulae. The set o f  labelled argu­
ments that can be deduced from  minimal consistent subsets o f A , denoted arguments(A) is:
arguments( A ) =  { I : a  | II G consistent A ) and II b  I : a  and
(there does not exist J  such that J  C  I  and II b  J  :c*)} .
I call any I : a  G arguments(A) an argument for a  derivable from A and I call a  the claim of that 
argument, unless a  is a tautology. The label on an argument here is a deduction label that tracks a single 
minimal consistent set of assumptions for an argument. I call the set of assumption formulae identified 
by the argument label the support of the argument. Not all deductions are valid arguments; they may 
not have consistent or minimal supports.
Example 2.4.2. Inconsistent premises. Let A  =  { a :a  A ->(a —» 0 ), b :a  —> 0}. Thus { a :a  A - '( a  —> 
0 ) , b : a  —► 0}  b  {a,b}  : 0  is a valid deduction but not a valid argument as the set o f  assumptions is 
not consistent. Clearly {a : a  A - i ( a  —> 0) , b  : a  —> 0}  b  _L. Thus {a, b} : 0  G deductions(A), but 
{a, 6 }: 0  & arguments( A),
I now give an example of valid arguments, showing the situation of multiple experts.
Example 2.43. Argument, minimal premises. Let A  =  {a  : a ,  b : a  —► 0 ,c  : a  —> 0}. Then 
{a, 6 } : /?, {a, c } : 0  G arguments( A). However {a, b , c } : 0 #  arguments(A) as the set o f assumptions is 
not the minimal required to deduce 0.
This example may be interpreted as one expert contributing b : a  —* 0  and the second expert 
c : a  —► 0. Thus there are two valid arguments for 0. This situation of multiple experts is akin to 
that of knowledgebase fusion. If  each expert is equated to an original knowledgebase, then the set 
arguments(A) could represent the fusion. However for arguments( A) to always be consistent a further 
level of judging is needed, as is discussed at the end of this chapter and in subsequent chapters. In 
merging the knowledge of multiple experts it is possible that something is learned or deduced that is 
not known to any expert individually. In the above example, ‘a’ could be viewed as a third expert 
meaning that 0  was not known to any of them prior to pooling, but became known after the fusion. To 
consistently track which expert contributed which formulae would require a more sophisticated labelling 
scheme, such as a 1, a 2 , . . .  for one expert and 61, 62, . . .  for another.
2.4.1 Catenate Inferences
Some schemes for describing arguments, e.g. (Walton, 1989; Gordon & Karacapilidis, 1997; Verheij, 
2001), have the notion of intermediate conclusions, so that more than one argument is involved in some
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kind of sequence in order to reach a final conclusion. The paper (Fox et al., 1993b) seeks a ‘complete 
record of the argument structure’, which from their context appears to be a reference to the same notion 
of a sequence of arguments.
In 1930, Wigmore informally introduced this notion of connected sequenced arguments calling it 
‘catenate inference’ (Wigmore, 1937; Twining, 1985). The following definition of catenate inference 
shows it to be basically just the cut property of classical logic. To tie better to his informal logic I present 
it without reference to labels or arguments. As cut is well known, no formal definition or proof is needed:
Let T  be a set of unlabelled assumption formulae and let C T .
If ($  h  (3 and ({/?} U  \&) 1- a )  then ($  U  \&) I- a .
For this discussion, I call the antecedent, i.e. the left hand side ( $  I- 0  and ({ / ? }  U  ty )  h  a ) ,  the 
sequence of inferences and (3 the intermediate conclusion. Furthermore, I call the consequent, i.e. the 
right hand side ($  U  \D) h a ,  the catenate inference and a  the final conclusion. Although written here 
with just two inferences in the sequence, cut could be applied repeatedly to create sequences of arbitrary 
length. The example below illustrates catenate inference:
Example 2.4.4. Catenate inference. Let A =  { a : 7 , 6 : 7  —> (3,c:(3 —> a } .  Thus { a ,6}  : /3, { a ,6 , c }  : 
a  e  arguments( A). Here {a, b } : j3 is the intermediate conclusion, and {a, b , c } : a  the final conclusion. 
In my nomenclature, {a, b, c} : a  also captures the catenate inference. However, to be able to write the 
sequence o f  inferences as two separate steps would require a slightly different notation from  mine. The 
challenge is that fo r  members o/arguments(A) items to the left o f the colon must be assumption labels, 
not a mix o f  assumption and deduction labels.
Catenate inferences are also unnecessary for documenting practical arguments as my label notation 
provides ‘a complete record of the argument structure’ as sought by (Fox et al., 1993b). Thus developing 
a notation that mixes assumption and deduction labels to the left of the colon is thus, I argue, unnecessary.
There is a problem with catenate inference in that they allow inconsistent reasoning as I now show:
Example 2.4.5. Inconsistent catenate inference. Let A =  { a : -17  —► (3, b : ->7 , c : (-> 7  A a )  A ->/?}. So 
clearly {a, & }:/?€ arguments( A). Let ^  =  { a : ->7  —► (3,b: —>7 } C  A , =  { c : (-> 7  A a )  V  ->/3} C  A. 
Thus $ ! - / ? ,  i.e. the {a, 6 } : (3 €  arguments(A), and it follows that ({/?} U V&) I-  a  is a valid catenate
inference. The problem comes in that $  U I- _L. Consequently while {a, 6 , c} : a  e  deductions(A)
is a valid deduction, the point is that the final conclusion {a, b,c} : a  £  arguments( A) is not a valid 
argument. Thus (a , b , c } : a  is an inconsistent catenate inference.
It is also possible for the catenate inference not to be an argument because it is not minimal. My 
framework, in contrast, does not permit such inconsistent or non-minimal reasoning, making it perhaps a 
better match to the goals of professional argumentation. Consequently I choose not to adopt the approach 
of (Walton, 1989; Gordon & Karacapilidis, 1997; Verheij, 2001; Wigmore, 1937; Twining, 1985), but 
instead opt to employ the approach of putting all of the assumptions of a catenate inference into a single 
argument support.
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2.4.2 Argument Properties
I now discuss some of the properties of arguments. Essentially this whole thesis is about properties of 
arguments, thus here I touch on a few of the most basic. All arguments are deductions, but not necessarily 
vice versa.
Proposition 2.4.1. Let A b e  a knowledgebase o f  labelled assumption formulae.
arguments(A) C deductions(A).
Proof. deductions(A) is just classical deduction plus the propagation of labels, which just tracks the 
assumptions used. arguments(A) is deductions(A) plus two more conditions, consistency and mini­
mality. So all arguments are deductions. Let I : a  € deductions(A). If formulae(/, A ) h _L then 
I :a & arguments(A). Thus not all deductions are arguments. The =  in C  is necessary as there exist A, 
e.g. { a : a }  where no deductions violate the two constraints of arguments. □
How many arguments can be derived from any given A, where A is finite? The cardinality of the 
set arguments(A) is infinity, as shown in the following proposition.
Proposition 2.4.2. Let A b e  a knowledgebase o f  labelled assumption formulae.
|arguments(A)| =  oo.
Proof. The set o f arguments is infinite because even if A =  0, then there are an infinite number of 
tautologies A h T that follow, such as A I- 0 : a  V ->a, A I- 0 : a  V ->a V £ V - i£ ,. . .  and so on ad 
infinitum. Here the support { o : a}  in all cases is consistent and minimal. Adding formulae to A would 
simply make |arguments(A)| even larger. □
As the set of arguments is always infinite, while A  is by definition finite, it follows that A can never 
be closed under argument. I give an example of this infinity.
Example 2.4.6. Infinity of arguments. Let A  =  {a : a ,  b : (3}. Conjunction introduction adds an 
infinite number o f  formulae, such as {{a} : a ,  {a, b} : a  A /3, {a} : a  A a , {a, 6} : a  A  (3 A  a ,  {a} : 
a  A a  A a , . . . € arguments(A). Disjunction introduction also adds an infinite number o f claims, 
including { a } :a ,  { a ,6} :a V /3, { a } :a V a ,  { a ,6} :a V /5v 7 , {a}:aV <5v £ , {a} :aV<5v£vAV^zVi/>V<;,. . .  € 
arguments(A).
The members introduced by the disjunction introduction rule are constrained by the set o f assump­
tions. However the members introduced by VI are constrained only by the language C and not by A. 
Some readers might think that claims introduced by these rules are a kind of noise or nuisance, however, 
as will be shown in Chapter 3 on undercuts, a number of them are particularly useful.
While the overall set o f arguments is infinite, for a specific claim it is finite. To prove this cardinality 
matter first requires two helper functions and a new definition to isolate just the arguments for one 
formula. Truncate delivers the nearest integer i below any positive real number r . The output is always 
i > 0 .
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Definition 2.43 . The truncate function, denoted trunc(r), is such that: i =  trunc(r), where i e  N, r  e  
* <  r, (i +  1) >  r  am/ r >  0.
A standard result in discrete mathematics is the number of combinations of n objects taken k at a 
time, with order being irrelevant. The factorial function, n!, has the standard definition n! =  n  • (n  — 1) • 
 1 , where • is multiplication.
Definition 2.4.4. Let t, n  € N. The combinations function, denoted combinations(n, i), gives the num­
ber of arrangements of a set of n objects, taken i at a time in a given order.
n\
combinations(n, i) =   ^r.
i!  • ( f i  — t )!
All the subsets o f a set, e.g. <J>, that is the power set of $ ,  denoted p ($ ) ,  when ordered via subset 
inclusion can be drawn as a lattice with the complete set, $ , at the top of the lattice and 0  at the bottom. 
In between the top and the bottom is the body of the lattice holding all the other subsets o f $ .  See the 
example of Section 2.8 to see a visually laid out lattice (akin to a Hasse diagram of order theory). The 
widest part of the lattice for an even $  contains subsets with a cardinality of |$ | +  2 ; for an odd $  
there are two widest rows and the truncate function, trunc(), is needed. While I do not employ such an 
ordering in my definitions, the notion of lattices is informally helpful for visualising the characteristics 
of a power set.
Definition 2.43. The mid lattice function, denoted midLattice($), is the cardinality of the largest subset 
of subsets of $  in which none of the members are strict subsets of other members.
midLattice($) =  combinations(|$ |, trunc(|$ | -4- 2)).
If  the power set o f $  was ordered by subset inclusion then this function delivers the number of 
members in the largest horizontal line across the centre of a lattice of the power set o f $ .  If  |A | =  5 
then midLattice(A) =  10. Or if | A | =  6  then midLattice(A) =  20. Given these helper functions, I can 
now return to the questions o f cardinality. Only for a rare A  does stripDeductions(arguments(A)) =  a , 
however for any A  to see just the arguments for a , leaving out those for j3,7 , 7r , . . .  I need the following 
definition.
Definition 2.4.6. Let A be  a knowledgebase of labelled assumption formulae and let a  G C. The set of 
arguments for a, denoted arguments(a, A ), is such that:
arguments(a, A ) =  {A e  arguments(A) | stripDeduction(A) =  a } .
The cardinality of the set of arguments for just one claim is:
Proposition 2.4.3. Let A be  a knowledgebase of labelled assumption formulae and let a  €  C.
0 <  |arguments(a, A )| <  midLattice(A).
Proof It could be that there are no arguments for a  in a given A , if a  & stripDeductions(arguments(A)), 
so for that A, arguments(a, A ) =  0 and thus 0 <  |arguments(o:, A )|. Or it could be that every $ C  A
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is such that there exists an argument I : a  in arguments(a, A ), where formulae(/, A) =  $ . Let one of 
these subsets be denoted C A  where there exists an argument J  : a  in arguments(a, A ), such that 
formulae( J , A ) =  Not all o f these subsets, $  C  A, VP C  A, would yield valid arguments as some 
of them would be subsets of others, i.e. if 4> C  \P, and thus not be minimal. The maximum number of 
subsets of A that are not subsets of each other are thus given by the midl_attice() function. Consequently 
|arguments(a, A )| <  midLattice(A). □
In stripping labelled-arguments labelled by the empty set the behaviour is that the label goes and 
the claim (a tautology) remains, as shown in the following example.
Example 2.4.7. Tautological argument Let 0: a  G arguments( A) be a tautological argument. Then 
stripDeduction(0 :a )  — a  and a  h  T . Furthermore i f  A =  0 then fo r  every I  : a  G arguments(A) it is 
the case that a  I- T .
Proposition 2.4.4. Let A b e  a knowledgebase o f  labelled assumption formulae.
stripAssumptions(A) C  stripDeductions(arguments(A)).
Proof. For all a : a  G A  it follows that {a}:a G arguments(A) and {a}:c* V [3 G arguments(A). 
For all a  G stripAssumptions(A), there exists a label b such that {6} : a  g arguments(A) 
and {6} : a  V (3 G arguments(A). Therefore for all a  G stripAssumptions(A) it follows that 
a  G stripDeductions(arguments(A)) and a  V (3 G stripDeductions(arguments(A)). But, for all 
a  G stripAssumptions( A ), it is not necessarily the case that a V /3 G stripAssumptions(A). Even if A  =  0 
it follows that arguments(A) will contain innumerable tautologies so therefore stripAssumptions(A) C  
stripDeductions(arguments(A)). D
The majority of authors using mincons write an argument as (<f>, a ) , (or a similar notation using 
square brackets instead of angle brackets) where $  is a minimal consistent set of formulae implying a ,  
i.e. $  is the support and a  the claim. All (4>, a)  can be written as I : a , however the converse does not 
necessarily hold as my notation allows multiple occurrences of a formulae in A. Thus:
If then I  :a , where $  =  formulae(7, A ).
Another simple feature is that some arguments are reflexive arguments, as defined below (which is 
different from reflected arguments in Chapter 4). My use of the word reflexive here is conceptually, but 
not formally, the same as the many uses of the term in grammar, mathematics and computer science. In 
the following definition / \  provides the conjunction of a members of a set of formulae. Intuitively an 
argument is a reflexive argument iff the conjunction of its support equals its claim, or more formally:
Definition 2.4.7. Let A be a knowledgebase o f  labelled assumption formulae and let I  : a  G 
arguments(A). I call I  .a  a reflexive argument iff
stripDeduction(7: a )  =  stripAssumptions(formulae(label(7: a ) ,  A )).
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With classical logic as the set of inference rules, reflexive arguments always exist, so if o : a  G A  
then {a} : a  G arguments(A). If the support is only one formula then the conjunction is immaterial, 
however, if |formulae(label(/:a), A )| >  1 the / \  is necessary.
2.5 Introducing Confirmation
Now that I have established the set of arguments, I need to aggregate together the ones that are for 
the same claim -  which I then call a confirmation. This section formally defines the confirmation as 
the first novel (albeit simple) idea of the thesis. I put that this formalisation of confirmation is novel 
relative to the formal argumentation literature; the concept has been present in parts of the informal 
argumentation literature and in debate in general since at least the 1930s (Wigmore, 1937; Twining, 
1985). The argumentation diagramming software tool, Araucaria, for example, building on the work of 
Wigmore, uses a closed triangular symbol to represent a confirming argument (Reed & Rowe, 2006). 
The formalisation of confirmation becomes my launching off point for discovering a number of thought- 
provoking properties of argumentation and debates. I start by defining a single confirmation and then go 
on to define various sets of confirmations.
Definition 2.5.1. A single confirmation is o f  the form  X : a, where a  €  £  is a formula and  X G C is a 
confirmation label and each I  E X i s  such that I : a  G arguments( A).
A confirmation label, X =  { / i , . . . ,  7n }, thus tracks a set of arguments for a single given claim. By 
definition, a confirmation label does not necessarily track all arguments for a claim, just some of them, 
as I go on to explore. The number of arguments in a confirmation can be as few as zero.
Proposition 2.5.1. For all a ,  {0} :a  is a confirmation, iff  a  \~ T .
Proof {0}: a  means that the support for the argument for a  is the empty set, i.e. that it needs no support 
and therefore a  is always true, i.e. a  I- T  is a tautology. Thus if {0} : a  is a confirmation then a  h  T .  
Now starting with a  is a tautology posit two arguments I : a  and J  : a  where I  ^  J .  Clearly 7 =  0 
as 0 H T .  If J  ^  0 than J  would not be minimal and hence J  : a  not an argument. Therefore such a 
J  : a  cannot exist and it must be the case that {0} : a  is a confirmation. So if a  \~ T  then {0} : a  is a 
confirmation. Consequently for all q ,  {0}: q  is a confirmation, iff a  I- T .  □
Definition 2.5.2. A confirmation o f the form  { /}  : a  is called a self confirmation. A confirmation o f  
the form  0 : a  is called an unfounded confirmation. A confirmation o f  the form  {0} : a  is called a 
tautological confirmation.
In addition to these three special cases for labelled confirmations, coming shortly in Section 2.5.1, 
is a fourth, the inconsistent confirmation. A self confirmation means that there is only one argument 
for a . In normal English it would not be called ‘confirmation’, however I call it that as it is clearly a 
logical member of the family of confirmations. Unfounded means that there is no evidence to know 
whether a  is true or false, or in other words there are no arguments for a . I will come on to show the 
role played by unfounded confirmations within various contradictions. Tautological confirmations such
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as the confirmation {0} : a  V ->a always exist. A tautological confirmation is a self confirmation of a 
tautological argument; it needs no assumptions to prove its claim.
I now define the confirmations function. While Definition 2.5.1 gives the form of a single confir­
mation, Definition 2.5.3 introduces the notion of a set of confirmations. I employ Q here as any set of 
labelled arguments, distinguishing it from A which is the full knowledgebase of labelled assumptions.
Definition 2.5.3. Let A  be a knowledgebase o f labelled assumption formulae, let I \  : a , . . . ,  I n : a ,  / ,  : 
a  G arguments( A), let Q C argum ents(A) and let j , n  G N. The set o f confirm ations derivable from  a 
set o f arguments Q, denoted  confirmations(f)), is such that:
confirm ations^) =  { { /i , a  | fo r  all I3 G { / i , . . . ,  7n } it is the case that I } . a  G Q}.
The above definition of a set of confirmations is purposefully flexible to allow for a wide variety 
of confirmations. Each confirmation for a  does not have to contain all the arguments for a  and thus the 
above function builds up the full power set of confirmations for a .
Proposition 2.5.2. Let A  be a knowledgebase o f  labelled assumption formulae, let I \ : a , . . . ,  I n : a ,  J  i : 
a , . . . ,  J m :a  G argum ents(A), let f I C argum ents(A) and let n, m  G N.
{ I i , . . . ,  7n , J i , . . . ,  J m } :a  G confirm ations^) 
iff { h ,  • • •, In}  '■& G confirm ations^) and 
{ J i , . . . ,  J m} :q  g confirm ations^).
Proof. If n  = m  = 0  then the starting point is two unfounded confirmations, creating a further un­
founded confirmation. For n =  m  =  1 two self confirmations make a confirmation with two ar­
guments. By induction, considering n  =  n + l ,m  =  m  -I- 1, it can be seen that successive elab­
orations of { I \ , . . . ,  I n , J \ , . . . ,  Jrn] can be built up. So if { 7 i ,. . . ,  7n } : a  G confirmations(Q) 
and {J i , . . . ,  Jm]  : a  G confirmations(Q) then {7 i , . . . ,  7n , J i , . . . ,  J m } : a  G confirmations(Q). 
Now for the other direction. If { 7 i , . . . ,  7n , J \ , . . . ,  J m } : a  G confirmations(fi) then from Defini­
tion 2 .5 .3  any subset of {7 i 7n , J \ , . . . ,  J m } is also the support of a confirmation for a . So in
conclusion { 7 i , . . . , 7 n } : a  G confirmations(Q) and : a  G confirmations(S7) iff
{ 7 ! ,___7n , J i , . . . ,  J m ) :a  G confirmations(Q). □
To describe the confirmations that follow from a set of labelled assumption formulae A, the two 
functions just defined are nested. Two shorthand notations, using 0  to mean confirmation, are now 
introduced to lighten the notation.
Definition 2.5.4. Let A  be a knowledgebase o f labelled assumption formulae and let a  G C. The set of 
confirm ations derivable from A , denoted 0 (A ), is:
0 (A ) = confirmations(arguments(A)).
And now the second of the shorthands, this time for a specific formulae (not just claim) as opposed 
to for all formulae in C.
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Definition 2.5.5. Let A  be a knowledgebase o f labelled assumption formulae. The set of confirmations 
for a  derivable from A , denoted Q(a,  A), is:
Q(a, A) =  confirmations(arguments(a. A )).
Naturally it follows that 0(ct, A) =  {X : a  G 0 (A )}  | stripConfirmation(X : a )  =  a} . Note that 
0 (rt, A ) will be likely to contain many confirmations (all of which are useful) and is thus not necessarily 
a singleton set.
Exam ple 2.5.1. O rd in a ry  confirm ation. Let A  =  {a : /3,b : p  —» a , c  : 7 ,d  : V a}. Then
{ { a ,6 } : a , { c , d }  : a }  C argum ents(A). Consequently { { a ,b}} : a ,{ { c ,d } }  : a ,  {{a, 6 }, ( r , d }} : 
a  G 0 (r t,A ) . Let X =  {{a, 6 }, {<?, d}}.  So X : a  G 0(c*,A ), but X  : a  f  0 ( a ,A ) .  It follows that 
formulae(X, A) =  { a : p , b : f 3  —► a,  c : 7 , d : ^ 7  V a } , stripAssumptions(formulae(X, A )) =  {p, j3 —> 
a , 7, ^ 7  V a},stripC onfirm ation(X :a) = a  and \abe\(X : a) — X.
To be more precise, I also refer to 0(ct, A ) a power set of confirmations for a . Proposition 2.5.2 
shows how a power set of confirmations is built up. I use the informal shorthand of referring to the 
minimum cardinality member of the power set as the bottom of the power set and the maximum cardi­
nality member as the top of the power set. Thus the power set’s minimum cardinality is the unfounded 
confirmation, 0:ct G 0 ( a ,  A ). The top of the power set is the maximum cardinality confirmation, which 
I will formally define shortly in Definition 2.5.8. To see an example of a power set of confirmations refer 
to the ‘Worked Example of the Basic Argumentation Framework’ in Section 2.8.4. As the empty set, 0, 
plays such an influential role in these power sets, I now focus on it.
First, some more small helper functions, the set of confirm functions to describe the mapping be­
tween a set of arguments all with the same claim and their equivalent confirmation are needed. I refer to 
this as a set of functions as normally a function has a fixed arity. Thus to provide the arbitrary arity in 
the definition below it is necessary to have a set of functions.
Definition 2.5.6. Let A  be a knowledgebase o f  labelled assumption formulae, let n  G N, let I \  : 
a , . . . ,  I n : a  G argum ents(A) and let X : a  G 0 (A ). Each function in the set o f  confirm functions, 
denoted confirm(/i : a , . . . ,  In : a ) , turns a set o f  arguments all with the same claim into the equivalent 
confirmation, such that:
X :a  = confirm(/i : a , . . . ,  I n :a ), where X =  { f . . . . .  I n }.
The confirm functions turn a set of arguments, all with the same claim, into a confirmation by 
making its many deduction labels into a confirmation label. This transformation is done by placing the 
deduction labels in a set. The difference between confirm() and confirmations() is that confirm gives 
just one confirmation, with a confirmation label comprising all deductions labels the function is input, 
whereas confirmations gives all members of the power set that can be built from the deduction labels it 
is input. A special case confirm function is when the input is a single argument. In that case the resultant 
confirmation is a self confirmation.
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In stripping labelled confirmations there are two contrasting situations relating to the empty set. For 
0 : a  E 0 (A ), an unfounded confirmation for a ,  it follows that a  ^  stripDeductions(arguments(A)). 
Thus for the unfounded confirmation 0 : a  E 0 (A ), it is the case that stripConfirmation(0 : a )  =  0 so 
stripConfirmation(0:a) f  a . In contrast, for {0} :a  E 0 (A ), the tautological confirmation (that is a self 
confirmation of a tautological argument), then stripConfirmation({0} :q ) =  a  ^  0.
If the claim of a confirmation is a tautology then the cardinality of the confirmation label, X will 
always be one. Or if 0 E X the claim will be a tautology.
Proposition 2.5.3. Let A  be a knowledgebase o f labelled assumption formulae.
I f X . a  E 0 (A ) and 0 E X, then |X j = 1 and {a }  b T.
Proof If 0 E X then the tautological argument 0 : o  E arguments(A) exists. Thus a  b T so no 
premises are required to deduce a . Conjecture another argument /  E X with 7 ^ 0  then I  would not be 
the minimal set that b a , so such an I : a  would not be a valid argument. Therefore the conclusion is 
that I : q  must also be a tautological argument with I  =  0. A set cannot contain the same member twice, 
so as 0 E X then |X| =  1. Thus if X : a  E 0 (A ) and 0 E X, it can only be the case that |X| =  1 and 
{a} b T. □
For a given knowledgebase the set of stripped arguments is the same as the set of stripped confir­
mations.
Proposition 2.5.4. Let A  be a knowledgebase o f  labelled assumption formulae.
stripDeductions(arguments(A)) =  stripConfirmations(0(A)).
Proof. The general case is that arguments(A) =  {7i : 0 i , . . . ,  7n :0 n }, n  E N, so
stripDeductions(arguments(A)) =  {0 i , -----0 n }. If arguments(A) =  {7i : 0 i  In : 0 n } then
0 (A ) =  { { / i , 0 1 , . . . ,  {/fc,. . .  , 7n } : 4>n}- Thus stripConfirmations(0(A)) =  ( 0 i , ----- <pn }.
For unfounded confirmations 0 : <p} E 0 (A ), Definition 2.2.5 is clear stripConfirmation(0 : 0 j)  =  0. So 
although there are many unfounded confirmations in (0 (A )) they are not in stripConfirmations(0(A)). 
Consequently stripDeductions(arguments(A)) =  stripConfirmations(0(A)). □
The confirmationsQ function only groups labels, it does not manipulate the formulae that are la­
belled. Therefore when the labels are removed by stripConfirmations() the effects of confirmationsQ are 
removed and what is left is just stripDeductions(arguments(A)).
A feature of this definition of confirmation is that confirmation is not relative to any specific ‘pro­
poser’. No one piece of evidence, that is no one argument, has to be taken as the first, and then be 
confirmed by the others. In my definition all pieces of evidence are equal and no explicit ordering is 
implied.
Whilst confirmation, with a form like the above, is not explicitly considered in the literature, much 
has been published on the related topic of ‘extensions to a theory’ whereby if a particular set of arguments 
meets certain criteria then the whole is deemed acceptable. Acceptability tends to revolve around notions
2.5. Introducing Confirmation 39
of conflict and freedom from conflict, with much consideration of sceptical versus credulous views, see 
for example (Caminada & Amgoud, 2005). This semantics-based approach, typically with abstract forms 
of argument, is outside the scope of this thesis, however there appear to be parallels and the intersection 
may be a fruitful area for future research.
As an illustration from medicine, in second surgical opinion, while there is a first and second re­
viewer, the surgical result would be the same if the sequence of reviewers was reversed. Consequently 
my scheme would support such medical reasoning.
A small area for future research would be to find a more succinct way of defining confirmations and 
related aggregations. The above sequence of definitions is good for this thesis as it has a didactic nature 
to it, but it is not as concise as it could be.
2.5.1 Inconsistent Confirmations
I now make the observation that confirmations can be inconsistent.
Definition 2.5.7. Let A  be a knowledgebase o f labelled assumptionformulae and let V : a , X:  a  € 0 (A ).
I f  X :a  G 0 (A ) and there exists a V C X such that formulae(V, A) b _L 
then X : q is an inconsistent confirmation.
The common definition of a mincon argument, see Definition 2.4.2, prevents an individual support 
from being inconsistent. The use of labelled mincons also prevents inconsistent catenate inferences. 
There are parallels between this notion and that of ‘Hang Yourself Arguments’ in (Caminada, 2004). 
There are also several differences stemming from Caminada’s use of default logic contrasting with my 
use of classical propositional logic.
Example 2.5.2. Inconsistent confirmation. Let A =  {a : 0 ,b  : 0  —> a,c : 7  A -<0,d : 7  —> a}
and I  =  {a. 6 }, J  =  {c, d } ,X  =  { I , J } .  So I  : a ,  J  : a  e  arguments(A) and X : a  € 0 (A ). As
formulae(X, A) h _L then X :a  is an inconsistent confirmation.
In informal argumentation it is quite common to hear the accusation ‘You just contradicted your­
self’. A debating team (i.e. the parties forming the prosecution or proponents or the parties forming 
the defence or opponents) is usually obligated to have not just its individual arguments be consistent, 
but also any set of arguments for a claim to be consistent. I suggest that the allowance of inconsistent 
confirmations in many argumentation frameworks is something of a problem, as it may hinder formal 
argumentation from emulating debating in professional life. However if the inconsistency is small (such 
as one witness said four shots were fired, while another witness said five) then professional debaters 
would probably tolerate it.
Proposition 2.5.5. Let A  be a knowledgebase o f labelled assumption formulae and let X :a  e 0 (A ).
I f  X :a  is an inconsistent confirmation, then fo r  all 0  G C, formulae(X, A) A 0.
Proof Even though no individual argument support /  6  X is inconsistent, i.e. formulae(7, A) K _L, 
the collective beliefs represented by formulae(X, A ) h  _L. So even though a constraint in the defini­
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tion of I ,  Definition 2.4.2, prevents the immediate ex falso quodlibet, that constraint fails to prevent 
formulae(X, A) from being inconsistent so for all (3 G C it is the case that formulae(X, A ) I- p. □
The logic of this chapter allows inconsistent confirmations; a restraint is provided in Section 3.7.
2.5.2 Cardinality of Confirmations
I now investigate how many confirmations can be derived from a given knowledgebase A, given that the 
knowledgebase is finite, while the set of arguments is infinite.
Proposition 2.5.6. Let A  be a knowledgebase o f labelled assumption formulae and l e t X : a  G 0 (A ).
0 < |label(X :a)| <  midLattice(A).
Proof. A confirmation X : a  G 0 (a , A) tracks some or all of the arguments for a  in arguments(A). 
Each member of label(X : a) is the deduction label of an argument for a. So, for the maximum end, 
|label(X :« ) l <  I arguments(a, A )|. Proposition 2.4.3 states that ]arguments(a, A )| < midLattice(A). 
Therefore | label (X : «)! <  midLattice(A). At the minimum end, there may be no arguments for a  
derivable from A. □
I now move to the question of the number of confirmations for a given claim a , something which is 
different from the number of arguments in a confirmation for a . Clearly |0 (a , A) | 7  ^ |arguments(a, A )|. 
Showing just one exception will prove the inequality. Suppose /  : a , J  : a  G arguments(A) then 
|{/ : q G arguments(A)}| =  2, however 0 : a , { /}  : a , { J }  : a , { / ,  J }  : a  G 0 (a , A) so |0 (a , A )| =  4 
hence |0 (a :,A )| /  |arguments(a, A )|. In fact |0 (ct,A )| > |arguments(a, A )|. To be specific, the 
cardinality of 0(c*, A ) is as follows:
Proposition 2.5.7. Let A  be a knowledgebase o f labelled assumption formulae and let a  G C.
1 <  |0 ( q ,A ) | < 2 midLattice(A).
Proof. Even if A  V- a  it is the case that the unfounded confirmation 0 :a  G 0 (o , A ), therefore the mini­
mum cardinality is 1, i.e. 1 <  |0 (o , A )|. Now for the maximum cardinality, Proposition 2.4.3 states that 
the maximum number of arguments for a single claim is given by midl_attice( A ). Proposition 2.5.6 states 
that the largest cardinality confirmation for a, let it be X : a  G 0(A ), will contain |X| < midLattice( A) 
arguments. All other valid confirmations for a  will have labels, Y, Z ,. . .  which are strict subsets of X, 
i.e. Y C X, Z C X. With confirmations there is no constraint that one subset, e.g. Y, cannot be the 
subset of another subset, e.g. Z. So Y C Z or Z C Y are both allowed. Thus the number of subsets of 
this confirmation label X is up to 2 m'c,*-attice(A). □
Thus for any A it is the case that 0: a  G 0(f*. A ) even if there exist arguments for a . In the above 
power set it is not necessary to exclude any element either at the top or bottom. While the number of 
confirmations for one formula is finite, the number for all formulae is infinite.
Proposition 2.5.8. Let A  be a knowledgebase o f  labelled assumption formulae.
10(A) | =  oc.
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Proof. 0 (A ) contains confirmations for every formula derivable from A. As |arguments(A)| =  oo then 
so also [0(A )| =  oo. □
2.5.3 Maximum Cardinality of Confirmations
Recall that all of the confirmations for a particular claim, a ,  derivable from a given knowledgebase A, 
denoted 0(c*, A ), if ordered by set inclusion could be arranged as a lattice of confirmations. Likewise 
all of the confirmations derivable from a set of arguments for a single claim can also be ordered and 
arranged in a lattice. For either lattice, at the top of the lattice is the maximum cardinality confirmation 
and at the bottom of the lattice is the unfounded confirmation. To extract this maximum cardinality 
confirmation requires a helper function:
Definition 2.5.8. Let A  be a knowledgebase o f labelled assumption formulae. Let T' be the set o f  
all the confirmations fo r  a  derivable from  a set o f arguments fo r  a  such that ^  =  confirmations^) 
where $  C arguments(a, A). The top o f confirmation lattice function, denoted top('I'), returns the 
confirmation fo r  a  with the largest label cardinality out o f all the confirmations in ^  such that:
top(^) =  {X :a  G 0 (A ) | X :a  G ^  and
there does not exist a confirmation Y : a  € 'L, 
where label(X:a) C label(Y :a )} .
As $  C arguments(a, A ) it follows that ^  =  confirmations^) C §( a .  A). The top of the power 
set is the one with the largest cardinality. The cardinality of the top() function is always one, as it always 
returns a single unique confirmation.
Proposition 2.5.9. Let A  be a knowledgebase o f labelled assumption formulae and let a  £ C.
|top(0(ck, A ))| =  1 .
Proof. Suppose arguments(A) K a  so there are no arguments for a  in arguments(A); in that case 
there is still a confirmation for a,  i.e. the unfounded confirmation, of the form 0 : a  e  0 (A ). The 
unfounded confirmation is a single confirmation, even though its label cardinality is zero. For a self 
confirmation, with the form {/}  :a  there is still a single confirmation albeit with a label cardinality of 1. 
If |0 (a ,  A ) | >  1 then its members will always form a non-trivial power set. A power set of the subsets 
of X always has a single top member which is X. So in all cases |top(0(c*, A ) | =  1 . □
Clearly the cardinality of a labelled confirmation is equal to the number of deduction labels in 
the confirmation label. The following simple relationships also hold; that |label(top(0(ct, A ))| =  
jarguments(o, A )| and also that top(0(o . A )) f  0.
Additionally, this top() function allows clarification of the earlier point relating to the distinction 
between confirmations and confirm, where n  e  N:
top(confirmations(/i  I n -(p)) =  confirm(/i :0, ..., I n :<p) =  X :0 .
I now touch on the cardinality of unfounded and tautological confirmations.
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Example 2.5.3. Special cardinalities. For any A , i f  A  Y- a, then the unfounded confirmation 0 : a  G 
0(A ) is the only member o f  0 (o , A ) and in that case | label (top(0(o, A )))| = 0. Again fo r  any A, z/0 b 
q, then a  (- T is a tautology, the tautological confirmation {0} :a  6  0(ct, A) and |label(top(0(o, A )))| 
=  1.
This ends the analysis of the cardinality of confirmations, allowing the discussion to move on to the 
topic of contradictions.
2.6 Introducing Contradiction
A contradiction is a further argument aggregation whereby a confirmation for a  and a confirmation for 
are combined into a new structure. Each contradiction thus captures an area of inconsistency. Later 
in the thesis, in Chapter 6 , 1 show that contradictions are useful for tracking professional debates.
Definition 2.6.1. A single contradiction is o f the form  o f a tuple o f two confirmation labels labelling a 
formula a, denoted (X, Y ) : a, where a  e  £ , X : a  is a confirmation fo r  a  and Y : ->oc is a confirmation 
fo r  -iq.
As with confirmation being denoted by 0 , 1 use a similar lightweight notation of ♦  to denote con­
tradiction.
Definition 2.6.2. Let A  be a knowledgebase o f  labelled assumption formulae. Let 4 (A ) be the set of 
all contradictions derivable from  A, such that:
♦ (A ) =  {(X, Y ) :q  | X :q  G 0 (A ), Y : - a  G 0 (A )} .
The above 4 (A ) contains contradictions for all formulae in C. The next definition is for one specific 
a  G C.
Definition 2.6.3. Let A  be a knowledgebase o f  labelled assumption formulae and let a , ->a G C. The 
set of contradictions for a  derivable from  A , denoted 4 (a , A) is:
♦ (a , A ) =  0 (a , A ) x 0 ( - a ,A ) .
Thus the set of contradictions for a  is the cross product of the set of confirmations for a  with the 
set of confirmations for ~^a. At times to be more specific I also refer to ♦  (« , A) as a power set of 
contradictions. Clearly ♦(<Y A) C ♦ (A ) and that ♦  (<}, A) can contain many confirmations and is thus 
not just a singleton set.
This definition has a flavour of Dung’s definition of an argument framework (see Definition 3.9.1 
which is from (Dung, 1993; Dung, 1995)). Both use the cross product of sets of arguments. One differ­
ence is that my definition of contradiction only considers an argument for a  contradicting an argument 
for ^a. Depending on what assumptions are used, the literature covers other ways that one argument 
can attack another, notably undercut, which are outside the scope of my current definition. Chapter 3 
goes on to address undercut. A second difference with Dung’s framework is that his is abstract, whereas 
mine is limited to only one kind of argument - those whose support is a minimally consistent subset of 
premises and whose method of inference is classical logic.
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Example 2.6.1. Ordinary contradiction. Let A  = {a : /3,6 : ft —> a , c : 7, d : ->7 V /3, e : ->a}. 77i^ aj 
{a, 6} : a , {c, d } : a , {e} : G arguments(A). Consequently {{a , 6}} : a , {{c, d } }  : a , {{a , b } ,  {c, d } }  :
f t ,{ { e } } :^ a  e  0 (A ). Thus ({{a , 6}, {c,d}}, {{e}}) :a  G 4(A ).
An empty contradiction is a contradiction where there is no evidence for either or both a and ->a.
Definition 2.6.4. I f  (X ,Y ):a  e ♦ (A ) is a contradiction and (X =  0 or Y =  0), then 
(X, Y ) : a  is called an empty contradiction.
As the definition contains an ‘or’, empty contradictions come in three forms: (X, 0) : a , (0, Y) : a  
and (0,0) : a. The second and third use the unfounded confirmation 0 : a  G 0 (A ) explicitly stating 
that there is no evidence for a, while the first and third use the unfounded confirmation 0: ->a G 0 (A ) 
explicitly stating that there is no evidence for ->a.
Contradiction thus provides a distinction between ignorance and negation. This distinction between 
ignorance and negation also has a flavour of the Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence, where absence of 
evidence is explicitly recognised.
Although (X, Y ) : a  is a contradiction in a, it is just as equally a contradiction in ->a. One implies 
the other.
Proposition 2.6.1. Let A be a knowledgebase o f  labelled assumption formulae. For all a , X, Y it is the 
case that:
(X, Y ) :a  G 4 (A ) i J f ( Y , X ) : ^ a  G 4 (A ).
Proof (X, Y) : a  G 4 (A ) iff X : a  G 0 (A ) and Y : G 0(A ) iff X : ->->a G 0 (A ) and Y : ->a G
0 (A ) iff X : - ( - a )  G 0 (A ) and Y : ( - a )  G 0 (A ) iff (Y, X ) : - a  G 4(A ). □
I now extend the label-removing strip functions to contradictions.
Definition 2.6.5. Let { (X i, Y i ) ( X n, Y n) : a n } be a set o f contradictions. The contradiction 
strip functions remove the label or labels from  a contradiction or set o f  contradictions, such that:
stripContradiction((X. Y) :a) =  stripConfirmation(X:a) U stripConfirmation(Y: ^ a).
stripContradictions({(X!, Y ^  : a i  (Xn , Y n ) :a n })
=  {stripContradiction((Xj, Y j):a j) | ( X ^ Y ,) :^  G {(X i. Y ^  : m , . . . ,  (Xn, Y„) :a „ }} .
The following example shows how stripping contradictions works when the empty set is involved.
Example 2.6.2. Stripped contradictions. The stripping o f contradictions involving the empty set il­
lustrates that the confirmation 0  : a  represents there being no arguments fo r  a, while the confirmation 
{0 } : a  states that a  is a tautology.
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1 . stripContradiction((0,0) :a) =  0 so stripContradiction((0,0) :a) K _L,
2 . stripContradiction((X, 0) :a) =  a so stripContradiction((X, 0): a
3. stripContradiction((0, Y) :a) =  a so stripContradiction((0, Y ) : a ) * - u
4. stripContradiction((X, Y) :a) =  {ct,-^ a} so stripContradiction((X, Y) :a) G _L,
5. stripContradiction((0, {0}) :a) =  {0, ->a} so stripContradiction((X, {0}) :a )  Y- _L,
6 . stripContradiction(({0}, 0) :a) =  { a ,0 } so stripContradiction(({0}, Y) :a) V- J_.
In 1. above both confirmations in the contradiction are unfounded confirmations. In 2. and 3. one of
the confirmations in the contradiction is an unfounded confirmation. In 5. and 6 . one of the confirmations 
in the contradiction is a tautological confirmation. Note that ({0}, {0}) : a  ^  4 (A ) as the negation of 
a tautology is an inconsistency. Thus it is impossible for both confirmations in a contradiction to be 
tautological confirmations.
The cardinality of 4 ( a ,  A ) is as follows:
Proposition 2.6.2. Let A b e  a knowledgebase o f  labelled assumption formulae and let a  G C.
1 <  |4 (q  A )| <  2t r u n c (m ic ,L a t t 'c e ( A ) ^ 2) 2 n r i i d L a t t i c e ( A ) - t r u n c ( m i d L a t t i c e ( A K 2 )
Proof For the minimum, even if A  =  0, the empty contradiction (0,0) : a  G 4 (a ,  A) exists, so in
all cases 4 ( a ,  A ) ±  0. Now for the maximum. The set of contradictions for a ,  i.e. 4 ( a ,  A ), can be
represented as a rectangular array with one axis for members of 0(ct, A ) and the other axis for members
of A ). Because 4 (a ,  A) =  0 (a ,  A) x 0 (~ ,Q:, A ), each cell is thus a unique contradiction. Start
the case where midLattice(A) is even. This array of contradictions will have the greatest area when
|0 (a ,  A )| =  10( —'Ck, A )|, i.e. that it is square. Now, if a set of premises, I , of an argument infers a ,
i.e. /  : a  G arguments(A) then I  : ^ct $  arguments(A) as otherwise formulae(/, A) I- _L, falsely
rendering I  : a  $  arguments(A). If I  : a ,  J  : ->a G arguments(A) and 'I' =  formulae( / ,  A ), <I> =
formulae( J, A ), then due to the definition of argument ^  ^  $  and $  4g The largest number of
contradictions is obtained if half of the possible confirmations and thus half the possible arguments, i.e.
midLattice(A) -G 2, are for a and half for ->q . So taking an optimal A that yields exactly two sets of
arguments such that |arguments(a, A )| =  |arguments(^a, A)| = midLattice(A) -G 2. The number of
confirmations that can be produced thus has the property |0(ct, A )| =  |0 (~ ,ft)| =  2m^*“a^’c e A^^ 2.
The area of this square is consequently (2m’c**“a^ 'ce A^ “^ 2)2. However, it can also be the case that
midLattice(A) is odd (e.g. if |A | =  7 then midLattice(A) =  35). The rectangular array can no longer
be exactly square. Thus the more precise answer is that the maximum number of contradictions is 
2 trunc(midLattice(A)-2 ) . 2 midLattice(A)-trunc(midLattice(A )-2 ) Clearly if mjdLattiCe(A ) is even (e.g.
if | AI =  9 then midLattice(A) =  126) the precise equation still works, providing the necessary square 
array. □
The number of possible contradictions can be large, even for a simple knowledgebase. The compute 
time to find all of the contradictions derivable from a given A rises exponentially.
Example 2.6.3. Contradiction size. Imagine a naive debate using just ten labelled assumption fo r ­
mulae. How many contradictions fo r  a  can be deduced from these 10? The mid lattice, o f the array o f
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subsets o f  A, contains 252 members or 252 potential arguments, i.e. fo r  | A| =  10, midLattice(A) =  252. 
Let half o f these, i.e. 126, be fo r  a  and the other half, i.e. 126 , be fo r  - > q .  The largest number o f confir­
mations that can be produced from an arguments(a, A) with |arguments(a, A )| =  126 is 2 126. 2 126 is 
o f the order 8.5 • 1037. The maximum number o f contradictions, |4 (ct, A)|, is the square o f the number 
o f confirmations. So | 4 ( o ,  A )| is o f the order o f  7.2 • 1075. To put that in context, if  a supercomputer had 
computed 1 billion contradictions a second since the universe began, it still would not definitely compute 
the answer to a debate involving just 10 assumptions. The universe is 13.7 billion years old (1.37 • 1010), 
there are 3.16 • 107 seconds in a year and 1.0 • 109 contradictions per second on this state o f the art 
computer, so the computer processes 4.3 • 1026 contradictions, which is a tiny fraction o f  7.2 • 1075.
These definitions are also somewhat related to Belnap’s four valued logic (Belnap, 1977). Belnap’s 
scheme uses a set with four values: neither, true, false and both. In the absence of evidence (for both a  
and ->a) that formulae (a) must be given the value neither. Once the first piece of evidence is available 
the value must change from neither to either true or false. If a contradictory piece of information arrives 
the Belnap value moves up to both. In my scheme it could be argued that I introduce a further area in the 
set above both, that could be described as ‘many occurrences of both’. To have a ‘many occurrences of 
both’ value would mean that the definition of Belnap’s ‘both’ would be made more specific to be ‘one 
occurrence of both’. My definitions give a precise breakdown of what underlies the ‘many occurrences of 
both’ value. I could also add values for ‘confirmed true’ and ‘confirmed false’, which would come above 
‘true’ and ‘false’ but below ‘both’. Furthermore summarising functions could be provided to reconstruct 
the four Belnap values from my seven values.
2.6.1 Maximum Cardinality of Contradictions
I now introduce a further helper function that I use later is the thesis. Just as confirmations exist in a 
power set, providing the need to refer to just the maximum cardinality member or top of the power set, so 
also contradictions exist in power sets. The following function, which builds on Definition 2.5.8, returns 
the maximum cardinality contradiction for a power set of contradictions.
Definition 2.6.6. Let A  be a knowledgebase o f  labelled assumption formulae. Let 'I' be the set o f all 
the confirmations fo r  a  derivable from  a set o f  arguments fo r  a  such that — confirmations^) where 
$  C arguments(a, A). Likewise let Q be the set o f  all the confirmations fo r  ->a derivable from a set o f  
arguments fo r  ->a such that Q = confirmations(Il) where FI C arguments(^a, A). Let T =  x Q. 
The top of contradiction lattice function, denoted top(T), returns the contradiction fo r  a  with the two 
largest label cardinalities out o f all the contradictions in T such that:
top(T) =  { < X , Y ) : a e # ( A ) |
( X , Y) : a  6  T, X: a  = top('I') and 
Y : -ia =  top(fi)}.
Clearly the set of contradictions T, above, is such that T C  4 (o , A ). While this function could 
have been defined to operate just on ♦((*, A ), its current form is more general and subsequently more 
useful.
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2.6.2 Rebuttal
For this discussion of contradiction to be more comprehensive it is helpful to introduce the concept of 
rebuttal. Rebuttal is the simplest of contradictions, is in widespread use in the literature and is employed 
later in this thesis as one kind of attacks relationship.
Definition 2.6.7. Let A  be a knowledgebase o f  labelled assumption formulae and let I  : a  £ 
arguments(A). The set o f all rebuttals o f I : a  derivable from  A, denoted rebuttals(7 : a , A), is such 
that:
rebuttals(7: a . A) =  { J : | J  : ^ a  e  arguments^ a ,  A )}.
The definition ensures that the rebuttals take on a well ordered form as the following example shows.
Example 2.6.4. Rebuttal. Let A =  { a : a  A j3 A 7, b\ ->a, c: ->/7, d: ->7}. Let I  — {a} and J  = {6,c, d} 
So I  : a  A (3 A 7, J  : ->(a A (3 A 7), J : ->(/3 A a  A 7), J  : -> q  V V ^ 7 ) € arguments(A). The 
definition ensures that J  : ->(/7 A a A 7), J  : -<a V ->/3 V -17 rebuttals(7 : a A /3 A 7, A). Only 
J : - > ( a  A j3 A 7) £  rebuttals(7:a A j3 A 7, A).
Now that the maximum cardinality, contradictions and rebuttals functions have been defined I can 
show that rebuttals are essentially a kind of contradiction:
Proposition 2.6.3. Let A  be a knowledgebase o f labelled assumption formulae, let I  : a . J  : -<a £ 
arguments(A) and let (X, Y) :q  6  4(A ).
(X, Y ) : a  =  top(4(a , A)) 
iff X :a  =  confirm(rebuttals(J:->a, A )) and 
Y :^ a  =  confirm(rebuttals(7:a, A )).
Proof. Given (X, Y ) : o  =  top(4(a . A )) then Definition 2.6.6 of the maximum cardinality contradiction 
informs that X : a  =  top(0(f>, A )) and Y : ->a = top(0(_io , A )). Then using Definition 2.5.8 of 
the maximum cardinality confirmation establishes that every argument 7 : a  for a  derivable from A 
will be in X : a  where 7 £ X and that every argument J  : ->q for ->a derivable from A will be in 
Y : -iQc where J  £ Y. Adding the rebuttals function, Definition 2.6.7 provides every rebuttal for 7 : a  
derivable from A, so Y : ->o =  confirm(rebuttals(7 : a , A )) and likewise X : a  — confirm(rebuttals( J  : 
-ia, A )). So if (X, Y) : a  = top(4(a. A ) then X  : a  ~  confirm(rebuttals( J  : -^a, A )) and Y : =
confirm(rebuttals(7 : o , A )). Now for the other direction. Given X : a  =  confirm(rebuttals( J  : - a .  A )) 
and Y : -^a =  confirm(rebuttals(7:a, A )) it follows from Definition 2.6.7 that X :a  =  top(0(o, A )) and 
Y: =  to p ^ -'O , A )). So if X :a  =  confirm(rebuttals( J : ->a, A )) and Y : -^o =  confirm(rebuttals(7 :
a .  A )) then (X ,Y ) : a  = top(4(a, A). So in conclusion (X ,Y ) : a  ~  top(#(a, A )) iff X : a  = 
confirm(rebuttals(J: ->0 , A )) and Y : ->a =  confirm(rebuttals(7:a, A )). □
Clearly rebuttals do not always exist and also an argument can never rebut itself. If the support of 
an argument is the empty set, that is it is a tautology, then it has no rebuttals.
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Proposition 2.6.4. Let A  be a knowledgebase o f  labelled assumption formulae and let I  : a  G 
arguments(A).
I f  I  =  0 then rebutta ls(7 :a , A) =  0.
Proof. If I  =  0 then, {a} b T , the argument is a tautology. The negation of a tautology is an in­
consistency, ->T b _L. Conjecture the existence of a rebuttal J  : ->a G rebuttals(/ : a ,  A). Then 
stripAssumptions(formulae(J, A )) b -iq, hence formulae( J, A) b ->T, meaning formulae(J, A ) b _L 
so J  is inconsistent, which is impossible as it is the support of a valid argument. Thus if I  = 
0 then reb u tta ls(/:a , A ) =  0. □
The vice versa is not always true as for example when A K  1  and there simply are no rebuttals in 
the set argum ents(A).
The rebuttals function possesses a form of symmetry, but is not a self-inverse function. A function 
is self-inverse iff f(f(x)) = x.
Proposition 2.6.5. Let A  be a knowledgebase o f labelled assumption formulae and let I  : a . J  : p  G 
argum ents(A).
I  :a  G rebuttals(J:/3, A) iff J  .p  G rebuttals(7:a, A).
Proof. Definition 2 .6.7 of rebuttal informs that rebuttals(7: a ,  A) =  {J : ->a G arguments(-iQ, A )}. If 
I : q  G rebuttals( J  : p, A )  then it follows that p  =  -iq . Thus I : a  e  rebuttals( J  : ->q, A). Again, by 
Definition 2 .6.7 any argument with a claim of -iq  will rebut I : a , therefore J : ->a G rebuttals(7: a .  A). 
Consequently if 7 : a  G rebuttals( J  : p, A) then J : p  G rebuttals(7: a ,  A). Now for the other direction. 
Assuming J  : p  G rebuttals(7 : a .  A ), Definition 2 .6.7 states that any argument for -*p is a rebuttal for 
J  : p. Thus if J  : p  G rebuttals(7 : a .  A) then 7 : ->/? is a rebuttal for J  : p, meaning 7 : a  G rebuttals( J  : 
p. A ). So in conclusion 7 : o  G rebuttals( J : p . A ) iff J : p  G rebuttals(7: a ,  A ). □
Rebuttal is not self-inverse as it is not always the case that rebuttals(rebuttals(7: a ,  A ), A) =  7: a . 
This follows because the rebuttals function only takes one argument as its input, while its output 
can be many arguments. However, if |rebuttals(7 : a ,A ) | =  1 , which occurs for some A, then 
rebuttals(rebuttals(7: a , A ), A) =  7 : a . The set of rebuttals of a single argument can be represented as 
a confirmation.
Proposition 2.6.6. Let A  be a knowledgebase o f labelled assumption formulae, let I  : a , K  : ->a G 
arguments(A) and let Z : ->a G 0(A ).
Z :^ a  =  confirm(rebuttals(7: a ,A ) )
iff fo r  all K  : G rebuttals(7 : o . A ) it is the case that K  G Z.
Proof Let Z = {A 'i A'n }. Thus Z : = { A 'i,. . . ,  K n ) : -ia . Given that Z : =
confirm(rebuttals(7 : a , A )) it follows from one of the confirm() functions of Definition 2.6.6 that
{ K i : ^ o  K n : -in} = rebuttals(7 : a .  A ). Thus from Definition 2.6.7 of rebuttals it is the
case that for every K  G Z that K  : ->o G rebuttals(7 : a .  A). Now for the other direction. Given
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that K  : ->a £ rebuttals(7 : a ,  A ), there exists a confirmation Z : ->a with K  £ Z that con­
tains all of the rebuttals of I  : a  such that Z : ->a = confirm(rebuttals(7 : ft, A )). Therefore 
Z : -.ft =  confirm(rebuttals(7: a ,  A )) iff for all K : ->q 6  rebuttals(7: ft, A) it is the case that K  £ Z. □
Thus the definition of rebuttal could just as easily be made using confirmation notation. It is also 
the case the set of rebuttals of a confirmation (rather than just an individual argument) can be represented 
as a single confirmation, as I now discuss.
2.6.3 Confirmation Rebuttal
The confirmation rebuttals function is a simple elaboration of the above rebuttals function, to show the 
interaction at the level of confirmations, not just at the level of individual arguments. Working at the level 
of confirmations shows a greater degree of symmetry and also facilitates later definitions in Chapter 5.
Definition 2.6.8. Let A  be a knowledgebase o f labelled assumption formulae and let X : ft, Y : -ift £ 
0 (A ). The set o f  confirm ation rebutta ls o f  X : ft, denoted confirmationRebuttals(X : ft, A), is a set o f  
confirmations such that:
confirmationRebuttals(X:ft, A) =  { Y : ->ft G 0(^stripConfirmation(X:ft), A ) | Y ^  0 ,X  /  0 }.
A confirmation labelled with the empty set means that there are no arguments for the confirmation’s 
claim. Thus valid confirmation rebuttals are never between unfounded confirmations. This set is the full 
power set of confirmations, less the unfounded confirmation - which is labelled with the emptyset and 
thus has the minimum cardinality label. Given the maximum cardinality confirmation for a claim the 
confirmation rebuttals function is self inverse.
Proposition 2.6.7. Let A  be a knowledgebase o f labelled assumption formulae and l e t X : a  £ 0 (A ).
top(confirmationRebuttals(top(confirmationRebuttals(X:ft, A )), A )) =  X :ft.
Proof. The confirmationRebuttals(X : ft. A) function returns many confirmations for -ift, namely 
{Yi : ->ft,. . . ,  Yn : —ift}, which equals the power set 0(~>ft, A) less the minimum cardinality mem­
ber, i.e. 0: ->ft £ 0 (A ). The maximum cardinality member of this power set of rebuttals is provided by 
top(confirmationRebuttals(X: ->ft. A )). So let the confirmation Yn : ->ft =  top(confirmationRebuttals(X: 
ft, A )). Now apply the same steps again to see that the maximum cardinality rebuttal of Y n : -ift is X : ft. 
Thus X:cv = top(confirmationRebuttals(top(confirmationRebuttals(X:ft, A )), A )). □
This paragraph touches on polymorphism. Polymorphic functions can make a nomenclature more 
condensed and understandable. For example the + function can add integers or floating point numbers: 
1 + 1 = 2  has the data types integer + integer = integer, while 1.2 + 1.2 = 2.4 shows float + float = float. 
In this analogy, individual arguments are parallel to integers and confirmations are parallel to floats -  
simply as different data types. I could have written confirmationRebuttals() as a polymorphic version 
of rebuttalsQ. The rebuttals function, as defined, has a single argument as input parameter and a set of 
arguments as its output. I showed, in Proposition 2.6.6, that the argument rebuttals output is equal in 
concept to, and could just as easily be represented by, a single confirmation. The confirmation rebuttals
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function, however, has a single confirmation as input and a power set of confirmations as its output.
The maximum cardinality confirmation rebuttal has a confirmation as input and a single confirmation
as output. I have chosen to not adopt polymorphism here in order to make the exact nature of these 
functional behaviours clearer.
A confirmation rebuttal can never rebut itself.
Proposition 2.6.8. Let A  be a knowledgebase o f labelled assumption formulae and l e t X : a  £ 0 (A ).
X :q  g  confirmationRebuttals(X:a, A).
Proof If an argument I : a , /  £ X, could attack itself its support would be inconsistent, meaning that 
stripAssumptions(formulae(/, A )) b _L, and thus it would not be an argument, I  :a  (f (arguments(A). 
Hence X :a  ^  confirmationRebuttals(X :a, A ). □
The cardinality of the maximum cardinality confirmation rebuttal is either 0 or 1.
Proposition 2.6.9. Let A  be a knowledgebase o f labelled assumption formulae and let X : a  £ 0 (A ).
0 <  |top(confirmationRebuttals(X:a, A ))| <  1.
Proof No matter how many rebuttal arguments there are for X : a , that is | J  : -iq  £ arguments(A)| 
they are all in just one confirmation, top(0(_,Q, A )). If A Y- _L there are no rebuttals, however that it 
represented as the unfounded confirmation 0 :q  £ 0 (A ). □
2.7 Judging the Outcome of Debates
I now come to the sixth and final step of the basic framework, after i) A, ii) deductions(A) iii) 
arguments(A), iv) 0 (A ) and v) 4 (A ). My sixth step is the definition of judge functions, which provide 
the outcome to a debate. While judges are akin to consequence relationships or inference operations 
found in the logic literature, e.g. (Gabbay, 1985; Makinson, 1988) they must be of a particular form. 
I address two categories of judge functions; those that judge a single claim and those that judge multi­
ple claims and hence a whole knowledgebase. I start with the signature, or common form, of a single 
claim judge for a , where j  is an index in the form of a decimal number to distinguish between the many 
possible judge functions that fit this general signature.
Definition 2.7.1. Let A  be a knowledgebase o f  labelled assumption formulae. A judge of a, denoted 
judge^o. A), is a filtering function, such that:
1. The contents o f  the set judge^a. A) conforms to one o f the following three cases
a) i f  a  £ stripDeductions(arguments(A)) then it may be the case that judgeJ(a, A) =  a, or
b) i f  “■a £ stripDeductions(arguments(A))//i6'n it may be the case that judgeJ(a, A) = ->a, or
c) regardless o f whether ->a, o  £ stripDeductions(arguments(A)) or
->a, a  g  stripDeductions(arguments(A)) it may be the case that judgeJ(a , A) =  0,
2. and in all cases judge - (a , A) V- _L.
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The ‘or’s here are exclusive ors so clearly judge^ (a , A ) C stripDeductions(arguments(A)). The 
judge for a  function delivers a consistent subset of stripDeductions(arguments(A)). Labels are re­
moved delivering just unlabelled deduction formulae. Thus if a  $  stripDeductions(arguments(A)) 
then a  ^  judge^a, A). However if a  ^  judge^(a,A) then it does not follow that a  ^  
stripDeductions(arguments(A)), as it could be the case that a  is filtered out by the judge. Regardless of 
whether A L  _L or A V- _L it is always the case that judgej(a , A) V- _L. The signature, or common form, 
of a multiple claim or what is called a cumulative judge, which covers all claims from a knowledgebase, 
is as follows:
Definition 2.7.2. Let A  be a knowledgebase o f labelled assumption formulae. A judge of A, denoted 
judge^A), is a filtering function, such that:
judgej (A ) =  judgej (0 i, A) u • • • u judge^(</>„, A),
where stripDeductions(arguments(A)) =  {</>1?. . . ,  0 n}.
Thus all of the possible judges will have the above definitions in common. While judges are defined 
as functions of A  here, 0 (A ) and 4 (A ) are of utility in defining specific judge functions.
The above pair of definitions provides the minimum set of properties of judge functions. If it is 
required that also judge^(A) K _L then a further property called ‘cumulativity’ must be added and that 
will affect the definition of the judge of a , but not necessarily that of the judge of A. If a judge forces 
consistency then there may be side effects and implications of forcing such consistency. Properties of 
judge functions, particularly cumulativity, are reviewed in (Prakken & Vreeswijk, 2002). Two broader 
reviews of judge function properties are to be found in (Cayrol & Lagasquie-Schiex, 1995) and (Elvang- 
Gpransson & Hunter, 1995).
My judge function for A has some resonance with Dung’s concept of a semantic extension, (Dung, 
1993; Dung, 1995). Both filter a set of arguments to give a desirable subset -  although my result is just 
the claim stripped of support or labels. Just as I have j  different judges, so also Dung and those who 
build on his work have many semantics. Dung and those building on his work do not appear to offer a 
general definition of a semantic and thus there is no rule to say that they must all be consistent. Exploring 
differences, similarities and a possible integration would be a useful area for further research.
A judge for A  delivers a set of unlabelled claims. Thus repetition of claims is not allowed. The 
opinions of different experts can be tracked in A, say as a : a , b : a . The judge, however, requires the 
removal of the labels and thus the removal of the repetition, which merges the opinions of the different 
experts.
To make the concept of a judge more concrete I provide two illustrative examples. The example 
judges employ two helper functions known as pro and con.
2.7.1 Definition of Pro and Con Functions
To more simply present various argument aggregation schemes, two further cardinality functions are 
defined, called pro() and con(). These are notational conveniences giving the number of arguments for 
and against a claim.
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Definition 2.7.3. Let A b e  a knowledgebase o f labelled assumption formulae and  (X, Y ) : a e  ♦((*, A). 
The pro and con functions give the number o f arguments fo r  or against a  respectively in A , denoted 
pro(#(a, A )) and con(4(c*, A )), such that:
pro(4(c*,A)) =  |label(top(0(a, A )))|. 
con (4(a , A )) =  |label(top(0(-a:, A )))|.
These two functions are sensitive to the use of labels.
Example 2.7.1. Label sensitivity. Let A  =  {a : £,b  : £ —► u;,c : £}. Thus {a, 6 } : w, {c, 6 } : ui G 
arguments(A). Consequently pro(4(u;, A )) =  2.
2.7.2 Illustrative Judges
So that I can include judgement in the example of the basic framework at the end of this chapter and 
establish that there can be different types of judges with different behaviours, it is helpful to define two 
illustrative judges. The first of these judges, drawn from (Benferhat et al., 1993), is defined here and 
discussed in Chapter 7. It is an existential judge that does not rely on counting arguments, but rather on 
just whether they exist or not.
Definition 2.7.4. Let A  be a knowledgebase o f labelled assumption formulae. The Benferhat 
judge1 o (<*, A, 0) is a judge such that:
a  e  judgex 0 (a , A , 0) iff pro(4(a, A )) >  1 and con(#(a , A )) =  0.
A second example judge is called the Benjamin Franklin method (Willcox & Bridgewater, 1977). 
This judge relies on the number of arguments, not just their existence, and again is discussed in Chapter 7 
under the headings on quantitative judges.
Definition 2.7.5. Let A  be a knowledgebase o f  labelled assumption formulae. The Franklin
judge2 0(a , A , 0) is a judge such that:
a  e  judge2 0 (q , A , 0) i f fp r o ( t(a ,  A )) >  con(#(a , A )).
The origin of the informal definition of this argument aggregation scheme is commonly attributed 
to eighteenth century American statesman Benjamin Franklin. He called it Prudential Algebra and doc­
umented it in a letter of 19 September 1772 to Joseph Priestly, the chemist.
Judges have many properties, each of which, depending upon a combination of general principles 
and application specific requirements, can be deemed desirable or undesirable. A recurrent theme in AI, 
commonly known as ‘horses for courses’, is that there is no one perfect solution that solves all problems, 
but rather that different problems require different solutions.
To look specifically at cumulativity in the light o f these two judges, consider the following example
Example 2.7.2. Cumulativity. Let A  -  {a : 0  A - > a ,  b : 0  —► a } .  Then { a }  : 0 , { a )  : - > a ,  {6} : 
0  —> a  G arguments(A). Suppose a debate was conducted over 0. Judges 1.0 and 2.0 would yield
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(3 £  judgej 0(f3, A) and (3 £  judge2 0 (/3, A). ^  second debate fo r  ft —> a  would result in (3 —► a  £ 
judgex 0((3 —* a , A ) and (3 —* a  £ judge2 0 (/3 —* a , A). Having established (3 and (3 —> a  it would 
appear to be reasonable to deduce a. However, i f  a debate is conducted over the question o f a  the 
outcome is -<a, i.e. ->a £  judge1 0 (a , A) and ->a £  judge2 0 (a , A). Both judges have thus delivered 
sets o f  inconsistent results showing that neither o f  them has the property ‘cumulativity’.
A cumulative judge would thus have to examine all claims in arguments(A) before it could judge 
one claim. Possibly, heuristics could be employed to limit the number of additional claims to examine, 
but all other judge outcomes that are possibly inconsistent with a  are relevant. An additional mechanism, 
beyond those presented in judges 1 .0  and 2 .0 , will be required to resolve inconsistencies so the above 
example would lead to a decision as either the judge results in (/3 and [3 —* a )  or in ->c*. To provide 
cumulativity it would appear that either levels of evidence would have to be established by computation 
or priorities used.
2.8 Worked Example of the Basic Argumentation Framework
This section is a worked example illustrating the flow of the basic argumentation framework leading up 
and including judging the outcome of a debate. My aim is to go into enough detail to show the workings 
of the three kinds of labels, a full power set of confirmations and a full power set of contradictions that 
arise from even a modest A.
2.8.1 Assumptions
The pattern I now show starts with assumption labels which are set members rather than whole sets. 
The example begins with the set of assumptions. In this example there are six assumptions and they are 
labelled with assumption labels a through to / .
A  =  { a :a , b :a  —> {3, c :a , d : 7  A ->/3, e:^(3  —> A, /:-■  A}, so |A| = 6
2.8.2 Deductions
From the assumptions, the set of deductions is inferred, using classical deduction. {6 , c, d} :(3 A 7  £ 
deductions(A) is a valid deduction, but its premises are not consistent and thus it is not an argument. So 
{6 , c, d } : (3 A  7  arguments(A). Furthermore {a, 6 , c } : (3, {a, c } : a  £  deductions(A) are valid deduc­
tions, but are not minimal and thus not arguments. Consequently {a, 6 , c } :/3, {a, c } : a  $  arguments(A).
2.8.3 Arguments
The arguments of relevance in this example are a small subset of all possible arguments. The set 
arguments(A) includes:
{«,&}:/? { b , c} :P { e , f } : ( 3  {d}:^(3  {d } : 7  {a}: a
{6 } : a —*(3 {b}:^/3 —> ->a { d } : 7  A { e } : - V ? —► A {c}:c*
{6 }:-ia V /3  { e } : - i7 —*(3 { e } : /? V 7  {a}:Q :V 7  {d ,e}:A  {6 ,d}:->a
So far I have shown the arguments as labelled with assumption labels. This is one valid approach, 
it shows the provenance of each deduction. Now to progress the example and make the notation less 
verbose, I introduce the necessary deduction labels together with their assumption label equivalencies.
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1 = {a, b} J  = {b,c} K  = { e J }  L  = {d} M  =  {a} N  = {b}
0  = {c} P  — {e} Q  =  { / }  P  =  {d,e} S  = {b,d}
Thus I can relabel the same set of arguments. They are now labelled with deduction labels, rather 
than assumption labels. The notation is more condensed, but the provenance is no longer visible. The 
provenance is still accessible however as the label equivalencies just defined provide traceability.
1 : 0  J : 0  K : 0  L :-^0  L : j  M : a
N : a —>0  TV:->/3 —►->c* L : /y A- >0  P : - '0 —> A Q :- ' A 0 : a
N : ->a V 0  P:-> 7  —► /? P : 0 \ /  7  M :q  V 7  R:  A S:  ->a
O f course there are innumerable additional arguments I could show, such as others added by dis­
junction introduction, e.g. L : 7  V ->/? V J : /3 V £ V G arguments( A ) , but I won’t clutter the example 
with them.
2.8.4 Confirmations
Given the set o f arguments, the confirmations become clear. Rather than describe all of the confirmations, 
this example focuses on the confirmations in 0  and also the confirmations in ->0. Other confirmations 
exist (e.g. in a ,  7  and A), but they are mostly self confirmations and would clutter the example.
0 (0 , A ) =  {0 :0 , { / }  :0 , { 0 } :  0 , { K } : 0 , { / ,  J } : 0 , { J, K )  :0 , { / ,  K } : 0 , { / ,  J , K}  :0}  
O (-0 ,A )  =  { 0 : -,0 , {£-}:->0}
The confirmations in each of 0  and ->0 each form separate power sets. Here is the power set of 
confirmations for 0 , employing sets of deduction labels to show the pattern. The ordering criterion is 
confirmation label set inclusion.
{ I , J } : 0  { J , K } : 0  { I , K } : 0
{ / } : 0  { J } : 0  { K } : 0
0:0
The lattice of confirmations for -'0, shown with deduction labels, is much simpler:
{ L} : ~ ' 0
0 :- /3
Here the |label(top(0(/3, A )))| = 3 and |label(top(0(-v3, A )))| = 1. Thus pro(4(/3, A )) =  3 and
con(4(/?, A )) =  1 .
2.8.5 Contradictions
Now that all of the confirmations in 0  and -*0 have been listed, I can enumerate the resultant contradic­
tions and draw them as if ordered by set inclusion in a lattice. The ordering criteria I use to draw this 
contradiction lattice, relevant only to this example, is (X, Y ) : 0  ‘subset or equal t o ’(X' ,  Y ') : 0  iff X C 
X 'a n d Y  C Y '. The deduction labels show which arguments the confirmations and contradictions arise 
from. This power set derives from the above, as the pairing of all the confirmations for 0  first with the
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single {L }  : -*0 and again with the empty set based 0 : ->0. Two power set of confirmations, for (3 and 
~>0, can be captured in just one integrated power set of contradictions:
( { I , J , K } , { L } ) : 0  
( { I , J , K } , 9 ) - . 0  <{I , J } , { L } ) : 0  ( { I , K ) , { L } ) : 0  {{J,  K } ,  { L } ) \ 0
({ /,J} ,0 > :/3  { { I , K } , 9 ) - . 0  { { J , K } , 9 ) : 0  < { /} ,{ !}> :/?  { { J } , { L } ) : 0  { { K } , { L } ) : 0
( { /} ,0 ) : /3  ({J } ,0 ): /3  {{K},<6):0 <0,{£}):/3
(0, 0) -.0
It can be seen that a portion of this power set of contradictions is empty-contradictions and the 
compliment portion the non-empty contradictions. Such power sets will not necessarily be symmetrical, 
for example this one has nine empty contradictions and seven non-empty ones.
2.8.6 Judgement
For the claim 0,  applying judge1 0 (/3, A , 0) there exist arguments for both 0  and ^ 0  so:
0 , ->0 £ju d gel o (/? ,A ,0).
However instead of yielding a stalemate, judge2 o{0, A , 0) resolves the inconsistency to declare a 
clear winner, such that:
0  g judge2 o(0,  A , 0) - .0  £  judge2 o(0,  A, 0).
Thus judgej o(0,  A, 0) =  0. Both judge 1 0 (/7, A , 0) Y  _L, judge2 o(0,  A , 0) Y  ±.  This example of 
judge2 0 is one simple way to resolve inconsistency, but as I go on to explain it is a naive one. By naive I 
mean that that the judge suffers from a number of undesirable properties -  using as yet undefined terms, 
such as being too eager (i.e. letting through weakly argued claims or noise, see Chapter 7), insensitive 
to undercut (Chapters 3 and 6 ), insensitive to reflection (Chapters 4 and 5) and insensitive to assisting 
arguments (Section 8.4).
Broadening my observation it can be seen that there are other inconsistencies such that:
A, iA  g  judgej 0(A, A, 0) a, £  judgej 0(a, A, 0).
However there are further claims in stripDeductions(arguments(A)) which are not in conflict, for 
example:
7  g judge! 0 (7 , A , 0) - 7  £  judge1-0 (7 , A , 0).
So for a debate judged by judge 1.0 with four motions Q , 0 , y  and A the outcome would be that 
motion 7  would pass, but that a , 0  and A would fail to pass. That completes my example showing 
the six steps of the basic framework, namely knowledgebase, deductions, arguments, confirmations, 
contradictions and judgement.
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2.9 Conclusions for Basic Argumentation Framework
This chapter on my basic argumentation framework has formally defined the first two foundations I need 
to track and judge debates, namely confirmation and rebuttal.
In addition to the definition of the knowledgebase A , the eight key argument aggregations intro­
duced in this chapter and reused throughout the thesis are:
Aggregation F or O ne Form ula Definition F or All Form ulae Definition
Arguments: arguments(a, A) 2.4.6 arguments(A) 2.4.2
Confirmations: 0 ( a ,A ) 2.5.5 0(A ) 2.5.4
Contradictions: ♦ (a , A) 2.6.3 ♦ (A ) 2 .6 .2
Judgement: judge^a, A) 2.7.1 judgej(A) 2.7.2
Table 2.1: Summary of Key Argument Aggregation Functions
Contradictions can be thought of as a general representation of the common concept of rebuttal. 
Contradictions are simply groups of arguments for the same claim and its negation, a construct which 
turns out to be useful for representing and thinking about professional debates.
A contribution of the chapter is the definition of the inconsistent confirmation -  one where the 
supports of the arguments for a single claim contradict each other. Additionally I examine the litera­
ture’s concept of catenate inference and find that it allows inconsistent catenate inferences -  a problem 
addressed by my framework. Another contribution of the chapter is in clarifying different types of argu­
ment and confirmation, namely the definitions o f terms: reflexive argument, tautological argument, self 
confirmation, unfounded confirmation, tautological confirmation and empty contradiction. Confirmation 
is not just a mechanical grouping of arguments for a claim, but rather a mindful and useful device with 
a number of interesting properties, a good correlation to professional debate and is helpful for building 
more refined debating constructs.
In addition, my helper functions will continue to be useful in manipulating the argument ag­
gregations in subsequent chapters, they are: stripAssumption(), stripAssumptions(), stripDeductionQ, 
stripDeductions(), stripConfirmation(), stripConfirmations(), stripContradiction(), stripContradictions(), 
label(), formulae(), midLattice(), confirm(), top(), pro() and con(). A number of these are polymorphic 
functions. In a category of their own, the functions rebuttals() and confirmationRebuttals() help in link­
ing my work to the literature and then extend it. The many propositions and examples of this chapter 
clarify the behaviours of each of these argument aggregations. Included in this analysis is the cardinality 
track with its Propositions 2.4.3, 2.5.7 and 2.6.2. Now the basic argumentation framework has been 
established I can move in the direction of determining how to properly track a debate, so that the whole 
debate and nothing but the debate is tracked, and judge its outcome.
Chapter 3
Undercut Framework
3.1 Overview of the Chapter
This undercut framework chapter analyses four types of undercut (Wigmore, Pollock, canonical and 
preclusive) over eight sections. The first section covers both Wigmore and Pollock, the second is devoted 
to canonicals and the last six introduce my new preclusive undercut.
I should emphasise at the outset that in rendering the undercuts of others into my formal frame­
work these undercuts become no longer absolutely identical to their originals. I deem it vital to do this 
rendering as it allows me to compare and contrast the various undercuts in the literature, and I hold that 
the distinctions exposed are due to the original works and do not stem from my rendering. Nonetheless 
what I call a Pollock undercut is not literally identical to that published by Pollock. To a certain degree 
this difference is at the philosophical level of rationalising the connection between premises and claims. 
Likewise for Wigmore and for Besnard and Hunter. This point of parallelism, but not identically, also 
applies to those tree and judge functions which I take from the literature. So although my rendering 
approach has a weakness of not being a carbon-copy of the original, it is a contribution in that it allows 
the various approaches to be compared and contrasted.
Introductory undercuts The first three types of undercut are from the literature, however many
of the properties I explore are new -  and found wanting for professional debate.
Wigmore undercut Section 3.2 .1 , is an attack that states that one of the assumptions sup­
porting an argument is wrong, affects debate outcomes, see Example 3.2.2, and resolves 
inconsistency, see Example 3.2.3.
Pollock undercut Section 3.2.4, argues that one or more of the assumptions supporting an 
argument is wrong. This is the most widely used undercut in the literature.
Canonical undercut Section 3.3, means that one or other of the assumptions supporting 
an argument is wrong. I formalise properties, showing it to be better behaved than the first 
two undercuts.
Preclusive undercut In this second half o f this chapter, I introduce a new form of undercut.
Section 3.4 defines preclusion as one or other of the attacked arguments is wrong.
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Motivation Section 3.5, preclusive undercuts are much used in professional debate, so I 
give examples from politics, detective work and court-room cross examination.
Canonical subsumption Section 3.6, here I show how preclusive undercuts cover and ex­
tend the ground of canonicals to better mirror professional debate.
Tautological preclusions Section 3.7, these novel undercuts prevent a debating team from 
being inconsistent when arguing a claim.
Non-unique formulae Section 3.8, goes more deeply into the properties of preclusive un­
dercuts, examining the effects of labels and non-unique formulae on cardinality.
Finally, Section 3.9, relates the definitions of undercut and rebuttal discussed so far with the notion 
of abstract attack.
This chapter builds my set of argument interactions to the principal three -  confirmation, rebuttal 
and undercut, providing a strong foundation for subsequent analysis for tracking and judging debates.
3.2 The Concept of Undercut
I start the body of this chapter by introducing the concept of undercut as described in the literature. 
There are two ways that one argument can attack another argument; rebuttal and undercut. The first 
way, rebuttal, is where the conclusion of one argument is the negation of the conclusion of the other 
argument. The second way, undercut, involves the conclusion of one argument attacking the support 
o f the other argument. I refer to the argument that is rebutted or undercut as the defending argument. 
Consequently I can refer to the undercutting or rebutting arguments as the attacking arguments.
Work on inconsistency has generally focussed on the rebuttal form of inconsistency, however under­
cut also merits attention as it is arguably a form of inconsistency and can effect the outcome of debates 
(as shown later in the example of Section 3.2.2). Each of the judge functions presented so far (which 
have excluded undercuts) could, broadly speaking, be repeated with the single difference of incorporat­
ing undercuts. There is, however, little consensus in the literature on a) the exact definition of undercut 
and b) how undercuts should be incorporated into argument aggregation, making it possible to have not 
just one, but several variations on each of the judges presented so far. In Section 7 .6 ,1 propose a way to 
incorporate undercuts into judgement.
The location of the first informal description of undercut in the literature is unclear, as a number of 
authors, including (Wigmore, 1937; Toulmin, 1958; Walton, 1989), explore the field that surrounds and 
includes undercut with a variety of vocabularies. The formalisation of undercut is generally attributed to 
(Pollock, 1970). Argument aggregation schemes not encompassing undercut include the various judges 
from (Manor & Rescher, 1970) and (Benferhat et al., 1993), the Franklin approach (Willcox & Bridge­
water, 1977) and net support (Fox & Das, 2000). It seems fair to suggest, given that undercuts can effect 
the outcomes of debates, to exclude them from argument aggregation schemes is somewhat naive.
The formal use of undercut within argument aggregation has been further developed notably by 
(Elvang-Gpransson et al., 1993b; Elvang-Gpransson & Hunter, 1995; Besnard & Hunter, 2001). To­
day undercut is well established in the logic literature with quite a number of authors, in addition to the
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above mentioned, also writing on the topic, including many papers by Amgoud, Nute, Parsons, Prakken, 
Shroeder, Verheij and Vreeswijk; in particular I cite (Prakken, 1997; Vreeswijk, 1997; Amgoud & Cay- 
rol, 2002). For reviews covering this developing aspect of argumentation see (Hunter, 2001; Chesnevar 
et al., 2000; Prakken & Vreeswijk, 2002).
At least three definitions of undercut are used in the literature:
1. What I call a Wigmore undercut, e.g. (Elvang-Gpransson & Hunter, 1995; Dung et al., 2006).
2. Pollock undercut, (Pollock, 1970).
3. Canonical undercut (Besnard & Hunter, 2001).
Several rather more complicated defeasible-logic based definitions are given by Hage and by 
Prakken with applicability to law, (Hage, 1996; Prakken & Sartor, 1997; Verheij, 2001). Limiting 
my analysis to classical propositional logic with minimal consistent arguments I now define three kinds 
of undercut; Wigmore, Pollock and canonical and then add one of my own.
3.2.1 Wigmore Undercut
Wigmore was the first to introduce the concept of undercut into informal logic in his writings on jurispru­
dence in 1937 (Wigmore, 1937; Twining, 1985). Some attribute undercut to Toulmin, but a) Wigmore 
predates Toulmin by two decades and b) the literature is clear that Toulmin did not precisely describe 
undercut, but rather what is more commonly known as the more general or related concept of defeat. 
See for example, the commentary of (Verheij, 1999) stating that Toulmin does not make the distinction 
between rebuttal and undercut.
Wigmore calls the construct ‘explanatory evidence’ and shows how it reduces the strength of effect 
of the argument it attacks. Thus if a witness said they saw a red wall and their barrister argues that 
therefore the wall is red, an explanatory evidence would be to say actually a red light was or could have 
been shining on that wall thereby making it only appear to be red.
I take Wigmore’s description as attacking an assumption and formalise it as Definition 3.2.1 be­
low. This same definition, but without labels appears in a number of published sources, e.g. (Elvang- 
Gpransson & Hunter, 1995; Amgoud & Cayrol, 2002; Dung et al., 2006), but without the attribution 
to Wigmore. This definition may be considered to be simpler than Pollock’s definition (to be covered in 
Section 3.2.4 below) which is slightly more predominant in later literature. I now provide this definition 
in my nomenclature, so that I can show the relationships between the different kinds of undercut.
Definition 3.2.1. Let A be a knowledgebase of labelled assumption formulae and let I : a, J : e
arguments(A).
J : -1 0  is a Wigmore undercut of I :a  iff <p e  stripAssumptions(formulae(/, A)).
Now I provide an example of a Wigmore undercut.
Example 3.2.1. Wigmore undercut Let A  =  { a : a , b : a  —► (3, c : ->a)}. Then {a, b} : (3, {c} : ->a e  
arguments(A). It follows that the argument {c} : ->a is a Wigmore undercut of {a, b } : (3.
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The Wigmore undercut of (Elvang-Gpransson & Hunter, 1995) is expressed as follows: ‘Let (II, 0) 
and (©, 0 ) be any arguments constructed from A. If  7  G © and b  0 <-> -<7 , then (II, 0) is an under­
cutting defeater of (©, 0 ) ’ . I now discuss how this definition is equivalent to my definition, b  0  <->• -17  
means that 0  <-* -<7  is a tautology. Consequently there is another argument, (II, ->7 ) that can also be 
derived from A, that is not a tautology and is a Wigmore undercut of (© ,0 ) . Because 0  <-* ->7  is a 
tautology, no further formulae need to be added to II, over and above those used to deduce 0, in order to 
deduce -1 7  (as would have been the case if 0  —> ->7  had been used instead of 0  ->7 in their definition).
Similarly the ABA attack can be seen to be a generalisation of the Wigmore undercut; see Definition 2.5 
in (Dung et al., 2006) where it states that argument A attacks argument B if ‘A attacks an assumption in 
the set of assumptions on which B is based’.
My use of labels makes Wigmore undercuts able to attack more arguments than would be the case 
without labels. For the Wigmore undercut without labels within the example below I employ the defini­
tion of (Elvang-G0 ransson & Hunter, 1995) and the notation of (Besnard & Hunter, 2001).
Example 3.2.2. Wigmore and labels. Let A  =  {a : a ,b  : a  —> p , c : --a , d : a ,e  : a  —> p ) . Then 
{ a ,6 } :/3 , {d , e}  : 0 , {c}  : - a  G arguments(A). With labels, it follows that the argument {c} : ->a is a 
Wigmore undercut o f  {a, b} : P and also o f  {d, e } : p. Now without labels, let V — {a , a  —> P, ->o:}. 
Consequently there are two arguments ({a , a  —► P},P) and  ({->«}, ->a). Therefore, ({->«}, ->a) is a 
Wigmore undercut o f  only one argument ({ a , a  —> P}, p).
Now here is an example showing how undercuts (even simple Wigmore undercuts) can make a 
difference to the outcome of a debate.
3.2.2 Undercuts Can Change Debate Outcomes
This subsection is built around a somewhat informal example to provide motivation for subsequent for­
malisms in this thesis. It also places this motivation in the context of the literature. The discussion builds 
on the earlier definition of judge 2.0, see Definition 2.7.5.
Example 3.2.3. Changed debate. Let the initial A* =  {a : p , b : 7 , c : —<A, d : ->a —> --7 , e : 
-*a —► —i/3, /  : ->a V A}. Then {a, e} : a , { 6 , d} : a , { c ,/ }  : ->a G arguments(Aj) are the argu­
ments for a  and ->a . Let {a ,e }  =  / ,  { 6 , d} =  J and {c, / }  =  K, so { / ,  J }  : a  G 0 (a , A*) and 
{K }  : -iq G OC-1**, Aj). 77ien f/ie debate can be summarised as the maximum cardinality contradic­
tion ( { / ,  J } , { I f} )  : a  G ♦ (« , Aj). Using judge2 .o(Aj) it is clear that a  wins. The outcome of the 
debate is a because pro(4(a, A j)) =  2 , con ($ (a , A*)) =  1 and as 2  >  1 so a  e  judge2 0 (A t) and 
-<a judge2 0 (At). A property o/judge2 0 is that it is always consistent, so a  E judge2 0 (A t) implies 
->a & judge2 0 (At). Now add two undercuts to the debate. Let the new A =  A , U { g : ->P, h : ->7 }. Let 
L =  {g}, M  =  {h}. So now L : ->/?, M : -> 7  G arguments(A). Note that any attempt to combine g : ->P 
with e : —> -<P implies nothing about a; as g : ->P only affirms the claim of e : ->a -'p. Similarly
h : -1 7  with d : ->a —> 7  also implies nothing about a. So no new confirmations or rebuttals of a  are
introduced. What exists is a pair of undercuts, namely the argument L:-^p is an undercut of I : a  and 
M : -1 7  is an undercut of J : a. While there is more consensus in the literature to the effect that L : -^ P
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attacks I : a, there is less agreement that L : defeats I : a.
So given this example, I can now examine the three possibilities of the impact of L : ->j3 on I : a  as 
full defeat, graded (or partial) defeat and no defeat (i.e. no effect).
1. No effect. Attack by an undercut can be taken to not imply defeat and have no effect. Papers 
taking this position include (Manor & Rescher, 1970), (Benferhat et al., 1993) and (Fox & Das, 
2000). ‘No effect’ is the assumption implicit in judge2 0. In this case the outcome of the above 
debate is a ,  namely a  €  judge2 ,0 (A ).
2. Full defeat. Alternatively, attack by an undercut can be taken to imply total defeat, i.e., to fully 
nullify the effect of the attacked argument. Papers broadly following this approach include (Dung,
1995), (Prakken & Vreeswijk, 2002) and (Amgoud & Cayrol, 2002). So far I have not formally 
defined this possibility, but intuitively, for the above example, the value of an undercut sensitive 
pro function should now reduce to zero. I say zero because the two arguments for a , i.e. I : a , J : a  
are now defeated by the two undercuts L : ->/?, M : ->7 . Thus by modifying the pro and con func­
tions to be undercut aware and using them in an otherwise unmodified judge2 0 (call it judge21 , 
which is not formally defined, although practical judges akin to it are defined in Chapter 7) would 
yield ->a € judge2 1 (A ). These modified pro and con functions should still deliver natural num­
bers in the same range as the original pro and con functions. Using this assumption reverses the 
outcome of the debate -  from a  6  judge2 0 (A ) to ->a e  judge2 1 (A) -  showing that, given certain 
assumptions, undercuts can affect debate outcomes.
3. Graded defeat. The third option is to say that attack by an undercut implies a gradation of defeat, 
that is anything in between the above two extremes of full and no defeat. This perspective is 
described in (Wigmore, 1937; Besnard & Hunter, 2001) and touched on in (Verheij, 1996).
•  Half. I examine first the situation where attack by an undercut halves the strength of the 
attacked argument. W hile I have not yet defined strength it is possible to explore it as an 
intuitive notion, and say that the strength of I  : a , initially 1 is reduced by the attack of L : ->/? 
to Similarly the attack of M  : -1 7  reduces the strength of J : a  to Thus the collective 
strength of the confirmation { / ,  J }  : a  is reduced to 1. Consequently a  £  judge2 1 (A ) 
and also ^  judge2 X(A ). To formalise this situation will require modified pro and con 
functions that deliver rational numbers rather than natural numbers. Neither a  nor - 1a  wins. 
I call this situation a stalemate because the inconsistency is not resolved and there is equal 
evidence for a  and ->a.
•  Over half. Continuing the above example, if the attacking strength of L : -^ (3 on I : a  is over 
half, then the residual strength of I : a  is reduced to under a half. The same applies for the 
M : -17  attack on J : a . Consequently the overall residual strength for a  is under one and a  
is defeated. The effect of the debate is reversed and ->a G judge2 : (A).
•  Under half. Now for the contrary situation. If the attacking strength of L  : ->(3 on I : a  is 
under half, then the residual strength of I : a  is reduced but is still over a half. Consider the
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same applies for the M : -> 7  attack on J : a . Consequently the overall residual strength for a  
is over one and a  is still victorious. The effect of the debate is unchanged so a  € judge2 X(A ) 
just as a  e  judge2 0 (A).
This example covering i) no effect, ii) full and iii) graded defeat shows that undercuts can make a 
major difference to the outcome of debates. The word ‘can’ is used due to two reasons: one is undercuts 
only make a difference if certain assumptions are made and the other is that even then the difference is 
seen only with certain A . One of these assumptions is my use of labels. As shown in Example 3.2.2, 
working with labels can alter the number of undercuts and thus can also affect debate outcomes.
Clearly there are some debates to which incorporating undercut does not effect the outcome. For 
instance, consider a A  that implies the contradiction ( { I , J , K } ,  {L }) : a  and also just one undercut, 
the argument M : (3, such that - (^3 e  strip Assumptions(formulae(7, A )) with the same judge^ as above. 
Then even if I assume M : (3 fully defeats I : a  it follows that there are still two arguments for and only 
one against so a  € judge2 j(A ). The outcome of this debate would not be changed.
To generalise from the above example there is nothing unique about the |  in its ability to infer stale­
mate or inconsistency. For example, the rational numbers 3  or |  for defeating strength of an undercut 
could create stalemate for other A. Similarly it is not always true that full defeat reverses the outcome 
of debates; this too depends upon A. What is generally true, however, is that there are three possible 
effects o f including undercut on the outcome of a debate, that is a) no effect, b) reverse the outcome, and 
c) stalemate where inconsistency is not resolved.
Before progressing to counting undercuts and rebuttals of arguments (in Section 7.2) it will be 
necessary to further evolve the understanding of patterns of repetition when arguments attack each other. 
To introduce an indication of the puzzles ahead consider the following example that shows that one 
undercut can undercut two arguments.
Example 3.2.4. Number of Wigmore undercuts. Let A =  (a  : a , 6 : a  —► /?, c : 7 , d : 7  —► (3,e :
->(a V 7 )}. Then {a,b}:(3, {c,d}:{3, {e} :->(a V 7 ), {e } :--a , {e } : - < 7  6  arguments(A). It follows that 
{ e } : ->(a V 7 ) is a Wigmore undercut of {a, b } : (3 and also of {c, d } : (3. Furthermore { e } : ->a is another 
Wigmore undercut of {a, 6 }: (3 and { e } : ->7 is of {c, d } : (3.
When tracking and judging a debate, should one, two or three of these undercuts be counted? Rather 
than counting all possible undercuts that can be found in arguments(A) instead I need some subset of 
well ordered undercuts that represents all others.
3.2.3 Undercuts, Confirmations and Rebuttals Resolve Inconsistency
So far this chapter has shown that undercuts, confirmations and rebuttals are interrelated and have a 
bearing on inconsistency. I now provide an example to demonstrate that each of these three interactions 
can be used to resolve an inconsistency. I argue that because all three can be used to achieve the same 
effect then all three are interrelated.
Let the initial A j =  { a  : /?, 6 : —► ->(3, c : -A , d : ->a V A}. Then { { a ,  6 } : a ,  {c, d} : -<a} C
arguments(Aj) are the arguments for a  and ->a . Let { a ,  b} = I  and {c, d] =  K .  Therefore the debate
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can be summarised as ({ /} , {/ST}): ck £  ♦(<*, A*). Thus A* I- _L, a  £  judge^(Aj) and -<a judge^Aj), 
where judge^ is akin to judge2 0 but also incorporates undercuts in some as yet undefined way.
There are three ways to resolve this inconsistency. All three approaches involve adding formulae 
T to A j to create a new A, that is A =  A* U T. My goal, of resolving the inconsistency, is to have 
a  £  judge^(A) or ^  judge^A). Even with the judge resolving the inconsistency it can still be the 
case that A  t- ± .
The three ways to resolve the inconsistency, which I describe relative to a  are:
1 . Add a confirmation to resolve the inconsistency. A  =  A i U { e : 7r , / : 7r —► a } , I  add another 
argument for a ,  namely L  : a ,  where { e , / }  — L  so now ( { / ,£ } ,{ # } )  : a  £  # ( a ,  A ), and 
a  £  judgej(A).
2. Add a rebuttal. Alternatively the inconsistency can be resolved using rebuttal of the argument 
for q , that is an argument for ->a. A  =  A* U {g : </>, h : 0  —► ->q:} let {g, h} — M  and now 
( { / } ,  {K , M }) :a £ ♦(«*, A ), so a £ judge^A).
3. Add an undercut as a third way to resolve the inconsistency. A =  A* U { j  : A}. If I assume full 
defeat then the argument { j}  : A defeats {c, d} : ->a, leaving one argument for a  and no viable 
argument against a ,  so a  £  judge^A).
So given an inconsistency that is based on a stalemate -  basically the worst kind of inconsistency -  
then three separate ways to resolve it are to add a confirmation, a rebuttal or an undercut to the debate.
3.2.4 Pollock Undercut
The concept o f undercut was added to the formal literature by Pollock with key papers on the subject 
stemming from 1970 (Pollock, 1970; Pollock, 1974; Pollock, 1987). To relate Pollock’s defeasible logic 
description to the classical logic approach of this thesis, consider the deduction {P, P  —► Q} t- Q. Here 
Pollock refers to P  as a ‘premise’, Q  as a ‘conclusion’ and P  —> Q  as the ‘connection between premise 
and conclusion’. He states that his undercut defeats this ‘connection between premise and conclusion’ 
so that ‘P  does not guarantee Q \  He writes the defeated P  —► Q  as P $ $ Q .  In my framework both 
P  and P  —► Q  are assumptions and I allow for either to be subject to undercut. The form of a Pollock 
undercut with many assumptions is overtly documented in (Pollock, 1992) showing that the claim of the 
undercutter is the negation of the conjunction of premises. Thus a Pollock undercut rebuts some, i.e. one 
or more, assumptions.
While this style of undercut originated with Pollock it has been more recently and perhaps more 
precisely documented by others, for example (Elvang-Gpransson et al., 1993a) and (Schroeder, 1999). 
This is arguably the main definition in the literature for undercut, but to suggest a consensus would be 
inaccurate. The Pollock undercut has also been called defeat, e.g. (Krause & Clark, 1993) p231, however 
the more common definition of a defeater is that it is a collective term for undercuts and rebuttal, see for 
example the formalisation of defeaters in (Besnard & Hunter, 2001). Recall that Wigmore undercuts, in 
contrast, only allow undercuts that rebut one and only one assumption. Pollock’s own definition does not 
involve labels or consistent or minimal premises, however in my framework the definition is as follows.
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Definition 3.2.2. Let A b e  a knowledgebase o f  labelled assumption formulae, and let I : a , J : ->(</> i A 
. . .  A 4>n ) G arguments(A).
J  :->(</»! A .. .A(f>n ) is a Pollock undercu t o f  I : a  iff  {(f>\,. . . ,  <fin } C stripAssumptions(formulae(/, A)).
I now give an example of an undercut that is a Pollock undercut, but not a Wigmore undercut.
Example 3.2.5. PoDock undercut Let A =  {a : a ,b  : a  —> 7 ,c  : 7  —► /?,d : ->(a: A ( 7  —► (3))}. 
Then { a ,6 ,c} : (3,{d} : ->a V - . ( 7  -> (3),{d} : -i(a  A ( 7  -> /?)) G arguments(A). The argument 
{d} : -i(q A ( 7  —> (3)) is a Pollock undercut, but not a Wigmore undercut, o f  the assumptions a : a  and 
c : 7  —»(3 in the argument { a ,  6 , c } : (3.
This example shows that the set of Pollock undercuts for an argument can be a superset of the set 
of Wigmore undercuts. All Wigmore undercuts are also Pollock undercuts, but not vice versa.
As shown with Wigmore undercuts, my use of labels can affect the number of Pollock undercuts, 
as illustrated in the following example. For the Pollock undercut without labels below I employ the 
definition of (Elvang-Gpransson et al., 1993a) combined with the notation of (Besnard & Hunter, 2001).
Example 3.2.6. Pollock and labels. Let A  =  { a : a , b : a  —> 7 ,  c : 7  —► (3, d : -1(0: A ( 7  —» / ? ) ) ,  e : a } . 
Then { a ,  6 , c} : (3, {e, b, c} : (3, {d} : ->(a A ( 7  —* (3)) G arguments(A). With labels, it follows that the 
argument {d } : ->(a A  (a  —* (3)) is a Pollock undercut o / { a ,  6 , c } : (3 and also of{e,  b, c }: (3. Now without 
labels, let the knowledgebase of unlabelled formulae be T — {a , a  —> 7 , 7  —> (3, ->(a A ( 7  —> /?))}. 
Hence the two arguments of relevance are ({a , a: —► 7 , 7  —> (3,}, (3) and ({—-(ct A ( 7  —► (3))} , -i(q  A 
( 7  —► (3))). Therefore, ({~ i(a  A ( 7  —+ /?))}, -'(a  A  ( 7  —* ft))) is a Pollock undercut of ({a,  c* —» 7 , 7  —► 
(3, }, (3). So with labels one attacking argument provides a Pollock undercut of two defending arguments. 
Without labels, however, the one attacking argument only undercuts only one defending argument.
Thus the use of labels makes Pollock undercuts able to attack more arguments than would be the 
case without labels. I now turn to two problems with Pollock undercuts, namely that of multiple subsets 
and that o f multiple claim orderings. I illustrate each of these problems with an example.
Example 3.2.7. Multiple subsets. Let A =  {a : a ,b  : (3,c : (a V 0)  —> 7 ,d : -•0 }. The defending 
argument is {a, 6 , c } : 7 . How many Pollock undercuts o f  {a, 6 , c } : 7  can be inferred from  A ? There are 
multiple subsets to {a, b, c}, so all o f  {d} : {d} : ->(q A (3), {d} : ->(0 ; A (3 A (a V ft) —>7 ) are valid
Pollock undercuts o f  the defending argument.
How many of the above Pollock undercuts should be counted within a judge that counts arguments? 
Judge 2.0 is a judge that counts arguments, so how should it be extended to consider Pollock undercuts 
in its deliberations? Intuitively the above three Pollock undercuts are three manifestations of the same 
one underlying argument, so if all are counted would the error that accountants call ‘double counting’, 
whereby an item is counted more than once, occur?
Exam ple 3.2.8. M ultiple orderings. Continuing with the same A  and defending argument {a, 6 , c } : 7  
as above. Even with the one attack {d} : -i(aA/3A(aV/5) —> 7 ), classical logic allows fo r  many orderings
3.3. Canonical Undercut 64
of the formulae within the claim. Thus { d } : ->(0 A a  A  (a  V 0) —> 7 ), { d } : ->(a A (a  V 0) —> 7 ) A 0 are 
also valid Pollock undercuts of {a, b,c} : 7 .
The above example deepens the concerns raised by Example 3.2.7. In conclusion, this review 
of Wigmore and Pollock undercuts shows that when aggregating arguments in order to avoid double 
counting requires some well ordered or standard subset of undercuts that properly represents all other 
undercuts.
3.3 Canonical Undercut
I now come onto a third definition of undercut. It is more specific than the Pollock undercut, with 
the value of this specificity being to give more appropriate results in argument aggregation schemes. 
It cannot represent new undercuts beyond those expressible in the Pollock form. However there are 
situations where many well-formed Pollock undercuts are subsumed into a single canonical undercut. 
The aim of the canonical undercut is to provide an undercut that represents a variety of other, logically- 
equivalent, undercuts.
The definition of canonical undercut requires a definition of canonical enumeration, which is a 
minor syntactical device that is necessary (but not sufficient) to prevent double counting or redundancy 
in subsequent definitions.
Definition 33.1. Let A  be a knowledgebase of labelled assumption formulae. Let every subset of 
stripAssumptions(A) have an enumeration (q i, . . . ,  c*n) of its elements. This specific ordering, or enu­
meration, is called the canonical enumeration of the subset.
This constraint of enumeration is satisfied whenever I impose an arbitrary total ordering over A  and 
is thus not an onerous constraint. It is only a convenient way to indicate the order in which I assume the 
formulae in any subset of A  are conjoined to make a formula logically equivalent to that subset.
This minor syntactical ordering is not intended to relay that some formulae are preferred over others. 
Preference-based ordering is a different topic, as addressed in such papers as (Cayrol et al., 1992; 
Amgoud & Cayrol, 1998), and is outside the scope of this thesis.
Example 3.3.1. Canonical enumeration. The knowledgebase A  =  {a : a, b : 0, c : 7 } has only one 
canonical form (a : a ,b  : 0 ,c  : 7 ). This ordering over A  dictates the ordering over all subsets of A. 
The one canonical form is used to stand for all of the many other possible sequences (a : a ,c  : 7 , 6  :
0 ) , . . . ,  (c : 7 , b : 0, a : a) etc.
Having defined canonical ordering I can now define canonical undercut. The definition, below, 
while based on (Besnard & Hunter, 2001), is in my notation and incorporates the use of labels. The 
claim of the undercutting argument is the negation of the conjunction of the assumptions of the undercut 
argument. In this approach a broader set of undercuts are allowed than with Wigmore as it includes cases 
where exactly which assumption or assumptions are negated is unknown.
Definition 3.3.2. Let A  be a knowledgebase of labelled assumption formulae and let I : a, J  : _i(0 i A 
. . .  A <f>n) e  arguments(A). The set of canonical undercuts of I .a  derivable from A , denoted
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canonicalUndercuts(7: c*, A), is such that:
canonicalUndercuts( J : a ,  A) =  { J : - i(0 i A . . .  A 0 n) |
{ 0 i , . . . ,  0 n } =  stripAssumptions(formulae(/, A )) and
( 0 i , . . . ,  0 n) /s //ie canonical enumeration o/stripAssumptions(formulae(7, A ))}.
I call an argument J : ->(0i A . . .  A 0 n ) a canonical undercut of an argument 7 : a  iff J  : —i(0i A 
. . .  A<f>n ) €  canonicalUndercuts(7: a ,  A ). I call 7: q  the defending argument and J : ->(0i A . . .  A 0 n ) 
the attacking argument.
I now give an example of the increased generality relative to Wigmore undercut and increased 
precision relative to Pollock undercut. In the following examples I assume that the canonical enumeration 
is the same as the sequence that the set members are written in each definition of A. While this detail 
could be added to each example it would make the text quite a bit longer and more cluttered without 
adding significant clarity.
Example 3.3.2. Canonical undercut Let A - {a : a ,b  : a  —> 0 ,c  : V ->(q —» /?)}. Let I —
{a, &}, J  =  {c} Then I : (3, J : - i(a  A (a  —» 0)) £ arguments(A). The argument J : ->(£* A (a —* 0)) £ 
canonicalUndercuts(7 : /5, A ) is a canonical undercut, but not a Wigmore undercut, of the defending 
argument 1 : 0. The argument J : ->(q A (a  —> 0)) is also one of many Pollock undercuts of the same 
defending argument 1 :0.
The disjunction present in V ->(a —» 0)  means it could be one or the other, or both assumptions 
that are undercut.
Proposition 3.3.1. Let A  be a knowledgebase o f  labelled assumption formulae and let J  : 7 ,7  : a ,  J  : 
0 , K : 0  £ arguments(A).
I f J  is a Wigmore undercut o f  I  :a
then there exists a K : 0  £  canonicalUndercuts(7:a , A), where K  C J, 
but not necessarily vice versa.
Proof. Definition 3.2.1 states that J :-> 0  is a Wigmore undercut of 7: c* iff 0  e  
stripAssumptions(formulae(7, A)).  Definition 3.3.2 gives the end point: canonicalUndercuts(7 : a ,  A) 
= { K  : 1 (0 1 A . . .  A 0 n ) | { 0 i , . . . , 0 n } = stripAssumptions(formulae(7,A)) and ( 0 i , . . . , 0 „ )  
is the canonical enumeration of stripAssumptions(formulae(7,A))}. Let 0* £ { 0 i , . . . , 0 n } =  
stripAssumptions(formulae(7, A)). So 7  =  —>0* and J  : - 10* is a Wigmore undercut of 7 : a .  Using 
VI and De Morgan J  : —>0* implies J  : ->0* V 0 j implies J  : —>0* V implies J  : -i0 i V • • • V ->0n 
implies J  : -i(0 i A • • • A 0 n ). However, A  may be such that K  C J  also implies —i(0i A • • • A 0 n ) 
yielding K : —>(0i A • • • A 0 n ). Such a A is A  =  { a : 7r, 6 : /3, c : ~>7r V —i/3} with 7 : a  =  {a, 6 } : 7r A 0, 
a Wigmore undercut of {6 , c} : —«7r and a canonical undercut of {c} : —>(7r A 0). Lastly, of the many 
orderings of J  : —>(0i A • • • A 0 n ) such as J  : —>(02 A 0 i A • • • A 0 n ) or J  : -i(0 n A ■ • • A 0 i)  one of
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them will have the required canonical ordering, so a canonical undercut is guaranteed. Now for the vice 
versa. So although {7 } h (3, the rule {ip V 7r} Y  ip means that, unless |formulae(7, A )| =  1, it is not 
the case that {/3} h 7 . Thus, given J : (3 e  canonicall)ndercuts(7: 6 , A ) is not always possible to infer 
a Wigmore undercut J  : 7 . So in conclusion if J  : 7  is a Wigmore undercut of 7 : a  then there exists a 
K : [3 6  canonicalUndercuts(7: a ,  A ), where K  C J, but not necessarily vice versa. □
Likewise, given a Pollock undercut it is always possible to infer the existence of a canonical under­
cut and vice versa.
Proposition 33.2. Let A  be a knowledgebase o f  labelled assumption formulae and let J  : a , 1 :6, K  : 
0  e  arguments(A).
There exists a Pollock undercut J -.a  o f 1:6
iff there exists K : 0  e  canonicalUndercuts(7:6 , A) where K  C  J.
Proof. Contrasting Definition 3.2.2 of Pollock undercut with Definition 3.3.2 of canonical undercut 
shows two differences: i) canonicals must attack the full support and ii) the canonical ordering. So given 
the Pollock undercut J  : a  it is known that a  =  -> / \  $ , where $  C  stripAssumptions(formulae(7, A ). 
W hich ever subset $  is started with it is always possible to use VI to extend a  into 0  where 0  — 
-> A  stripAssumptions(formulae(7, A ). It should be noted (see the proof of Proposition 3.3.1) that as 
the full support is weaker than the subset it may not require all of J  to infer it, hence K  C  J ,  
meaning J  : 0  & arguments(A) and K  : 0  e  arguments(A). Furthermore there are many or­
derings for the members of stripAssumptions(formulae(7, A ), however one of them will always ex­
ist that will satisfy the canonical ordering of Definition 3.3.1. So if J  : a  a Pollock undercut of 7 : 
6 then K  : 0  e  canonicalUndercuts(7 : 6, A ), where K  C  J. Now for the other direction: given 
K  : 0  G canonicalUndercuts(7 : 6 , A ) it immediately follows that K  : 0  is also a Pollock undercut of 
7 : 6. Hence there exists J : a  a Pollock undercut o f 7 :6 iff there exists K : 0  € canonicalUndercuts(7: 
9 , A ) where K  C J. □
The number of canonical undercuts is as follows:
Proposition 3 3 3 .  Let A  be a knowledgebase o f  labelled assumption formulae and let I  : a  e  
arguments(A).
0 <  |canonicalUndercuts(7:a, A )| <  midLattice(A).
Proof. Some A ’s will not produce any attacks, for example when A Y- _L, so the lower bound 
is zero. All canonical undercuts of 7 : a  will have the same claim, namely <p, equal to 
-i(/\stripAssumptions(formulae(7, A))).  Thus for two canonical undercuts of 7 : a , i.e. K  : <p,L : 
(p e  canonicalllndercuts(7 :a , A ), to be distinct they must different supports, so K  ±  L.  The number of 
different deduction supports derivable from A is 21 ; not all of these supports belong to valid arguments. 
The support of one undercut K : (p cannot be a subset of the support of another L : <p, that is K  % L  and 
L % K .  The largest number of subsets of A  with this property is given by the midLattice() function. 
7 : (p can never be a canonical undercut of any argument 7 : a,  as then formulae(7, A) h _L which is not
3.3. Canonical Undercut 67
allowed. The attacked support 7 could occur anywhere in the power set of 2A attacking supports, that is 
a) in the bottom portion between 0 and below midLattice(), b) in the upper portion above midLattice() up 
to A, or c) on the midLattice() line. If  I  is in a) it would remove many members of midLattice(). In b) 
members of midLattice() would invalidate I ,  or consequently many members of midl_attice(). Thus the 
smallest reduction from midLattice() is case c) and the reduction is 1. Therefore the maximum number 
of canonical undercuts is <  midLattice(A). □
As an argument cannot attack itself, so I  :a  g  canonicalUndercuts(/: a ,  A ). Now another property: 
if an argument A is undercut by B then B cannot undercut A’s rebuttal C.
Proposition 33.4. Let A b e  a knowledgebase o f labelled assumption formulae and let I :  a, J : - i q ,  K : 
0  e  arguments(A).
I f  K:<f> e  canonicall)ndercuts(7:c*, A ) then K:<f> & canonicalUndercuts(J:-'Q, A).
Proof. Clearly stripAssumptions(formulae(J, A )) t- a ,  stripAssumptions(formulae(/f, A )) I- 0  and 
stripAssumptions(formulae( J , A )) I— >a. Because K  : <f> e  canonicalllndercuts(7 : a , A ) it is the case 
that {->0} b a .  If the above proposition was false then it would also be the case that {—>0} I— 'Q. A s 
->0 is equal to the negation of the conjunction of the members of stripAssumptions(formulae(/, A ) it 
would follow that J  =  I  and I : a , I : ->q 6  arguments(A), which is impossible, so the proposition is 
correct. □
Clearly the set o f canonical undercuts of a single argument can be represented as a confirma­
tion, where Z : 0  =  confirm(canonicalUndercuts(7 : a ,  A )) iff ( i f  : 0  € canonicalUndercuts(7 : 
a ,  A ) and K  e  Z). Therefore the original definition of canonical undercut, Definition 3.3.2, could just 
as easily be made using confirmation notation.
In the definition of canonical undercut note the equality sign, meaning that every assumption within 
the undercut argument must appear in the claim of the undercutting argument. Pollock could also have 
every assumption in the claim, but the Pollock definition only requires a subset. What is interesting, 
however, is that even if one or more assumption is missing from the claim of an argument (that is the 
reference to the assumption is missing relative to a valid canonical undercut), these formulae can be 
added by VI. I call this process of adding formulae by VI, growing the claim. This ‘growing’ behaviour 
extends the disjunction of formulae in the claim of the attacking argument in order to round it out to 
match and attack the full support of the defending argument.
The support of a canonical undercut cannot be the empty set.
Proposition 3.3.5. Let A  be a knowledgebase o f  labelled assumption formulae and let I : a, J  : 7  € 
arguments(A).
I f  J 17  G canonicalUndercuts(7:a, A) then J  ^  0.
Proof. If the support of the canonical undercut was the empty set, J  =  0, then the claim would be 
a tautology {7 } b T. From Definition 3.3.2 it is clear that -<7 is the conjunction of the members of 
stripAssumptions(formulae(7, A)).  So, because -<T b _L, it follows that if J  =  0 then formulae(7, A ) b
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±  which is impossible given I  .ot G argum ents(A). So the support of a canonical undercut can never be 
the empty set. □
3.3.1 The Effect on Labels in Canonical Undercut
I now turn to the use of labels in canonical undercut, looking at their role and effects. The use of labels 
can increase the number of canonical undercuts (and similarly the number of Wigmore and Pollock 
undercuts) compared to the situation without labels, as shown in the next two examples. The following 
three examples illustrate the effects of labels.
Example 3 3 3 .  Labels add supports. Let A  =  {a : a , b : a  —* 0, c:  : -'(c* —» 0 s),e  : ->a}.
Let I =  { a ,6 }, J = { c } , K  =  {d} ,L  =  { e } ,M  =  {e,d}.  Thus I : 0 ,J  : - ( a  A (a  -> 0) ) , K  : 
->(a A (a  —> 0 ) ) ,L  : ->a,L : ->(a A (a  —► 0 ) ) ,M  : A ->(a —> 0) € arguments(A). Then
additional undercuts of I : 0 include the Wigmore and Pollock undercut L : ->a and the canonical 
undercut L:->(a A  (a  —> 0))  G canonicalUndercuts(7:0,  A). Thus J :->(aA (a —> 0)),K:->(a A  (a  —► 
0)), L : —'(ck A (a  —► 0))  G canonicalUndercuts(7:0,  A). These undercuts would not all occur without 
the use of labels, that is because stripAssumption(c: -<a) =  stripAssumption(e: ->a) =  ->a.
The above example shows labels increasing the number of canonical undercuts by introducing more 
than one support. It is also possible for labels to increase the number of canonical undercuts by intro­
ducing more than one claim, as shown in the next example.
Example 33 .4 . Labels add arguments. Let A  =  { a : a ,  b :a , c :a  —> 0 , d :  ->a}. Let I  =  {a ,c} , J  =  
{6 , c } , K  = {d}.  Then I  : 0 , J  : 0 , K  : ->(a A  (a  —> 0 ))  e  arguments(A). Consequently the one 
assumption d : ->a, which gives rise to one argument K  : ->(a A (a  —> 0)),  produces two canonical 
undercuts, namely K  : ->(a A ( a  —► 0 ))  € canonicalUndercuts(7 : 0 , A) and K  : - i(a  A (a  —> 0 ))  G 
canonicalUndercuts( J : 0 , A).
It is also possible for the labels to add no additional arguments relative to the non-label situation, 
however the labels could still be used to track which expert contributed which items of knowledge.
33.2 Reflexivity and Canonical Undercut
Can an argument be both a rebuttal and an undercut? The answer, somewhat surprisingly, is yes as it 
occurs for reflexive arguments.
Example 33 .5 . Rebuttal = undercut Let A  =  {a : a , b : - 17, c : a  —> 7 }. Let I  — {a}, J  =  {6 , c}. 
Consequently I : a , J  : ->q g arguments(A). It is possible fo r  an argument to be both a rebuttal and 
an undercut i f  the defending argument is a reflexive argument. Here I : a  is reflexive. Thus J  : G
rebuttals(7: a , A) and J:->a  G canonicalUndercuts(7: a , A).
Intuitively one might think that undercut is an asymmetric relationship, i.e. if attacked, the attacked 
argument cannot attack back. Clearly rebuttal is always symmetric, i.e. if attacked by a rebuttal there is 
always a rebuttal counter attack. Can undercut ever be symmetric? The answer is yes as it occurs for 
reflexive arguments. Now, unlike Example 3.3.5, both arguments have to be reflexive.
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Example 33.6. Reflexive counterattack. Let A  =  {a : a ,  b : ->a}. Thus {a} : a ,  {6 } : ->a £ 
arguments(A). It is possible fo r  undercut to be reflexive; {a} : a  £ canonicalUndercuts({6 } : ->a, A ) 
and {6 }: ->a £  canonicalUndercuts({a} :a ,  A).
So reflexive undercuts can act like rebuttals. These observations do raise the interesting question 
that if one was somehow tracking rebuttals and undercuts in a debate would one show an attack on a 
reflexive argument as both an undercuts and a rebuttal?
That concludes this discussion of canonical undercuts. The next section introduces an even more 
general definition of undercut, namely preclusive undercut. This definition continues the progression of 
generalisation described so far.
3.4 Introducing and Defining Preclusive Undercut
I now provide a new and arguably a somewhat more fundamental and general, definition of undercut. 
Just as canonical undercut provides a generalisation on the Wigmore undercut so also preclusive undercut 
provides a generalisation on canonical undercut. An informal way to describe preclusive undercuts is 
this: just as a canonical undercut is one argument undercutting another argument, so also a preclusive 
undercut is one confirmation undercutting another confirmation. Given that a confirmation is simply 
a set o f arguments for the same claim and just as a canonical undercut is one argument attacking one 
argument, so also a preclusive undercut is a set o f arguments attacking a set o f arguments. Furthermore, 
in simple terms, just as a canonical undercut says ‘one or more of your assumptions is wrong’ so also a 
preclusive undercut says ‘one or more of your arguments is wrong’.
The word preclusive is used because just as a canonical undercut precludes one or more premises, so 
also a preclusive undercut precludes one or more arguments. My definition, below, of preclusive undercut 
has two principle changes from canonical undercut. Firstly, I define the attacker to be a confirmation 
rather than limiting it to just an individual argument. Secondly I broaden the definition of the claim of 
the undercut, so that I accept undercuts that attack more than one argument, as shown in Example 3.4.1. 
Such undercuts identify that the targeted arguments are incompatible with each other, given the existence 
of the undercutter. The definition of a set o f preclusive undercuts is closely related to i) the definition of 
canonical undercut, which is Definition 3.3.2 and ii) the definition of the set §( a ,  A) of confirmations 
which is Definition 2.5.5. I now give the formal definition of preclusive undercut in two steps.
Definition 3.4.1. Let A  be a knowledgebase o f  labelled assumption formulae and l e t X  . a ,  Y : a ,  Z : 
~' ( 0 1  A . . .  A 0 n) £ 0 (A ). The set o f  cand idate  preclusive undercuts o f  Y : a  derivable from  A, 
denoted candidatePreclusiveUndercuts(Y : a ,  A), is such that:
candidatePreclusiveUndercuts(Y : a ,  A)
=  { ( Z : - . ( 0 ! A . . .  A 0 n ) , X , Y : a )  | Z ^  0,
0 ^ X  C Y, stripAssumptions(formulae(X, A )) =  { 0 i , . . .  ,0 n }  and 
the canonical enumeration o f  { 0 i , . . . ,  0 n} is ((f)i , . . . ,  0 n)}.
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So now given the form of the candidate preclusive undercut I take the one with the minimal claim 
to be the preclusive undercut.
Definition 3.4.2. Let A  be a knowledgebase o f labelled assumption formulae and let W  : a , X : 
a ,  Y  : a , Z : </>, Z : ifi G 0 (A ). The set o f  preclusive undercu ts o f  Y  : a  derivable from  A, denoted 
preclusiveUndercuts(Y :a ,  A), is such that:
preclusiveUndercuts(Y: a , A)
=  { (Z : <fi, X, Y : a) G candidatePreclusiveUndercuts(Y: a ,  A ) |
i f  (Z : ifi, W , Y : a) G candidatePreclusiveUndercuts(Y: a , A) 
then X C W }.
For a preclusive undercut between two confirmations, which is of the form of a 3-tuple (Z : 
->(0x A . . .  A 0 n ) ,X,  Y : a ), I call Z : ->((fii A . . .  A  </>n ) the attacking confirmation, I call X the 
target confirmation label and I call Y : a  the defending confirmation. Clearly for any preclusive un­
dercut, (Z : ->{4>i A  . . .  A  (fin ), X, Y : a ) ,  it is always the case that X C Y. Given the target confirmation 
label is X and the defending confirmation is Y  : a  then X : a  G 0 (A )  is the target confirmation. At 
times I use the word ‘preclusion’ as a shortened form of ‘preclusive undercut’.
Preclusive undercuts are more general than canonical undercuts as they allow undercuts which could 
not be previously represented, as shown in the following example. As before, I will continue to assume 
that the canonical enumeration condition is met, unless otherwise stated.
E xam ple 3.4.1. A preclusive u n d e rc u t Let A  =  {a : a , b : a  —> (3, c : 7 , d : 7  —> 0 , e :  ->(o; A 7 )}. 
Then {a,b}  : (3, {c , d}  : 0,  {e } : ->a V - 17, {e} : ->(a A  ( a  —► 0)  A 7  A ( 7  —> (3)) G arguments(A). 
Let {a, a  —► (3,7 , 7  —► (3) be the canonical enumeration o f  {a , a  —* (3,7 , 7  —> (3}. Let {a, b} =  
I , { c , d }  =  J , { e }  = K,  then { I ,  J }  : /3, { K }  : —>(a A  (a  —> /?) A 7  A ( 7  —» 0))  G 0(A ). A  
preclusive undercut o f  { I ,  J }  : 0  is { K }  : ->(o; A  ( a  —» 0 )  A 7  A ( 7  —> 0)),  or, put more formally, that 
is ({ if}  : ->(a A (a  —* 0)  A 7  A ( 7  —> 0)) ,  { I ,  J } ,  { I ,  J }  : 0)  G preclusiveUndercuts({7, J }  : 0,  A). 
However { K }  : - i(a  A (a  —* 0 )  A 7  A ( 7  —► 0 ))  ^  canonicalUndercuts(7 : 0, A) and likewise { K }  : 
->(c* A (a  —► 0 )  A 7  A ( 7  —> 0 ))  ^  canonicalUndercuts( J : 0 , A ) as it is not possible to say that just one 
o f the arguments 1 :0,  J : 0  is undercut. Thus { K } : ->(a A (a  —> 0)  A 7  A ( 7  —» 0)) is not a Wigmore 
undercut o f  either I  :a  or J  :a.
The second definition is necessary because given a candidate preclusive undercut that attacks X, 
VI will ensure many additional candidate preclusive undercuts that attack supersets of X. Because there 
is no requirement that a preclusive undercut is a maximal cardinality confirmation then it is possible to 
have many preclusive undercuts attacking the same target X, hence the need for the X =  W  part of 
X C W.
The second definition covers the process of invalidation. In the above definition, if there exists 
a (Z : ip, W , Y : a) such that X C W  then I call (Z : cfi, X ,Y  : a) an invalidated candidate preclusive
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undercut, because it is not a preclusive undercut. I call {Z : x/>, W , Y : a )  the invalidating preclusive 
undercut.
Nowhere in the above two definitions does it insist that Z : 0  is a maximum cardinality confirmation. 
Hence if Z : 0  is an attacking confirmation then each V : </>, where 0 /  V C Z, is also an attacking
confirmation. Also for a single defending confirmation there can be many target confirmations. For
a single target confirmation X there will be one attacking claim, i.e. |stripConfirmation(Z : <f>)\ =  1. 
Clearly, however, it is possible for |label(Z:0)| >  1.
From a perspective of the cardinality of the attack and the target, I identify four types of preclusive 
undercut:
•  a m ono-target preclusive undercut iff target |X| =  1,
•  a m ulti-target preclusive undercut iff target |X| >  1,
•  a m ono-attack  preclusive undercut iff attacking |Z| =  1 and
•  a m ulti-a ttack  preclusive undercut iff attacking |Z| >  1.
Referring to Definition 2.5.2 of self confirmation, all self-confirmed canonical undercuts are mono­
target mono-attack preclusions, see Proposition 3.6.1. The self confirmation of a set containing many 
canonical undercuts, all with the same target, yields a mono-target multi-attack preclusion, see Proposi­
tion 3.6.2.
Preclusive undercuts, by definition (see Definitions 3.4.1 and 3.4.2), allow that the attacking, de­
fending and target confirmations can be tautological, but not unfounded. Unfounded confirmations with 
X =  0, Z =  0, W  =  0, |X| /  0, |Z| /  0, |W | ^  0 always exist and are used in professional debate
only to make clear where there are no arguments for a claim, but by definition they are not parts of
preclusions.
Only multi-target preclusive undercut candidates are subject to invalidation by invalidating confir­
mations. A multi-target preclusive undercut candidate may be invalidated either by another multi-target 
preclusion of lower target cardinality or by a mono-target preclusion (all subject to constraints being 
met).
Because X C Y, the defending confirmation Y : a  can be viewed as the whole front line of soldiers, 
perhaps many miles long and the target confirmation X : a  as the small section of the front that is actually 
targeted for attack and attacked. Thus, the arguments in the defending confirmation can all be potentially 
targeted, while the ones in the target confirmation are the ones that are effectively (or actually) targeted 
and attacked. It is the relationship between the attacking confirmation and the defending confirmation 
that is the preclusive undercut.
Having defined and given an example of preclusive undercut I now move immediately to their 
practical motivation.
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3.5 Practical Motivation for Preclusive Undercut
1 have refrained from giving practical motivation for preclusive undercut until now as I first needed the 
formal definition. The use of preclusive undercut is common in various professional activities such as 
in courts of law, political debates and detective investigations. My examples mostly come from current 
events, or news, at the time of writing. I am not intending to pass comment on the content of the 
arguments, but rather focus just on the form of the arguments. My focus is logical structure and in 
particular the presence of particular kinds of argument that arise in the real world and can be naturally 
modelled by preclusive undercut, but not by earlier forms of undercut.
Preclusive undercuts are often identifiable from the phrase ‘they can’t all be true’, which is a suc­
cinct English description of the claim of a preclusive undercut. Here ‘they’ refers to the supports of the 
arguments in question, which equates to the set of assumptions {4>i , . . . ,  0 n }. ‘Can’t ’ is the negation 
at the front of the claim. ‘A ll’ refers to the conjunctions joining the assumptions. Thus ‘they can’t all 
be true’ means -i(</>i A . . .  A (j>n ). Sometimes the larger phrase ‘at a minimum they can’t all be true’ is 
used, as if more information were known it would be possible to say specifically which arguments were 
not true. Other phrases that identify preclusive undercuts are ‘you can’t have it both ways’ and ‘this 
constraint x  means that both y  and z  can’t be the case’. The constraint x  is often time or money. Thus, 
for example, the witness’s story cannot be true as there was not enough time x  for them to do both y  and
2  as they claimed. Or, for example, that some political manifesto is not viable as there is not enough 
money x  to pay for both y  and z.
I now give motivating examples.
3.5.1 Incompatibilities due to Unsatisfied Constraints
A common place to find the use of preclusive undercuts is when someone’s proposals are disputed on 
the grounds that they do not fit with constraints o f time or money.
For example at the 2003 Conservative Party conference, their leader at that time, Mr Iain Duncan 
Smith made two key proposals that he argued together would lead to winning the next general election, as 
reported by the BBC and others on 9 October 2003. He stated that upon election he would a) definitely 
lower taxes rather than just maybe lower taxes and b) raise pensions by .£11 a week. He argued that 
these promises would lead to his winning the election. I can refer to lowering taxes as (3, winning the 
election as a  and raising pensions as 7 . Thus he has two consistent arguments {/?, (3 —> a }  \~ a  and 
{7 , 7  —► a}  I- a , resulting in a confirmed argument for winning the election.
Subsequently his critics pointed out that the overall constraint of the government’s financial budget 
meant that he could not pursue both promises. If  I let the budget be 6 then the critics, notably Work and 
Pensions Secretary Andrew Smith, are adding the formula of world knowledge 9 —» -y((3 A 7 ). Stating 
this more formally: I now have A =  {a: (3,b : (3 —> a , c : 7 ,  d : 7  —> a ,e  : 0, f  : 0 —> ->((3 A 7 ) } .  
Thus { a ,  b } : a , {c, d } : a ,  {e, / }  : ->(/3 A 7 ) ,  {e, / }  : -«(/? A (0  -*  a )  A 7  A ( 7  —> a ) )  e  arguments( A). 
The defending confirmation is { { a ,  &}, {c, d}} :a . The attacking confirmation is {{e, /} } :  ->(/3 A {(3 —> 
a )  A 7  A ( 7  —► a ) ) .  The target and defending confirmations are { { a ,  b}, {c, d}} : a . So the preclusive 
undercut is:
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<{{e> / } }  : ^ A ( ^ a ) A 7 A ( 7 ^  a )) , {{a , 6}, {c, d}}, {{a , 6}, {c, d}} :a)
G preclusiveUndercuts({{a, 6}, {c, d}} :a , A ).
A similar example of a preclusive undercut was raised at Governor of California Arnold 
Schwarzenegger after he proposed he would reduce the state’s deficit and also reduce taxes. He promised 
to repeal a proposed increase in car tax with an implied cost to the state of $4Bn. As reported by the BBC 
and others on 8  October 2003, California State Treasurer Phil Angelides made the preclusive undercut: 
given that the state deficit is $8Bn today, repealing the car tax would inevitably raise rather than lower 
the deficit, indicating that Schwarzenegger could not successfully lower taxes and lower the deficit.
3.5.2 Sherlock Holmes Relies on Preclusive Undercuts
The underlying plot of many of the Sherlock Holmes detective stories, written by Sir Arthur Conan 
Doyle during the Victorian era, revolves around the existence of a preclusive undercut. They progress 
like this:
Sherlock Holmes is called in to investigate a murder. Holmes invariably starts by casting his net 
wide, gathering police interviews from all possible suspects. Naturally each of the, let us say three, 
suspects professes their innocence. The first suspect provides their evidence b : n  G A, which when 
combined with world knowledge c : n  —► a  G A , where a  means innocence (effectively ‘we are all 
innocent’), leads to the argument that the first suspect is innocent {b, c} : a  G arguments(A). Similarly 
the second suspect gives their evidence to the police, d : i/j G A, which again combined with world 
knowledge e : —+ a € A shows their innocence {d, e }  : a  G arguments(A). Similarly for the third
suspect, /  :<p,g : 0  —» a  G A  so { f , g}  : a  G arguments(A). Thus early in the investigation Holmes 
will frame the confirmation {{6 , c}, {d, e}, { / ,  <7}}: a ,  i.e. the witness statements and world knowledge 
forming the defending confirmation.
W hat H olm es also knows from  his evaluations is that this list o f suspects is exhaustive and thus he 
knows a : —i(7r A tp A 0 ) 6  A. Therefore H olm es knows A =  {a : —>(7r A xjj A <f>), b : 7r, c  : 7r —► a ,  d : 
V>, e : ip —* a ,  / :  </>, g : (f> —> a } .  From  this constraint, com bined with V I ,  the preclusive undercut arises, 
namely:
( { M } :^ (7rA(7r -*■ a)A^A(V> -» a)A(f)A((f) -► a )) , {{&, c}, {d, e}, { / ,  # }} , {{6, c}, {d, e}, { / ,  g}}  :a)
G preclusiveUndercuts({{6, c}, {d, e}, {/,<?}} :a , A).
At this stage he does not know which suspect is lying. Using his keen powers of observation, coupled 
with his various pieces of world knowledge (concerning the behaviour of cigar ash, strides, mud on 
shoes, writing on walls, etc.) he gathers some additional pieces of evidence (which he adds to A). The 
way he describes his next step of logic is ‘eliminate all the other factors and the one that remains must 
the truth’. In other words, the standard logic of V E :  given - 17r V ->tjj V ->0, then establishing independent 
arguments confirming xf) and <p implies that —>7r must be the case.
3.5. Practical Motivation for Preclusive Undercut 74
In the murder mystery Holmes quietly gathers small details that eliminate two of the three suspects; 
the police then arrest the remaining suspect, who provided b : 7r. Subsequently Holmes explains to 
Watson that the matter was elementary.
3.5.3 Cross Examination Uses Tautological Preclusive Undercuts
In Section 2.5.1 I introduced the inconsistent confirmation and pointed out that it is problematic if used 
in professional debate. I argued the need for some construct to disallow the use of inconsistent confirma­
tions. Preclusive undercut is the mechanism exactly fitting that requirement. It is, in fact, just a particular 
form of preclusive undercut that repudiates inconsistent confirmations, namely the tautological preclu­
sion. I start this motivating example by showing the inconsistent confirmation.
During the Hutton enquiry in September 2003, (as reported by the BBC and others), a witness for 
the UK Government who worked in Human Relations was arguing that her conduct was in order, call 
it the claim a. At one point she said that there was no ‘naming procedure’ for releasing the names of 
civil servants to the press, so she could be excused for not following such a procedure. Let this naming 
procedure be 0  and thus her piece of evidence is ->0. Her logic, building on an implied piece of world 
knowledge ->0 —> a  was thus { - i 0 , —>/3 —» a }  I- a .
Under cross examination at another point the same witness said that Dr Kelly would have known 
of the Government’s naming procedure, call it claim 7  (i.e. 7  =  ‘Kelly knew 0 ')  and thus there was no 
need for her to brief him about his naming. Common sense or world knowledge provides 7  —*► 0  (i.e. ‘if 
Kelly knew the naming procedure then that implies a naming procedure exists’) and thus the argument 
{ l i l  0 }  I-  0 • Her implied reasoning is still that her conduct was in order, this time implying the 
world knowledge 0  —> a  and thus she is arguing { 7 , 7  —> / ? , / ? —► a }  b  a.
Each of this witness’s arguments has a valid minimal consistent subset o f premises that deductively 
proves its conclusion. In lieu of undercuts the witness may even feel (naively) pleased that she has two ar­
guments for a  and thus a  is confirmed. Also the barrister is not able to prove his goal of -> a .  To formalise 
this reasoning, adding labels, a : ->0, b : -<0 —> a ,  c : 7 ,  d : 7  —* 0 , e : 0  —> a E A  gives the defending con­
firmation is {{a, &}, { c ,  d, e}}  : a.  What is clear, however, is that formulae({{a, b}, { c ,  d , e } } ,  A ) I- _L. 
Cross examination has exposed that, taken together, her arguments are inconsistent, even though no 
individual argument is inconsistent.
Classical logic shows that not an inconsistency is a tautology. Therefore a preclusive undercut that 
attacks an inconsistent confirmation [i.e. that argues for -<(/\ formulae({{a, &}, ( c ,  d ,  e } } ,  A))] needs no 
assumptions. It is a self evident truth that the witness has contradicted herself. Thus:
(0:->(-</? A { p0  —► a )  A 7  A ( 7  —> /?) A (/? —> a ) ) ,  { { a ,&}, { c , d ,  e}}, {{a, 6 }, { c ,  d , e } } : a )
€ preclusivellndercuts({{a, 6 }, { c ,  d ,  e } } : a ,  A).
What the barrister has done is undermine both her arguments. A common phrase is that both of the 
witnesses arguments have been brought into question, and usually both arguments are treated as defeated.
When a barrister cross examines a helpful witness (one on his own side) he aims to do the opposite, 
that is to introduce confirmations of the key points thereby bolstering the main arguments supporting
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his case. If a third argument for a  was introduced, then the defeat of the above two would render a  
undefeated.
This discussion of cross examination has focussed on a contradiction in evidence from one witness. 
If more than one party is accused, or if the accused has witnesses to support their case, then labels are 
necessary. In this multiple-source labelled situation, contradictions in evidence, in practice, are even 
more likely to occur and thus preclusive undercuts are all the more common. Again in the Hutton 
enquiry, under cross examination from the barrister Gompertz, Queens Council for the Kelly family, 
incompatibilities were exposed between the evidence of the Defence Secretary Mr Geoffrey Hoon and 
that of his aides on who was present at the meeting that decided on the Dr Kelly naming strategy. The 
logic is fundamentally the same as for the single witness case.
3.5.4 Tautological Preclusions are ‘Just Asking Questions’
To conclude this section on motivation for preclusive undercuts I observe that there is an interesting 
connection between preclusive undercuts and the asking of questions.
A tautological preclusive undercut can be phrased as a question. For example one could ask: ‘please 
can you clarify how, as you say, on the one hand Dr Kelly would have known the Government’s naming 
procedure, while on the other hand you say that such a procedure did not exist?’ Such a question tends 
to have an innocent tone as it requires no evidence to argue its claim, but rather is pointing out the 
self-evident truth that an inconsistency is present.
Politicians and debaters often prefer asking questions to making direct statements of attack, because 
a question cannot be rebutted or undercut, whereas as a direct statement can. This observation is present 
in the classical logic as not a tautology is a contradiction. Thus, any attempt to rebut or undercut a 
tautological preclusion would require an inconsistency and hence would not be a valid argument. If the 
topic of debate is highly controversial and opposition is not well tolerated or well received then asking 
questions is all the more common.
It can be the case that the barrister has unearthed an apparent contradiction, but one that, in truth, 
has a rational explanation. Even this situation can be turned to advantage as such an answer provides 
further formulae in A , with the possible result that inconsistency is introduced. It is not uncommon that 
while a witness tries to hide an inconsistency by introducing falsehoods they ‘tie themselves in knots’ 
and supply further contradictions.
Two examples of political commentators ‘just innocently asking questions’ on highly controversial 
topics are 1) the article in the Guardian on 6  September 2003 by Michael Meacher, Member of Parliament 
and former Minister for the Environment, entitled ‘This war on terrorism is bogus’ and 2) the first chapter 
of the book by Michael Moore ‘Dude, W here’s My Country’ regarding events of 11 September 2001. I 
cite these two controversial examples because of their precise use of logic in ‘just asking questions’ to 
imply preclusive undercuts attacking the claims of their opponents.
Each of these questions stems from an inconsistency found between the opponent’s statements 
and reports in reputable news sources. These question takes the form of ‘please explain this apparent 
inconsistency’, thereby politely allowing for the case that there is a reasonable explanation that the
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questioner was unaware of. Also as the subject matter of the questioning is so politically contentious the 
questioner avoids being subject to criticism as they are making no direct accusations.
3.6 Preclusive Undercut Generalises Canonical Undercut
Canonical undercuts are a special case of preclusive undercuts, or to reverse that, preclusive undercuts are 
a generalisation of canonical undercuts -  a relationship which I now clarify. Every canonical undercut 
has an equivalent preclusive undercut, but not always vice versa. I examine this relationship in four 
stages:
1 . a mono-attack mono-target preclusive undercut has an equivalent canonical undercut,
2 . a multi-attack mono-target preclusive undercut has an equivalent set of canonical undercuts,
3. a mono-attack multi-target preclusive undercut has no equivalent canonical undercuts and
4. a multi-attack multi-target preclusive undercut has no equivalent canonical undercuts.
So first, the mono-target mono-attack preclusive undercut situation:
Proposition 3.6.1. Let A  be a knowledgebase o f  labelled assumption formulae, let I  : a ,  J  : 0  € 
arguments(A) and let { /} : a,  { J } : 0  e  0 (A ).
J : 0  e  canonicalUndercuts(7: a , A)
iff ( { J } :0 , { / } , { / } :  a )  € preclusiveUndercuts({/} : a ,  A).
Proof Given that J : <j> e  canonicallindercuts(7: a , A ), each condition of Definitions 3.4.1 and 3.4.2 of 
preclusive undercut will have to be met for ({J }  : 0, {7}, {7} : a) e  preclusivellndercuts({7} : a , A ). 
A canonical undercut, by Definition 3.3.2, is one argument J  : 0  attacking one argument 7 : a . 
Let Z =  {J }  and Y =  {7}. So confirm(J : 0) =  {J }  : 0  =  Z : 0  is a self confirmation, 
which means | label(Z : 0)| =  1 and Z /  0, thereby meeting the mono-attack condition. Like­
wise for the defending confirmation confirm(7 : a )  =  {7} : a  =  Y : a  is another self confirma­
tion, which means also |label(Y : a )| =  1 . Thus the target X must be X =  Y as that is the only 
value that satisfies 0 /  X C Y, meaning mono-target. Consequently there cannot exist any in­
validating confirmation as this candidate meets the X C W  condition, so the conditions of Defini­
tion 3.4.2 do not exclude any candidate preclusion. All that remains now is the latter part of of Defi­
nitions 3.4.1. Given that stripAssumptions(formulae(X, A )) =  stripAssumptions(formulae({J}, A )) =  
stripAssumptions(formulae( J, A )) is the same for confirmations and individual arguments, the strip and 
canonical ordering conditions are identical for both canonical and preclusive undercuts; so there is no 
need to analyse the expansion of 0. Thus given J  : 0  £ canonicalUndercuts(7 : a ,  A) it follows that 
(confirm(J : 0),label(confirm(7 : a)),confirm(7 : a )) e  preclusiveUndercuts(confirm(7 : a ) , A ) so 
( { J }  : 0, {7}, {7}: a ) e  preclusiveUndercuts({7} : a,  A ). Given the proof so far, the other iff direction 
is simple. The attacking argument inside Z : 0  is J : 0  and the defending argument inside Y : a  is 7: a.  Be­
cause the strip and canonical ordering conditions of Definition 3.4.1 are met it follows that the claim and
3.6. Preclusive Undercut Generalises Canonical Undercut 77
enumeration conditions for canonical undercut are also met. Thus J : 0  G canonicalU ndercuts(/: a ,  A) 
iff ({ J } :0 , { / } ,{ /} :a)  G preclusiveUndercuts({7} : a ,  A ). □
Thus every canonical undercut has one and only one equivalent preclusive undercut, and that preclu­
sive undercut will be a mono-attack mono-target preclusive undercut. This equivalent preclusive under­
cut may not be a maximum cardinality preclusive undercut, but all the same it will be a perfectly valid 
preclusive undercut.
Now I look at the second of the four situations, that of multi-attack mono-target preclusive un­
dercuts. Every mono-target preclusive undercut has an equivalent set of canonical undercuts all with 
the same claim. In other words, there exists a mono-target preclusive undercut iff there exists a set of 
canonical undercuts all with the same claim.
Proposition 3.6.2. Let A b e  a knowledgebase o f labelled assumption formulae, let I : a , J\:<p,. . . ,  Jn : 
4> € argum ents(A) and let n  G N.
( { J i , . . . ,  J „ } :0 ,  { /} ,{ /} :  a)  G preclusivellndercuts({/} :a,  A) 
iff J i : 0 , . . . ,  J n : 0  G canonicalllndercuts(7: a ,  A).
Proof. Proposition 3.6.1 has established that each J* : 0  G { J i : 0, . . . , J n : 0}, where Ji : 
0  G canonicalllndercuts(7 : a ,  A ), will mandate the existence of ({Ji} : 0, {7},{7} : a)  G 
preclusiveUndercuts({7} : a ,  A ) and vice versa. The next step is to use Proposition 2.5.2 that many 
self-confirming confirmations for the same claim, i.e. { J i}  : 0 , . . . ,  { Jn } : 0  are equivalent to a single 
confirmation, {J \ , . . . ,  J n } : 0 , for that same claim and vice versa. Thus ( { J i , . . . ,  J n } : 0, {7}, {7} : 
a)  G preclusiveUndercuts({7} : a ,  A) iff ({ J i}  : 0, {7},{7} : a ) , . . . ,  ({J n } : 0, {7},{7} : a)  G 
preclusiveUndercuts({7} :a ,  A ) iff J i : 0 , . . . ,  J n : 0  G canonicalUndercuts(7:a, A ). □
Multi-target preclusive undercuts are the preclusive undercuts that do not have equivalent canonical 
undercuts. The contrary, that mono-target preclusive undercuts have equivalent canonical undercuts, is 
Proposition 3.6.1.
Proposition 3 .6 3 . Let A b e  a knowledgebase o f  labelled assumption formulae, let I : a , . . . ,  J n - 
0  G arguments( A), let X : a ,  Y : a  G 0 ( A )  and let n  G N.
I f  ( { J \ , . . . ,  J n } :0,  X, Y : a )  G preclusivellndercuts(Y: a ,  A) such that |X| >  1 
then J i : 0 , . . . ,  J n : 0  ^  canonicalUndercuts(7: a , A) where I  G X.
Proof. If the target confirmation X : a  is such that | label (X : a ) \ >  1 then there does not exist an 7: a  such 
that confirm(7: a)  =  X : a .  Instead it will be the case that X =  {7 i , . . . ,  7m} where m  > 2. It also fol­
lows, from Definition 3.4.2, that 0  =  0 1 A .. .A0P =  ->(/\ stripAssumptions(formulae({7i,. . . ,  7n }, A)))  
with m  > 2 and p >  2. So any argument or arguments with this claim of 0  =  0 i A . . .  A 0 m will be 
attacking more than one argument and consequently cannot comply with Definition 3.3.2 of canonical 
undercut. So if ( { J i , . . . ,  J n } : 0 , X , Y  : a )  G preclusivellndercuts(Y : a ,  A ), where |X| >  1 then 
J i : 0 , . . . ,  J n : 0  ^  canonicalUndercuts(7: a ,  A) where 7 G X. □
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In the above proposition if n  =  1 I have mono-attack, multi-target preclusions. If n > I I  have 
multi-attack, multi-target preclusions. Thus I have just addressed both the third and fourth situation 
outlined at the start of this section.
A preclusive undercut is either mono-target or multi-target (it cannot be both or neither) so this 
proposition makes is clear exactly which preclusive undercuts have equivalent canonicals and which do 
not. The first input parameter to a canonical undercut is a single argument, not a confirmation. So, 
while a canonical undercut can only attack one argument, a preclusive undercut has the added ability to 
attack multiple argument. Nonetheless, preclusive undercut still retains all of the properties of canonical 
undercut -  none are lost in this generalisation. It is this ability to attack multiple arguments that allows 
preclusive undercut to attack inconsistent confirmations.
3.7 Tautological Preclusions Attack Inconsistent Confirmations
Preclusive undercuts prevent a debater or debating team from being inconsistent. Exposing of inconsis­
tencies in a debater’s arguments is part of cross-examination. Specifically, it is the tautological preclusive 
undercut which attack the inconsistent confirmations of Section 2.5.1. The following example shows that 
it is possible to start with a tautology, extend it with VI and end up with the full claim of a multi-target 
preclusive undercut that attacks an inconsistent confirmation.
Exam ple 3.7.1. Tautological u n d e rc u t Let A  =  {a : (3, b : 0  —> a , c :  7r —> a , d  : ->(3 A n}. Let 
I  =  {a, &}, J  = {c, d}, K  =  0. Thus I : a , J  : a , K  : 0  V —>/5, K  : ->(3 V (3 V —>7r, K  : ->(3 V ->{->(3 A 
•n ) , K  : ->(0 A (0  —* a )  A (tt —► a )  A (->0 A 7r)) G arguments(A). Therefore { / , J }  : a , { K }  : 
-i(0  A (0  —► a )  A (n  —► a )  A (-<0 A 7r)) G 0 (A ). Consequently ({ /f  } : ->(0 A (0  —► a )  A (7r —> a )  A 
(->0 A 7r)), { /, «/}, { / , J }  : a )  G preclusivellndercuts({J, J } : a ,  A). Here { /, J }  : a  is an inconsistent 
confirmation and ( { / f }  : ~>(0 A (0  —> a )  A ( t v  —> a )  A (~>0 A 7r)) ,  { I ,  J } ,  { / ,  J }  : a )  is a tautological 
preclusive undercut.
A tautological preclusive undercut must have an attacking confirmation containing only one ar­
gument. That one argument must have a support containing no assumptions. Hence for an attack­
ing confirmation Z : </> it is not the case that Z /  0, but rather Z =  {0} =  {0} so |Z| =  1 and 
not the zero of |0| =  0. Using this approach a debating team can argue that it is self evident that 
the other side has contradicted itself. It was established in Proposition 2.5.1 that for all a , {0} : a  
is a confirmation, iff a  b T. Therefore given that A is a knowledgebase of labelled assumption 
formulae, J  G arguments(A) and W : a ,Y  : a ,Z  : 7  G 0(A ), then it follows immediately that if 
(Z :7 , W , Y : q )  g  preclusiveUndercuts(Y:a, A ) with J  G Z and J  — 0 then |label(Z : -7) | =  1 .
A tautological undercut must thus be attacking a target confirmation of at least two arguments.
Proposition 3.7.1. Let A  be a knowledgebase o f labelled assumption formulae and l e t W : a , Y : a , Z :  
l  e  0 (A ).
If (Z : 7 , W , Y : a) G preclusivellndercuts(Y: a , A), where Z =  {0} then |label(W : a ) | > 2 .
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Proof. Suppose instead that |label(W : a ) | =  1. Clearly 7  is a tautology. Also known is that 7  is 
the negation of the conjunction of stripAssumptions(formulae(W, A)).  Clearly {->T} I— _L so if indeed 
|label(W : a ) | =  1 then stripAssumptions(formulae(W, A )) I- _L. If  that was the case then the support 
of an argument J  : a  where J  € W, would be inconsistent, stripAssumptions(formulae( J, A )) h _L 
and thus J  : a  would not be a valid argument. So |label(W : a )| =  1 cannot be the case. Any other 
value of |label(W : a ) | would not require any individual argument J  G W to be inconsistent so it can be 
concluded that |label(W : a ) |  >  2. □
Thus tautological undercuts cannot be canonical undercuts and must be preclusive undercuts. This 
point, that the support of any canonical undercut J  : 7  E canonicalllndercuts(/ : a ,  A) is such that 
J  /  0, was established earlier in Proposition 3.3.5. Thus I can unambiguously use the term tautological 
undercut to refer to a tautological preclusive undercut.
From the definition of preclusive undercut, Definition 3.4.2, the terminology has been established 
that the target confirmation label label(X : a )  is always a subset or equal to the defending confirma­
tion label label(Y : a ) , i.e. X C Y. Therefore a tautological undercut must be attacking a defending 
confirmation of at least two arguments.
To further the analysis o f preclusive undercut it is useful to have two helper functions as follows:
Definition 3.7.1. Let A  be a knowledgebase o f labelled assumption formulae and let (Z : </>, X, Y  : 
a )  E preclusivel)ndercuts(Y : a ,  A). The attacker functions, denoted attacker((Z : </>, X ,Y  : a ) )  and 
attacker({ (Z : 0, X, Y : a ) }), given a preclusive undercut or set o f  preclusive undercuts return the attack­
ing confirmation or set o f  attacking confirmations, such that:
attacker((Z:0, X, Y :a ) )  =  Z:0. 
attacker({(Z:0,X, Y :a )} )  =  {Z :0}.
If there exists an inconsistency between two arguments of one confirmation then the existence of the 
tautological undercut of those two inconsistent undercuts is independent of A. Thus given an inconsistent 
confirmation, the tautological preclusive undercut is automatically and always introduced into the debate 
without needing to reference A . It happens for all knowledgebases.
One might be tempted to record the following relationship using iff: there exists an inconsistent 
confirmation Y : a  iff there exists a tautological preclusion Z : 0  E {attacker((Z : 0 , X , Y  : a ) )  | (Z:  
<f>, X, Y : a)  E preclusiveUndercuts(Y: a ,  A ), J  E Y and J  =  0}. However, such a biconditional is not 
helpful as it has Y : a  on both sides. More realistically, the confirmation Z : <j> always exists as it is a 
tautology, but the confirmation Y : a  only sometimes exists -  it is a matter of A. So such a biconditional 
would only be saying that if Y : a  exists it will always be subject to undercut -  which is a conditional, 
not a biconditional.
Proposition 3.7.2. Let A  be a knowledgebase o f  labelled assumption formulae and let V : a ,  W : a , Y : 
a ,Z : 7 E 0(A ).
For any confirmation Y  : a, i f  there exists a W C Y such that formulae(W, A ) h  1  and there
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does not exist a V C  W  such that formulae(V, A ) b  _L, then there exists a (Z : 7 ,  W, Y : a)  G 
preclusiveUndercuts(Y: a ,  A).
Proof. The proposition starts with by ensuring Y : a  is an inconsistent confirmation. However, the set 
formulae(Y, A ) may not be minimal with respect to formulae(Y, A ) b  ± . Thus it is necessary to ensure 
the non-existence of V C W  with formulae(V, A) h _L, so it follows that formulae(V, A) is minimal for 
proving _L. Establishing this minimality is essential as otherwise V : a  would be an invalidating target 
confirmation for the preclusive undercut (Z : 7 ,  W , Y : a )  G preclusiveUndercuts(Y : a , A). So given 
that the target confirmation W : a  is a minimal inconsistent confirmation it follows that the tautological 
preclusive undercut ( Z : 7 ,  W , Y :a) G preclusiveUndercuts(Y: a ,  A ) must exist. □
One might think that the supports of only two arguments would combine to make an inconsistency, 
but that is not the case. The supports of any number of arguments can combine and be necessary to 
make an inconsistency. However that number must be greater than one because the definition of mincon 
arguments prevents having an inconsistent support.
Once a debating team has established the other side has contradicted itself then it is an interesting 
question as to the interpretation of that result. All o f the arguments in the target confirmation have been 
brought into question, however no single one of them has been shown to be defeated. A common theme 
in legal argumentation is that the entire set o f inconsistent arguments is defeated. An even more extreme 
legal position, albeit a popular one, is that the tautological undercut shows that everything the other 
team says is untrustworthy. This extreme position is not logically justifiable as it is an argument that 
generalises from the specific to the universal.
A tautological confirmation (which can act as the attacking confirmation in a tautological preclusive 
undercut) cannot be subject to a preclusive undercut.
Proposition 3.7.3. Let A b e  a knowledgebase o f  labelled assumption formulae and let Y : a  G 0(A).
/ / m  1-  T  then preclusiveUndercuts(Y :a ,  A) =  0.
Proof I f  stripAssumptions(formulae(label(Y : a ) ,  A)))  b  T  then it follows that Y : a  is a tau­
tological confirmation, such that I  G Y, I  =  0 and |Y| =  1, i.e. b  a . Consequently any 
preclusive undercut with a target or defending confirmation of this Y  : a  will require a claim of 
- i( / \  stripAssumptions(formulae(7, A))) .  However such a claim is not allowed for any argument as that 
argument would be inconsistent. Thus if a  is a tautology then preclusiveUndercuts(Y: a ,  A) =  0. □
Thus for a debater, the tautological preclusion is a useful tool. It has the unique benefits that a) it 
can never be counter attacked and b) it is always available regardless of the contents of A. It is thus 
effective in preventing an opposing team from using inconsistent confirmations. So while one could 
directly constrain confirmations to be consistent, the preclusive undercut does exactly that job and does 
it more elegantly. The preclusion is more elegant as a) it directly mirrors professional debating and b) it 
has additional purposes in also undercutting consistent confirmations.
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3.8 Non-unique Formulae, Labels and Preclusive Undercut
I now discuss cardinality of the preclusive undercut function as a starting point for looking at the effect 
of labels and non-unique assumption formulae.
Whereas with canonical undercuts the statement J  : /3 e  canonicalUndercuts(7 : a , A) specifies 
one and only one canonical undercut, the situation with preclusive undercuts is different. The statement 
(Z : (3, X, Y : a )  € preclusiveUndercuts(Y: a ,  A) specifies one or more preclusive undercuts. The distin­
guishing factor between these many preclusive undercuts is that they have different target confirmations, 
X. Thus while a canonical undercut is a relationship between two arguments, a preclusive undercut is a 
relationship between three confirmations.
Proposition 3.8.1. Let A b e  a knowledgebase o f  labelled assumption formulae, l e t X : a ,  Y : a  € 0 (A ).
0 <  |preclusiveU ndercuts(Y :a, A ))} | <  (2|Y| -  1) • (2midLattice(A) -  l) .
Proof. The label of the defending confirmation Y : a  can contain many target confirmation labels X as 
X C Y. The Definition 3.4 .1 of preclusive undercut requires 0 ^  X. Thus the maximum number of target 
confirmations for a given defending confirmation Y : a  is — 1 , with the - 1  due to the 0  constraint. 
Given one target confirmations X : a  the next challenge is to find the number of attacking confirmations 
Z : 0. So how many confirmations are derivable from A  that imply this 0? Proposition 2.5.7 states 
that 1 <  10 (0 , A )| <  2m'd*_a*t'c e (A). A refinement is needed because the unfounded confirmation 
is not allowed, again by Definition 3.4.1 , to ensure 0 : 0  ^  Z : 0  and thus it is necessary to deduct
1. Combining these two results means that the maximum number of preclusive undercuts for Y : a  is 
(2*Yl — 1) • (2 m'dl-a ttic e (A) _  i) .  The smallest number of attacking confirmations is zero if A  Y- _L, so the 
lower limit is zero. Furthermore, if non-unique formulae exist in A  it will not effect X, Y or Z as X, Y  
and Z are purely labels. Thus 0 <  |preclusiveUndercuts(Y :a , A ))} | <  ( 2 ^  — 1) • (2 m'd*-aH'ce(A) -  
1). □
I now look at the impact of non-unique formulae, labels and the stripping of within the definition of 
preclusive undercut, Definitions 3.4.1 and 3.4.2. This stripping is necessary as, in my representation for 
confirmation, labels only exist on the left hand side of the colon. Claims are unlabelled formulae. When 
forming the claim of the preclusive undercut I make one conjunction out of the premises of the attacked 
arguments using the unlabelled premise formulae. Thus, strip is needed in the definition to remove the 
labels to allow the claim of the undercut to match the support o f the defending argument.
Unlike canonical, Pollock and Wigmore undercuts, preclusive undercuts do not have an unlabelled 
form in the literature to be contrasted with. The following example shows the role of labels in preclu­
sive undercuts, demonstrating that two confirmations (i.e. a defending confirmation and an attacking 
confirmation) related by preclusive undercut can have many target confirmations, due to labels.
Example 3.8.1. Two target confirmations. Let A  = { a : a , b : a  —> (3, c : a , d : 7 ,  e : -17  V (3, f : ->q}. 
Let I  — { a , b } , J  = { b , c } , K  =  {d, e } , L  =  { / } .  Then I : (3, J  : (3, K  : (3, L  : ~^a,L : ->(a A (c* —> 
0)) € arguments(A) and { I , J , K }  : 0 , { L }  : ^ a , { L }  : ->(0 : A (a  —> (3)) e  0 (A ). Conse­
quently ( {L}  : - , (a A  (a  -  0 ) ) , { I } , { I , J , K } : 0 ) , ( { L } : ^ ( a A ( a  -> 0)) ,  { J} , {I ,  J , K }  : (3) e
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preclusiveUndercuts({7,«/, K }  : (3, A). Furthermore ({L } : -i(a  A (a  —> 0)) ,  { I ,  J } , { / ,  J, K }  : 0)  G 
preclusiveUndercuts({7, J, K }  : 0,  A ) as {7, J }  : 0  cannot be a target confirmation because there exist 
two invalidating target confirmations, both that happen to be se lf confirmations.
Imagine the defending confirmation as a vertex in a tree, with its children being the attacking con­
firmations of its preclusive undercuts. The interesting question for the above example is then should 
there be one or two children? [I later go on to adopt having two children in the tree in this situation.] If 
two children then the attacking confirmations would be identical -  without some syntactic device, such 
as edge labels, they would be indistinguishable.
This Example 3.8.1 also raises the question of how much defeating power is provided. Is it one 
unit of defeat as there is only one confirmation {L }  : - i(a  A (a  —> 0))?  Or, as there are two target 
confirmations, is it two units o f defeat? Does counting target confirmations introduce double counting?
I argue no, that it is more intuitive to count this situation as two attacks and that the target confirmations 
have merit in tracking what is happening. But first I must relay more about the behaviour of the various 
confirmations involved in preclusion.
Now I turn to the role of VI in extending claims of candidate preclusive undercuts.
3.8.1 Growing Claims and Invalidation
Earlier with canonical undercuts, in Section 3.3, it was clear that VI can be safely used to ‘grow’ the 
claim so that the full support o f the undercut argument is matched. This is simply a property of classical 
logic. Similarly with preclusive undercuts VI can play an influential role, however here it is a slightly 
more novel behaviour. The claim of the preclusive undercut can be ‘grown’ to fill in a variety of missing 
parts. If an undercut attacks just one premise each for several arguments, then VI can be used to grow 
the claim to attack all o f the premises of several arguments. However, the invalidating aspect of the 
definition of preclusive undercut specifically prohibits growing a claim to attack arguments for which 
one has no assumptions.
While a conjectured undercut can fail to be a preclusive undercut if it attacks the support of some­
thing less than a whole number of arguments, (as shown in the following example), there will always be 
a logically equivalent argument (following from VI) that is valid preclusive undercut. Continuing this 
series of examples:
Example 3.8.2. The role of VI. Let  A =  {a : 0 , b : 0  —> o, c : 7 , d : -< 7  V <7, e : A, /  : —>
- . A , 0 : - . 0 V - 7 } .  Let I  =  { a , b } , J  =  { c , d } , K  = { e , f } , L  =  {g} and R  -  {L },V  =
Therefore I  : a, J  : a, K  : a, L : ->(0 A 7 ), L : ->(0 A (0  —» o) A 7  A ( -1 7  V <7 ) ) ,  L : ->(0 A (0  —» 
a) A 7  A ( -1 7  V o) A A A (~>a —> -iA)) G argum ents(A) and R : ->(0 A (0  —> o) A 7 ), R : —>(/3 A (0  —»
o) A 7  A ( -1 7  V ct)), R : ->(0 A (0  —> o) A 7  A ( -1 7  V o) A A A (~>o —► -A )) G 0(A) .  It can be concluded 
that given A 5, a valid preclusive undercut fo r  V :o  is (R: ->(0A(0  —» a) A y A ( ^ y V o ) ) ) ,  {I ,  J } ,  V: o) .  
However, the valid confirmation R : ->(0 A (0  —> o)  A 7  A ( -1 7  V a )  A  A A  ( - > 0  —> ->A)) with a target o f  
{ I ,  J , K }  is not a valid preclusive undercut as invalidation occurs.
In this example I started with pieces of the attack on the assumption sets of two arguments; namely
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i) ->/3 is a partial attack on { a : (3, b : (3 —> a}  and ii) -1 7  is a partial attack on {c : 7 , d: ->7  V o }. The logic 
allowed ‘growing’ the formula (3 —> a  in the first case and -1 7  V  a  in the second. This part of the example 
shows the valid growing of assumptions to round out or complete the attack on multiple arguments.
However the attempt to further grow the attack to take on a completely new argument is prohibited. 
That is, even though A A (~>a —► -iA) can be grown as an argument and also as a confirmation, it is not 
allowed as a preclusive undercut.
Given the definition of 0(c*,A ), that if |label(X : a)\ >  1 , (i.e. for everything other than self 
confirmations), then a W : a  with W  C X will always exist in ()(a , A) as 0 ( a ,  A)  is a power set with a 
minimum cardinality member of 0 : a.
This concludes the properties of preclusive undercuts. While I have given a comprehensive analysis, 
more research could be done further comparing and contrasting canonical and preclusive undercuts.
3.9 Attack, Abstract Attack and Attack Graphs
Now that definitions for undercut and rebuttal are established, both at the level of individual arguments 
and confirmations, the simplifying construct of ‘attack’ can be introduced. The concept of attack is 
central to the abstract framework of (Dung, 1993; Dung, 1995) and the semi-abstract ABA framework 
(Bondarenko et al., 1997; Dung et al., 2006). The attack construct has assisted Dung in deriving several 
important results about logic programming and game playing and facilitated Bondarenko et al in showing 
the unity of a wide variety of non-monotonic logics.
To build on Dung’s concept o f abstract attack I will describe bridging assumptions that map be­
tween the concrete world of mincon argumentation in the bulk of this thesis and the abstract Dung 
framework. This building on concepts from the abstract and the ABA work aims to provide a more 
concrete interpretation of these abstract frameworks -  continuing the broad theme of others’ research, 
notably (Amgoud & Cayrol, 1998; Amgoud & Cayrol, 2002), (Baroni et al., 2002; Baroni & Giacomin, 
2003) and (Prakken & Vreeswijk, 2002). Thus I start with a reminder of Dung’s definition of his Dung 
argumentation framework, which is comprised solely of abstract arguments and abstract attacks, with a 
slight refinement of symbol use to avoid any subsequent ambiguity:
Definition 3.9.1. A  Dung argumentation framework, denoted dung Framework =  
(dungArguments, attacks#  (dungArguments)), showing the relationships within a set o f  arguments, is a 
pair such that:
dungFramework =  (dungArguments, attacks#(dungArguments)), where
1. dungArguments is a set o f  abstract arguments and
2. attacks# (dungArguments) C dungArguments x dungArguments
is an abstract attacks relationship between arguments.
The tuple ( X, y )  € attacks#(dungArguments) where X , y  e  dungArguments, denotes that the 
argument X  attacks argument y, or in other words that 3  ^ is attacked by X.
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To map Dung’s simple definition back to the mincon world requires two bridging assumptions. 
While a number of bridging assumptions exist in the literature, the analysis of which I leave as an area 
for further research, the original bridging assumptions come from (Amgoud & Cayrol, 1998). While I 
build on (Amgoud & Cayrol, 1998) in this section, I will be using a different definition of undercut and 
be adding labels.
I start with the argument assumption. I hold that to examine a concrete instance of the Dung or 
ABA frameworks, that could be implemented or used in a professional debate, it is necessary to say 
or define what would constitute an argument. Thus given two arbitrary items A and B, what are the 
criteria to say whether A and B are arguments or not, separate from any declaration that A and B simply 
are arguments? Clearly Dung gives no indication of what constitutes an argument; that is exactly his 
foundation assumption. If, however, a more direct comparison of abstract and concrete argumentation is 
desired then some bridging is needed.
I would suggest that the ideal bridging would allow a) a concrete implementation in a professional 
debate setting, while at the same time b) providing overall behaviours in keeping with motivations or 
common sense intuitions for Dung’s framework. The paper (Besnard & Hunter, 2001), in looking at this 
area of bridging, shows how a collapse might occur. Most would probably agree that their collapse is or 
should be seen as more a feature of the choice of assumptions and not some flaw in the Dung framework.
I have not placed my argument assumption in a formal definition as I do not use it any further in 
the formalisms of this thesis. My first assumption is thus the argument assumption in which I suggest an 
instance of the Dung framework where I let { X  \ X  £  dungArguments} =  { I : a  \ I : a  £ arguments(A)} 
iff formulae(label(J : a ) ,  A ) is the support o f X , stripDeduction(7 : a )  is the claim of X  and classical 
logic is used to infer the claim from the support. Clearly Dung never made any such statements, but this 
understanding does facilitate comparison.
My second assumption is to clarify what is meant by the attacks relationship. Because (Amgoud 
& Cayrol, 1998) do not use canonical undercuts from the more recent paper (Besnard & Hunter, 2001), 
the below is not literally their definition. However, the below is a close adaptation of the (Amgoud & 
Cayrol, 1998) attack assumption. This simple definition plays a central role in my thesis.
Definition 3.9.2. Let A. be a knowledgebase o f  labelled assumption formulae and let I  : a  £ 
arguments(A). An  argument attack, denoted  argumentAttacks(/ : a ,  A), is the set o f arguments that 
attack I : a  such that:
argumentAttacks(7: a ,  A ) =  rebuttals(7: a ,  A ) U canonicalUndercuts(7: a , A).
A sequence of two or more arguments (A , B , C , . . .  , N ) ,  where A , B , C , . . .  , N  £ arguments( A), 
that each attack the adjacent neighbour next in the row, such that B  £ argumentAttacks(A, A ), C  £ 
argumentAttacks(7?, A ) , . . . ,  I call an attack chain of arguments or just a chain for short. I call the first 
member, A,  which is attacked, the head of the chain and the last member, N ,  which attacks, the tail of 
the chain. I call the direction from tail to head up the chain, and from head to tail down the chain. In this 
way small pieces of a graph of arguments can be analysed while avoiding the complexity of the whole 
graph. As trees are a kind of graphs, chains also help with the analysis of trees of arguments.
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In Section 4.8 and Definition 4.8.2, for reasons to be made clear in the next chapter, I refine my 
attacks assumption to that I call “direct attack” . An area for further research would be to examine more 
deeply the topic o f collapse from (Besnard & Hunter, 2001) and see how it is affected by using that direct 
attack rather than this more general attack.
3.9.1 Argument Graphs, Confirmation Graphs and Contradiction Graphs
To allow this discussion of attack chains to be more robust and extensive I now define the argument 
graph, which is akin to D ung’s graphs, see for example the many diagrams in (Prakken & Vreeswijk, 
2002), as follows. Later in the thesis where I provide argument graphs, these commonly show just the 
subset o f relevant vertices and edges. Often the graphs are annotated to provide further explanation.
Definition 3 .93. Let A  be a knowledgebase o f  labelled assumption form ulae and I  : <p, J  : ip 6 
argum ents(A ). An  argument graph, denoted  argum entG raph(A ) =  (V,£), where V is the set o f  
vertices and £  is the set o f  edges, is a directed graph such that:
V =  {/:<£ | 7 :0  =  argum ents(A )},
£  — { ( I  :<p,J :rp) \ I  :<j>,J :xp e  V, where 7 :0  G argum entA ttacks(J: 0 , A )}.
One implication of these argument and argument attacks assumptions is that self-defeat is ruled out, 
or in other words that an argument cannot attack itself. Thus there are no loops in my argument graphs. 
A claim such as T am a liar’ is an example o f a self defeating argument and hence o f an argument that 
cannot be represented as a mincon. Thus it is known that I : a  & argum entA ttacks(/: a ,  A ), or in other 
words X  & argumentAttacks(A\ A ). The Dung argumentation framework does not rule out self-defeat, 
that is an argument which attacks itself, such as ( X , X ) .  Self defeat is not dwelt on in (Dung, 1993; 
Dung, 1995), however it is extensively discussed in (Prakken & Vreeswijk, 2002) and mentioned in 
(Cayrol & Lagasquie-Schiex, 2002).
Given argumentAttacks() and argum entG raph(A ), it is also reasonable to extend the analysis from 
the level o f individual arguments to the level o f confirmations. In the next definition I extend the attacks 
assumption. Preclusive undercuts are defined in Definition 3.4.2 and confirmation rebuttals in Defini­
tion 2 .6 .8 .
3.9. Attack , Abstract Attack and Attack Graphs 86
Definition 3.9.4. Let A  be a knowledgebase o f  labelled assumption form ulae and let Y : a ,  Z : 0  € 0 (A ). 
The confirmation attacks function, denoted  confirmationAttacks(Y: a ,  A), is the set o f  attacks on Y : a  
derivable from  A  such that:
confirmationAttacks(Y :a , A ) =  preclusiveUndercuts(Y :ct, A ) 
u  { (Z :0 ,la b e l(Y :o ), Y :q ) | Z : 0 e  confirmationRebuttals(Y:q, A )} .
I call an individual (Z : 0 , X, Y : a )  € confirmationAttacks(Y: a ,  A ) a targeted attack tuple, where 
X ,Y  € C ,X  C Y. As with preclusive undercuts, Z : 0  is the attacking confirmation or attacker, X 
the target confirmation label and Y : a  the defending confirmation. Clearly neither the attacker nor the 
attacked confirmation can be labelled with the empty set.
One minor issue in forming this definition of confirmation attack is what should the target confir­
mation be for a confirmation attack that is a rebuttal? If W: ->a e confirm ationR ebutta ls(Y A ) then I 
define the target confirmation as the whole confirmation Y : q  as clearly every argument in it is attacked 
(which could not be said for the whole defending confirmation in the case of preclusive undercuts, but is 
the case for the target confirmation for preclusion).
A sequence of two or more confirmations (A, B , C , . . . ,  N ), where A , B , C , . . . ,  N  e  0 (A ) , that 
each attack the adjacent neighbour next in the line, such that B  e  confirmationAttacks(A, A ), C  € 
confirmationAttacks(£, A ) , . . . ,  I call an attack chain of confirmations. I use the terms head, tail, up and 
down as established for individual arguments. Consequently pieces of a graph or tree of confirmations 
can be studied in isolation. Again to make the discussion more robust I define the confirmation graph 
as follows. In an edge labelled graph, an edge is represented by a tuple (Z : 0 , X, Y : a )  where Z : 0  is
the vertex the edge is incident from, i.e. the attacking confirmation, Y : q  the vertex the edge is incident 
on, i.e. the defending confirmation, and X the edge label, i.e. the target confirmation label. Later in the 
thesis where I provide confirmation graphs these usually show just the subset of relevant vertices and 
edges. Often I annotate the graphs with text to provide further explanation.
Definition 3.9.5. Let A  be a knowledgebase o f  labelled assumption form ulae and  W : 0 , X : a , Y : a , Z :  
<$> € 0 (A ). A confirmation graph, denoted  confirmationGraph(0(A)) =  (V, £), where V  is the set o f  
vertices and S  is the set o f  edges, is an edged-labelled directed graph such that:
V =  { W : v’ I W : 0  =  top(O (0. A ))} ,
S  -  {(Z:<2>, X, Y :a ) \ Z:&,  Y :a  € V and  (Z :0 , X, Y :a )  € confirmationAttacks(Y:a, A )} .
To complete this section I introduce a third kind of graph, the contradiction graph, building on the 
earlier argument graph and confirmation graph.
Definition 3.9.6. Let A  be a knowledgebase o f  labelled assumption formulae, (S ,T)  : 0 , ( U , V )  : 
0 , (X, Y) : «  e  4 (A )  and  W e  C. A contradiction graph, denoted  contradictionGraph(#(A)) = 
(V, S), where V is the set o f  vertices and S  is the set o f  edges, is an edged-labelled directed graph such
3. 10. Conclusions for Undercut Framework 87
that:
V =  { (W : 0  | W :0  =  top (4 (0 , A ))} ,
£  =  { « U ,V ) : 0 ,X ,(W ,Y ) :a )  | (U, V ) : 0 , (X, Y) :a  G V and either
(U :0 , W ,X :q ) g  preclusiveUndercuts(X :a , A ) or 
(U :0 , W , Y :->«) G preclusivellndercuts(Y:-~>a, A )}.
Clearly, in the case that U : 0  is attacking X : a  then W  C  X. Otherwise U : 0  is attacking Y : -iq  
then W  C  Y. The contradiction graph is first used in Section 5.7.1 where it is helpful in illustrating 
some o f the behaviours of reflection. In this third graph, attacks are occurring both between and within 
vertices. As all vertices are m aximum cardinality contradictions each rebuttal V : ~^<p is fully defined.
That concludes the laying of the foundations on attack, abstract attack and attack graphs as well as 
this whole chapter on undercut.
3.10 Conclusions for Undercut Framework
This chapter on my undercut framework has formally defined the third foundation, or type of argument 
interaction, beyond confirmation and rebuttal, needed to track and judge professional debates. W hile 
undercut is widely discussed in the literature there is a lack of consensus on what exactly constitutes 
an undercut, how to represent them and how they behave. Undercuts, according to a portion of the 
literature and my own view, m ust be considered in debate outcomes as they definitely help resolve 
inconsistency. Consequently there is a clear need for a formally defined undercut that better matches 
professional debate.
There are four undercut definitions in the chapter, starting with Wigmore undercut and Pollock 
undercut, leading to the two key undercut functions, which are shown in Table 3.1.
Key Undercut Function Definition
J : 0  G canonicalUndercuts(/:a, A )
(Z : 0 , X, Y : a )  G preclusiveUndercuts(Y: a , A )
3.3.2
3.4.2
Table 3.1: Summary of Key Undercut Functions
There are four points to em phasise about preclusive undercuts.
1. Preclusive undercuts comprise a confirmation attacking a confirmation, rather than just an argu­
ment attacking an argument -  as was the case for the other three undercuts.
2. They cover, or subsume, all the exact same behaviour of canonical undercuts -  because confirma­
tions can be self confirmations.
3. Preclusive undercuts also extend canonical undercut to cover the recurrent situation in professional 
debate where it is put that ‘one or other of your arguments is false’. Motivating examples quote real 
life situations where preclusions have been central to the refuting of Iain Duncan Smith and Arnold
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Schwarzenegger, central to Sherlock Holmes proving a case and central to cross examinations in 
the U K ’s Hutton Enquiry.
4. A particular form of preclusive undercut is called a tautological preclusion. They are used quite of­
ten in professional debate, especially to ask difficult questions. Tautological preclusions have three 
key properties. Firstly, tautological preclusions enable inconsistent confirmations to be attacked 
and effectively removed from a debate. Secondly, tautological preclusions always exist, because 
they require no premises. Finally, they cannot be attacked back, as any conjectured rebuttal or 
undercut attacking them has to be inconsistent and thus cannot be a valid argument.
This chapter employs propositions and examples to explore and draw out the specific properties of 
preclusive undercut -  showing where they faithfully reproduce established good undercut behaviours, 
where they remedy the short com ings of other approaches and where they extend the behaviour of un­
dercuts in the literature to better match professional debate. The point about this extension of behaviour 
is that it doesn’t just cover arguments put, but also removes inconsistencies from debate. In this way I 
suggest that preclusion is, for avoiding inconsistency in argumentation, on a par with the use of mi neon 
arguments and the avoidance of catenate inferences.
A final section in this chapter leverages the work of Dung to provide two attacks functions. The 
first o f these, at the level o f individual arguments, is based on the work of Amgoud and Cayrol. In the 
second I extend the literature to show how preclusive undercut is part o f a confirmation attack. These 
two attacks functions are summarised in Table 3.2.
Attacks Function Definition
J : 0  €  argumentAttacks(/: a , A )
(Z :0 , X ,Y :a )  € confirmationAttacks(Y:a, A )
3.9.2
3.9.4
Table 3.2: Summary of Key Attacks Functions
These two attacks functions are used in my subsequent analysis of the novel concept of reflection. 
The chapter concludes by providing three attack graphs which aid the illustration of various behaviours 
later in the thesis. These attack graphs are summarised in Table 3.3.
Attacks Graph Vertices Edges Definition
argumentGraph (A ) arguments argument attacks 3.9.3
conf irmationGraph (0 (A )) confirmations confirmation attacks 3.9.3
contradictionGraph(4(A)) contradictions preclusive undercuts 3.9.6
Table 3.3: Summary of Three Attacks Graphs
These three graphs provide different and complimentary ways of illustrating the relationships be­
tween the various levels o f argument aggregation and attacks between those aggregations.
Chapter 4
Reflected and Direct Arguments
4.1 Overview of the Chapter
This short preamble provides an overview of the chapter, together with its context within the thesis. 
This chapter introduces the core novel notion of the thesis -  reflection. The thesis covers four types 
of reflection: Type I is defined in Section 4.2.4 and analysed throughout this chapter ; the next chapter 
defines Type II in Section 5.5, Type in  in Section 5.8 and Type IV in Section 5.9. Within the current 
chapter four kinds of Type I reflection are analysed, which I call Base Propositions One, Two, Three and 
Four.
4.1.1 Sections on Reflected and Direct Arguments
I develop this chapter’s analysis o f reflected and direct arguments and attacks in seven stages. The stages 
progress from a definition and analysis o f the problem I call ‘reflection’ to my proposed solution of only 
employing ‘direct’ arguments. The sections o f this chapter are:
Abstract reflection Section 4.2 identifies the predictable presence of reflected arguments and 
attacks. This analysis, relating to D ung’s work, demonstrates that attack engenders attack.
Reflected canonical undercuts Section 4.4 studies these reflected attacks that are also canonical 
undercuts. They can be reflected off rebuttals or off other undercuts.
Direct canonical undercuts Section 4.5 covers those attacks that are not reflected and must be 
isolated to properly track a debate. These are the arguments and attacks of value.
Mono-pair enlarged reflection Section 4.6 establishes that there can be many more reflections 
than might be intuitively thought. Reflections for a  and ->a have inexact symmetry.
Reflected argument rebuttals Section 4.7 shows that rebuttals can be reflected off canonical 
undercuts or other rebuttals. Their properties differ markedly from reflected canonical undercuts.
Direct argument rebuttals Section 4.8 shows that tracking such rebuttals that are not reflected 
is vital to capture a complete debate -  a point that has been missed in the literature.
W hile the chapters prior to this one have broadened the focus from individual arguments to sets of 
arguments, this chapter steps back to single arguments again to establish the basic principles of reflection.
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The next chapter, Chapter 5, while closely allied to this one, extends the analysis back up to sets of 
arguments. That said, the properties unfolded in the current chapter, when subjected to the confirm() 
functions, nevertheless also apply to self-confirmed confirmation rebuttals and to self-confirmed mono­
attack mono-target preclusions.
4.2 Introducing Attack and Reflection
Conceptually the starting point for understanding reflection is attack, which is described in an abstract 
form by (Dung, 1993), see Definition 3.9.1. This section builds on the concept o f attack, abstract and 
concrete, to introduce a new and related concept I call reflection. In order to define reflection in terms of 
attack it is necessary to first establish two base propositions which simplify subsequent proofs.
4.2.1 Base Proposition One: Rebuttal Engenders Undercut
My first base proposition is that rebuttal engenders undercut.
Proposition 4.2.1. Base Proposition O ne Let A  be a knowledgebase o f  labelled assumption form ulae  
and let I  : a , J  K  :(f) e  argum ents(A ).
I f  there exists J : /3 G re b u tta ls ( /: a , A )
then there exists K : 0  e  canonicalllndercuts( J : (3, A) 
where K  C I .
Proof. For J : p  to be a rebuttal o f I : a  it must be the case that (3 = --a . Let 
stripAssumptions(formulae(J, A )) =  {0 i , . . . ,  0 n }. So J  : (3 equates to (0 i A . . .  A 0 n ) —► ->q and 
thus by contraposition a  —» - '( 0 i  A . . .  A 0 n ). Let stripAssumptions(formulae(/, A )) =  { 0 i , . . . ,  0 m }, 
so similarly I  : a  equates to (0 i  A . . .  A 0 m ) —► a .  Combining (0 i  A . . .  A 0 m) —* a  with a  —► 
->(0! A . . .  A0 n ), by hypothetical syllogism, yields the valid deduction (0 i  A .. .A 0m) —► ~’(0 i A .. .A 0„). 
The support (0 i  A . . .  A ipm ) may not be minimal, so given a { 0 P, . . . ,  ipq} C { 0 1?. . . ,  0 m }, it follows 
that (tpp A . . .  A A . . .  A 0 n ) is a minimal deduction. The support (ipp A . . .  A ipq) ¥  1  as its
superset is consistent, being as it is the support o f the valid argument / :  a . Moving to label nomenclature, 
let the support { 0 P, . . . ,  tpq} = stripAssumptions(formulae(A\ A)),  hence K  C I.  Consequently there 
must exist K : -<(0\  A . . .  A 0 n ) € argum ents(A ). Given the equality 0  =  ->(01 A . ..  A 0 n ) it follows that 
K : 0  e  argum ents(A ). Selecting ( 0 i , . . .  , 0 „ )  as the canonical ordering of {0 i , . . .  , 0 n }, it follows that 
K : 0  is a canonical undercut for J : >3. In conclusion it is clear that this K : 0  € canonicalUndercuts( J : 
J ,  A ), given the stated prerequisites, always exists. □
The proof shows that the support o f the argument K : 0 is known from the support of the defending 
argument /  : a  , as K  C I. Furthermore the claim of K  : 0  is known from the support of the attacking 
argument J  : J  , as 0  = -'(/\stripA ssum ptions(form ulae(J, A))) .  The prerequisites referred to are 
simply the first part o f the proposition, namely that /  : a , J  :[3 6  argum ents( A ) and J  :{3 e  reb u tta ls (/: 
a .  A ). Thus if argument B rebuts argument A, then argument B is always subject to canonical undercut 
from an argument C.
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4.2.2 Base Proposition Two: Undercut Engenders Rebuttal
Turning now to my second base proposition it is the case that undercut always engenders rebuttal.
Proposition 4.2.2. Base Proposition Two. Let A be a knowledgebase o f  labelled assumption form ulae  
and let I  :a , J  :p , K  :<p G arguments(A).
I f  there exists J : p  € canonicalUndercuts(/: a ,  A) 
then there exists K : 0  G rebuttals( J : p,  A) 
where K  — I .
Proof. From the existence o f J : p  and I : a  it is always possible to infer the construct K  : 0 . Using the 
definition of canonical undercut, for J : p  to be a canonical undercut o f I : a  it must be the case that p =
- ’( / J i A . . . Apr) where { P i  pr ) =  stripAssumptions(formulae(7, A)).  By conjunction introduction,
{/7i, . . . ,  p r } h p\  A . . .  A p r is a valid deduction. It cannot be the case that a strict subset of { p \ , . . . ,  /3r } 
implies p\  A . . .  A p r because if it did the argument 7 : a  would not be minimal. Inconsistency is also 
impossible as K  -  I  and /  : a  G argum ents(A ). Thus I : Pi  A . . .  A p r G argum ents(A ). Clearly for 
the two arguments J : p  and K : 0  to rebut it must be the case that ->/3 =  0 . Thus the reflexive argument 
(reflexive by Definition 2.4.7) I  : p \  A . . .  A p r =  7 :->/? =  7 : 0  =  K  : 0  , which is a rebuttal of 
J : /3,therefore K : 0  G rebuttals( J : p ,  A ), always exists. □
The support o f this argument K  : 0  is known from the support of the defending argument /  : a .  
The claim o f the argument K : 0  is also known, this time from the claim of the attacking argument J : p. 
Clearly these two base propositions are closely related to each other, however they also contain a number 
of differences which affect the properties o f this field.
4.23 Attack Engenders Attack
Rather than immediately analyse these two base propositions, I first show where they fit in the larger field 
o f argumentation. I thus introduce a general (i.e. abstract or generic) definition of reflection. My starting 
point is the attacks function, introduced earlier in Definition 3.9.2, which provides all the arguments 
derivable from A  that either rebut or undercut an argument / :  a .  To recap, in that definition, A  is a set 
of labelled assumption formulae and I  :a  G arguments(A). The Amgoud-Cayrol attack function, from 
Definition 3.9.2, is such that:
argumentAttacks( / :a , A ) =  rebuttals(/:a, A ) U  canonicalllndercuts(/:a, A ).
For a rebuttal, the attacks relationship (following Amgoud-Cayrol) is bidirectional, while for an 
undercut it is unidirectional. Rebuttal was defined back in Definition 2.6.7 and canonical undercut in 
Definition 3.3.2. An alternative way of stating the definition of attacks is that:
J : p  G argumentAttacks(7: a. A)
iff ( J : p e  rebuttals(7:a, A) or J : p  G canonicalUndercuts(7 :a , A)).
Thus an argument J  : p  attacks an argument 7 : a  iff J  : p  is a rebuttal of 7 : a  or J  : p  is a canonical 
undercut of 7 :a .  I now establish the somewhat startling proposition that attack always engenders attack.
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Proposition 4 .23 . Let A  be a knowledgebase o f  labelled assumption form ulae and let I  : q, J  : (3 € 
arguments(A).
I f  J :  (3 e  argumentAttacks(7: a ,  A)
then argumentAttacks( J  : / 3 , A ) ^ 0 .
Proof. It is a given that J  : (3 G argumentAttacks(/ : a ,  A ), so using the definition of attack, Def­
inition 3.9.2, either J  : 3  G rebuttals ( I  : a ,  A ) or J  : p  € canonicalUndercuts(7 : a .  A ). If 
J  :p €  rebuttals(7: a ,  A ) then from Base Proposition One, (Proposition 4 .2 .1), this rebuttal always en­
genders the undercut K : 0  € canonicalUndercuts( J : /3, A ). If, however, J : (3 e canonicalUndercuts(7: 
a ,  A ) then from Base Proposition Two, (Proposition 4.2.2), this undercut always engenders the rebut­
tal K  : p  G rebuttals(7 : p.  A ). Thus K  : <p is either a rebuttal or an undercut o f J  : p.  So in ei­
ther case, the definition of attack, Definition 3.9.2, can be reapplied to show that it is inevitable that 
K  :<t> G argumentAttacks( J : p,  A ). Thus it is always that case that argumentAttacks( J : ft, A ) /  0. □
In addition to knowing that there always is an engendered argument, quite a lot can be predicted 
about the support o f this engendered argument, as I now show.
Proposition 4.2.4. Let A  be a knowledgebase o f  labelled assumption form ulae and let I : a , J  : p , K  : 
<p e  arguments(A).
I f J . p e  argumentAttacks(7:a , A )
then there exists a K  :cf> £ argumentAttacks( J : p , A) 
such that K  C  7.
Proof. The above Proposition 4.2.3 established that the engendered argument K  : <p always exists. Fur­
thermore, Proposition 4 .2 .1 established that if the first attack is a rebuttal, then there exists an undercut 
in the role of the second and that K  C  7 follows. Or from Proposition 4.2.2, if the first attack is an 
undercut then there exists a rebuttal in the role of the second argument and thus K  — I holds. As K  =  7 
is a special case o f K  C  7 it follows that in all cases K  C  7 holds. □
4.2.4 Type I Reflection -  The Reflected Attacks Function
The first reflected attacks function, Type I Reflection, which I now define, follows on directly from the 
attacks function. Three other types of reflection functions, called Type II, III and IV, are covered in this 
thesis, so this is the first of four. I start with a concise description, supported by the argument graph 
shown below as Figure 4 .1 and then give the formal definition.
Given a pair o f arguments 7 : o  and J  : p  where J  : p  attacks 7 : a  then there always exists another 
argument K  : <p that attacks J  : p . Thus if there are two arguments in a chain, where chain was defined 
in Section 3.9, and argument attack in Definition 3.9.2, then there always exists a third. Stating that 
formally:
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Reflecting Argument / :  q
J : j3 G argumentAttacks(/: a ,  A )
J-.p
K : 0  e  argumentAttacks( J : [3, A )
Reflected Argument K  \<p K  C 7
Figure 4 . 1 : Type I Reflection is Provided by reflectedAttacks( J : p, I : a ,  A )
D efinition 4.2.1. Let & be a knowledgebase o f  labelled assumption form ulae and let I : a, J  : 
J  € arguments(A). 77ie set o f  reflected a ttack s  arising from  the attack o f  J : p on I : a, denoted  
reflectedAttacks( J  : p . I : a ,  A ), is such that:
reflectedAttacks(J:/3,7 : a ,  A )  =  { K : € arguments(A) |
J :p  € argumentAttacks(/:q , A ), K : 4> e  argumentAttacks( J : p, A ) and K  C I}.
I call the head o f the chain, I : a, the reflecting a rg u m en t or reflector for short, J : P the attacking 
argument, K : <p a reflected a rg u m e n t and {K : <j>} the se t o f reflected argum ents. Furthermore, I call 
the attack K  : 0  e  argumentAttacks( J : P, A ) a reflected a ttack . If  the support, K , of the reflected 
argument, K  : <p, is a strict subset o f the support /  o f the reflector I : a, i.e. that K  $  I, then I say 
su p p o rt sh o rten in g  has occurred.
This reflection definition could be applied recursively, suggesting an infinite chain of arguments 
arising from just one pair of arguments. I clarify and refine that notion over this and the next two chapters, 
taking the analysis one step at a time. I now prove that reflected arguments, given their prerequisites, 
always exist.
P roposition  4.2.5. Let A  be a knowledgebase o f  labelled assumption form ulae and let I : a, J : p  € 
arguments(A).
I f J - . p e  argumentAttacks(/:a, A )
then ref lected Attacks (J : P, I: a. A ) /  0, 
otherwise ref lected Attacks (J : p, I : a. A ) = 0 .
P roof It is a given that J:P  e argumentAttacks(7 :o . A ) so either J :p  e canonicalUndercuts(7:a, A ) 
or J : P e. rebuttals(7 : a. A ). Thus the proof where prerequisites exist can be taken in two halves. The 
first half is the situation J :p  e  canonicalllndercuts(7 : o . A ). Base Proposition One, Proposition 4.2.1, 
demonstrates that if J : p € canonicalUndercuts(7 : a, A ) then there always exists a rebuttal of J : p. 
Now the second half, which is the other situation for J  : p  e  rebuttals(7 : a , A ). Base Proposition
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Two, Proposition 4.2.2, states that if J : 0  G rebuttals(/ : a ,  A ) then there always exists a canonical un­
dercut o f J  : 0 . So regardless of which of the two situations ( J  : j3 G canonical Undercuts (7 : a ,  A ) 
or J  : 0  G rebuttals(/ : a ,  A )) is the case, when the prerequisites are present it is always true 
that reflectedAttacks( J  : 0 ,1  : a ,  A ) ^  0. If on the other hand, I  : a  & arguments(A) or 
J  : 0  & arguments(A) or J  : 0 & argumentAttacks(A) then the proof so far would not follow and 
thus reflectedAttacks(Jr:/7 ,1 :a , A ) =  0. □
Stating the proposition in English: ‘if argument A attacks argument B then there always exists an 
argument C that attacks argument B ’ shows that in practice the prerequisites are quite naturally fulfilled 
and are therefore not onerous.
4.2.5 Seeing What is Reflected
The reflected attacks function as defined is abstract or general in that it is not specific about what kind 
of attack (i.e. rebuttal or undercut) is involved. M aking attack specific allows certain observations to be 
made, including the following Propositions 4.2.6 and 4.2.7 and subsequent 4.2.9 and 4 .2 .1 1. The first of 
these four is that one o f the reflected arguments from a rebuttal is a canonical undercut.
Proposition 4.2.6. Let A  be a knowledgebase of labelled assumption formulae and let I : a, J : 0, K  : 
0  G arguments(A).
If there exists J : 0  G rebuttals(7: a , A ) then
there exists a K  :0  €  reflectedAttacks( J : 0 ,1 : a, A )  
such that K  :<p G canonicalUndercuts( J : 0 , A).
Proof. Given that J  : 0  G rebuttals(7 : a .  A ) then by Base Proposition One there exists K  : <p G 
canonicalUndercuts(J  : 0 , A ) where K  C 7. Definition 3.9.2 of argument attack establishes that 
given J  : 0  G rebuttals(7 : a ,  A ) then also J  : 0  G argumentAttacks(7 : a ,  A ). Likewise given 
K : <$> G canonicalUndercuts( J  : 0 ,  A ) then K : <p G argumentAttacks( J : 0 , A ). Furthermore from Defi­
nition 4.2.1 o f reflected attack, given this chain o f two argument attacks plus the fact that K  C 7 proves 
that K  .0  G ref lected Attacks (J  : 0 , I : a ,  A ). So if there exists J : 0  G rebuttals(7: a.  A ) then there exists 
a K : <p G ref lected Attacks (J : 0 , 1 : a ,  A ) such that K : 0  G canonicalllndercuts( J : 0,  A ). □
This proposition is close to Base Proposition One, Proposition 4.2.1, with the added clarity that this 
engendered argument may be categorised as a reflected argument and also as a canonical undercut. It is 
also interesting to see, building on the generic form of reflection, that if the attack is a canonical undercut 
then there exists a reflection which is a rebuttal.
Proposition 4.2.7. Let A be a knowledgebase of labelled assumption formulae and let I : ct, J : 0. K  : 
<p G arguments(A).
If there exists J :0  G canonicalUndercuts(7: a , A )
then there exists a K  :0 G ref lected Attacks (J : 0 , 1 : a,  A ) 
such that K : 0  G rebuttals(J : 0, A).
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Proof. Given that J  : p  € canonicalUndercuts(7 : a ,  A ) then by Base Proposition Two there exists 
K  : 4> € rebuttals( J  : p , A ) where K  — I. Definition 3.9.2 o f argument attack establishes that given 
J  : p  e  canonicalUndercuts(7 : a ,  A ) then also J  : p  €  argumentAttacks(7 : a .  A ). Likewise given K  : 
<t> €  rebuttals( J  : p , A ) then K  : <$> e  argumentAttacks( J  : /3, A ). Furthermore from Definition 4.2.1 of 
reflected attack, given this chain of two argument attacks plus the fact that K  =  7, and thus that K  C 7, 
proves that K  : <p € reflectedAttacks( J  : p , I  :a ,  A ). So if there exists J  : p  € canonicalUndercuts(7 : 
a .  A ) then there exists a K  : 0  e  reflectedAttacks(J : P ,1  : q , A )  such that K  : 0  e  rebuttals(J : 
P. A ) .  □
4.2.6 Base Proposition Three: Rebuttal Engenders Rebuttal
I now present two further base propositions, Base Propositions Three and Four, as two further instances 
or consequences of reflectedAttacksQ. Three is perhaps simple, but the fourth is more profound.
Base Proposition Three is the seemingly trivial observation that rebuttal always engenders rebuttal. 
I use the same format as used for Base Propositions One, Definition 4.2.1 and Two, Definition 4.2.2, to 
show this observation:
Proposition 4.2.8. Base Proposition Three. Let A  be a knowledgebase of labelled assumption formulae 
and let I : a , J  :p, K  :<p e  arguments(A).
If there exists J :p  £ rebuttals(7: a , A )
then there exists K  :<f) € rebuttals(J  :/3, A ) 
such that K  =  7.
Proof. For these rebuttals it is a clear that a  =  ->P, <p = ~^P and thus a  =  (p. Proposition 2.6.5 
establishing that rebuttal possesses a form of symmetry, states that 7 : a  G rebuttals( J : -■a. A ) iff J : 
->q € rebuttals(7 : a . A ). The solution is that K  : <p =  7 : a  so thus K  =  7. Therefore a rebuttal attack 
always engenders another rebuttal attack. □
This simple proposition is interesting as it fits with the general reflection function, of Defini­
tion 4.2.1. The engendered rebuttal is in fact a reflected argument.
Proposition 4.2.9. Let A be a knowledgebase of labelled assumption formulae and let I : a, J : P, K  : 
<P e  arguments(A).
If there exists J : p  6  rebuttals(7: a , A )
then there exists a K  :<p G ref lected Attacks (J : p, I : a. A ) 
such that K : 0  G rebuttals ( J : p,  A ).
Proof. Given that J  : p  e  rebuttals(7 : a ,  A ) then by Base Proposition Three there exists K  : 4> G 
rebuttals(J : p , A ) where K  = 7. Definition 3.9.2 of argument attack establishes that given J  : p  e  
rebuttals(7 : a .  A ) then also J  : p  e  argumentAttacks(7 : a , A ) . Likewise given K  : <p e  rebuttals( J  : 
p . A ) so K  : 0  e  argumentAttacks(J : P , A ) .  Furthermore from Definition 4.2.1 of reflected attack,
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given this chain o f two argument attacks plus the fact that K  = I  so K  C  7 proves that K  : 0  G 
reflectedAttacks(J : 0 ,1  '■ a , A ). So if there exists J  : 0  G rebuttals(7 : a , A ) then there exists a 
K:<t> €  reflectedAttacks( J : 0 , 1 :q , A ) such that K : 0  G rebuttals(J :0,  A ). □
In this situation the reflected argument turns out to be the same as the original defending argument. 
W hat is different or generated and also predictable by this theory of reflection, however, is the attack. 
In contrast with earlier examples o f reflection (Base Propositions One and Two) those base propositions 
had a new argument plus a new attack. For Base Proposition Three there certainly is a new attack, but 
the difference is in not having a new argument. If Base Propositions One, Two and Four did not exist, 
then Base Proposition Three would hardly be worth mentioning, but what is interesting is how it still fits 
with general reflection. It also is a necessary small step in showing further properties, as I now cover in 
Base Proposition Four.
4.2.7 Base Proposition Four: Undercut Engenders Undercut
Here I show that undercut engenders undercut. This observation employs the earlier Base Propositions 
One, Two and Three to draw this fresh conclusion. I use the same format as used for Base Propositions 
One to Three to show the observation.
Proposition 4.2.10. Base Proposition Four. Let A be a knowledgebase of labelled assumption formu­
lae and let I : a , J:0 ,  K  :<p G arguments(A).
If there exists J :0  G canonicalUndercuts(/:a, A )
then there exists K : 0  G canonicalUndercuts( J : 0, A ) 
such that K  C  I.
Proof. First apply Base Proposition Two, Proposition 4.2.2: given J  : 0  is a canonical undercut of 
7 : q  then it follows that there exists a I  : ->0 G arguments(A) which is a rebuttal o f J  : 0 . Now 
apply Base Proposition Three, Proposition 4.2.8, to give a rebuttal attack of that rebuttal argument, i.e. 
J : 0  € rebuttals(7: ->0, A ). This has just created a new attack, but not a new argument. Now apply Base 
Proposition One, Proposition 4.2.1, given this rebuttal attack, J : 0  G argumentAttacks(7: ->0, A ), there 
exists K  : 0  a canonical undercut o f J  : 0 . So given there exists J  : 0  € canonicalUndercuts(7 : a ,  A ) 
then there always exists K : 0  €  canonicalllndercuts( J : 0 , A ) where K  C  7. □
This base proposition, given the context o f a chain o f arguments could be referred to as the grand­
parent reflection. It is also the case that this reflected canonical undercut is a reflected argument, again 
fitting exactly with the earlier definition of reflection, Definition 4.2.1.
Proposition 4.2.11. Let A be a knowledgebase of labelled assumption formulae and let I : a , J : 0, K : 
0  G arguments(A).
If there exists J : 0  G canonicalUndercuts(7 :a . A )
then there exists a K : 0  G ref lected Attacks (J : 0 , 1 :a, A) 
such that K :0  e canonicalUndercuts(J: 0 , A) .
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Proof. Given that J  : p  G canonicalllndercuts(/ : a ,  A ) then by Base Proposition Four there exists 
K  :<t> e  canonicalUndercuts(J:^, A ) where K  C  I .  Definition 3.9.2 of argument attack establishes that 
given J : p  G canonicalUndercuts(/: a ,  A) then also J : p e  argumentAttacks(7: q , A). Likewise given 
K : <f) €  canonicalUndercuts( J : p,  A) so K : 0  e  argumentAttacks( J  :/3, A). Furthermore from Defini­
tion 4.2.1 of reflected attack, given this chain of two argument attacks plus the fact that K  C  7 proves that 
K  :<t> e  reflectedAttacks( J  : p , I : q , A). So if there exists J : P e  canonicalllndercuts(7: a ,  A) then there 
exists a K : 4> e reflectedAttacks( J  : p , I : a , A)  such that K : <f> e  canonicalUndercuts( J : p,  A). □
These four base propositions show that whenever there are there are two arguments in an argument 
chain, then there will always be a combination of reflected rebuttals and reflected undercuts extending 
this attack chain. Thus both types of attack, rebuttal and undercut, are seen to be reflected off any attack, 
be it rebuttal or undercut.
4.2.8 Reflexive Arguments and Reflection
To show how reflexive arguments fit with reflection, it helps first to clarify some behaviours of reflexive 
arguments. This clarification requires not just the definitions of reflexivity (Definition 2.4.7), rebuttal 
(Definition 2.6.7), canonical undercut (Definition 3.3.2), but also attack (Definition 3.9.2). If  a reflexive 
argument A is attacked by an argument B, then B will be a member of the canonical undercuts o f A and  
B will be a member of the rebuttals o f A.
Proposition 4.2.12. Let A  be a knowledgebase o f  labelled assumption form ulae and let I : a , J  : (3 € 
argum ents(A ).
(J  :p  is a reflexive argument and I : a  G argumentAttacks( J : (3, A ))
if f  ( 7 : q  € canonicalU ndercuts(J:/3 , A ) a n d l . a  e  rebuttals(J:/3 , A)).
Proof Because J : p  is a reflexive argument it follows that stripDeduction(J:/3) = 
A  stripAssumptions(formulae(label( J : p ), A)) ,  i.e. that its claim formula is the same as the conjunction 
of the members of its support formulae. Clearly J  : (3 is attacked, so the attack could be 7 : a  6  
canonicalUndercuts(J : p . A ) or 7 : a  e  rebuttals(J : p , A ), with the emphasis on the word ‘or’. 
However, as J  : p  is reflexive, with its claim a conjunction of its support, anything which is capable of 
attacking its support will also attack its claim and vice versa. So if one is attacked, both are attacked. It 
cannot be the case that there exists any K  : a  £ argumentAttacks( J  : P, A ) where K  C  7 as then 7 : a  
would not be minimal and hence not an argument, so it is 7 : a  that both rebuts and undercuts J : p  and 
not any such K  .a .  Now for the reverse direction of the biconditional. As 7 : a  can undercut the support 
and rebut the claim of J : p , it means that stripDeduction( J : p ) = f \  stripAssumptions(formulae(label( J : 
p ), A )) so J  : p  is reflexive and is attacked by 7 : a . So in conclusion (J  : p  is a reflexive argument and 
7 : a  € argumentAttacks( J  : p , A )) iff (7 : a  e  canonicalUndercuts( J  : p , A ) and 7 : a  e  rebuttals(7 : 
^ A ) ) .  □
Thus if an argument A is subject to both rebuttal from an argument B and also canonical undercut 
from an argument B, then A must be reflexive. If, however, A is subject to an undercut from B, and A is
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reflexive then A must also be subject to a rebuttal from B. Additionally, if A is subject to rebuttal from 
B and A is reflexive then A must also be subject to a canonical undercut from B. Thus an attack can be 
both a canonical undercut and a rebuttal.
Now, here is an example of reflection and reflexivity:
Example 4.2.1. Reflection and reflexivity. A  =  { a : a ,  6 : 7 , 0 : 7  —► ->q}. Thus { a } : a ,  {&, c} : 
- 'a ,  {a} : - >(7  A ( 7  —» -^a)) €  arguments(A). The attack chain fo r  this example has {b, c} : ->o at 
the head o f  the chain, attacked by the reflexive argument {a} : a . The tail o f  the chain is the reflected 
{6 , c } : - i a  € reflectedAttacks({a} : q ,  {6 , c} :-<a,  A ). Observe that {6 , c} : ->a e  rebuttals({a} : a ,  A)  
and also {6 , c} : ->a € canonicalUndercuts({a} : a ,  A). Later in this chapter the reflected argument 
rebuttal and the reflected canonical undercut are form ally defined.
Thus reflexive arguments are no exception in giving rise to reflections -  which need to be understood 
in assessing debates. A point to draw from the above example is that by removing reflected arguments 
one also removes some of the ‘double counting’ arising from reflexive arguments.
Recalling the terms defined immediately after Definition 4.2.1, a three member attack chain has 
the reflector argument at its head, a mid-chain argument and reflected argument at its tail; reflexive 
arguments may reside in any o f these three places. Looking first at the reflected argument: all reflected 
argument rebuttals are reflexive arguments. In practical debate most reflected canonical undercuts are 
not reflexive arguments, but there can exist reflected canonical undercuts that are reflexive. Consider 
A  =  {a:a , b: ->a} .  Later, in Section 4.4 these reflexivity roles are revisited.
Any reflexive argument may or may not take the role o f reflecting argument - depending on whether 
it is attacked or not. Thus any reflecting argument may or may not be reflexive. If the defending argument 
is a reflexive argument then there exists a reflected argument that is the same as the defending argument.
Any attacking argument (occupying the mid-point in the three member attack chain describing a 
Type I Reflection) may or may not be reflexive. If this attacking argument is reflexive then the reflected 
argument rebuttal will be the same argument as the reflected canonical undercut.
When counting arguments in judgem ents, care should be taken not to count the attacks on a reflexive 
argument twice, regardless of the presence or absence o f reflection. This consideration is addressed in 
Section 6.7.
4.3 Reflection in Other Argumentation Frameworks
In the introduction I stated that there are four main formal approaches to defining an individual argument, 
namely i) minimal consistent subset arguments following classical logic (mincons), ii) defeasible logic 
argumentation schemes, iii) semi-abstract and iv) fully abstract. I have established that reflection occurs 
with the first one, so the question arises does it occur with the other three?
Given that the proofs presented in the semi-abstract approach papers, notably (Bondarenko et al., 
1997), show it to encompass many of the defeasible logic argumentation schemes in the literature, it 
follows that this list of four formalisms is not a simple subdivision of the field of argumentation into 
equal quarters. The defeasible approach is noteworthy in its own right because of the central position in
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the argumentation aggregation literature of works of Pollock (Pollock, 1970; Pollock, 1974; Pollock, 
1987; Pollock, 1992; Pollock, 2000) and of Chesnevar, Garcia, Loui and Simari (Simari & Loui, 1992; 
Simari et al., 1994; Chesnevar et al., 2000; Garcia & Simari, 2004; Chesnevar et al., 2005).
I now establish that the semi-abstract approach is so defined as to encompass and allow reflection. 
Some o f the concrete manifestations of the semi-abstract approach, however, may move far enough away 
from classical logic, by imposing proof rule restrictions, to no longer contain reflection - hence an area 
deserving further research.
An argument in the ABA framework is defined as follows. I refer to Definitions 2.1, 2.2, 2.3 and 
2.4 in (Dung et al., 2006) and have packaged four original definitions into one here for brevity.
Definition 4 3 .1 . An assumption-based argument (ABA) argument is defined as follows:
1. A deductive system is a pa ir (C, 71) where
(a) C is a form al language consisting o f  countably many sentences,
(b) 71 is a countable set o f  inference rules o f  the form  °‘l i c>ia" ,
(c) q  G C is called the conclusion o f  the inference rule and
(d) Q i , . . . ,  a n are called the prem ises o f  the inference rule and n  > 0 .
2. A deduction o f  a conclusion a  based on a set o f  premises P is a sequence f3\, . . . ,  Pm o f
sentences in C, where m  > 0  and a  = /3m , such that, fo r  a l i i  =  1 , . . . ,  m  :
(a) (3t G P, or
(b) there exists G 7Z such that a i , . . . ,  a n G {(3\ , . . . ,  (3t- 1 }.
3. An assumption-based fram ew ork is a tuple(C, 7Z,)C,~) where:
(a) (£ , 71) is a deductive system.
(b) 1C C C, K. /  0. K  is the set o f  candidate assumptions.
(c) I f  a  e  fC, then there is no inference rule o f  the form  Ql! Q' :a,‘ G P .
(d) is a (total) mapping from  K. into C. a  is the contrary o f  a .
4. An ABA argument is a deduction whose premises are all assumptions.
To refer to the parts of an individual ABA argument I reuse the unlabelled notation described fol­
lowing Proposition 2.4.4, where ( $ . 0 ) is an argument. It can be observed that my language C is an 
instance of the more general C above and that K, is an ABA knowledgebase of assumption formulae. 
The original uses A  not K  for its knowledgebase, but I have changed it to avoid a clash with the set of 
assumption labels defined in Chapter 2. Observe that the set of proof rules which make up classical logic 
is an instance of 71. Thus mincons are a kind of ABA argument, but not all ABA arguments are mincons. 
Example 1.1 in (Dung et al., 2006) presents arguments with minimal consistent sets o f premises that 
infer their claims using classical logic.
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An attack in the ABA framework (their Definition 2.5) is defined as follows: An ABA argument A 
ABA attacks an ABA argument B iff A contradicts an assumption in the set of assumptions on which B 
is based. I present that as a function now and limit it to classical logic, so that I can more easily reuse it 
in a further definition and proposition.
Definition 43 .2 . Let V, be classical logic, the ABA C be equal to the C o f  Definition 2.2 .1, K, be an ABA 
knowledgebase o f  assumptions and be Let (4>, a ) ,  ('I', 0) be ABA arguments derivable from  1C. ABA 
attack, denoted  a t ta c k s ,* ^  ( ( $ ,  a ) ,  £ ) ,  is the set o f  arguments that attack (4>, a ) such that:
( $ , 0 )  G attacks a  ba{(®,ol ) , IC)  iff ^ 0  G $ .
The ABA attack is thus a generalisation of my Wigmore undercut, see Definition 3 .2 .1. I now show 
that reflection exists in this assumption-based framework. If exactly the same definition of reflection 
as used earlier in this chapter, Definition 4.2.1, is used then the second argument in the attack chain of 
ABA arguments must be reflexive. Thus if the unlabelled knowledgebase AC =  {0,  /3 —> a ,  ->a}, then 
the ABA arguments include ( { 0 , 0  —» q } , q ) ,  ( { - , c*},  - |a ) .  Consequently the head o f the attack chain 
is ( { 0 , 0  —► a } , a ) ,  which is subject to W igmore undercut by the reflexive ({ - 'a } , -•a ). Consequently 
( { 0 , 0  —<► c*}, a )  is a reflected W igmore undercut o f ({_,a } , ->a), so using exactly the same reflection 
definition is unsatisfactory due to its triviality of only working for reflexive arguments. W hat is needed 
is a slightly modified or generalised definition o f reflection, which I call a reflected ABA attack, to see 
that, given certain assumptions, reflection always occurs in the ABA framework regardless o f whether 
the ABA attack is reflexive or not. In the following definition I limit the analysis to classical logic.
Definition 4 3 3 .  Let V, be classical logic, the ABA C be equal to the £  o f Definition 2.2.1, 1C be an 
ABA knowledgebase o f  assumptions and ~ be Let (4>,a), (ty, ->0,) be ABA arguments derivable 
from  AC. The set o f  reflected ABA attacks arising from  the ABA attack o f  {4/, -><£,) on (<£, a ) , denoted 
reflectedAttacks^B/i(('!>> ~'<t>t), (4>, a ) , 1C) is such that:
( r , ^ 3) €  reflectedAttacks^BA((^, ^ t ) ,  (♦ •« ) . £ )
iff  ( ^ , - 0 t ) G attacks,**^(($,<*},£)>
(T, is an ABA argument derivable from  1C and  
T =  A u  where A C 4>.
The above definition is a generalisation of the basic reflected attacks function, Definition 4.2.1, 
that I examine throughout much of this thesis. W hile the reflection function I examine in detail is for 
canonical undercuts, the above is also viable for W igmore and Pollock undercuts. An area for further 
research would be to generalise all of the reflection functions in this thesis to directly cover Wigmore 
and Pollock undercuts as well as canonical undercuts.
Given their prerequisites, reflected ABA attacks always exist, as I now prove.
Proposition 43 .1 . Let V, be classical logic, the ABA C be equal to the C o f  Definition 2.2.1, K. be an
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ABA knowledgebase o f  assumptions and be Let ($ , a ) ,  ('I', ->0t ) be ABA arguments derived from  1C.
/ / ( ^ , - 0 . )  €  attacksABA{(<b,a),IC)
then reflectedAttacksi4 Bi4 ( ( ,I', ~i0 l), ( $ , a ) , / C )  -f- 0, 
otherwise reflectedA ttacks^B A U ^ ( $ , a ) , / C )  =  0.
Proof. Clearly for ('I', ->0,) to be an ABA attack on ($ , q ) , by the definition of ABA attack and given 
$  =  {01> • • • >0n}. >t must be the case that 0 , G <!>. Also if ( I \  ->0j) is an ABA attack on (ty, ->0,), 
letting ^  =  {0 i , 0 m }»it follows that 0 j  € 'if. Given that ( ^ ,  ->0,) is an ABA argument then by VI 
so is (4 ', -<0, V ~ i0j), which is also the case when <pj G <I>. Thus ('if, ->(0i A . . .  A 0 n )) is also an ABA 
argument that exists if ('I', ->0,) exists. Now using Al it follows that 0x A . . .  A 0 m —► ->(0i A . . .  A 0 n ). 
By contraposition 0 i  A . . .  A 0n —► _,( 0 i  A . . .  A 0 m). Furthermore by VE, if assumptions are added to the 
antecedent then their negations can be ruled out from the consequent, i.e. if 0 i  A . . .  A 0 n —> ->(0j A 0*) 
then { 0 i , . . . ,  0 n } u  {0fc} I— >0j. So by VE it follows that $  U  '£ \0 j  I— <ipj, where the \0_, prevents 
ex falso quodlibet. This statement can be simplified as not every member of the set <I> may be necessary 
to infer ->(0i A . . .  A 0 m ). Thus if (<I> U  ' i f\ipj,  _,0 j )  and A C $  then (A U  ^ \ 0 j ,  _i0 J ) is also an ABA 
argument. Thus with T =  A U  ^ \ 0 j ,  where A C  <I>, it follows, given the prerequisites, that the reflected 
ABA argument ( I \ -» 0 j)  always exists. Absent any one o f the prerequisites then (T ,->0j) will not 
exist. Thus if ( ^ , - > 0 ,) € attacksa b a ((^>^ ) »  AC) then reflectedAttacksJ4 BA( ( ^ 1 ±  0,
otherwise reflectedAttacks^BA ( ( ^ 7  _,0i)< (&, a ) ,  AC) =  0. □
W hat is seen here is undercut to undercut reflection with a similar, but not identical form, to that 
covered in Base Proposition Four, see Proposition 4.2.10. Base Proposition Four addresses the situation 
with canonical undercuts and the above proposition describes essentially the same situation, but this time 
with a form of W igmore undercuts.
This proposition shows that if A ABA attacks B then there always exists a counter ABA attack of C 
ABA attacking B. Thus if A is defeated by B, then B is defeated by C and consequently A is reinstated 
by C. This inevitable reinstatement raises some interesting issues around some of the semantics used in
the ABA framework. Questions suggestive by this initial analysis, each o f which is a topic for further
research, include the following.
•  W hat other forms of reflection exist within the ABA framework?
•  W hat are the minimum sets o f proof rules needed for each form of reflection?
•  What alternative minimum sets o f proof rules can be used to show each reflection?
•  Which of the non-monotonic logics that are special cases of the ABA framework permit which 
forms of reflection?
•  Which semantics are affected by the observation that given the right prerequisites each attacked 
argument is automatically subject to counterattack and thus reinstatement?
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•  W hich of the semantics referred to in ABA papers are affected by the existence of which forms of 
reflection and what is the effect?
Referring back to the question of reflection with defeasible logic, most defeasible logics do not have 
contraposition so that would appear to rule out some forms of reflection. Even without contraposition, 
however, some other forms of reflection, such as the reflected rebuttal (see Definition 4.7.1 and Proposi­
tion 4.7.2) are possible. Therefore it would appear that defeasible logics may also contain reflection and 
warrant further research.
In the fully abstract approach o f (Dung, 1993) there is full clarity that the arguments and deduction 
rules are undefined and hence there can be no assumption of classical logic or even of assumptions and 
a claim. So here it cannot be said whether reflection occurs or not.
In conclusion, reflection is not unique to minimal consistent arguments with rebuttal and canonical 
undercut, but rather is also a feature of other definitions o f argument and attack in the literature.
4.4 Reflected Canonical Undercuts
I now define the reflected canonical undercut and go more deeply into its properties. This function 
outputs a set o f arguments, all o f which are canonical undercuts, that arise through reflection, from a 
single pair o f attacking arguments. The attack could either be a rebuttal or an undercut. The reflected 
attacks function is Definition 4.2.1 and the canonical undercuts function is Definition 3.3.2.
Definition 4.4.1. Let A  be a knowledgebase o f  labelled assumption form ulae and let I  : a , J  : (3 e  
arguments(A). The set o f  reflected canonical undercuts, denoted reflectedCanonicalUndercuts(J : 
3 , / : a , A ), attacking J :(3, reflected o ff I  :a , is such that:
reflectedCanonicalUndercuts( J  :(3, I \  a , A )
=  { K : 0  € arguments(A) |
K : <p €  reflectedAttacks(J :(3,1 : a ,  A) and 
K:<p G canonicalUndercuts(J:/3, A )} .
I now give an example of a reflected canonical undercut. As in earlier chapters the sake of brevity I 
skip the repeated restatement o f the canonical ordering constraint.
Example 4.4.1. Reflected canonical undercut Let A  = {a : a , b : a  —* >3,c: Let J  -  {a, 6}, I  =
{ c } .  It fo llow s that J  : f 3 , 1: ->(3, 0 : ( a  A ( a  —♦ [3)) —* /3, 0: ->j3 —► - ■ ( a  A ( a  —►/?)),/:  -> (a  A ( a  —» 
,J)), € argum ents( A). Thus I : ->(a A ( a  —► j ) )  e  reflectedCanonicalUndercuts( J  : f l , l : -«/3, A). This 
fo llow s as clearly I  C  I  and thus I : - ’( a  A ( a  - >  (3) )  is a reflected canonical undercut.
The above is a simple example where the support o f the undercut is the same as the support of the 
rebuttal, i.e. no strict subsets are involved. I have shown some of the tautologies which exist in the set of 
arguments as an aid to seeing the steps of logic that lead to the reflected undercut. To infer the existence 
of the argument J  : - > ( a  A  ( a  —> [3)) only requires the assumption c : - (^3. However, to deduce that
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this same argument J  : ->(a A  ( a  —* (3)) is a reflected canonical undercut requires three assumptions 
a : a , b :a  —*• 0  and c: -<(3.
So a reflected canonical undercut is simply a canonical undercut that is also a reflected argument. 
Every member of the set o f arguments reflectedCanonicalUndercuts( J  :/3,7: a ,  A) has the same 
claim and thus can always be represented as a confirmation. Thus 
Z : 0  =  confirm(reflectedCanonicalUndercuts( J  :0 , 1 : a ,  A )) where for each K  e  Z the constraints of 
the above definition apply. To be more specific, the set o f reflected canonical undercut arguments of a 
given rebutted argument can be precisely represented as a mono-target preclusive undercut. Depending 
upon A  this preclusion may be multi-attack or mono-attack.
Given a single contradiction, comprising o f an argument for a  and an argument for ->a, it is possible 
to deduce the existence o f at least two canonical undercuts (one attacking the argument for a  and the 
other attacking the argument for ->q ). The reflected canonical undercuts function is given a plural name 
because combining just one attacking argument with just one reflector argument can give rise to many 
reflected canonical undercuts (that is many arguments even just attacking a ) .
4.4.1 Properties of Reflected Canonical Undercuts
A simple corollary to the Proposition 4.2.5 that reflected arguments always exist is the following. Given 
a defending argument I : a  and its attacker J : 0  then reflected canonical undercuts always exist, as shown 
in the following proposition.
Proposition 4.4.1. Let A  be a knowledgebase o f  labelled assumption form ulae and let I : a , J  : 0  € 
argum ents(A ).
I f  J  :0  G argum entAttacks(7: a ,  A )
then reflectedC anonicalU ndercuts(J:/3 ,7 :a , A ) ^  0, 
otherwise reflectedCanonicalUndercuts( J  : 0 , I : a , A )  =  0.
Proof. The attack of J  : 0  G argumentAttacks(7 : a ,  A ) could be either a rebuttal or a canonical un­
dercut. If J  : 0  e  rebuttals(7 : a ,  A ) then Base Proposition One shows that there exists K  : 0  e  
canonicalllndercuts( J  : 0 , A ) with K  C 7. If  J  : 0  e  canonicalU ndercuts(7: a , A ) then Base Proposi­
tion Four establishes that there exists K : 0  € canonicall)ndercuts( J : 0 , A ) with K  C 7. Thus in either 
case there exists A' : 0  e  canonicalUndercuts( J : 0 , A ) with K  C 7. It also follows, by Definition 4.2.1 
of reflected attack that K : 0  e  reflectedAttacks(J : 0 , A ). Thus by Definition 4.4 .1 o f reflected canonical 
undercut, as K  : 0  is both a reflected attack and a canonical undercut it will be the case that K  : 0  € 
reflectedCanonical Undercuts ( J  : 0 , 1 : a .  A ) and so reflectedCanonicalUndercuts( J  : 0 , 1 : a ,  A ) 0. 
However if 7 : a  £  arguments( A ) or J  . 0  g  argum ents(A ) or J  : 0  e  argumentAttacks(7 : a ,  A ) then 
reflectedCanonical Undercuts ( J : 0 , 1 : o , A ) = 0. □
The support of a reflected canonical undercut is always equal to the support of the reflector argu­
ment, or a strict subset of the support of the reflector argument, regardless of whether the attack on the 
reflector is a rebuttal or an undercut.
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Proposition 4.4.2. Let A  be a knowledgebase o f  labelled assumption form ulae and let I : a , J  : (3 €  
argum ents(A ). Let J:(3  e  canonicalUndercuts(7:a ,  A ) or J  :(3 e  reb u tta ls (/:a ,  A).
reflectedC anonicall)ndercuts(J:/7 ,7: ct, A ) =  { K  :<p e  argum ents(A ) ) K  c  I } .
Proof. By Definition 4.4 . 1 , members of reflectedCanonicalUndercuts( J : (3,1 :a , A ), must be reflected 
attacks reflectedAttacks(J  : ( 3 , 1 : q , A ) that are also canonicalUndercuts( J  : (3, A ). Definition 4.2.1 of 
reflected attack and Proposition 4.2.5 (reflections always exist) establish that a reflectedAttacks( J  : ( 3 , I : 
a,  A ) always arises from any argumentAttacks(7 :ct, A ). From Definition 3.9.2, that argument attack on 
the reflector 7 : a ,  could be either a member of rebuttals(7 : a ,  A ) or of canonicalUndercuts(7 : a ,  A ). 
Base Proposition One, Proposition 4.2.1, states that a reflected attack off the rebuttal is a canoni­
cal undercut K  : <f> € canonicalUndercuts( J  : (3, A ) with K  C 7. Base Proposition Four, Propo­
sition 4.2.10, states that a reflected attack off the canonical undercut is another canonical undercut 
K  : (p e  canonicalUndercuts( J  : (3, A ) again with K  C 7. Thus in either case of reflected canonical 
undercut, it follows that K  C 7. So in conclusion reflectedCanonicalUndercuts( J  : (3,1 : a , A )  =  
{ K  : <p € arguments(A) | (J  : (3 € canonicalllndercuts(7 : a ,  A ) or J  : (3 e  rebuttals(7 : a , A )) and 
K  C  7}. □
The cardinality o f the reflected canonical undercuts function is as follows.
Proposition 4 .43 . Let A  be a knowledgebase o f  labelled assumption form ulae and let I  : a , J  : (3 £  
argum ents(A ).
0 <  |reflectedCanonicalUndercuts(J:/7, 7 :q , A) |  <  midLattice(7).
Proof. If the prerequisites don’t exist, e.g. if either 7 : a , J  : (3 & arguments(A), then there are no 
reflected canonical undercuts and reflectedCanonicalUndercuts( J  : (3,1 : a ,  A ) = 0 .  For the upper 
limit consider two arguments K  : <p,L : <p £  reflectedCanonicalllndercuts( J  : (3,1 : a , A ). Every 
K  : 0  e  reflectedCanonicalUndercuts( J  : (3,1 : a ,  A ) must be such that K  C  7 and must have the same 
claim. The number o f subsets o f 7 is However it cannot be the case that K  C  L, nor L  C  K .  
Consequently the mid lattice function must be used to give the maximum number of subsets that are not 
subsets o f each other. Subsets o f assumption labels in 7 yield the supports o f all the possible reflected 
arguments. □
Furthermore, reflected canonical undercuts are always canonical undercuts, but not necessarily vice 
versa.
Proposition 4.4.4. Let A  be a knowledgebase o f  labelled assumption form ulae and let I : a , J  : (3 € 
argum ents(A ).
reflectedCanonicalUndercuts(J :(3,1 :a , A )  C canonicalUndercuts( J  :(3, A ).
Proof. The function canonicalUndercuts( J : [3, A ) is defined in Definition 3.3.2. Definition 4.4.1 defines 
reflectedCanonicalUndercuts( J  : (3,1 : a ,  A ) as a canonical undercut that is also a reflected attack, for
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which see Definition 4.2.1. The additional conditions to be a reflected attack are that J  : 0  argument 
attacks I : a  and that K  C  I . Thus for a canonical undercut canonicalUndercuts( J  : 0 , A ) to also be a 
reflected canonical undercut reflectedCanonicalllndercuts( J  -.0 ,1: a ,  A ) there are additional conditions 
to meet. Thus for any set o f canonical undercuts some of the set members will not meet the additional 
constraints. Therefore reflectedCanonicalUndercuts(J : 0 , 1 : a ,  A ) C  canonicalUndercuts(J  : 0 , A ) .
□
A simple corollary follows from the logic of the proof:
|reflectedCanonicalUndercuts( J : 0,  / : « ,  A )| <  |canonicalUndercuts( J  :0,  A )|.
4.4.2 A Motivational Example of Reflected Undercut
I now give a motivational example o f reflected canonical undercut where I provide linguistic gloss for the 
individual formulae and discuss the common sense meaning and implication of this reflection. This sub­
section continues with the approach o f Example 4.4.1 and expands on it by including gloss, as follows. 
The formulae in the knowledgebase are shown in Table 4 .1 .











a: a  
not assumed
b: 7  
c: a  —» 0  
d  : 7  - »  ^ 0
It’s raining.
Bring an umbrella.
Wear a good raincoat.
If  it’s raining then bring an umbrella.
If  one wears a good raincoat 
then one need not bring an umbrella.
Table 4.1: M otivational Example o f Reflected Undercut
Thus the assumptions in this small debate are just four formulae A  =  { a : a ,  6 : 7 ,  c : a  —♦ 0,  d : 
7  —► ->0}. Thus the arguments include {a ,c}  : 0 , {b, d}  : -< 0,{a ,c} : -> (7  A  ( 7  —► ->/?)), {6 , d} : 
->(q A  ( a  —» 0 ))  e  arguments(A). The relevant resultant arguments and their interactions are shown in 
the argument graph o f Figure 4.2 below.
This pair o f rebutting arguments yields two reflected canonical undercuts: the first is {a, c } : - - ( 7  A 
( 7  —» ->/?)) with a gloss o f ‘It's not the case that (one is wearing a good raincoat and that i f  one wears a 
good raincoat then one need not bring an umbrella). This follow s because i t ’s raining and i f  i t ’s raining 
then one brings an umbrella.’ The second reflected canonical undercut is {6 , d} : - '( a  A ( a  —♦ 0 ))  
with a gloss o f ‘Either i t ’s not raining or i t ’s not the case that when its raining you should bring an 
umbrella. This fo llow s because one has a raincoat and i f  one wears a raincoat then one need not bring 
an umbrella.’ W hile these are logically valid arguments, the reflections would not normally appear in 
professional debate.
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{6, d} :-'(3 e  rebuttals({a, c} : 0, A )
{ a , c } :0    ^ {b,d}:^0
{a, c} :0  e  rebuttals({6, c}: ->/?, A )
{ M } : > A ( a - / 3 ) ) e  
canonicalUndercuts({a, c } : 0,  A )
{ a , c } : - > ( 7  A ( 7  — ^/3)) e  
canonicalllndercuts({6, d } : ->/?, A )
{6, d } : - ( q  A (q — /3)) {a, c } : - . ( 7  A  ( 7  —> -/?))
{6 ,d }:-> (a  A (q  —► /5)) e  reflectedCanonicall)ndercuts({a,c}:/3, {fc,d} A )
{a, c } : - 1(7  A ( 7  —» ->/?)) € reflectedCanonicalUndercuts({6 , d } : —*>3, {a, c } : a , A )
Figure 4.2: Reflected Canonical Undercuts Shown in an Argument Graph
4.5 Direct Canonical Undercuts
Not all canonical undercuts are reflected canonical undercuts. 1 now define the direct canonical undercut 
simply as those canonical undercuts that are not reflected. I will show that they do exist, but do not 
always exist. I now build on Definition 3.3.2 o f canonical undercut and 4.4.1 o f reflected canonical 
undercut.
Definition 4.5.1. Let A  be a knowledgebase o f  labelled assumption form ulae and let I  : a , J  : 0  e  
arguments(A). The set o f  direct canonical undercuts o f  J  : 0, not reflected o ff I  : a, denoted 
directCanonicalllndercuts(J : 0 , I : a , A ), is such that:
directCanonicalUndercuts( J  . 0 , 1 ’. a , A )
=  canonicalUndercuts(J : 0 , A )  \  reflectedCanonicalUndercuts(J .0 ,1 ' .a , A ).
I call K  : <f> a direct (or unreflected) argument and as before the head o f the chain, I  : a  is the 
reflecting argument or reflector. There are two situations where reflections do not occur; either there is 
no reflector or the reflector exists but is not attacked. For direct canonical undercuts, predictions can be 
made about the support o f the attacking argument:
Proposition 4.5.1. Let A  be a knowledgebase o f  labelled assumption form ulae , let I :  a , J : 0 , K  :cj) € 
arguments(A) and let J : 0  € argumentAttacks(7: a , A).
I f  K\<t> e  directCanonicalUndercuts(J:/?, 7 :a , A ) then K  £  7.
P roof Proposition 4.4.2 establishes that if K  : 4> G reflectedCanonicalUndercuts( J  : 0 , 1 : a , A )  then 
K  C 7. Definition 3.3.2 of canonical undercut imposes no constraint on the support of the attacking 
argument, K  : <f>, relative to any reflector, 7 : q , so in that case for any 7 : a  some rebuttals may have 
K  C 7 and others K  % I .  The definition of direct canonical undercut, Definition 4.5.1 immediately 
above, uses set difference to remove the reflected canonical undercuts from the full set o f canonical
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undercuts, thus the only undercuts remaining in directCanonicalUndercuts( J  : 0 , 1 : a ,  A ) must have 
K  £  I .  So in conclusion if K  :<f> €  directCanonicalUndercuts( J  :/3,1 : a ,  A ) then K  £  I .  □
It will also be the case that K  £  J  as if it were then, as for any attack, it would infer J  h  i ;  
likewise for J  £  I .  So far, this concept o f direct undercut is weak as the existence of a specific direct 
canonical undercut depends on the choice of reflector, i.e. /  : a .  For example, there could exist an 
L : q  €  rebuttals(«7: -^q, A ) such that K  C  L  and thus if L : a  were passed in as the reflecting argument 
it would render K : <f> reflected. This potential weakness is removed once I progress to the consideration 
o f sets o f maximal direct arguments in Sections 5.3 and 5.6.
A particular canonical undercut (which is a relationship between two arguments) must be either 
direct or reflected. A canonical undercut cannot be both. An individual argument, however, can be both 
direct and reflected at the same time as shown by the following example.
Example 4.5.1. Both direct and reflected argument Let A  =  {a : 7r, 6  : tt -> q , c  : 7  A  -^a, d :
A, e : A —+ ->7 }. Let I — {a, 6 }, J  =  {c}, L  =  { d ye}. Thus I : a , J  : ->a, J  : 7 , L  : -1 (7  A 
->a), L : -> 7  € arguments(A). This example involves two chains, each o f  three arguments. The first 
chain, from  head to tail is I : a , J  : ->q, L  : - < ( 7  A -iq). The second chain, again from  head to tail 
is L  : ->7 , J  : 7 , L  : - - ( 7  A -<a). For the first chain the defending argument is I : a . The attacking 
argument is J  : ->a where J  : ->a € rebuttals(7 : a , A ). This attacking argument is in turn attacked by 
a canonical undercut, namely L  : - > ( 7  A ->a) e  canonicalllndercuts( J  : ->a, A). As {d, e} £  {a, 6 } 
so L  £  I then L  : - > ( 7  A ->a) £  reflectedCanonicalUndercuts( J  : ->a, I : a , A). So it fo llow s that 
L  : - > ( 7  A  ~>q) € directCanonicalUndercuts( J  : ->a, I : a ,  A ). Turning now to the second chain, the 
defending argument is L : ->7 . The attacking argument is J : 7  and as clearly L  C L, L : -1 ( 7  A  ->a) is a 
reflected canonical undercut. So one argument can be both direct and reflected, that is L : -> ( 7  A  ->a) e  
reflectedCanonicalUndercuts( J : 7 , L  : ->7 , A ) and also L : - * ( 7  A  ~^a) e  directCanonicalUndercuts( J : 
—>q, I : a,  A ).
Thus it is the context which determines whether a particular argument is direct or reflected. There­
fore reflection is a relative property of arguments and not an absolute property. This point emphasises 
the need for placing arguments in suitable graphs or trees to provide the right context for determining 
which arguments are then reflected and which are direct. It also shows the importance o f passing in the 
reflector, J  :/3, in Definition 4.5.1.
Thus there are two situations where direct canonical undercuts are found: one is where there is no 
reflector; the other is where there is a reflector, but the undercut in question is not reflected. I now give 
an example o f such a direct canonical undercut where the argument / :  a  has no reflector.
Example 4.5.2. Direct canonical undercut without reflector. Let A =  {a : a  A b : ->/3}. Then 
{a} : a ,  {a} : 0 ,  {6} : ->/3, {6} : V ->a, {6} : - i(a  A 0 )  e  arguments(A). Thus the defending argument
{a} : a  has a canonical undercut o f  {6} : - '( a  A 0), but no rebuttal. It has no rebuttal because A (/ ->a. 
So {b} : ^ ( a A 0 )  e  canonicall)ndercuts({a} :a,  A), but {c} :->a £  arguments(A) Thus {6 }: ->(qA/3) e  
directCanonicalUndercuts({a} : a ,  {c} : ->q, A) is a direct canonical undercut.
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The second situation is when the reflector argument I : a  exists, but the undercut in question, K : <f>, 
is not a reflected undercut. This second situation is more interesting as given the result of Proposition 
4.4.1, that reflected canonical undercuts always exist, it is perhaps somewhat unexpected. I now give an 
example to show that not all canonical undercuts are reflected canonical undercuts.
Exam ple 4 i 3 .  Direct canonical undercut with reflector. Let A =  {a : a  A 0, b : ->(3, c : ->a}. Then 
{ a } : a ,  { c } : ->a, {6}: ->(3, {6}: ->(3 V -iq , {6}: ->(a A /?), { c } : -<(3 V ->a, { c } : -»(a A (3) € arguments( A). 
Thus the defending argument { a } : a  has two canonical undercuts namely {6}: ->(a A/3), { c } : ->(a A/3) e  
canonicalUndercuts({a} : a ,  A). I f  fo llow s that {c} : ->(a A (3) e  reflectedCanonicalUndercuts({a} : 
a , {c} : ->q, A), but {6} : ->(a A (3) & reflectedCanonicalUndercuts({a}: a , {c} : ->q, A) as {6} % {c}. 
Thus {6}: ->(a A /3) G directCanonicalUndercuts({a}: a , { c } : ->a, A) is a direct canonical undercut.
Clearly in the above discussion a canonical undercut K  : ->(0i A . . .  A <f>n ) is either a member of 
reflectedCanonicalUndercuts or it is not. To emphasise the key point: for a given reflector (which could 
be the empty set) a canonical undercut is either direct or reflected; it cannot be both. So some canonical 
undercuts are a function o f a reflector, whilst others are not. The number of direct canonical undercuts 
that an argument has is clearly unrelated to any reflectors and is instead purely a function of the contents 
o f A .
As the number o f direct canonical undercuts is not constrained by any reflector argument, it is the 
same as for canonical undercuts, Proposition 3.3.3:
Proposition 4.5.2. Let A  be a knowledgebase o f  labelled assumption form ulae and let I : a ,  J  : (3 e  
arguments(A).
0 <  |directCanonicalUndercuts(J:/3,1 :a,  A )| <  midLattice(A).
P roof The proof is the same as for the cardinality o f canonical undercuts, Proposition 3.3.3. An undercut 
o f J : (3 given reflector I : a  is either direct or reflected. If  none of them are reflected then all canonical 
undercuts are direct. □
This analysis thus shows that a single argument I : a ,  that attacks a reflector J : (3, can be attacked 
by a mixture o f direct and reflected canonical undercuts.
4.6 Mono-Pair Enlarged Reflections
I have shown that given an attacking argument and a reflector then a reflected canonical undercut al­
ways exists. W hile this is true, there is more to the matter: the number of reflected canonical undercuts 
is one or more than one. There are two reasons why there may be more reflected arguments than ex­
pected. The first stems from support shortening resulting in what I call a mono-pair enlarged reflection 
(Definition 4.6.1 below); the second reason I address shortly (in Section 5.7.4 on multi-pair enlarged 
reflections).
To introduce mono-pair enlarged reflections I start by giving an example that demonstrates the case 
where the support o f the reflected canonical undercut is a strict subset o f the support o f the reflector.
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Example 4.6.1. Support shortening. Let A  = {a  : 0,b : 0  —> a ,c  : -^0,d : -^0 —> ->a}. Let 
P  =  {a , 6 }, Q =  { c ,d}, R =  {c}. Therefore P : a , Q :  ->a, R : -^0, 7?: ->/3 V (/3 —► a ), R : ^(0 /\ (0 —> 
a)) e  arguments(A). The defending argument is P  : a. The reflector is the rebuttal Q : ->a. One 
might think that Q : ->(/? A  (0 — > a)) e  reflectedCanonicalllndercuts(P : a ,Q  : -> q , A ) would be a 
reflected canonical undercut, however it is not even a valid argument as the support is not minimal. 
Rather R : -^(0 A (0  —* a ))  e  reflectedCanonicalUndercuts(P: a , Q : - ’a ,  A ) is a reflected canonical 
undercut. In this valid case the support of the reflected canonical undercut R is a strict subset of the 
support of the rebuttal Q.
There can be more than one possible minimal consistent subset that implies ->(</>i A . . .  A  <j>n ). In 
other words, because support shortening can happen in more than one way, reflected canonical undercuts 
are not necessarily unique, as shown below:
Proposition 4.6.1. Let A  be a knowledgebase o f  labelled assumption form ulae and let I : a , J  : 0  £ 
arguments(A).
I f  J . 0  £  argumentAttacks(/:a , A)
then |reflectedCanonicalllndercuts(J: 0 , I  : a , A ) \  >  1 .
Proof. Given Proposition 4.4.1, plus that I  : a , J : 0  £  arguments(A) and J  : 0  £  argumentAttacks(/ : 
q ,  A ), it follows that reflectedCanonicalUndercuts( J  : 0 , 1  : a ,  A ) f  0. For an argument K  : 7  to be 
a member of reflectedCanonicalUndercuts( J  : 0 , 1 :  a ,  A ), by Definition 4.4.1, requires that K  : 7  e  
reflectedAttacks(J : 0 , 1  : a ,  A ), which in turn requires K  C I.  For any argument I  : a,  because 
|label(7 : a ) |  >  0 , the argument can have many assumptions, and thus the set o f assumptions can have 
many subsets. Therefore if J  : 0  £  argumentAttacks(7 : a ,  A ) then |reflectedCanonicalUndercuts( J  : 
0 , I  :a,  A )| >  1 . □
I now give an example that illustrates the above proposition.
Example 4.6.2. Mono-pair enlarged reflection. Let A  =  { a : 0,  b : 7 , c: ->0, d : ->7 , e : (0  A 7 ) —> a , f :
(->/? A  - 17) —► - » a } .  Let P  =  {a, b, e) ,  Q  =  {c, d,  / } ,  R  = {c}, 5  =  {d}. Therefore P : a , Q :  - > a ,  R : 
->0,R:-<0  V ->7  V - « ( ( 0  A 7 ) —> a ) , R : - ' ( 0  A  7  A ( (0  A  7 ) —> a ) ) ,  S:  ->7 , 5 : - > 7  V ~>0 V -> ( (0  A 7 ) —► 
q ) ,  5 :  -<(0 A 7  A  ( (0  A  7 ) —► a ) )  € argum ents(A ). One might think that Q : -<(0 A 7  A  ( (0  A 7 ) —1> q ))  
is a valid canonical undercut o f  P  : a , however it is not even a valid argument as it is not minimal. The 
two arguments R : - '(0  A 7  A ( (0  A  7 ) —♦ a ) )  and S : -«(0 A  7  A ((0  A 7 ) —► a ))  are valid canonical 
undercuts o f  P : a  and also members o f  reflectedCanonicalU ndercuts(P : a , Q : ->q, A). These two valid 
arguments show the situation o f  multiple reflected canonical undercuts arising from  a single defending 
argument and its rebuttal.
In contrast to the above example, Example 4.6.1, while showing support shortening (where the 
support of the reflected canonical undercut is a strict subset of the support of the reflector) still only 
yields one reflected canonical undercut, so no mono-pair enlarged reflection occurred there. Given this 
conceptual introduction, I now define the mono-pair enlarged reflection.
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The following definition, Definition 4.6.1, provides the introduction to support shortening, strict 
subsets, multiple undercuts and mono-pair enlarged reflection. The pair o f arguments referred to is the 
attacking argument and the argument which it attacks, also known as the reflector.
Definition 4.6.1. Let A  be a knowledgebase o f  labelled assumption formulae, let I  \ a , J  : (3 £ 
arguments( A ) and let Z : 0  e  0 (A ). A  mono-pair enlarged reflection, where a single pair o f  arguments 
give rise to more than one reflected argument, denoted  monoPairEnlargedReflection(J : (3 ,1: a ,  A ) is 
such that:
monoPairEnlargedReflection( J  : ( 3 , I : a , A )
=  {Z : 0  =  confirm(reflectedCanonicalllndercuts(J:/?, 7: a , A )) | \Z\ > 1 }.
Because the set reflectedCanonicalUndercuts(J : (3, I : a, A ) contains all such reflec­
tions, the confirm() o f that is the maximum cardinality confirmation Z : (f>. If |Z| =  1 then 
monoPairEnlargedReflection(J : (3,1 : a , A ) =  0. M ono-pair enlarged reflections only occur when 
there is support shortening, which in turn can permit more than one subset o f the support of the defend­
ing argument to be the support o f an attacking argument. Not every attack chain of two arguments gives 
rise to a mono-pair enlarged reflection, even though it is the case that every attack chain of a pair of 
arguments gives rise to a reflected canonical undercut. Support shortening can also result in two previ­
ous distinct supports becoming indistinguishable - this is support merging - where two or more distinct 
reflectors L : a , M : a  with N  £  L, N  C A/ yield fewer reflections N :0.
The maximum number o f mono-pair reflected arguments is as follows. The mid lattice function, 
Definition 2.4.5, returns an integer.
Proposition 4.6.2. Let A  be a knowledgebase o f  labelled assumption form ulae and let I : a, J  : (3 £ 
arguments(A).
0 <  |monoPairEnlargedReflection(J:/?, 7 :q , A )| <  midLattice(J).
P roof The cardinality can be zero, if for example J  : (3 & argumentAttacks(7 : a ,  A), which sets 
the lower limit as 0 < . Now for the upper limit. As it’s possible to have many arguments making the 
same point [i.e. the point ->( stripAssumptions(formulae( J, A))) ], all the different canonical undercuts 
K : - - ( 0 i , . . . ,  0 n ) e  canonicalUndercuts( J : a ,  A) will have the same claim but different supports. Take 
one o f these undercuts with support K .  Any strict subset, K ,  of the support of the reflector 7, that is 
K  £  7, can be the support o f a reflected canonical undercut attacking J  : (3 as long as there does not 
exist an L  ^  K  such that L  : —-(0i A . . .  A 0 n ) is also a canonical undercut o f J  : (3. If there were 
an L  £  K  then L  : - « ( 0 i , . . . ,  0 n ) would be the valid argument and K  : - - ( 0 i , . . . ,  0 „ )  would not be 
minimal and therefore not a valid argument. The canonical ordering condition will always be met by just 
one conjunction of the members of J  and thus does not affect the cardinality. The subsets of 7 (which 
are deduction labels) form a power set with 7 as its maximum cardinality member and 0 as its minimum 
cardinality member. The largest set of subsets of 7, (call it X as it will be a set o f deduction labels 
and thus a confirmation label), that does not include subsets of other members of X [i.e. L, A7 e  X iff
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(L  g  M  and M  % L )] has a cardinality of midLattice(Z). Hence the maximum number of reflected 
canonical undercuts attacking a single argument J : (3 arising from its interaction with the single reflector 
7: a ,  i.e. the maximum cardinality of mono-pair enlarged reflection, is midLattice(7). □
Even for a relatively small number of premises in J : /3 the number of reflected canonical undercuts 
o f /  :q  can be large. For example if \J\ =  10 then the number o f mono-pair enlarged reflected canonical 
undercuts can be up to 252.
As a final comment, given their prerequisites, the smallest number of reflections is 1, which is not 
surprising due to the inevitability o f reflection. Shortly I will discuss a phenomena that arises with con­
firmations, preclusions and reflection where there are fewer reflected arguments than one might expect; 
this I will call reduced reflection.
4.6.1 Reflection has an Inexact Symmetry
The reflected attacks function has an inexact symmetry about a pair of rebutting arguments for the claims 
q , -<a. W hile I use the word symmetry in the title this is not a perfect symmetry as mono-pair enlarged 
reflections may or may not occur for each side of a  and ->a. Also if mono-pair enlarged reflections do 
occur for both a  and -<a, the number o f reflected arguments on each side may differ. However there is 
still a certain undeniable symmetry as I now show:
Symmetry o f existence. In this analysis o f symmetry of reflected canonical undercuts I focus on 
the case where the reflector is a rebuttal.
Proposition 4 .63 . Let A  be a knowledgebase o f  labelled assumption form ulae and let I : a , J  : ->q 6  
argum ents (A).
reflectedCanonicalUndercuts(7: a ,  J : ->a, A ) ^  0
i f f  reflectedCanonicalUndercuts(J : ->a, 7 : q ,  A)  ^  0.
Proof If  reflectedCanonicalllndercuts(7 : a , J : - >a, A ) ^ 0 then it must be the case that I  : a , J  :->a e  
arguments(A) and I  : a  e  argumentAttacks(J  : ->a, A ). The claims of 7 : a , J  : ->q confirm the attack 
and also make it clear that I  : a  e  rebuttals(J : ->q, A ). Using Definition 2.6.7 of rebuttal, it is the 
case that J  : ->q g rebuttals(7 : a ,  A ) and thus that J  : -*q € argumentAttacks(7 : a ,  A ). Therefore, 
using Proposition 4.4.1, it follows that ref lectedCanonical Undercuts ( J  : -<a,I : a ,  A ) ^  0. Now for 
the other direction. If reflectedCanonicalUndercuts( J  : -•«, 7 : a ,  A ) /  0 then it must be the case that 
I  : a , J  : ->a €  arguments(A) and J  : €  argumentAttacks(7 : a ,  A ). The claims of 7 : q , J  : ->q
confirm the attack and also make it clear that J  : ->a e  rebuttals(7 : a ,  A ). Using Definition 2.6.7 of 
rebuttal, it follows that 7 : a  € rebuttals( J  : ->q, A ) and thus that 7 : a  e  argumentAttacks( J  : -^q, A ). 
Therefore, using Proposition 4.4.1, it follows that reflectedCanonicalUndercuts(7 : a ,  J  : ->q, A ) /  0. 
So in conclusion reflectedCanonicalUndercuts(7: a ,  J : ->a, A ) ^  0 iff reflectedCanonicalllndercuts( J : 
->a, 7 : a ,  A ) /  0. □
W hile I have shown that there is a symmetry of existence, in that both sides will have reflected 
canonical undercuts, this does not mean that the number o f reflected canonical undercuts is symmetrical.
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Asymmetry of cardinality. I now show by example, there is no guaranteed symmetry in the 
number of reflected canonical undercuts. The following example shows:
|reflectedCanonicalUndercuts(7 :q , J : ->q, A )| ^  |reflectedCanonicalUndercuts(J : ->q, I  :a , A )|
Example 4 .63. Asymmetry of cardinality. Let A  = { a : a ,  b : a  -* 0,  c i y A ^ a ,  d : ( j  —► ~V?)A->a}. 
Let  I  =  { a ,b } , J  — { c , d } , K  = { a } , L  =  {6 } ,M  =  { c } , N  — {d}.  Therefore I : 0 , J  : ->/?, A/ : 
->a, TV : ->a, A/ : ->(a A (a  —> 0) ) ,  iV : ->(q A (a —► 0)) ,  K  : a ,  K  : a  V ->7 , A : q V -> 7  V - > ( 7  —► 
~>/3) V o , A :  - > ( 7  A -iq A ( 7  —► ->/3) A L :  0 \ l  -iq, L : —» ->a, A/ : 7 , A /  : -iq, TV : 7  —»
->/? € argum ents(A ). The defending argument is 1 : 0  and its rebuttal is J  : -0. One might think that 
J : ->(q A (a —» 0 ))  was a reflected canonical undercut o f  1:0,  however it is not even a valid argument 
as it is not minimal. Standing in the p lace o f  the invalid argument J : ->(a A  (a  —► 0 )) are two reflected 
canonical undercuts o f  1 : 0 ,  namely A /: ->(a A  (a  —* 0) )  and N : - ’(a  A (a  —* 0)),  as clearly A/ £  J  
and N  £  J. That has addressed the 0  side o f  the debate (showing two reflected undercuts), so now  
consider the ->/? side o f  the debate. One might think that I : - > ( ( 7  A -<a) A ( 7  —> ^ 0 )  A  ->q) was the only 
reflected canonical undercut on this side o f  the debate, however it is not even a valid argument as it is not 
minimal. Rather, on this side, it is K : - > ( 7  A  -<a A  ( 7  —► ->0) A -<a) that is the only reflected canonical 
undercut that exists here. Thus there are two reflections on one side and one on the other, making the 
result asymmetrical.
The above example is symmetrical at the level o f ‘one argument and its one rebuttal’, which is 
at the level o f pro and con functions covered so far, and would thus yield a stalemate. It would seem 
preferable to have a judge function that considered the effects o f undercut and reflection before reaching 
a conclusion. With an undercut aware, reflection unaware judge for this same debate intuitively no 
stalemate would be seen.
That completes the analysis o f reflected and direct canonical undercuts, with the interesting property 
o f mono-pair enlarged reflections. W hat makes reflected canonical undercuts particularly interesting is 
that they can be reflected off either an undercut or a rebuttal.
4.7 Reflected Argument Rebuttals
The final part o f this chapter is on rebuttals: reflected and direct argument rebuttals. Although there 
are close similarities between these rebuttals and the behaviour of undercut analysed above, a key point 
is that there are differences. These subtle differences are relevant when tracking debates and thus it 
is necessary to analyse them now. I have already established that a reflected argument rebuttal can be 
reflected off a canonical undercut or off another rebuttal. While it is true that the rebuttal to rebuttal 
reflection is a genuine reflection it creates no new argument. Consequently the focus of the rest of this 
chapter is on rebuttals reflected off canonical undercuts. Even so I start this analysis in a general way 
and then home in on the specific.
I now define the reflected argument rebuttal as a special case or instance of abstract reflection 
(Definition 4.2.1). Here I am defining a set o f arguments, which are all rebuttals, that arise through 
reflection, from a single defending argument and its attacking argument.
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Definition 4.7.1. Let A  be a knowledgebase o f  labelled assumption form ulae and let I : a, J  : 0  € 
arguments(A). The set o f  reflected argument rebuttals, denoted  reflectedArgumentRebuttal( J : 0 , 1 :  
q, A ), attacking J : 0, reflected o ff I  : a , is such that:
reflectedArgumentRebuttal(J : 0 ,  I : a ,  A)
=  {*■  - ’/? € arguments(A) |
K : ->0 e  reflectedAttacks( J  : 0 , I :  a ,  A) and  
K :-> 0 e  rebuttals(J:/3, A)}.
The function is defined with a singular name, unlike the related functions, because as I prove in 
Proposition 4.7.5 it is a singleton set. Here is an example of a reflected argument rebuttal.
Example 4.7.1. Reflected argument rebuttal. Let A  =  {a : 7 , 6  : 7  —> a ,c  : 9 ,d  :8  -* ->7 }. Thus 
{0 , 6 } : a ,  {c,d} : - > ( 7  A ( 7  —► a ) ) ,  {a, 6 } : 7  A ( 7  —* a )  €  argum ents(A). So {c , d}  : - 1 ( 7  A ( 7  —> 
a ) )  €  canonicalUndercuts({a, 6 } : a,  A ). The reflected argument rebuttal is {a, 6 } : 7  A ( 7  —> a ) ,  in 
other words {a, 6 } : 7  A  ( 7  —► a )  e reflectedArgumentRebuttal({c, d } : - - ( 7  V ( 7  —► a) ) ,  {a,  6 } : a ,  A). 
Clearly label({a, b} :7  A  ( 7  —► a ) )  C label({a, b} :a)).
4.7.1 A Motivational Example of Reflected Rebuttal
A practical question to ask about reflected arguments is ‘what do they m ean?’, i.e. when the informal 
gloss o f the direct and reflected arguments are studied would it commonly be agreed that the reflected 
arguments are superfluous or redundant. Therefore, I now provide a motivational example of reflected 
argument rebuttal where I give gloss to the formulae and arguments. The formulae and assumptions 
involved are as shown in Table 4.2.





Q —► 0  







a: a  
not assumed
e : 9  
f : 7T 
c : a  —> 0  
g : (9 A 7r) —► - iq
It’s raining.
Bring an umbrella.
Water is visible on the window pane.
The neighbour’s hosepipe is wetting the glass. 
If  it’s raining then bring an umbrella.
If  water is visible on the window pane and 
the neighbour’s garden hose is wetting the 
glass then it’s not raining.
Table 4.2: Motivational Example of Reflected Rebuttal
The assumptions in this small debate are just five formulae A  =  {a  : a , c : a  —► 0 , e : 9, f : it, g : 
(9 A 7r) —> >Qr}. I have picked labels such that they do not clash with the previous motivational debate of 
Example 4.4 .1 and Section 4.4.2, but I still conduct this current example as an isolated debate. Thus the 
arguments include {a, c }  : 0 , { a ,  c }  : a  A  ( a  -► 0 ) , {e, f , g }  : ~^a, {e, f ,  g}  : ~^a V  ^ ( a  -♦ 0 ) , { e , f , g } :  
->(a A ( a  —► 0 ))  e  arguments(A). The relevant chain o f arguments is shown in the Figure 4.3.
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The reflector argument, {a ,c}  : 0 , means ‘i t ’s raining’, ‘i f  i t ’s raining then bring an umbrella’, 
therefore ‘bring an umbrella ’. The canonical undercut argument which attacks the reflector has the gloss 
‘water is visible on the window pane ’, ‘the neighbour’s hosepipe is wetting the glass ’, ‘i f  water is visible 
on the window pane and the neighbour’s garden hose is wetting the glass then i t ’s not raining’, therefore 
i t ’s not the case that ( ‘i t ’s raining’ and ‘i f  i t ’s raining then bring an umbrella’). Consequently there 
exists a reflected argument rebuttal, {a, c} : a  A  ( a  —» 0)  with the gloss o f ‘given the fac ts  that ‘it is 
raining’ and ‘i f  i t ’s raining then bring an umbrella’, then it can be concluded that ‘it is raining’ and ‘i f  
i t ’s raining then bring an um brella’. Thus it can be seen from an informal perspective that this reflected 
argument adds nothing sensible to the debate even though from a formal logic view it is correct.
Reflector Argument {a, c } : 0
{e, / ,  5 }: ->(q A ( a  -> 0 ))  G canonicall)ndercuts({a, c } : 0 , A ) 
{ e , f , g } : ^ ( a A ( a  -♦ 0 ) )
{ a ,c } :a  A  ( a  —► 0)  G rebuttals({e, f , g } : ->(a A  ( a  —► 0)) ,  A)
Reflected Rebuttal {a, c } : a  A  ( a  —> 0)
{ o ,c } :q A (q  —► 0)  g reflectedArgumentRebuttals({e,/ ,  <7} :-»(q A ( a  —► 0)) ,  { a ,c } :a ,  A )
Figure 4.3: Motivational Example o f Reflected Rebuttal Shown in an Argument Graph
4.7.2 Properties of Reflected Argument Rebuttals
Having defined reflected argument rebuttals in Definition 4 .7 .1, it is appropriate to go on to establish 
their properties.
The support o f this type o f reflected argument only uses the =  part of the C sign. Thus while 
Definition 4.7.1 is perfectly valid, it turns out that the Q part of C in the reflected attacks function is not 
used in this context. The following ‘or’ is a normal logical or, not an exclusive or, as for a reflexive / :  a  
then sides o f the ‘or’ can be true.
Proposition 4.7.1. Let A  be a knowledgebase o f  labelled assumption form ulae and let I : a , J  : 0  G 
arguments (A).
reflectedArgumentRebuttal(J . 0 , 1  . a ,  A)
=  { K : -i0  G arguments(A) |
( J : 0  G canonicalUndercuts(/:a, A ) or 
J  .0  G rebuttals(/:a, A )) and K  =  /} .
Proof. By Definition 4.7.1, members of reflectedArgumentRebuttal(J : 0 , 1 :  a ,  A ), must be reflected 
attacks reflectedAttacks(J : 0 , 1 : a ,  A ) that are also rebuttals(J : 0,  A ). Definition 4.2.1 and Proposi-
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tion 4.2.5 establish that a reflectedAttacks( J  : 0 , 1 : a ,  A )  always arises from any argumentAttacks(/ : 
q , A ). From Definition 3.9.2, that argument attack on the reflector 7 :  a ,  could be either a member of 
rebuttals(7 : a ,  A ) or o f canonicalUndercuts(7 : a ,  A ). Base Proposition Two, Proposition 4.2.2, states 
that a reflected attack off the canonical undercut is a rebuttal K  :cf> e  rebuttals( J  : 0 ,  A ) with K  =  7. 
Base Proposition Three, Proposition 4.2.8, states that a reflected attack off the rebuttal is another rebuttal 
K  : 4> e  rebuttals( J  : 0 ,  A) again with K  = I .  Thus in either case of reflected rebuttal, it follows that 
K  = 7. So in conclusion reflectedArgumentRebuttal( J  : 0 , I :  a ,  A ) =  { K : -<0 £ arguments( A ) | (J : 
0  e  canonicalUndercuts(7:q ,  A ) or J : 0  e  rebuttals(7:a ,  A )) and K  =  7}. □
Given the preconditions of existence of i) a defending argument and ii) an attacking argument of 
that defending argument, then reflected argument rebuttals always exist. A simple corollary to the earlier 
proposition that reflected arguments always exist, is the following more specific one. Reflected argument 
rebuttals, given their prerequisites always exist.
Proposition 4.7.2. Let A  be a knowledgebase o f  labelled assumption form ulae and let I  : a , J  : 0  € 
arguments(A).
I f  J : 0  e  argumentAttacks(7:a, A )
then reflectedArgumentRebuttal(J:/3,7:a, A ) /  0, 
otherwise reflectedArgumentRebuttal( J  : 0 , I : a , A )  =  0.
P roof The attack o f J : 0  £  argumentAttacks(7: a ,  A ) could be either a rebuttal or a canonical undercut. 
If  J  : 0  €  rebuttals(7 : a ,  A ) then Base Proposition Two shows that there exists K  : 4> e  rebuffals(J : 
0 , A ) with K  =  7. If J  : 0  £  canonicall)ndercuts(7 : a ,  A) then Base Proposition Three establishes 
that there exists K  : <t> e  rebuttals( J  : 0 , A ) again with K  =  7. Thus in either case there exists 
K  : <j> €  rebuttals(J : 0 , A ) with 7C =  7. It also follows, by Definition 4.2.1 of reflected attack that 
K  : <f> €  reflectedAttacks(J  : 0 , A ) .  Thus by Definition 4.7.1 of reflected argument rebuttal, as K  : <f> 
is both a reflected attack and a rebuttal it will be the case that K  :<f> e  reflectedArgumentRebuttal( J  : 
0 , 1 :  a ,  A ) and so reflectedArgumentRebuttal( J  : 0 , 1 : a,  A )  ^  0. However, if  7 : c* £  arguments( A ) 
or J : 0  & arguments( A) or J : 0  e  argumentAttacks(7: a ,  A) then reflectedArgumentRebuttal( J  : 0 , I :  
a ,  A) = 0. □
Building on the Proposition 4.2.12 which shows that reflexive arguments if attacked are attacked 
twice, it follows that:
Proposition 4.73. Let A  be a knowledgebase o f  labelled assumption form ulae and let I : a , J  : 0 ,  K  : 
<f> e  arguments(A).
I f  ( J : 0  is a reflexive argument and J : 0  e  argumentAttacks(7: a , A )) 
then K : 0  € reflectedCanonical Undercuts (J  : 0 , I : a , A )  and 
K  :<j> e  reflectedArgumentRebuttal( J  : 0 , I : a , A ) .
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Proof. Proposition 4.2.12 shows that if a reflexive argument is either undercut or rebutted then it is in fact 
both undercut and rebutted. The argument chain, of J : 0  attacking / :  a  as defined here, always gives rise 
to reflection, hence if the attacking argument (the one in the middle o f the chain) is a reflexive argument 
there will always exist one reflected argument rebuttal J  :<f> €  reflectedArgumentRebuttal( J  : 0 , I : a ,  A ) 
and one reflected canonical undercut (J :<p e  reflectedCanonicall)ndercuts( J : 0 , I : a , A ). □
The fact that a reflected canonical undercut of a reflexive argument cannot be subject to mono-pair 
enlarged reflection is also noteworthy. That must be the case as the same argument is also a reflected 
argument rebuttal -  which can only give rise to a reflection of one argument and not more than one 
argument, a point that is formally proved in Proposition 4.7.5.
To allow the next proposition, Proposition 4.7.4, to be clear I need to first provide a new definition, 
the strict subset reflected argument rebuttal.
Definition 4.7.2. Let A  be a knowledgebase o f  labelled assumption form ulae and let I : a, 
J : 0  G arguments(A). The strict subset reflected argument rebuttals, denoted  
strictSubsetReflectedRebuttals( J  : 0 , 1 : a ,  A ), are the rebuttals o f  J : 0  that can be inferred from  the 
existence o f  I  : a  and J : 0, such that:
strictSubsetReflectedRebuttals( J  : 0 , I : a ,  A )
=  { K : - '0  e  arguments(A) | J  : 0  e  canonicalUndercuts(7 :a,  A ) and K  C / } .
I now show that strict subset reflected argument rebuttals never exist.
Proposition 4.7.4. Let A  be a knowledgebase o f  labelled assumption formulae, let I  : a , J  : 0  £ 
arguments(A) and let J  :0  e  canonicalUndercuts(/:a ,  A).
strictSubsetReflectedRebuttals( J : 0 ,1 : a , A ) =  0.
P roof Suppose K  : ->0 €  strictSubsetReflectedRebuttals( J  : 0 , 1  : a ,  A ). There always exists an 
A/ : -i/3 €  reflectedArgumentRebuttal( J  : 0 , 1  : a ,  A ). As both M  : ->0 and K  : ->0 are rebuttals 
o f J  : 0  they must have the same claim. If  K  £  I  and AT =  7 then K  Q M .  If K  £  M  and 
the two arguments have the same claim, then M  is not a minimal support and therefore M  : ^ 0  is 
not a valid argument. This is a contradiction, so consequently no such K  : ->0 can exist and thus 
strictSubsetReflectedRebuttals(7 : a , J : 0 ,  A ) =  0. □
W hat is interesting here is not only that such arguments are not reflected, but also that they simply 
never exist. This point may seem counterintuitive or somewhat surprising because with reflected canon­
ical undercuts, the reflected arguments arise from both parts of the subset or equal to sign (the C and 
=  parts o f C ). This simple result has a key effect on the number of reflected rebuttals and thus on the 
structure of debates, as I will shortly show.
Because of the =  sign there can be no multiple subsets, which would require support shortening 
but not support merging, and therefore no mono-pair enlarged reflections. There is no need to define 
such a thing as mono-pair enlarged reflected rebuttals because they do not exist. Thus the function 
reflectedArgumentRebuttal() is a singleton set and thus has been named in the singular.
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Proposition 4.7.5. Let A  be a knowledgebase o f  labelled assumption form ulae and let I  : a , J  : f3 e  
arguments(A).
I f  J  : P  G argumentAttacks(7: a , A )
then |reflectedArgumentRebuttal(J:/3,1 : a , A )| =  1, 
otherwise |reflectedArgumentRebuttal( J  : p , I : a ,  A ) | = 0 .
P roof If  it were the case that subset reflected argument rebuttals, i.e. a K  . 4> where K  £  J ,  existed 
(see earlier Proposition 4.7.4) then there could be many subsets K  of 7. However, as such subsets are 
not allowed then there is only one way that the support o f the reflected argument K  : <f> can equal the 
support o f the defending argument I : a  such that K  =  7. Consequently for reflected rebuttals there 
will be one and only one reflected argument. If  the prerequisites of 7 : a , J  : 0  € arguments(A) and 
J : P e  argumentAttacks(7: a , A ) are not met then there are no reflected argument rebuttals. □
Any reflected canonical undercut K : <f> has a support that is a subset of the support of the reflecting 
argument J  :(3 ,K  C J .  However, if  the attacking argument (the one in the middle of the attack chain) is 
reflexive then the reflected canonical undercut reflected canonical undercut K : <f) will have the identical 
support to its reflector.
Proposition 4.7.6. Let A  be a knowledgebase o f  labelled assumption form ulae and I  :a , J : P, K  :<p € 
arguments(A).
I f  J .P  is a reflexive argument, J - . p  G argumentAttacks(7:a )
and K:<p e  reflectedCanonicalllndercuts( J : P, I : a , A ) 
then K  = I .
P roof Because K  : <p e  reflectedCanonicalUndercuts( J  : P, I : a ,  A ) it must be the case that K  : 4> e  
canonicall)ndercuts( J  : P , A ). Now J  : P is a reflexive, so K  : <f> e  rebuttals( J  : P, A ). So K  : 4> is 
also a reflected argument rebuttal, K : 0  e  reflectedArgumentRebuttal( J : p , I : a ,  A ). Now for reflected 
argument rebuttals K  = I .  So even though reflected canonical undercuts allow K  C I  it must be the 
case that here K  =  7. □
It will also be the case for the above proposition that there is only one reflected canonical undercut 
not a set o f many of them. The number of reflected arguments arising from a single attack pair is as 
follows.
Proposition 4.7.7. Let A  be a knowledgebase o f  labelled assumption form ulae and let I : a , J  : P G 
arguments(A).
0 <  |reflectedAttacks(J:/3,7:a, A )| <  ( | reflectedCanonicalUndercuts(J:/3,7:q , A ) | +  1).
Proof If A  V- -L then A  implies no undercuts, thus for that A , reflectedAttacks(J  : P, I : a , A )  =  0, 
so the lower cardinality limit is zero. If J  : p  is a reflexive argument then rebuttals( J  : P, A )  =
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canonicalUndercuts(J : 0 , A ) and thus the upper limit is not reached. For a non-reflexive argu­
ment the reflected argument rebuttal is not a subset o f or equal to a reflected canonical undercut, i.e. 
reflectedArgumentRebuttal(J : 0 ,1  : a , A ) % reflectedCanonicalUndercuts(J : 0 , 1 :  a ,  A ). Conse­
quently the cardinalities o f these two functions must be added together to get the upper limit. Therefore 
0 <  |reflectedAttacks(J:/?, 7: a ,  A )| <  ( | reflectedCanonicalUndercuts(J:/3, 7 :q ,  A ) | +  1). □
That completes the analysis o f reflected argument rebuttals.
4.8 Direct Argument Rebuttals
Not all argument rebuttals are reflected argument rebuttals. The pattern here is similar to direct canonical 
undercuts in many ways (Definition 4.5.1), but also different as I now show and discuss.
Definition 4.8.1. Let A  be a knowledgebase o f  labelled assumption form ulae and let I  : a , J  : 0  G 
arguments(A). The set o f  direct argument rebuttals o f  J  : 0, not reflected o ff I  : a, denoted  
directArgumentRebuttals( J  : 0 , I :  a ,  A ), is such that:
directArgumentRebuttals( J : 0 , 1 :  a ,  A )
=  rebuttals( J  :0,  A )  \  reflectedArgumentRebuttal(J  : 0 , I : a ,  A ).
In this analysis, I continue with the attack chain o f three arguments, i.e. 7 ,:7 G argumentAttacks( J : 
0 , A ) , J  : 0  G argumentAttacks(7 : a ,  A ), and make it specific so that reflected argument L  : 7  is a 
rebuttal, hence L:->0  is used in subsequent analysis. W ith direct argument rebuttals, predictions can be 
made about the support o f the attacking argument:
Proposition 4.8.1. Let A  be a knowledgebase o f  labelled assumption formulae, let I  : a , J : 0 , L : - ^ 0  € 
arguments(A ) and let J  : 0  e  argumentAttacks(7:a , A ).
I f  L : ^ 0  G directArgumentRebuttals(J : 0 , I : a , A )  then L  ^ I .
Proof. Proposition 4.7.1 establishes that i f  L  : ->0 G reflectedArgumentRebuttals( J  : 0 , 1 : a ,  A ) then 
L  = I .  Definition 2.6.7 o f argument rebuttal imposed no constraint on the support o f the attacking 
argument, L  : -*0, relative to any reflector, 7 : q , so in that case for any 7 : a  some rebuttals may have 
L  = I  and others L  I .  The definition o f direct argument rebuttal, Definition 4.8.1 immediately above, 
uses set difference to remove the reflected argument rebuttals from the full set o f argument rebuttals, 
thus the only rebuttals remaining in directArgumentRebuttals( J  : 0 , I : a , A )  must have L  ^  7. So in 
conclusion if L : ->0 G directArgumentRebuttals( J  : 0 , I : a , A )  then L ^  I.  □
Direct argument rebuttals may exist, dependant upon the reflecting argument passed in, here is an 
example.
Example 4.8.1. Direct argument rebuttal. Let A = {a:n, b:n —> a, d :7 , e : 7  —> (tt A (tt —*
a ))} . Let I =  {a, 6 } ,  J  =  {c}, L  =  {d, e}. Thus I : a , J : -<(7r A (tt —► a)), I :-k A (n —> a ) , L : 
7r A (7r —► a ) ,  L  : a  G arguments(A). So J : A (n —* a)) G canonicalUndercuts(7 : a , A ) and
1 : 7r A  (n —* a), L  : it A (n —* a) G rebuttals( J : ->(7r A (n —> a ) ) , A). Consequently as L % I and
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clearly I  C  I , so I : n A  (n —> a) G reflectedArgumentRebuttal(J : -i(7r A  (7r —» q ) ) ,  /  : q , A ) am/ 
L : 7T A (7T —*■ q ) g  directArgumentRebuttals(J: -i(7r A  (7r —► a ) ) ,  / : a ,  A). /Vote J : —i(7r A  (7r —► a ) )  £  
canonicalUndercuts(L:a , A ) so L :n A (7r —► a ) ^ reflectedArgumentRebuttal(J : —«(7r A (7r —► a )) , L : 
a ,  A).
Not every A  will give rise to direct argument rebuttals, so they do not always exist; they may exist. 
For the same input parameters, a particular argument can never be in both direct and reflected argument 
rebuttals, so clearly:
reflectedArgumentRebuttal(J:/3,/:q, A ) n  directArgumentRebuttals(J:/3,7:a, A ) =  0.
In other words:
If K : 0  G directArgumentRebuttals( J : 0 , I :  a ,  A )
then K:(f> & reflectedArgumentRebuttal(J : 0 , I : a ,  A ).
If K  :<f> e  reflectedArgumentRebuttal( J  : 0 , I :  a ,  A )
then K:<p & directArgumentRebuttals( J : 0 , 1 :  a ,  A) .
How many direct argument rebuttals can there be? Depending upon the given A  it is quite possi­
ble to have large numbers o f direct argument rebuttals that are unconstrained by any encumbrances of 
reflection.
Proposition 4.8.2. Let A  be a knowledgebase o f  labelled assumption form ulae and let I : a , J  : 0  G 
arguments(A).
0 <  |directArgumentRebuttals(J:/?, I :a ,  A )| <  midLattice(A).
Proof. It is possible that a given defending argument J : 0  can be subject to rebuttal by every argument 
that is o f the form K : —>0 G arguments(A). Clearly form ulae^, A ) C A. However not every subset o f 
A  can be a valid support for a K : ->0 as arguments must be minimal. The largest number of subsets of 
A  that are also not subsets o f themselves is given by the midLattice function, midLattice(A). However as 
K , J  C A  and for the support to be consistent J : -<0 & arguments( J : 0 , A) it is necessary to take one 
argument off the total and use <  . The minimum number is zero as A  may simply contain no formulae 
that such rebuttals can be derived from. □
Now that direct argument rebuttals are defined I can add one final property, requiring first the def­
inition of direct attack. My starting point for this analysis o f reflection was the attack function, Defini­
tion 3.9.2. I have shown that that definition always yields reflection. If reflections are problematic then 
the definition is arguably the cause or root of the problem. In that case the solution is to use direct attack, 
as defined below, in lieu of attack. I leave as an area of future research further analysis of bridging as­
sumptions between the work of Dung and mincon argumentation, both with and without a consideration 
of reflection.
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Definition 4.8.2. Let A  be a knowledgebase o f  labelled assumption form ulae and I  : a , J  : 0 , e  
arguments(A). The set o f  direct attacks on J : 0  which are not subject to reflection o ff I : a , denoted 
directAttacks (J :  0 , 1 :  a ,  A ), is such that:
directAttacks( J  : 0 , I : a ,  A ) =  argumentAttacks( J  : 0 , A ) \  reflectedAttacks( J : 0 , I : a ,  A ).
As defined, this direct attack is relative to the reflector passed in. One could conjecture a kind of 
direct attack between two arguments that is absent from reflections not just from one reflector, but rather 
from many or all possible reflectors. That generalisation is done in the next chapter which generalises 
reflection from individual arguments to sets o f arguments. So now the final property.
Proposition4.83 . Let A  be a knowledgebase o f  labelled assumption form ulae and I  : a J : 0  e  
arguments(A).
directAttacks( J  : 0 , I : a ,  A )
=  directArgumentRebuttals( J : 0 , 1 :  a ,  A )
U directCanonicalUndercuts( J : 0 , 1 : a ,  A) .
Proof Direct attack, in Definition 4.8.2, is defined as all attacks argumentAttacks( J  : 0 , A )  less the 
reflected arguments reflectedAttacks( J  : 0 , I  :a,  A ). A ttacks is defined, in Definition 3.9.2, as canonical 
undercuts set-unionised with rebuttals. Direct canonical undercuts, by Definition 4.5.1 are canonical un­
dercuts less reflected canonical undercuts. Direct argument rebuttals, from Definition 4.8.1, are rebuttals 
less reflected argument rebuttals. Therefore the set o f direct attacks directAttacks( J : 0 , 1 : a ,  A ) is equal 
to the set o f direct argument rebuttals U the set o f direct canonical undercuts. □
This completes analysis o f reflected argument rebuttals and also of reflected and direct arguments.
4.9 Conclusion for Reflected and Direct Arguments
This chapter on reflected and direct arguments and attacks introduces this thesis’ main contribution -  
namely reflection. Reflected arguments, given their prerequisites, always exist. The process of reflection 
always involves a reflecting argument and one or more reflected arguments. As reflections are predictable 
they introduce redundancy or duplication and therefore make any counting of arguments problematic.
The following table shows the six new key definitions presented in the chapter, together with previ­
ous ones to provide context. These nine direct and reflected attacking functions are shown in Table 4.3 
below.
Note that all o f the above table is at the level o f individual arguments. The dimension of confirma­
tions is added in the next chapter. O f the above nine, only reflectedArgumentRebuttal( J  : 0 , 1 : a,  A ) is 
always a singleton set. Three discoveries in this chapter are i) the existence of reflected arguments with 
either rebuttal or undercut as the attack on the reflector and ii) again with either rebuttal or undercut as 
the reflected attacks by the reflected arguments and iii) the mono-pair enlarged reflection. The following 
table, Table 4.4, summarises the reflections that occur with individual arguments.
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Attack Reflection Argument Attacks Function Definition
Rebuttal Reflected U  Direct rebuttals (7 :a , A ) 2.6.7
Undercut Reflected U  Direct canonicalUndercuts(/: a ,  A ) 3.3.2
Attacks Reflected U  Direct argumentAttacks(/: a ,  A ) 3.9.2
Rebuttal Reflected Only reflectedArgumentRebuttal( J  : 0 , I : a ,  A ) 4.7.1
Undercut Reflected Only reflectedCanonicalllndercuts( J  : 0 , I : a , A ) 4.4.1
Attacks Reflected Only reflectedAttacks(J  : 0 , I : a ,  A ) 4.2.1
Rebuttal Direct Only directArgumentRebuttals( J  : 0 , I :  a ,  A ) 4.8.1
Undercut Direct Only directCanonicalUndercuts( J : 0 , 1 :  a ,  A ) 4.5.1
Attacks Direct Only directAttacks( J : 0 , 1 : a ,  A ) 4.8.2
Table 4.3: Summary of Reflected and Direct Argument Attacking Functions
Reflected Enlarged Exact Reduced
Canonical Undercut: 
Argument Rebuttal:
Exist: Mono-Pair, Section 4.6 Exist: Prop 4.6.1 D on’t Exist: Prop 4.6.1 
Don’t Exist: Prop 4.7.5 Exist: Prop 4.7.5 D on’t Exist: Prop 4.7.5
Table 4.4: Summary o f Scaling Factors Found With Argument Reflections
O f particular interest with mono-pair enlarged reflections are a) the fact that there can be more 
reflected arguments than might be anticipated intuitively, b) that the number of reflections can be large 
and c) that while the reflection has a basic symmetry o f existence it d) does not have symmetry of 
cardinality. There are no reduced reflections from mono-pair reflection, however these are encountered 
through another mechanism in the next chapter. These complications with mono-pair enlarged reflections 
are a harbinger for the deeper challenges to be unfolded in the next chapter. These scaling properties 
o f reflection show that the approach of using reflected arguments as proxies or substitutes for direct 
arguments is questionable.
That completes my analysis o f single arguments attacking single arguments. In the next chapter I 
extend this discussion by moving up to the consideration of confirmations attacking confirmations.
Chapter 5
Reflected and Direct Confirmations
5.1 Overview of the Chapter
I develop this chapter’s analysis o f reflected and direct confirmations and attacks in seven stages. The 
chapter retraces the previous chapter’s coverage o f Type I Reflection attacks (with its four forms) this 
time considering sets o f arguments. It uncovers novel properties and three further types of reflection: 
Types II, HI and IV. These properties, particularly distorted reflection, impact the tracking o f debates. 
Reflected confirming arguments, where knowledge o f arguments nearer a tree’s leaves allow prediction 
o f arguments nearer the root, come near the end of this chapter, however they influence debate tracking 
as much as the other types o f reflection. The sections o f this chapter are:
Reflected Preclusive Undercuts Section 5.2 identifies the form and properties of reflected 
preclusive undercuts.
Direct Preclusive Undercuts Section 5.3 shows that not all preclusive undercuts are reflected. 
W hile reflected preclusive undercuts are always mono-attack, direct preclusive undercuts can be 
multi-attack.
M ixed Preclusive Undercuts and Invalidation Section 5.4 illustrates that a single confirmation 
may contain a mixture of reflected and direct preclusive undercuts. Features o f the process of 
invalidation are described.
Reflected Confirmation Rebuttals Section 5.5 introduces a second kind of reflection, Type II 
Reflection, where a different mechanism from reflectedAttacksQ is involved, due to multi-target 
preclusions, to create reflections arising off more than one argument.
Direct Confirmation Rebuttals Section 5.6 establishes that confirmation rebuttals exist which 
are not reflected. They are half of what needs to be tracked for a complete debate. The other half 
is the direct preclusions.
Scaled and Distorted Reflections Section 5.7 defines reflection scaling factors and shows that 
enlarged, reduced, exact and distorted reflections exist. Also a second mechanism for enlargement 
is shown.
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Reflected C onfirm ing A rgum ents Section 5.8 covers a third and Section 5.9 a fourth type of 
reflection, i.e Type HI and IV Reflection, as distinct from the forms addressed so far in this and 
the previous chapter. These reflections can be understood as flowing up attack chains from tail to 
head, in contrast to the other types which flow down.
This chapter argues that there is no simple practical way to have reflected arguments stand in for, 
or represent, direct arguments. Attempts to count the reflected arguments, as a substitute for counting 
the direct ones, are likely to create erroneous, if not random, results. Even if existential schemes are 
used instead of argument counting the same problem appears to arise. The ground work is laid here 
to reason that all reflected arguments should be removed from the tracked debate and all direct ones 
included. W hether the nomenclature uses confirmations or some other way to aggregate arguments is 
relatively unimportant -  the exclusion o f reflection and inclusion of direct arguments is the focus. The 
confirmation notation, however, facilitates both the description and comprehension of these phenomena.
5.2 Reflected Preclusive Undercuts
Just as there exist reflected canonical undercuts arising from a pair o f arguments where one attacks the 
other, so also there exist reflected preclusive undercuts arising from a pair of confirmations where one 
attacks the other. These two different undercut reflect functions, reflectedCanonicalUndercuts( J : (3,1: 
a ,  A ) and reflectedPredusiveUndercuts(Y : (3, V , X : a ,  A ), take slightly different input parameters: the 
former takes an attack chain o f two arguments while the latter takes a attack chain of two confirmations 
(with its target confirmation label). Both result in attack chains o f three items. The former is o f three 
arguments, which I have referred to as the reflector / :  a  attacked by J:(3,  attacked by the reflected K : 7 . 
The latter is o f three confirmations. See Figure 5.1 for an annotated confirmation graph illustrating 
reflected preclusive undercut.
Reflector Confirmation 




(Y : /?, V, X : a )  G confirmationAttacks(X: a ,  A )
(Z :7 , W , Y \(3) G
reflectedPreclusiveUndercuts( Y : (3, V , X : a ,  A )
Reflected Confirmation Z : 7  For each K  £  Z, K  C / ,  /  £  V
Figure 5.1: Reflected Preclusive Undercut is a Form of Type I Reflection
I now define the reflected preclusive undercut and its associated terminology:
Definition 5.2.1. Let A be a knowledgebase o f  labelled assumption formulae, let I  : a ,  K  : 7  G 
arguments( A ) and l e t \  :a,  W : (3, X : a ,  Y : (3, Z : 7  G 0 (A ). The reflected preclusive undercuts fu n c ­
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tion, denoted  reflectedPreclusiveUndercuts(Y : /3, V, X : a , A), provides the set o f  reflected preclusive 
undercuts o f Y : 0  that can be inferred from  the existence o f  V : a  and Y : 0  such that:
reflectedPreclusivellndercuts(Y: 0, V , X : a, A )
=  { (Z :7 , W , Y : 0)  G preclusiveUndercuts(Y: 0 , A ) |
(Y : 0 , V, X : a ) G confirmationAttacks(X: a , A ) and 
fo r  every K  G Z there exists an I €  V where K  C  / } .
I call the attacked target confirmation at the head of the chain, i.e. V :q , the reflecting confirmation 
or reflector. The reflector is attacked by Y : 0 , which is attacked by the reflected confirmation Z : 7 . If 
a targeted attack tuple (Z : 7 , W , Y : 0)  G reflectedPreclusiveUndercuts(Y : 0 , V, X : a ,  A ) then I call 
(Z : 7 , W , Y : 0 )  a reflected preclusive undercut. Each argument in the reflected preclusive undercut is 
reflected off one and only one reflector argument.
Now here is an example of a reflected preclusive undercut, where the reflection is two mono-target 
mono-attack preclusions.
Exam ple 5.2.1. Reflected preclusive undercut Let A  = {a : 0, b: 0  —► a , c : 7 , d : 7  —► ->a, e : 
t t V ^ q ,  /  tt}. Let I  =  { a ,6 } ,J  =  { c ,d } ,K  =  { e , / } ,U  =  { J } ,V  =  { X } ,X  =  { / } ,Y  =  
{J , K } ,  Z =  { / } .  So I  :a , K  7  A  ( 7  —► ->a)),/:-< ((7r V ->a) A —»7r) 6  arguments(A).
Consequently U : ->a,V  : ->q,X : q ,Y  : ->q,Z : - > (7  A  ( 7  —* ->a)),Z : ->((7r V ->a) A ->tt) G 0 (A ). 
The head of this attack chain is X : a, so defending confirmation X : a = target confirmation X : a, 
so it is this confirmation which acts in the role of reflector. Next in the attack chain is Y  : as
Y  : ->a G confirmationRebuttals(X : a, A ). Two reflected preclusive undercuts follow, namely (Z : 
-< (7  A ( 7  —» ->q)),U , Y  : -<a) G reflectedPreclusiveUndercuts(Y : ->a, V ,X  : a , A ) and (Z : ->((7r V 
->q) A ->7r), V, Y  : -«a) G reflectedPreclusiveUndercuts(Y : -iq , V, X : q , A). Clearly there are other 
members of arguments( A ) such as {c, d, e } : n, but these do not partake in the reflections.
Commenting on Figure 5.1, clearly the confirmation attack by Y : 0  on the head of the chain X : a  
could be either a confirmation rebuttal or a preclusive undercut. In either case the target confirmation 
label V will be a subset o f the defending confirmation label X, i.e. V C X. The next attack in the chain 
here is Z : 7  attacking Y : 0. It is a preclusive undercut and thus W C Y.
Therefore in the above definition there is one confirmation, namely V : a ,  in the role of the reflector. 
A second confirmation Y : 0  is the attacking (i.e. rebutting or undercutting) confirmation of X : a . The 
reflected preclusive undercut function does not just yield a single tuple (Z : 7 , W , Y : 0), rather, it yields 
a set o f tuples {(Z : 7 , W , Y  : 0)} ,  where each tuple in the set is a reflected preclusive undercut. The 
definition does not mandate that either V : a  or Y : 0  are maximum cardinality confirmations. Any 
cardinality is allowed and thus knowledge of both V : a  and Y : 0  need to be explicitly passed in.
5.2.1 Properties of Reflected Preclusive Undercuts
Reflected preclusive undercuts, given their prerequisites, always exist. This proposition uses Defini­
tion 3.9.4 of confirmation attacks.
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Proposition 5.2.1. Let A  be a knowledgebase o f  labelled assumption form ulae and let V : a ,  X : a ,  Y : 
0  e  0 (A ).
I f  (Y : 0, V, X : a )  € confirmationAttacks(X: a ,  A )
then reflectedPreclusiveUndercuts(Y : 0, V, X : a ,  A ) ^  0, 
otherwise reflectedPreclusivellndercuts(Y : 0, V, X : a ,  A ) =  0.
P ro o / Consider an /  6  V, a J  e  Y and a i f  €  Z where (Z : 7 , W , Y : 0 )  e  preclusiveUndercuts(Y : 
0 , A ) ,  where W  : 0,  Z : 7  e  0 (A ). For (Z : 7 ,W , Y : 0)  to be in reflectedPreclusivellndercuts(Y : 
0 , V , X  : a ,  A ), where W C Y, then every argument K  : 7  must be reflected. Because V : a ,  Y : 
0  e  0 (A )  it follows that I  : a ,  J  : 0  e  arguments(A). Furthermore given (Y : 0,  V ,X  : a)  €  
confirmationAttacks(X: a ,  A ) then J : 0  e  argumentAttacks(7: a ,  A ), where V is any V C X. Proposi­
tion 4.4.1 establishes that given a pair o f attacking arguments then a reflected canonical undercut always 
exists. These conditions are met here, so such a reflection exists. Consequently for every K  e  Z there 
exists an I  e  V where K  C /  and thus the set reflectedPreclusiveUndercuts(Y: 0,  V, X : a ,  A ) cannot 
be the 0. However if any prerequisite is not met then the reflection cannot occur. Therefore if (Y  : 
0,  V, X : a )  e  confirmationAttacks(X: a ,  A ) then reflectedPreclusiveUndercuts(Y: 0,  V, X : a,  A ) ±  0, 
otherwise reflectedPreclusiveUndercuts(Y: 0,  V, X : a ,  A ) =  0. □
The target cardinality o f reflected preclusive undercuts can only ever be one. The reflection is thus 
always a mono-target preclusive undercut and never multi-target.
Proposition 5.2.2. Let A  be a knowledgebase of labelled assumption formulae and letV  .a , W :0,X:  
q ,Y : / 3 ,Z : 7 € 0 ( A ) .
If (Z: 7 , W , Y : 0) e  reflectedPreclusivellndercuts(Y: 0,  V, X : a ,  A ) then |W| =  1 .
P roof Definition 5.2.1 establishes that each argument K : 7  which is in the reflected preclusive undercut 
attacking confirmation Z : 7 , i.e. where K  € Z, has a support which is a subset or equal to the support 
o f an argument / :  a  that is in the reflector confirmation V : a , i.e. I  €  V, such that K  C I .  Definition 
5 .2 .1 does not explicitly constrain the claim o f Z : 7  apart from stipulating that it must be a preclusive 
undercut attacking confirmation. Now hypothesise that there exists a ( Z : ->(7 / A . . .  A 7 m), U, Y : 0)  € 
reflectedPreclusivellndercuts(Y : 0 , V, X : a , A ) where U e  C, |U| >  1. Such a target o f U could not 
exist as their exists an invalidating preclusive undercut (Z : 7 , W , Y : 0)  (see Definition 3.4.2 of preclusive 
undercut and the definitions o f terms in the text below it) where each argument K  : 7  with K  €  Z is 
a reflected canonical undercut (see Definition 4.4.1) and hence any reflected preclusive undercut has a 
target o f W  : (3 where |W | =  1 . Thus the attacking confirmation with target U : 0, |U| >  1 would be 
invalidated by the one with W : 0, | W | =  1. So all reflected preclusive undercuts have a target cardinality 
of 1, they are mono-target. So if (Z : 7 ,  V, Y : 0) e  reflectedPreclusivellndercuts(Y : 0, V, X : a , A ) then 
|W | =  1. □
Thus a reflected preclusive undercut never means 7  attack this argument or that argument’ -  instead 
it only attacks one argument: 7  attack this argument’. In analysing the patterns created by these various
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reflections the above proposition plays a prominent role. It follows that reflected preclusive undercuts 
are comprised only of reflected canonical undercuts.
Proposition S .13 . Let A  be a knowledgebase of labelled assumption formulae, let I: a, J-0,  
K : 7  £ arguments( A ) and let V : a ,  W : 0,  X : a ,  Y : 0,  Z : 7  £ 0 (A ).
reflectedPreclusiveUndercuts(Y: 0,  V , X : a ,  A )
=  { (Z : 7 , W , Y : 0) £ preclusiveUndercuts(Y :0,  A ) |
for every K  £ Z there exists an I G V am/ a J £ Y
such that K : y  £ reflectedCanonicalUndercuts( J .0,1: a,  A ) }.
Proof Proposition 5.2.2 establishes that the target confirmation, which is W : 0 , of each reflected preclu­
sive undercut (Z : 7 , W , Y : 0 ) in the set reflectedPreclusiveUndercuts(Y: 0 , V, X : a ,  A ) can only have 
a label cardinality o f one, that is where |label(W : /3) | =  1 and W C Y. Hence, using Definition 4.4 .1 of 
reflected canonical undercut, each argument K  : 7  within a reflected preclusive undercut attacker Z : 7 , 
where K  £  Z, can be represented as a canonical undercut, i.e. K  : 7  £  canonicalUndercuts( J  : 0 , A ) 
so it is always the case that this K  : 7  £  reflectedCanonicalUndercuts( J  : 0 , 1 :  a ,  A )  with no loss of 
information. Therefore it follows that reflectedPreclusiveUndercuts(Y: 0 , V , X : a , A )  =  { (Z :7 , W , Y : 
0)  £ preclusivel)ndercuts(Y : 0,  A ) | for every K  £ Z there exists an /  e  V  and a J  £ Y such that 
K : 7  £ reflectedCanonicalUndercuts( J  : 0 , I : a ,  A )} . □
In defining the reflected preclusive undercut an alternative approach could have started by defining 
them as comprised o f reflected canonical undercuts - in which case Proposition 5.2.3 would become the 
definition and an adaptation o f the above Definition 5.2.1 would follow as a proposition.
I now show that the number of reflected preclusive undercuts attacking any given defending confir­
mation is between one and the cardinality of that defending confirmation.
Proposition 5.2.4. Let A  be a knowledgebase of labelled assumption formulae and let V : a ,  X : a ,  Y :
0  €  0 (A ).
0 ^  |reflectedPreclusiveUndercuts(Y:/5, V ,X :q ,  A )| ^  |Y |.
Proof If  a prerequisite, e.g. (Y : 0, W , X : a) € confirmationAttacks(X : a ,  A ), is absent then re­
flected preclusive undercuts do not exist, so the set’s minimum cardinality is 0. Proposition 5.2.2 
shows that each reflected preclusive undercut has a target cardinality of 1. Thus each argument
1 £  Y, where Y : 0  is the defending confirmation o f the reflected attack, may be subject to a unique 
reflected preclusive undercut, i.e. to a maximum of one preclusive undercut. Consequently there 
can only be as many reflected preclusive undercuts as there are deduction labels in Y. Therefore 
0 ^  |reflect©dPreclusiveUndercuts(Y: 0,  V, X : a, A )| ^  |Y |. □
Each of these up to |Y | reflected preclusive undercuts, arising from the interaction of X : a  with 
Y : 0,  will have a different claim and will contain one or more attacking arguments.
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53  Direct Preclusive Undercuts
A direct preclusive undercut is a preclusive undercut that contains no reflected canonical undercut argu­
ments, relative to a specific reflector. Thus all o f its arguments are direct and none of them are reflected. 
Furthermore, a direct preclusive undercut is allowed to be a multi-target preclusive undercut -  as is stan­
dard for preclusive undercuts -  and therefore not every argument in a direct preclusive undercut can be 
represented as a direct canonical undercut, nor even as a canonical undercut. It may be the case that the 
input to a direct preclusive undercut is a confirmation attack ( Y : 0, V , X : a )  € confirmationAttacks(X: 
q , A ) or it may not, in which case V =  X =  0 and only Y : 0  is non-empty. The definition builds on 
Definition 3.4.2 for preclusive undercut and Definition 4.4 .1 for reflected canonical undercut.
Definition 53.1 . Let A b e  a knowledgebase of labelled assumption formulae, let I : a , J :0, K : 7  e  
arguments( A ) and let V : a , W : 0, X : a , Y : (3, Z : 7  e  0 (A ). The direct preclusive undercuts function, 
denoted directPreclusivetlndercuts(Y: 0, V, X : a , A ), provides the set of preclusive undercuts o f Y : 0  
that are not reflected off V : a  such that:
directPreclusiveUndercuts(Y : /?, V, X : a ,  A )
=  { (Z : 7 , W , Y : 0) e  preclusiveUndercuts(Y :0 ,A)  \
(either (Y : (3, V, X : a )  e  confirmationAttacks(X: a ,  A ) or V =  X =  0) 
and for every K  G Z there does not exist a J € W  and an I  e  V 
where K  : 7 6  reflectedCanonicalllndercuts( J : 0, 7 : q ,A ) } .
Here Z : 7  is the direct attacking confirmation and V : a  is the reflecting confirmation. Clearly 
it is the case that i) W  : 0  is such that 0 /  W  C Y , ii) that the negation o f the conjunction 
o f the members o f stripAssumptions(formulae(W, A )) is equal to 7  and iii) as always, canonical or­
dering is followed. Also note that the attack of Y  : /3 on X : a  can be either a confirmation re­
buttal or a preclusive undercut. It is not possible to use a definition akin to Definition 4.5.1 of di­
rect canonical undercut as directPreclusiveUndercuts(Y : 0,  V, X : a ,  A ) /  preclusiveUndercuts(Y : 
0,  A ) \  reflectedPreclusiveUndercuts(Y : /3, V , X : a ,  A ) for reasons addressed in Section 5.4 (i.e. the 
existence o f ‘mixed preclusive undercuts’, see Definition 5.4.1).
The cardinality of the target confirmation W : 0  for direct preclusive undercuts can be greater than 
one, 1 <  |W| <  | Y  |, unlike the situation with reflected preclusive undercuts where the cardinality of the 
target confirmation can only be one, |W | =  1. In the above, Definition 5.3.1, the last two lines remove 
reflections and as such all removed arguments have the form of a reflected canonical undercut with a 
target cardinality of one.
I now give an example of a direct preclusive undercut, taking the opportunity to show an attacking 
confirmation, here Z : ->(/? A  (0  —► a ) ) ,  that has a support cardinality of greater than one, i.e. |Z| >  1, 
making it a multi-attack direct preclusive undercut.
Example 5 3 .1 . Direct preclusive undercut Let A  =  {a : 0,  b : 0  —► a ,  c : -</?, d : ->/?}. So 
{ a ,  6 }  : a ,  {c} : -</3, {c} : - ' ( / ?  A  (0  —> a ) ) ,  { d }  : - ’( / ?  A  (0  —► a ) )  e  arguments(A). Consequently
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{ { a ,6 }}  : a ,  {{c},{d}} : ->((3 A (/3 —► a ) )  E 0 (A ). The target confirmation is { { a ,6 }} : a  and 
the attacking confirmation is {{c}, {d}}  : ^((3 A  ((3 —» a ) ) . LetX  =  { { a ,  6 }} and Z =  {{c}, {d}}. 
There are no arguments for ->a and indeed no arguments undercut by X : a ,  so for completeness it is 
stated that the unfounded confirmation 0 : ->a E 0 (A )  is passed in as the reflector in question. Thus 
(Z : ->(/? A {(3 —► a ) ) ,  X, X : a )  E directPreclusiveUndercuts(X : a ,  0 ,0  : ->a, A ) is a direct preclusive 
undercut of X : a  as no rebuttal exists, i.e. because A  V- ->a.
5.3.1 Properties of Direct Preclusive Undercuts
Given a direct preclusive undercut and the confirmation it is not reflected off, then information about the 
supports involved is known.
Proposition 5 3 .1 . Let A be a knowledgebase of labelled assumption formulae, let I: a , J:(3, K : 7  E 
argum ents( A ) and let V : a ,  W : (3, X : a ,  Y : (3, Z : 7  E 0 (A ).
If (Z :7 , W , Y :/3) E directPreclusivel)ndercuts(Y:/3, V , X :a ,  A ), 
then for all K  E Z there does not exist an I  E V such that K  C  I.
Proof. Given that (Z : 7 ,W ,Y  : 0 )  E directPreclusiveUndercuts(Y : (3, V ,X  : a ,  A ) then by Defini­
tion 5.3.1 it is the case that for every K  E Z that for all I  E V and J  E Y there does not exist a 
K  : 7  E reflectedCanonicalUndercuts( J  : (3,1 : a ,  A ). If  there had been a reflected canonical undercut 
then it would have been the case that K  C I, so as there is no reflection it is clear that for all K  E Z 
and all I  E V it is the case that K  % I .  Therefore if  (Z : 7 , W , Y : (3) E directPreclusiveUndercuts(Y: 
(3 ,W,X:  a ,  A ) then for all K  E Z there does not exist an /  E V such that K  C / .  □
Direct preclusive undercuts can be mono-target or multi-target preclusive undercuts. Reflected 
preclusive undercuts and all canonical undercuts, in comparison, are only ever mono-target undercuts.
Proposition 5 3 3 .  Let A b e  a knowledgebase of labelled assumption formulae and let V : a ,  W : 0, X : 
a ,Y : / ? ,Z : 7 € 0 ( A ) .
If (Z :7 , W , Y:(3)  E directP reclusiveU ndercuts(Y :/? ,V ,X :a, A ) then |W | >  1.
Proof. By Definition 5.3.1 o f direct preclusive undercut and its use of Definition 4.4.1 of reflected 
canonical undercut there is no further constraint on W , beyond that for ordinary preclusions, see Def­
inition 3.4.2, so the cardinality is the same as for ordinary preclusions. So if (Z : 7 ,W ,Y  : (3) E 
directPreclusiveUndercuts(Y : ( 3 , V , X  :a,  A ) then |W | > 1 .  □
Furthermore it is possible to be quite specific about the cardinality of the direct preclusive undercuts 
function.
Proposition 5 3 3 .  Let A be a knowledgebase of labelled assumption formulae and let V : a ,  X : a,  Y : 
(3 € 0 (A ).
0 <  |directPreclusiveUndercuts(Y:/?, V, X  :a ,  A )| <  |preclusiveUndercuts(Y:/5, A )|.
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Proof. Depending upon A  there may exist a Y : 0  which simply does not have any undercuts, let alone 
direct undercuts, so the lower limit is 0. It may also be the case that X =  0 when there are no reflecting 
arguments for a  being passed in and thus V =  X =  0 is an empty reflector and hence there are no reflec­
tions. Consequently, at the upper limit, every preclusive undercut of Y : 0  would be a direct preclusive 
undercut. Therefore 0 <  |directPreclusivellndercuts(Y : 0 , V , X : a , A ) |  <  |preclusiveUndercuts(Y : 
0 , A)|. □
53.2 Maximal Direct Preclusive Undercut
In the above definition o f direct preclusive undercut, only one reflector is considered rather than all 
possible reflectors. Furthermore no constraint is applied that forces the attacking confirmation of a direct 
preclusive undercut to be as large a cardinality confirmation as possible. The two advantages of the 
following maximal cardinality direct preclusive undercuts function are that a) it considers all possible 
reflectors and b) the attacking confirmation is as large a cardinality as possible. Motivational discussion 
needed to justify the form of the maximal direct preclusive undercut is aided by Figure 5.2’s annotated 
confirmation graph.








Figure 5.2: Reflectors to Consider for the M aximal Direct Preclusive Undercut Z : <j>
One might think that to determine the form of the maximal direct preclusive undercut, Z : <f> in 
Figure 5.2 above, would involve two types and many occurrences of reflector. The two types of reflector 
would be rebuttal and preclusive undercut. W hile there can be only one rebuttal confirmation reflector, 
Y : ->q, there could be many preclusive undercut reflectors V i : , . . . ,  V n : ipn . However, following the
extension of Base Proposition Two, to be provided shortly as Proposition 5.5.1, it is the case that every 
one o f these preclusive undercut reflectors will be reflected down to the rebuttal Y  : ->a and therefore 
they do not need independent consideration as reflectors. Secondarily, a reflector can be part of either a 
direct or a reflected attack. If the reflector is itself part o f a reflected attack then it will always exist in an 
attack chain where at the head o f that attack chain is a direct argument. Thus, when using the maximum 
cardinality confirmation for ->a, i.e. lop(0(->a,  A )) as the reflector it is not necessary to know which of 
these rebuttal arguments are direct and which are reflected.
A confirmation graph may be cast into a confirmation tree, following the common approach for
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casting graphs into trees, see for example (Chalmers, 2003), even if the resultant tree of confirmations 
is an infinite one. Now assume that these confirmation chains of Figure 5.2 are part o f such a confir­
mation tree and consider the consequences. Thus it will be the case that X : a  has only one preclusive 
undercut parent, some W  : ip, (unless X : a  is the root in which case it has no parent). Thus out of 
the many preclusive undercut reflectors, V i : ip i, . . . ,  V n : ipn , which could act as reflectors, there is 
only one preclusive undercut reflector, V : ip, that is active as all the other possible preclusive reflec­
tors will not be part o f the tree and thus rendered irrelevant. There is no need to pass in even this one 
preclusive reflector as its presence is accounted for by the maximum cardinality rebuttal confirmation: 
top(0(_,stripConfirmation(X: a ) ,  A )) =  Y : ->a. O f all these possible reflector rebuttal arguments, con­
sidering each J : ->a where J  e  Y , some will be part o f the tree and others will not be (they are ‘pruned 
out’, analogous to the way that a gardener prunes a rose bush or tree by removing undesirable material) 
because they are reflected off arguments higher in the tree (nearer to the root). Thus to consider them all 
as reflectors it is not sufficient to just refer to any rebuttal confirmation of X : a , but rather it is necessary 
to refer to the maximum cardinality confirmation that has the claim of ->stripConfirmation(X: a ) . Now 
I formalise this discussion as the definition for the maximal direct preclusive undercut. For comparison, 
the non-maximal or ordinary direct preclusive undercuts function is Definition 5.3.1 and the attacker 
helper function is Definition 3.7.1.
Definition 5 3 .2 . Let A  be a knowledgebase of labelled assumption formulae and let 
V :q , X :q , Y:->q, Z :<p € 0 (A ). The maxim al direct preclusive undercuts function, denoted 
maximalDirectPreclusiveUndercuts(X: a ,  A ), which provides the set of maximal cardinality preclusive 
undercuts of X : a  that are not reflected off any reflector derivable from A, is such that:
maximalDirectPreclusiveUndercuts(X :a, A )
=  { (Z : <p, V, X : a ) e  directPreclusiveUndercuts(X: a , Y, Y : ->a, A ) |
Z :<p e  top(attacker(directPreclusiveUndercuts(X:a , Y , Y : -<a, A ))) and 
Y:->q =  top(0(^stripConfirmation(X:a), A ))} .
The first top() ensures that Z : <p is the maximum cardinality member of its power set, i.e. that the at­
tacker o f any other preclusive undercut, (Z ': 0 ',  V ', X : a ) ,  where V ^  V ' £  X, that exists that is also not 
reflected off the same reflectors and that attacks X : a ,  has a label of lower cardinality than the maximum 
cardinality Z : <p. Clearly there can only be one top member of the set o f subsets o f Z. The defending 
confirmation X : a  can still have many maximal cardinality direct preclusive undercuts attacking it as X 
can have many subsets, V C X, and thus contain many targets. Each maximal cardinality confirmation 
attacking X : a  will have a different claim. The target V is unconstrained, apart from V C X, so the 
preamble of Definition 5.3.2 contains the phrase ‘the set o f’ to cover all the targets (not the power set of 
attackers). I now give an example of a maximal direct preclusive undercut.
Example 5 3 .2 . M aximal direct preclusive undercut Let A  =  {a : (3, b : j3 —► q ,c  : 7 ,d  : 7  ->
(->0 V ->7r), e : 7r, / :  -i7r V V ->(0 A 7r), i \  :a  ~^ C } -  Let I  = {a, 6 }, J  — {c, d}, K  =
{e, / } ,  L  =  {g, h } , M  = { i j }  and let T  = { /} ,U  =  { K } , V  =  { ^ } ,W  =  {L } ,X  =  { I , K } ,  Y  =
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{ M } ,Z  =  {J, L) .  So I  : a , K  :a,  M  :->a, J:-> 0V-^tt, L:~>(/3Att) G arguments(A). Thus X :a  G 0 (A )  
is the defending confirmation and Y : ->a G 0 (A )  the rebutting confirmation and reflector. The attacking 
confirmations are (Y : ->(0 A (0  —► q ) ) ,T ,  X : a ) , (Y  : —i(7r A (~>it V a ) ) ,U ,X  : a ) , (V : -i(/3 A (0  —> 
a )  A 7r A (~>7r V a )) , X, X : a ) , (W  : -<(0 A (fi —> a )  A 7r A (~>7r V a )) , X, X : a ) , (Z : -i(/? A (0  —* 
a )  A 7r A (—>7r V o ) ) ,X ,X : o )  €  preclusiveUndercuts(X: a , A). However ( Y : -i(/3 A (0  —* a ) ) ,  T , X : 
a ) , ( Y : ->(7r A ( >7r V q ) ) ,U ,X :o )  g  reflectedPreclusiveUndercuts(X: a , Y, Y : -ta, A ). Consequently 
(V : -.(/? A (/3 -  q )  A tt A (-7T V a ) ) ,  X, X : a ) , (W : -(/3  A {0  -  a ) A tt A ( - t t  V q ) ) ,X ,X :q ) , ( Z :  
->(/? A (0  —» q )  A 7r A ( —>7r V q ) ) ,X ,X :q )  g  directPreclusiveUndercuts(X :a , Y , Y :->a, A). However 
only (Z : -•(/? A (/? —♦ q ) A 7r A (-«7r V q ) ) ,  X, X :q ) g maximalDirectPreclusiveUndercuts(X:a , A), /r i'j 
case that (V :->(/? A (/? —> a )  A 7r A (-i7r V q ) ) ,X ,X :q ) ,  —♦ a )  A7r A (->7r V q )), X ,X :
q )  maximalOirectPreclusiveUndercuts(X : a , A ) as they are not maximal. It is also the case that 
(Y :->((3a (0 —* a ) ) ,T ,X : a ) ,  (Y:--(7r A(->7t V a ) ) ,U ,X : a )  ^ maximalDirectPreclusiveUndercuts(X: 
q , A ) as they are reflected.
To conclude this section on direct preclusive undercuts I emphasise their relevance to debate track­
ing; i.e. to the tracking of all and o f  only direct arguments. W hilst this and the previous chapter cover 
both reflected and direct arguments, it is the reflections which are to be avoided or removed and the direct 
arguments which are o f lasting value. This is perhaps akin to woodwork, where the direct arguments are 
the piece o f art or equipment being created and the reflections the waste or scrap wood around the work 
that need to be cut off and discarded. M aximal direct preclusive undercuts are especially relevant as 
they are immune to the relative weakness I pointed out in Section 4.5.1 on direct canonical undercuts. 
In a maximal direct preclusion, by using a maximum cardinality reflector, which stands for all other 
reflectors, the status o f being direct is strengthened from being relative to being absolute.
5.4 Mixed Preclusive Undercuts and Invalidation
A mixed preclusive undercut is a preclusive undercut that contains a mixture of direct and reflected 
preclusive undercuts. All o f the arguments in one o f these attacking confirmations will have the same 
claim, but different supports. One might think that this is a mixture of direct and reflected canonical 
undercuts, however that constraint is unnecessary as the direct arguments may not all be representable 
as direct canonical undercuts - due to the possibility o f multi-target claims. A confirmation is a mixed 
preclusive undercut iff it is a preclusive undercut and yet not a reflected preclusive undercut nor a direct 
preclusive undercut, as I now define:
Definition 5.4.1. Let A  be a knowledgebase o f  labelled assumption form ulae and let V : a ,  X : a ,  Y : 
0 , G 0 (A ). A  mixed preclusive undercut denoted  mixedPreclusivel)ndercuts(Y: 0 , V, X : a ,  A), is a
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preclusive undercut where some o f  its arguments are direct and some are reflected, such that:
mixedPreclusiveUndercuts(Y: /?, V , X : a ,  A)
=  (preclusiveUndercuts(Y :/?, A ) \
directPreclusiveUndercuts(Y: /3, V, X : a ,  A )) \  
reflectedPreclusiveUndercuts(Y: /?, V, X : a ,  A ).
The existence o f mixed preclusive undercuts, as shown in the following example, illustrates that 
judges which rely on the counting or existence of arguments need to distinguish between direct and 
reflected arguments within a preclusion -  as the two can be mixed together and only direct arguments 
should be allowed to affect professional debate outcomes.
Example 5.4.1. Mixed preclusive undercut Let A  =  {a : (3,b : (3 —> a ,c  : ->/3 ,d  : ->(/3 —► a )} . 
Let I  = { a ,  6 } ,  J  = { c } , K  =  {</}. So I : a ,  K  : - a ,  J  : J  : ^/3 V - .(0  -» a ) ,  J  : ->(/? A (/3 -►
a ) ) ,  i f  : ->(/? —► a ) , K  : -<(/? —► a )  V ->(3,K : -'(/? A (/3 —► a ) )  G arguments(A). Consequently 
{ / }  : a , { i f }  : : -.(/? A (/? — q ))  g  0 (A ). 7r /o//ows t/wt ({J , K } : ^((3 A (0 —
a ) ) ,  { /} ,{ /}  : a )  G mixedPreclusiveUndercuts({/} : a ,  { if} , {A"} : - ’Q, A ) w a mixed preclusive 
undercut. The attacking confirmation label o f  this m ixed preclusive undercut is the union o f  the at­
tacking confirmation label o f  the direct preclusive undercut ({J }  : -<(/3 A (/? —► a ) ) ,  { /} , { /}  : a )  G 
directPreclusiveUndercuts({/} : a ,  { K } ,  { K }  : ->a, A ) and the attacking confirmation label o f  the re­
flected  preclusive undercut ( { K } :  ->((3 A  ((3 —> a ) ) ,  { / } ,  { / }  : a )  G reflectedPreclusivellndercuts({/}: 
a ,  { K } ,  { t f } : - a ,  A), i.e. {J, K }  = {J }  U { K } .
A simple observation is that a direct preclusive undercut can never be invalidated by a reflected 
preclusive undercut. Definition 3.4.2 of preclusive undercut, together with the definitions of terms in 
the three paragraphs following it, establish that any invalidating preclusive undercut must have the same 
attacking confirmation label as the invalidated preclusive undercut. If  two preclusive undercuts have the 
same attacking confirmation label they must be either both direct or both reflected. So direct preclusive 
undercuts can never be invalidated by reflected preclusive undercuts.
Another simple observation is that a reflected preclusive undercut can never be invalidated. If a 
preclusive undercut is m ulti-target then it must be direct. Proposition 5.2.2 shows that reflected preclusive 
undercuts are all mono-target. Proposition 5.3.2 shows that direct preclusive undercuts can be mono­
target or multi-target. Therefore a multi-target preclusion cannot be the result o f reflection and thus must 
be direct. Thus, it follows that a reflected preclusive undercut can never be invalidated; not by a direct 
preclusive undercut, not by a reflected preclusive undercut, indeed not by any preclusive undercut. The 
reason that reflected preclusive undercuts cannot be invalidated is that they can only ever be mono-target 
and hence the formulae of the attacking confirmation label can never imply a non-empty shorter claim. 
Thus if invalidation occurs it must be that a direct preclusive undercut has been invalidated by another 
direct preclusive undercut.
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5.5 Type II Reflection -  Reflected Confirmation Rebuttals
To recap for context, the previous chapter, in Section 4.7, covered the reflected rebuttals arising from a 
single pair o f arguments (Definition 4.7.1), one attacking the other, analysing it as a Type I Reflection. 
Now I turn to the situation o f reflected rebuttals arising from a pair o f confirmations, again with one 
attacking the other, and establish that this is a new type of reflection which I call Type II Reflection. 
This pattern is also a parallel o f Section 4.4 on reflected canonical undercuts being elaborated upon by 
Section 5.2 on reflected preclusive undercuts. Now reflected argument rebuttals, Definition 4.7.1, are 
elaborated upon by reflected confirmation rebuttal, Definition 5.5.1. My focus here in the current section 
is on confirmations containing multiple arguments, i.e. multi-attack confirmations, as that distinguishes 
them from self-confirmed single arguments. It is the rebuttals reflected off multi-target preclusive under­
cuts, in particular, that provide novel behaviour. Note that reflected argument rebuttals between single 
arguments, addressed earlier with Definition 4.7.1 as a form of Type I Reflection, does not require the 
K  C  11 u . . . U / „  clause introduced below. Figure 5.3 shows an annotated confirmation graph illustrating 
the requirements and form of Type II Reflection.
X :q
Reflector Confirmation 
is V : q  where y
V = { / l f .
and V C X .  y  -p
(Y : (3, V, X : a) e  preclusiveUndercuts(X: a , A)
Reflected Confirmation Z : ->(3
Z : ~>(3 G confirmationRebuttals(Y: (3, A)
For each K  €  Z, K  C  / x u  . . .  U  In .
Figure 5.3: Type II Reflection is Provided by reflectedConfirmationRebuttals(Y \(3, V, X : a ,  A )
In defining the phenomena o f reflected confirming rebuttals there could be two situations: a) the 
reflector is subject to preclusive undercut, or b) the reflector is subject to confirmation rebuttal. Even 
though including b) would fit better with the abstract perspective of the last chapter and of this chapter 
so far, it would be trivial. If  a confirmation rebuttal is reflected off another rebuttal then the reflector is 
itself -  which does not add any new arguments, nor materially add to the tracking of professional debates. 
Instead I analyse here the situation a) above, as then the following properties and definitions are more 
practical and intuitive. I now define the shape or form of the reflected confirmation rebuttals function. 
W hile the definition is akin to that for reflected preclusive undercuts, Definition 5.2.1, a number of 
differences are necessary. This function returns the full power set o f confirmations, not just the maximum 
cardinality one.
Definition 5.5.1. Let A  be a knowledgebase o f  labelled assumption formulae, let I \ : a , I n : a ,  K : 
->/3 e  arguments(A) and l e t V  .c*, X :a ,  Y : (3, Z :-•/? €  0 (A ). The reflected confirm ation rebutta ls
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that can be inferred from  the existence o f  the confirmation attack o f  Y  : 0  on defending confirmation 
X : a  with target confirmation V : a , denoted  reflectedConfirmationRebuttals(Y: (3, V, X : a ,  A ), is a set 
o f  confirmations such that:
reflectedConfirmationRebuttals(Y: 0 ,  V , X : a ,  A )
=  { Z : ->0 G confirmationRebuttals(Y :0 , A ) |
(Y :/?, V, X :a )  G preclusivel)ndercuts(X :a, A ), 
fo r  each K  £ Z it is the case that K  C 7i U . . .  U 
where V  = { / l f . . . , / n }.
The fact that a reflected confirmation rebuttal is also a confirmation rebuttal ensures that neither the 
attacked nor attacking confirmations are labelled with the empty set. I now give an example of a reflected 
confirmation rebuttal, which uses the *=’ part o f the ‘C ’ on the last line of the Definition 5.5.1.
E xam ple 5.5.1. Reflected confirm ation  rebutta l. Let A  =  {a : 0 ,b  : 0  —> Q , c : ( , d : (  —► a ,  e : 
~~>rb / : _,Q r),g : ->0 V -< } . Let I  =  {a, 6 }, J  =  {c, d},  K  =  {e, / } ,  L =  {p}, M  = {a, 6 , c, d}. So 
I : a , J : a , K : a , L : - > ( 0  A (/? —► a )  A £ A (£ —> a ) ) , M : ( 3  A (/? —► a )  A £ A (£ —> a )  G argum ents(A). 
L e /X  =  { / ,  J , K } , W  =  { / ,  J } , Y  =  {L}, Z =  {M }. T h u s X . a ,  W :q ,  Y :- ( /?  A (/? -*  a )  AC A(C -♦ 
q ) ) ,Z  : 0  A (/5 —♦ a )  A ^ A (£ —> a )  e  0 (A ). Consequently (Y : ->(/? A q )  A (  A ( (  ->
a ) ) ,W ,X  : a )  G preclusiveUndercuts(X : a ,  A ). It also fo llow s that Z : 0  A {(3 —> a )  A £ A (£ —» 
a )  G confirmationRebuttals(Y : -«(/? A (^  -> q )  A (  A ( (  -> a ) ) ,  A ). Matching with the definition o f  
reflected confirmation rebuttal, the observation can be made that in this example indeed M  C I  u  J, 
in fa c t M  =  /  U J . Thus the conclusion can be drawn that Z : (3 A (0  —* a )  A £ A (£ —> a )  G 
reflectedConfirmationRebuttals(Y: ->(0 A (/3 —> a )  A £ A (£ —» a ) ) ,  W , X :a ,  A).
The above example also illustrates the point that the reflector is always the target confirmation, 
here W  : a ,  not the larger defending confirmation, here X : a ,  unless of course W  =  X given that 
always W  C X. This point is not a property or separate design decision as it is contained within the 
Definition 5.5.1 of reflected confirmation rebuttals. The example also brings out that this definition 
requires not just such a target confirmation, but also that Y : /3 attacks X : a ,  in the form of a preclusive 
undercut.
5.5.1 Properties of Reflected Confirmation Rebuttals
Now that the form o f reflected confirmation rebuttals is established it is possible to show that given their 
prerequisites, reflected confirmation rebuttals always exist.
Proposition 5.5.1. Let A  be a knowledgebase o f  labelled assumption form ulae and let W : a ,  X : a ,  Y : 
0  e  0 (A ).
I f  (Y : /?, W , X : a )  G preclusivellndercuts(X : a ,  A)
then reflectedConfirmationRebuttals(Y :/3, W ,X :a ,  A ) ±  0, 
otherwise reflectedConfirmationRebuttals(Y: 0 , W , X : a ,  A ) =  0.
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Proof. Given that (Y : 0 , W , X : a )  €  preclusiveUndercuts(X : a ,  A ) it follows from Definition 3.4.2 
o f preclusive undercut that X ^  0, Y /  0 and that there must exist a target confirmation W : a  
such that 0 =  W C X. From the same definition, as (Y : 0 ,  W ,X  : a )  is a preclusive undercut 
o f X : a  with target W  : a ,  it follows that ->0 =  ^stripAssumptions(formulae(label(W : a ) ,  A )). 
Now to rebut Y : 0  just requires one or more argument K  : ->0, where K  e  Z, Z : ->0 e  
reflectedConfirmationRebuttals(Y : /?, W , X : q , A ) and X  is any support that infers ->0 to ensure a 
non-empty confirmation label label(Z : ->0). Such a K always exists as given these preconditions it fol­
lows that stripAssumptions(formulae(label(W : a ) ,  A )) I- ->0, so there will always exist the reflexive 
argument K  : ->0 €  arguments(A) where K  C / i  u  . . .  U  /„  and W =  I \  U . . .  U  /„ .  This union 
11 U  . . .  U  / „  therefore always implies ->/?, the negation o f the claim of the preclusive undercut attacker
Y  : 0 . The full union may not be needed however, as 7i U . . .  U /„  I— <0 may not be a minimal ar­
gument. If any o f the prerequisites are not met there cannot be a reflection. So if (Y : 0 , W , X : a )  e  
preclusiveUndercuts(X : a ,  A ) then reflectedConfirmationRebuttals(Y : 0 , W , X : a ,  A ) ^  0 otherwise 
refl©ctedConfirmationRebuttals(Y: 0 , W , X : a ,  A ) =  0. □
With the reflected argument rebuttal, one reflecting argument gives rise to one and only reflected 
argument, as shown in Proposition 4.7.5. However with the reflected confirmation rebuttal the number 
o f reflections is not as simple. The above example, Example 5.5.1, shows two reflector arguments in the 
target confirmation giving rise to one reflected argument. The following example shows four defending 
arguments with two reflector arguments in the target confirmation giving rise to two reflected arguments. 
Here there are two subsets (that make up the support o f the reflected attacking confirmation) of the union 
of the supports o f the reflector target confirmation.
Example 5.5.2. Subset Let A  =  {a : A A 7r, b : A A 7r, c : A —► a ,  d : 7r —► a , e  : (A V 7r) A ->a}.
Let I  =  { a ,c } ,J  =  { a , d } , K  = { 6 ,c} ,L  =  { 6 ,d } ,M  =  {e},JV =  { a , c , d } , 0  =  {6,c,d}. So
I : a ,  J : a ,  K  : a ,  L  : a ,  M  : (A A ->a) V (n  A -> q ), M  : ->(A - > a ) V  —>(7r —► a ) ,  M  : --(A A 7r A (A —► 
a )  A (7r —► a ) ) ,  N  : A A n  A (A —► a )  A ( n  —» a ) ,  O : A A 7r A (A —► a )  A (7r —♦ a )  6  arguments(A). 
L e t X  =  { / ,  J , t f ,L } ,W  =  { / ,L } ,Y  =  { M } ,Z  =  { N , 0 } .  Thus X : a ,  W  : a ,  Y  : -(A  A tt A (A -  
a )  A (n  —► a ) ) ,  Z : A A n  A (A —* a )  A (n  —> a )  € 0(A ). Consequently (Y : ->(A A tt A (A —♦
a )  A (7r —► a ) ) ,  W ,X  : a )  G preclusiveUndercuts(X : a ,  A). The point is that Z : A A n  A (A —►
q ) a ( 7 t  —♦ a )  e  reflectedConfirmationRebuttals(Y:-i(A A7r A (A —► q)A (7 t —► ct)), W ,X :a ,  A), //e re  
|Z| =  2 and  eac/i TV, O  € Z «  such that N  £  ( /  U  L ), O  £  ( /  U  L). A t the assumption level observe 
that N  =  {a ,c , d} C {a, 6, c, d} and  O  =  {6, c, d} C {a, 6, c, d}. So here is a reflected confirmation 
rebuttal Z : A A n  A (A —» a )  A (7r —* a )  where the defending confirmation X : a  contains fo u r  arguments, 
the target or reflector W : a  contains two and the reflection two.
In the above example the target confirmation is uniquely set by the W  =  { /, L}. However, still 
with all o f the following being identical to the example: knowledgebase A , defending X : a ,  attacking
Y  : ->(A A 7r A (A —> a )  A (tt —* a))  and reflected Z : A A tt A (A —► a )  A (n —> a ) ,  the target could 
have been defined differently. A valid target w ould have to include the assum ptions a , 6, c, d, m eaning it 
could  have been any one o f  { / ,  L}, { J , K } ,  { / ,  J , K } ,  { / ,  J , L}, { / ,  K , L } , { J , K , L }  or { / , J, K , L } .
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It can also be the case that the number o f reflected arguments in the reflected confirmation rebuttal 
is greater than the number of reflector arguments in the target o f the preclusive undercut at the head of 
the chain, as I now show.
E xam ple 5.5.3. E n larged  reflection. Let A  =  {a : 7r, 6 : 7r, c : n  —* a , d :  it —► a , e : ->7r}. Let I  — 
{a, c}, J  =  {6, d},  K  =  {6, c }, L =  {a, d}, M  =  {e} . L e t X  =  { / ,  J } , Y =  {A /} , Z =  { / ,  J, L}. 
Thus Y : —*(7T A (7r —► a ) ) ,  X : a , Z : a , Y : —«(7r A (7r —♦ a )  A 7r A (7r —► a )) , Z : 7r A (n  —► a )  G 0 (A ). 
So (Y : *(7r A (7r —► a ) ) ,X ,Z  : a ) G preclusivellndercuts(Z : a). 77i£ preclusive undercut attack 
is on the target confirmation label o f  X and hence X is the reflector. Hence Z : it A (n  —► a )  G 
reflectedConfirmationRebuttals(Y: ->(7r A (7r —> a ) ) ,  X, Z : a , A). Afofe f/iaf ( Y : —i(7r A (7r —► a ) A 7r A 
(tt —► q )), X, Z :a ) £  preclusiveUndercuts(Z: a )  as it is invalidated.
Reflected confirmation rebuttals are always confirmed reflexive arguments. See Definition 2.4.7 for 
reflexive arguments and Definition 2.5.6 for the confirm function as used in the proof below.
Proposition 5.5.2. Let A  be a knowledgebase o f  labelled assumption formulae, let I j  : -> 0 ,h  : 
->0, . . . ,  I n : -i/J G argum ents( A ) and let V : a ,  X : a ,  Y : 0 , Z : -./? G 0 (A ).
t fZ: ->0  G reflectedConfirmationRebuttals(Y:/?, V ,X :a ,  A ) and 
/ j  G Z =  { / i , . . . ,  / „ }  
r/ien eac/i /_,: ->/? w a  reflexive argument.
Proof. For an argument I : a  to be a reflexive argument it is necessary that the claim stripDeduction(7: a )  
equals the conjunction of the members o f the support /\stripAssumptions(formulae(label(7 : a ) ,A ) ) .  
Meeting this condition is a necessary step in the proof of Proposition 5.5.1 which showed that reflected 
confirmation rebuttals always exist. Thus any reflected confirmation rebuttal Z : ~>0 = confirm(7i : 
->0 , . . .  , I n : - 1 0 ) is such that each argument I j  : - > 0  in it is always a reflexive argument. □
I look more closely at the number o f reflected arguments in the next but one section on scaled re­
flections. That completes my analysis o f reflected confirmation rebuttals, which are Type II Reflections, 
distinct from Type I Reflections analysed above as reflected attacks. Now I turn to the topic of direct 
confirmation rebuttals.
5.6 Direct Confirmation Rebuttals
By symmetry it is apparent that just as there are rebuttals, reflected rebuttals, direct rebuttals, confirma­
tion rebuttals and reflected confirmation rebuttals, so also there must be direct confirmation rebuttals. 
This is not just a mechanical symmetry, however, as noteworthy properties follow. Now I leverage the 
definition of confirmation rebuttal, Definition 2.6.8 and reflected confirmation rebuttal, Definition 5.5.1.
Definition 5.6.1. Let A  be a knowledgebase o f  labelled assumption form ulae and let V : -*0, W : a ,  X : 
a ,  Y : 0  G 0 (A ). The set o f  direct confirmation rebuttals, denoted directConfirmationRebuttals(Y :
5.6. Direct Confirmation Rebuttals 137
(3, W , X : q , A ), is a pow er set o f  confirmation rebuttals o f  Y : 0  not reflected o ff X : a  such that:
directConfirmationRebuttals(Y: /?, W , X : a, A )
=  {Z:->0 e  0 (A )  | ( Y : 0 ,  W ,X :a )  G preclusiveUndercuts(X:a, A ),
Z : —>/? g  confirmationRebuttals(Y: /?, A ) am/
f/iere */ocs not exist a V C Z suc/t that
V : ->/? g  reflectedConfirmationRebuttals(Y:0, W , X :a , A )}.
As with other reflected and direct confirmations there are a number of power sets involved here. 
The direct confirmation rebuttal is so defined as to not mandate that any of the particular confirmations 
are the maximum cardinality members of their respective power sets. W hat is clear, however, is that all 
of the support of Z : ->0 is direct as no part o f it, i.e. label(V : ->//), is reflected off W : a . I now give an 
example of a direct confirmation rebuttal.
Exam ple 5.6.1. Direct confirm ation  rebuttal. Let A  =  {a : 0 ,b  : 0  -> a ,c  : n ,d  : n  —*• a , e  :
~>0 V -i7r, / : <7 A (7r —► a ) , g : o  —► 7r}. A/so let I  =  {a, 6 }, J  =  {c,e/}, AT =  {e} ,L  =  {a, 6 , /,<?}, Af =  
{/,<?}, X =  { / ,  W  =  { / ,  J } ,  Y =  { K } ,  Z =  {L}. Therefore I  : a , J  : a , K  : -^(0 A ( 0  -
a )  A 7r A (7r —► a ) ) ,  A / : a ,  M  : n  A (n  —» a )  G argum ents(A). Furthermore X : q ,W  : q ,Y  : 
-<(/? A (// —» a )  A 7r A (7r —► a ) ) , Z  : 0  A (0  —► a )  A 7r A (7r —» a )  G 0 (A ). 7/ follows that 
( Y : ->(0 A (0  —* a )  A 7T A (n  —> a ) ) ,  W , X : a )  G preclusiveUndercuts(X: a ,  A). So there is a direct 
confirmation rebuttal Z : 0  A (0  —» a )  A  7r A (n  —► a )  g directConfirmationRebuttals(Y: -<(// A (0  —* 
q )  A 7r A (7r —► a ) ) ,  W , X : a ,  A ) because fo r  the L  G Z it is the case that L  I  U J , because 
L  % {a, 6 } U {c, d}, because L  % {a, 6 , c, d} because {a, 6 , / ,  <7} £  {a, 6 , c, d}.
Direct confirmation rebuttals, such as Z : 0  A {0  —► a )  A 7r A (7r —> a ) ,  are not predictable from any 
other part o f A  (i.e. the claim cannot be predicted other than from their own support Z), and thus cannot 
be predicted from any other part o f a tree or graph they might be situated in. So given the prerequisites 
of two valid confirmations in an attack chain with the attack being a preclusive undercut, it is always the 
case that a reflected confirmation rebuttal exists, but it only sometimes the case that a direct confirmation 
rebuttal exists. Something that is predictable allows for propositions, but for exactly that reason there is 
a paucity o f propositions about direct arguments and direct confirmations.
5.6.1 Maximal Direct Confirmation Rebuttal
The direct confirmation rebuttal does continue the relative weakness identified before - of being relative 
to just one specific reflector. W hat is needed is an absolute function that covers all possible reflectors - 
given its context within a debate. Being maximal there is only one maximal direct confirmation rebuttal, 
so this rebuttal function is written in the singular. The function is maximal in two ways: i) it covers all 
possible reflectors and hence yields the complete set o f direct rebuttal arguments, and ii) is a maximum 
cardinality confirmation. Here is the absolute function, the maximal direct confirmation rebuttal, which 
builds on the relative Definition 5.6.1 for direct confirmation rebuttals:
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Definition 5.6.2. Let A  be a knowledgebase o f  labelled assumption form ulae and let W  : a ,X  : 
a, Y  : 0, Z : ->(3 £  0 (A ). The maximal direct confirmation rebuttal function, denoted 
maximalDirectConfirmationRebuttal(Y : 0 ,  X : a ,  A ), which provides the maximal cardinality confir­
mation rebuttal o f  Y  : (3 that is not reflected o ff any confirmation fo r  a , is a single confirmation such 
that:
Z : ->(3 = maximalDirectConfirmationRebuttal(Y : 0 , X : a , A )  
i f f  Z : ->/? =  top(directConfirmationRebuttals(
Y :0,  label(top(0(stripC ontirm ation(X :a), A ))),top(0(stripC ontirm ation(X :a), A )) and 
(Y :0,  W , X :a)  £  preclusivel)nd©rcuts(X:a ,  A ).
The target confirmation label W  need not be passed in as it is derived. It can be the case that there 
are no direct confirmation rebuttals for Y : (3 and hence no maximum cardinality one, so it is possible for 
maximalDirectConfirmationRebuttal(Y : 0 , X : a ,  A ) =  0.
A t this stage in the progression of this thesis, the basic analysis o f Type I and II reflected arguments 
and reflected confirmations is complete. However there is another, more advanced, group of properties 
relating to scaled reflections; as I now establish.
5.7 Scaled and Distorted Reflections
This section on scaled and distorted reflections defines and examines the concepts o f reduced, exact, 
enlarged and distorted reflections. The starting point is a function that measures the average scaling 
factor for a particular reflection. A finding of this section is that there are two mechanisms that cause 
enlarged reflection, namely the multi-pair enlarged preclusive reflection as distinct from the mono-pair 
enlarged preclusive reflection (from Section 4.6). I start by defining some helper functions plus the 
formal terminology for scaled reflections. The term ‘targeted attack’, used below, was defined in the text 
immediately after Definition 3.9.4 of confirmation attacks.
Definition 5.7.1. Let A  be a knowledgebase o f  labelled assumption form ulae and let W  : a ,  X : a ,  Y  : 
0 , Z : <f> £  0 (A ). The reflected confirmation attacks function, denoted  reflectedConfirmationAttacks(Y: 
0 ,  W , X : q , A ), is a set o f  targeted attack tuples such that:
reflectedConfirmationAttacks(Y: 0 ,  W , X : a ,  A )
=  reflectedPreclusiveUndercuts(Y: 0 ,  W , X : a ,  A ) U  
{ (Z :0 , label(Y : 0 ) , Y : 0 )  \
Z:<p £  reflectedConfirmationRebuttals(Y:/?, W , X : q ,  A )}.
This function should appear as an unsurprising extension of the work so far, for example because 
attacks on reflexive arguments are both undercuts and rebuttals at the same time -  and, as established, 
all arguments can be expressed as confirmations. Given this reflected confirmation attacks function, it is 
possible to define the reflection scaling factor in a way that applies to both reflected preclusive undercuts 
and reflected confirmation rebuttals.
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The first helper function here gives the conjectured or anticipated reflection size as equal to the 
size of the target confirmation, which is a simple, but incorrect assessment o f the actual reflection size. 
This definition of the intuitively anticipated number of reflected arguments is based on the notion that a 
reflected argument can act as a proxy for the reflector arguments.
Definition 5.7.2. Let A  be a knowledgebase o f labelled assumption formulae and let W  : a ,  X : a ,  Y :
/3 G 0 (A ). The an tic ipated  reflection size, denoted anticipatedReflectionSize(Y: 0 , W , X : a ,  A ), given 
the reflection ref!ectedConfirmationAttacks(Y :/3, W , X : q ,  A )), is:
anticipatedReflectionSize( Y : /3, W , X : a ,  A) =  |lab e l(W :a)|.
The second helper function gives the actual reflection size - which is a somewhat more complicated, 
but correct, assessment of the actual reflection.
Definition 5 .7 3 . Let A  be a knowledgebase o f  labelled assumption formulae and let V i V n :
0, X : a ,Y  : 0, Zi : 7 1 , . . . , Z/ : 7 1 , Zm : 7 P, . . . , Z n : 7 P G 0 (A ). The actual nu m ­
b e r o f reflected argum ents, denoted  actual Ref lectionSize(Y : 0 , W , X : a ,  A), fo r  the reflection 
reflectedConfirmationAttacks(Y : /3 ,W ,X  : a ,  A )) =  {(Zi : 7 i , V i , Y  : / ? ) , . . . ,  (Zj : 7 i , V i , Y  : 
0 ) , . . . ,  (Zm :7 p, Vp, Y : 0 ) , . . . ,  (Zn :7 P, Vp, Y :0}}  is such that:
actualReflectionSize(Y : /?, W , X : a ,  A )
=  |label(top(attacker((Z i: 7 1 , V i , Y : 0 ) ) , . . . ,  attacker((Z /: 7 1 , V i , Y :0 ) ) ) ) | +  . . .  +
| label (top(attacker ( (Zm : 7 P, Vp, Y : /3)) , . . .  ,attacker((Zn :7 P, Vp, Y:/?)))) | ).
Clearly V i , . . . ,  Vp C Y, p (Y )\0  =  { V i , . . . ,  Vp}, all the arguments that attack target V i are in 
the confirmations Z i : 7 1 , . . . ,  Z / : 7 1  and all the arguments that attack target V p are in the confirmations 
Zm : 7 p> • • • > Zn : 7 P. Given these two helper functions, the reflection scaling factor follows simply as 
one divided by the other. I call this the ‘down tree’ reflection scaling factor to distinguish it from the 
subsequent ‘up tree’ one in Section 5.9.2.
Definition 5.7.4. Let A  be a knowledgebase o f  labelled assumption formulae and let W : a , X : a , Y : 0  G 
0 (A ). The dow n tree reflection scaling fac to r function, denoted reflectionScalingFactorDownTree(Y: 
0 , W , X : a ,  A), provides a rational number such that:
„ . « r- _ T v  . .  actualReflectionSize(Y:/3, W , X : a ,  A )
reflectionScalingFactorDownTree(Y: 0 , W , X : a ,  A ) = ---------------------------- ^ ^ ----------- -.
anticipatedReflectionSize(Y: 0 , W , X : a ,  A )
The reflector employed to compute the scaling factor is the target confirmation and not the defending 
confirmation. The reflection scaling factor gives the size ratio between a naive expectation of exact 
reflection and an actual reflection that may be enlarged or reduced.
Definition 5.7.5. Let A  be a knowledgebase o f  labelled assumptions and let W : a ,  X : a ,  Y :0  G 0 (A ) .
I f  reflectionScalingFactorDownTree(Y: 0 , W , X : a ,  A) <  1
then reflectedConfirmationAttacks(Y: 0 , W , X :a ,  A ) is a reduced reflection,
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//■reflectionScalingFactorDownTree(Y:/3, W , X : q , A) =  1
then reflectedConfirmationAttacks(Y :0 , W , X :a ,  A ) is an exact reflection,
7freflectionScalingFactorDownTree(Y:/3, W , X : a ,  A) >  1
then reflectedConfirmationAttacks(Y: /?, W , X : a ,  A ) is an enlarged reflection.
These helper functions can now be used to clarify the distinctions between enlarged, reduced and 
exact reflections.
5.7.1 Reduced Reflection
Reduced reflection occurs for reflected confirmation attacks, and within that it occurs for both reflected 
preclusive undercuts and for reflected confirmation rebuttals. Support shortening can give rise to the 
phenomena I call support merging. Support merging for confirmations can in turn give rise to reduced 
reflections. I hold that this behaviour should influence the structure of debate tracking trees and the 
examination of arguments, either through counting or existential schemes, in judge functions.
In the case o f reduced reflection there are fewer reflected arguments than there are reflector argu­
ments. Many examples in this section include a graphical depiction of the relationships involved; these 
graphs are contradiction graphs, see Definition 3.9.6, as they show the illustrated behaviour well. I 
now give an example o f reduced preclusive undercut reflection together with its contradiction graph in 
Figure 5.4.
Example 5.7.1. Reduced preclusive undercut reflection. Let A  = { a : a , b : a  —> 0, c :  AA7rA7 A -ict,d: 
7  -*0 , e : 7r -»  - < 0 , / : A  -► -«/?}. Let I  =  { a , b } , J  = { c , d } , K  =  {c ,e } ,L  =  { c , /} ,M  =  {c}.
So I  : 0 , J  : -> 0,K  : ->0yL  : : ~^{a A ( a  —► /? ) ) , /  : a  A (a  -»  j8 ) 6  arguments(A). Also
J  : ->(a A ( a  —► 0 ) ) , K  : ->(a A ( a  —► 0 ) ) , L  : ->(a A ( a  —► 0 )) e  deductions(A), but they are 
not members o/argum ents(A) as they are not minimal. Consequently { /}  : 0 , { J , K , L }  : -»/?, {M } : 
-«(a A ( a  —v 0)) ,  { /}  : a  A ( a  —» 0)  e  0 (A ) . It follow s that ( { M }  : ->(a A (a  —> 0)) ,  { /} , { /}  : 
0)  6  preclusiveUndercuts({/} : 0,  A ), { / } :  0  e  confirmationRebuttals({ J , K ,  L } : ->0, A )‘ and ( { M }  : 
-i(q  A (q  —> 0 )), { / } ,  { / }  : 0)  g reflectedPreclusivel)ndercuts({/} : 0 , { J , K , L }, { J , K, L }  : -</?, A ) 
is the reflected attack. So {J , K , L )  : -*0 is the reflector confirmation and { M }  : ->(a A ( a  —> 0 )) is 
the reflected confirmation. The resultant reflection scaling factor is thus the actual number o f reflections 
| {A/} | divided by the intuitively anticipated number o f  reflections \{J, K ,  L } \ , i.e. As the reflection 
scaling factor is less than one this is a reduced reflection.
( { I } , { J , K , L } ) : 0
m
<{Af}, { /}):-(<*  A ( a - . /? ))
Figure 5.4: Reduced Preclusive Undercut Reflection Shown in a Contradiction Graph
In the above example there is only one reflected undercut argument, not three (one per rebuttal) as 
one might expect. Thus this is a reduced reflection.
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5.7.2 Exact Reflection
Now I come to another behaviour of reflection, which I call the exact reflection. In this case there are 
exactly the same number of reflected arguments within the reflected confirmation as there are arguments 
in the reflector. Exact reflection occurs with all three types of confirmation attacks: reflected confirmation 
attacks, reflected preclusive undercuts and reflected confirmation rebuttals.
Exam ple 5.7.2. E xact p reclusion reflection. Let A  =  { a : 0 , b : (3 —► a ,  c : 7 , d : 7  —► a , e : ->tt A -1 7  A 
cr A A , / :  a  —> - i Q , p : A  —» ->a}. Let I  =  {a, b } , J  =  { c , d } , K  =  { e , / } , L  =  { e ,  h } , M  =  { e } .  
Therefore I : a , J  : a , K  : ->a, L  : ->a, M  : ->(n A  (n  —» a ) ) ,  M  : - 1(7 A ( 7  —> a ) )  G arguments(A). 
Clearly M  C K , M  C L. Consequently ( { M }  : ->((3 A (f3 —» a ) ) ,  { /} ,{ / ,  J }  : a ) , ( { M }  : -> (7  A 
( 7  —> a ) ) ,  { J} , { / ,  J }  : a )  g  reflectedPreclusiveUndercuts({/, J }  : a ,  { K , L } , { K ,  L}  : -^a, A). So 
the reflector is { K , L } : ->a and the reflected confirmations are { M }  : ->(/3 A (0  —> a ) )  am/ {A/} : 
-< (7  A ( 7  —► a )) . Hence the reflection scaling fa c to r  = |{/C, L}| -f (|{A /}| 4- |{M } |) =  2 4 - 2  =  1, 
meaning that this is an exact reflection. This example is now shown as a contradiction tree in Figure 5.5.
( { I , J } , { K , L } ) : a
<{M}, { / } ) : - ( 0  A ( 0  —. a ) )  ({M }, { J } ) : - ( 7  A ( 7  —> a ))
Figure 5.5: Exact Preclusive Undercut Reflection Shown in a Contradiction Graph
There still may not  be a one-to-one mapping between individual reflector arguments and reflected 
arguments, in that, for example, two rebuttals may result in one undercut, while a different rebuttal may 
result in two undercuts, giving the overall effect o f exact reflection. Reflections that lack a one-to-one 
mapping from reflector to reflected I cover under distorted reflections.
In the case o f reflected confirmation rebuttals, the Example 5.5.2 illustrates the existence of an exact 
reflection that is also a rebuttal. This example of exact confirmation reflection is perhaps surprising as 
the form of the Type II Reflection function intuitively tends to give reduced reflections -  because the 
reflected support is the union o f multiple reflector supports.
5.73 Enlarged Reflection
Enlarged reflection occurs with reflected confirmation attacks and within that it occurs for reflected 
preclusive undercuts and for reflected confirmation rebuttals. There exist A where enlarged preclusive 
reflections occur, as illustrated in the following example.
Example 5.73. Enlarged preclusive reflection. Let A =  {a : it,b  : it -> a ,c  : or A : (o  —>
—’O') A ->7r,e: A, / :  A —► a ,g : t ] ,h : r i  —> ->a}, so |A | =  8. Let I  =  { a ,6}, J  = { e , f } , K  =  {c ,</}, L = 
{ g , h } , M  =  {c},iV =  {</}. Consequently I  : a , J  : a , K  : ~^a,L : ~^a ,M : ->(tt A (7r —> a ) ) , N  : 
>(77 A (7r —♦ a ) ) ,  L  : -i(7r A ( i t  —* a ) ) ,  K  : ->(A A (A —* a ) ) ,  L  : ->(A A (A —► a))  G arguments(A). 
Importantly although K : —<(7r A ( i t  —> a ) )  G deductions(A ) it is the case that K : ->(tt A (tt —* a ) )  ^
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arguments( A ) as it is not minimal. T h u s { M ,  TV, L} :-i(7rA(7r —> a ) ) , { K , L } :->( AA(A —► a )) ,{ 7 , J } :  
a ,  { /f , L } : -«a G 0 (A ). There are two preclusive undercuts {{M ,  TV, L } : ->(7r A (7r —> a) ) ,  { /} , { / ,  J } : 
a ) ,  ({AT, L }  :-i(A A (A —» a ) ) ,  { J} , { / ,  J }  :a )  €  preclusivellndercuts({/, J } : a ,  A), both o f which are 
reflected, i.e. <{A7, TV, L} : - .(7 r A ( tt -> a ) ) ,  { /} , {7, J }  : a ) ,  ({ /f , L }  : ->(A A (A —> a) ) ,  {J } , { /, J }  : 
a )  G reflectedPreclusiveUndercuts({/, J }  : a ,  {7C, L}, { /f , L} : - ia ,A ) . The scaling factor is thus 
reflectionScalingFactorDownTree({7, J }  : a , { K , L } , { K , L }  : -•a , A ) =  (|{M , TV,Z,}| +  \ { K ,L } \ )  4  
\ {K,  L}| =  5 4  2 =  2.5 so reflectedPreclusiveUndercuts({/, J }  : a , { K , L } , { K , L }  : - ^ A )  is an 
enlarged reflection. This enlarged reflection is illustrated as the contradiction graph in Figure 5.6 below.
<{M, TV, L}, { / } ) : - ( t t  A ( t t  -> a ) )  <{7C, L}, { J } > : —>(A A (A —+ a ) )
Figure 5.6: Enlarged Preclusive Undercut Reflection Shown in a Contradiction Graph
Enlarged reflected confirmation rebuttals also exist. In contrast, however, enlarged reflected argu­
ment rebuttals do not exist, so that non-existence o f enlargement is an exception as all of the other forms 
of reflection analysed in this thesis have enlargement behaviour.
W hat the definition o f enlargement does not relay is why a particular preclusion is an enlarged 
preclusive reflection -  it turns out that it could be due to mono-pair enlarged reflection (as defined earlier 
in Definition 4.6.1) or due to multi-pair preclusive reflection defined immediately below.
5.7.4 Multi-Pair Enlarged Preclusive Reflection
This subsection focusses on the situation where preclusive undercuts are reflected off a contradiction. For 
this situation, I now define a pure multi-pair enlarged preclusive reflections, as the case where the total 
number of reflected arguments is more than the number of reflector arguments and mono-pair enlarged 
reflection is not involved. The term ‘enlarged reflection’ was defined in Definition 5.7.5 and ‘mono-pair 
enlargement’ in Definition 4.6.1.
Definition 5.7.6. Let A  be a knowledgebase o f  labelled assumption formulae, let I  : a , J  : ->a G 
arguments(A) and let W  : --a , X : a ,Y  : ->a,Z : 7  G 0 (A ). A  m ulti-pair enlarged preclusive re­
flection, denoted  multiPairEnlargedReflections(Y: ->a, X, X : a , A), is an enlarged preclusive reflection 
where no mono-pair enlargement is involved, such that:
multiPairEnlargedReflections(Y: -^ q , X, X : a ,  A )
=  { (Z : 7 , W , Y : ^a) G reflectedPreclusiveUndercuts(Y: ->a, X, X : a ,  A) |
reflectedPreclusiveUndercuts( Y : ->a, X, X : a ,  A ) is an enlarged reflection and 
fo r  each I  G X and J  G Y it is the case that 
monoPairEnlargedReflection( J : ->a, /  :a , A ) =  0}.
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Multi-pair enlarged reflections do not always exist. They may exist depending upon the existence of 
prerequisites. The basic mechanism is that given a contradiction (X, Y ) : a  for every member of the set 
X x Y  there exists a candidate reflected undercut. Reflected undercuts are always mono-target (be they 
preclusive or canonical). Given these candidates, however, the final solution may contain a somewhat 
different set of reflected arguments due to interactions with mono-pair enlargement. Alternatively or 
additionally, the final solution may contain a reduced number of reflected arguments due to support 
shortening and hence support merging.
This analysis shows that the above Example 5.7.3 of enlarged reflection contains a mixture of mono 
and multi-pair enlargements. In that example, it is the reflector support K  giving rise to attacking sup­
ports M  and N  that is the mono-pair enlargement. The reflection of attacking K  and L  with target of J  
is half o f the multi-pair enlargement; the other half is partially obscured by the mono-pair enlargement 
with only the reflection of attacking support L  with target of 7 remaining directly visible.
The multi-pair enlarged reflection could present a complication or difficulty for notions of judging 
debates by counting arguments. As reflection can produce reductions and enlargements, even a distorted 
mixture o f enlargements and reductions, it follows that, without proper consideration, reflection can 
confound the counting o f arguments and lead to incorrect judgements. This predicament is akin to trying 
to make precise measurements in a distorting mirror. In the extreme case, with a variety of related A ’s, 
the presence o f distortion could reduce a judge that does not consider the effects of reflection, across this 
variety o f A ’s, to appear to be an arbitrary judge. Arbitrary here is relative to an intuitive assessment 
based on an appreciation of professional debates.
The number of reflected arguments arising from a mono-pair enlarged reflection was provided in 
Proposition 4.6.2. The next steps are to establish the number of arguments in i) a multi-pair enlarged 
reflection in isolation and then ii) with mono-pair and multi-pair together.
P roposition  5.7.1. Let A be a knowledgebase o f  labelled assumption formulae and let W :a , X :a , Y : 
/? £  0 (A ). For the reflection multiPairEnlargedReflections(Y: (3, W , X :a , A ) it is the case that:
2 <  actualReflectionSize(Y:/3, W ,X :a , A ) <  |label(X:a)| • |label(Y:/3)|.
Proof If  the prerequisites are not met, e.g. (Y  : (3, W ,X  : a) £  confirmationAttacks(X : a ,  A ) 
for any W  C X, then there is no reflection. However, as it is a given that there will exist 
a (Z j : 7 i ,V ,Y  : j3) £  multiPairEnlargedReflections(Y : /? ,W ,X  : a ,  A ), where V : (3 £ 
0 (A ) then it follows that a) the prerequisites have been met and b) a multi-pair enlarged reflec­
tion has occurred. A multi-pair enlarged reflection is, by Definition 5.7.6, a special case of an en­
larged reflection and hence has reflectionScalingFactorDownTree(Y : (3, W ,X  : a , A )  >  1. To 
guarantee such a reflectionScalingFactorDownTree(Y : (3, W , X : a , A ) requires that at least 2 <  
|multiPairEnlargedReflections(Y : (3 ,W ,X  : a ,A ) |  for the low end case of |X| =  1. Now, re­
call the mechanism for how reflected canonical undercuts arise from a pair J  : (3,1 : a  where 
J  : (3 £  argumentAttacks(7 : a ,  A ). In either the case J  : (3 £ rebuttals(7 : a ,  A ) or J  : (3 £ 
canonicalUndercuts(7 : a , A )  the number of reflected canonical undercuts is the same. In the absence
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of mono-pair enlargement, a single argument J  : 0  combines with a single reflector I : a  to yield one 
K  : 7  =  reflectedCanonicalUndercuts( J  : 0 , I  : a ,  A ). The word ‘combines’ here means the five 
steps of i) expanding the claim of J  : 0  [to J  : ->a for rebuttal or to J  : ->(V>i A . . .  A 0 n ) for un­
dercut, where I  =  { 0 i , . . . ,  ipn }], ii) expanding the support o f J  : 0  [to (0 i A . . .  A 0 P) —> ->a, or 
(</>i A . . .  A 0 P) —» (0 i  A . . .  A 0 n ), where J  =  { 0 i , . . . ,  0 P} ], iii) taking the contrapositive of what 
was J : 0  [to q  —♦ ->(0i A . . .  A 0 p) or (0 i  A . . .  A 0 n ) —> —i(0i A . . .  A 0 P)] and then iv) joining with 
the reflector I : a  [either by hypothetical syllogism or straight substitution to give I : -> (01  A . . .  A 0 P)] 
and v) remembering that the subset K  £  I  may be involved for minimality K  : ->(0i A . . .  A 0 P). 
Thus there can be one multi-pair enlarged reflected argument for each member of the cross product 
label(X : a )  x label(Y : 0 ). The number of members of this cross product comes from multiply­
ing |label(X : a ) |  by |label(Y : 0)\. Hence the maximum number of multi-pair enlarged reflections is 
|label(X : a ) |  • |label(Y : 0)\. So for the reflection multiPairEnlargedReflections(Y: 0 , W , X : a ,  A ) it is 
the case that 2 <  actualReflectionSize(Y:/3, W ,X :a ,  A ) <  |label(X :a)| • |label(Y :/?)|. □
Finally here is the maximum and minimum size of an enlarged reflection where both multi-pair and 
mono-pair enlargement are involved.
Proposition 5.7.2. Let A  be a knowledgebase o f  labelled assumption formulae, let Ji : 0 , J \ : 
/?, . . . ,  J|Y| : 0  G arguments(A) and let X : a , Y  : 0  £  0 (A ). For an enlarged reflection 
reflectedPreclusiveUndercuts(Y: 0 , X, X : a , A ), where Ji 6  Y, it is the case that:
2 <  actualReflectionSize(Y:0, X , X :a ,  A ) <  |label(X :a)| • midLattice(Ji).
P roof This proof combines that for mono-pair and multi-pair enlarged reflected preclusive undercuts,
i.e. Proposition 4.6.2 and Propositions 5.7.2. The claims reveal that if X : a ,  Y : 0  £  0 (A ) then for every 
I  6  X and J  e  Y it is the case that I : a  €  argumentAttacks( J : 0 , A ). The midl_attice( Ji) in the above is 
the maximum number o f subsets o f J, that are not subsets o f each other. Suppose midLattice(Ji) =  1, for 
the case of no mono-pair enlargement with support J if then (5Z!=iY* |label(X :a)|-l) is equal to |label(X: 
a ) | • |label(Y : 0)\. Hence if there is no mono-pair enlargement the result is the same as for multi-pair 
enlargement in isolation. However, as both mono-pair and multi-pair enlargement can occur for the same 
attack chain ( Y : 0 , W , X : a )  £  confirmationAttacks(X: a ,  A ) the two cardinalities must be multiplied. 
Hence for an enlarged reflection reflectedPreclusiveUndercuts(Y:0,X,X:a, A ), where Ji £ Y it is the 
case that 2 <  actualReflectionSize(Y:/3, X ,X :a , A ) <  |label(X :a)| • midLattice(J,). □
As this is an enlargement there exist more reflected canonical undercuts than there are rebuttal 
arguments in the reflector, as I now demonstrate.
Example 5.7.4. Multi-pair enlarged reflection. Let A  =  {a : a, h : a  -+ 0 , c : 7 , d : 7  —> 0 , e : A, /  :
A —> 0 ,g  : £ ,h  : C —► 0}. Let I  = =  { c ,d } ,K  = { e , /} ,L  =  =  { /} ,W  =
{ J } ,Y  =  { / , J } ,X  =  {K , L }  = Z. So there are clearly two defending arguments and two rebuttal 
arguments o f  0, namely 1 :0 , J : 0 , K : ->0, L : ~>0 £  argum ents(A). There must also be four canonical 
undercuts, namely K  : -i(q  A ( a  —► 0 ) ) , L  : ->(a A ( a  —» 0) )  £  canonicalUndercuts(7 : 0,  A ) and
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K : -< (7  A  ( 7  —» 0)) ,  L : - 1 (7  A  ( 7  —> /?)) e  canonicalUndercuts( J : 0 , A). These canonical undercuts 
are reflected and can be represented as (Z : - i ( q  A  ( a  —> 0)) ,  V , Y : /?), (Z : - 1(7  A  ( 7  —* /?)), W , Y  : 
/?) €  reflectedPreclusiveUndercuts(Y : 0 , X , X :  -^0, A ) . There are no mono-pair enlargements present, 
consequently there exists a multi-pair enlarged reflection. {Z : - > ( a  A ( a  —> 0)) ,  Z: -> (7  A ( 7  —> 0) ) }  =  
multiPairEnlargedReflections(Y : 0 , X , X :  -> 0,A ). This multi-pair enlarged reflection is illustrated as 
the contradiction graph o f  Figure 5 .7 below.
( { I , J } , { K , L } ) : t 3
({K, L),  { /} > :  ->(a A ( a  0))  « K , L}, {J }):  - ( 7  A ( 7  —» a ) )
Figure 5.7: M ulti-Pair Enlarged Reflection Shown in a Contradiction Graph
This example shows that if one nominates canonical undercuts to stand for the rebuttals that they are 
derived from, then one must be aware that it is not a one-for-one swap. In (Besnard & Hunter, 2001) the 
argument is made that a canonical undercut can represent a rebuttal. They use this idea as a motivation 
for the way that their argument trees exclude all rebuttals, except at the root, and only include root 
arguments plus their recursive canonical undercuts. M y analysis indicates that counting or existential 
based judging is only accurate for the situation o f direct arguments and exact reflections. I revisit this 
issue in greater detail in the next chapter.
5.7.5 Distorted Reflections
Distorted reflections may be enlarged, exact or reduced and may involve any combination of those three 
situations within their reflections. Within the distortion, if there is enlargement, the cause may be mono- 
pair enlarged reflection, multi-pair enlarged reflection or a combination of the two. If  reduction is in­
volved, however, there is only one mechanism. It is the existence of distorted reflections that prevents or 
blocks the approach of scaling the number of undercuts to match the number of rebuttals.
Definition 5.7.7. Let A  be a knowledgebase o f  labelled assumption formulae and let T  : a ,  U : a , W  : 
a , X : a ,  Y :0  G 0 (A ).
reflectedPreclusiveUndercuts(Y: 0 , W , X : a ,  A ) is a distorted refection o f  W : a  
iff  there exists a T C W  and a U C W  such that T  D U =  0 and 
reflectionScalingFactorDownTree(Y: 0 , T, X : a, A) ^  
reflectionScalingFactorDownTree(Y: 0 , U, X :a , A ).
A distorted reflection does not necessarily need to have one part enlarged and another reduced; it 
just needs to have different scaling factors for the two parts. Furthermore there could be more than two 
parts to such a distortion by applying the definition repeatedly. I now give an example.
Exam ple 5.7.5. D istorted  reflection. Let A  =  {a  : 0 ,b  : 0  —» q , c : 7 ,d : 7  -> a , e  :
7r A - 1/? A 7] A A, /  : 7r —► ~>a,g : A —> ->a, h : 77 —> ~^a,i : a  A ~>0 A - 17 , j  : 0 —* ->a}. Let
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I  = { a , b } , J  = { c , d } , K  =  {e, / } ,  L  = { e , g } , M  -  { e , h } , N  =  { i , j } , 0  = { e } ,P  = {i}. Thus 
I : a , J : a , K : ->a, L : ->q, M  : ->a, N  : -^a, P : ->((3 A  (/? —> a ) ) ,  O : ->(/? A (/3 —> a ) ) , P : -< (7  A ( 7  —* 
a ) )  € argum ents(A ). Therefore {7, J }  : a ,  { K , L , M , N }  : ->a, {P } : -> (7  A  ( 7  —> a ) ) ,{ 0 ,  P }  : 
->(/3 A (/5 —► a ) )  €  0 (A ). Clearly P  C N , 0  C K , 0  C L , 0  C M  so these are reflected preclu­
sive undercuts ({P }  : - ( 7  A  ( 7  —► a ) ) ,  { J} , {7, J }  : a ) , ( { 0 , P }  : -.(/? A (/? -+ a ) ) ,  { /} ,{ / ,  J }  : 
a )  e  reflectedPreclusivellndercuts({7, J } : a ,  {/C, L , M , AT}, { if , L , M , N }  : -iq , A). Le/ T , U and W  
from  the definition o f  distortion, Definition 5.7.7, take the values o f  T  =  { if , L, M }, U =  {TV} ami 
W  =  { if , L, M , N } . Consequently T  C W  and  U C W  such that T  n  U =  0. Looking at T, the 
three candidate reflections from  the three reflecting arguments i f : ->a, L : -iq , M : ->a merge to become 
only one actual reflected argument O  : -*(P A  (ft —* a ) ) ,  which is a reduced reflection with a scaling 
factor o f  ^ =  0.33. Turning now to the subset U, one reflecting arguments N : ->a has been reflected as 
two reflected argument P : ->(/3 A  (/3 —* a ))  and P : -> (7  A  ( 7  —► a )) , which is an enlarged reflection 
with a scaling fac tor o f  2.0. As  0.33 ^  2.0 it fo llow s that reflectionScalingFactorDownTree({i, J }  : 
a ,T ,W  : ->q, A ) ^  reflectionScalingFactorDownTree({7, J }  : a ,U ,W  : -<a, A ). The fa c t that 
reflectionScalingFactorDownTree({7, J } : a ,  T , W : -«a, A ) ^  reflectionScalingFactorDownTree({7, J } : 
q , U, W : ->a, A ) means that this is a distorted reflection. The three arguments o f  T  =  { if , L , M }  give 
rise to a reduced reflection o f  ju s t O  : ->(/3 A (0  —» a ) ) .  In contrast, the single argument o f  U =  { N }  
gives rise to the enlarged reflection o f  P  : -«(/? A (/3 —► a ) )  plus P  : -> (7  A ( 7  —> a )) . This distorted 
reflection is shown as a contradiction graph in Figure 5.8 below.
({7, { if ,  L , A7, N } ) : a
( { P h  m > : -(/*  A (0  -  a) )  ({O , P } , { J } ) : ^ ( 7  A ( 7  -  a ) )
Figure 5.8: Distorted Reflection Shown in a Contradiction Graph
My view is that the existence o f distorted reflections should effect the tracking of debates. Suppose 
for a moment that reflected canonical undercuts were exact reflections -  that would form a useful basis 
to propose that direct rebuttals could be excluded ffom debate tracking -  because the reflected canonical 
undercuts would act as their representatives. Such a notion however is refuted by the existence of en­
larged and reduced reflections. This proposal could be refined by arguing that a scaling factor be applied 
to compensate for enlargement or reduction -  hence it could be imagined that appropriately scaled reflec­
tions could still stand in for the excluded direct rebuttals. Such scaling factor usage would supposedly 
correct any counting errors coming from the scaled reflections. The problem with that refinement is that 
the reflections are non-linear. The above example clearly establishes the existence of such non-linear 
or distorted reflections -  blocking the hope of using linear scale factors. These properties are further 
discussed in the next chapter in Section 6.4.
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5.8 Type III Reflection -  Reflected Confirming Arguments
I now introduce another type of reflection, distinct from those discussed so far. I call it ty p e  HI Re­
flection or ‘reflected confirming arguments’. The annotated argument graph of Figure 5.9 below, where 
the additional circle represents the confirmation { / ,  L }  : a ,  illustrates the following commentary and 
definition.
Reflected Argument L C KL . a
I . a
J  :/3 e  canonicalUndercuts(7: q , A)
J -.0
K : ->(3 G directArgumentRebuttals( J  :(3,I :a , A)
Reflector Argument K : —■/?
Figure 5.9: ty p e  HI Reflection is Provided by reflectedConfirmingArguments(/r: ->/?, J : /? , / :  a ,  A)
This reflection is from the reflector at the tail o f the chain to the reflection at the head of the chain. 
Recall that, in contrast, ty p e  I and II Reflections have the reflector at the head of the chain and the 
reflection at the tail.
Informally, this reflection is coming from a direct rebuttal and goes up the chain of arguments, via 
an undercut, appearing as a reflected confirming argument. It is a reflection akin to, but not the same as, 
my reflectedAttacks() function -  so it is a third type of reflection, which I call ty p e  HI Reflection. It is 
a reflection as it is the predictable existence of an argument in a debate given certain other arguments 
and attacks. This reflection arises from a pattern or interaction between three arguments, giving rise 
to a fourth or more, whereas the reflected attacks function, reflectedAttacks(), arises from a pattern or 
interaction between two arguments, giving rise to a third or more. The number of attacks involved, i.e. 
two, however, is the same for all o f these types of reflection.
The ty p e  HI Reflection function’s input of a chain o f three arguments has the first argument attacked 
by the middle argument and the middle argument attacked by the third argument. The definition and 
properties that follow from it are amongst the central findings of this thesis and are relied upon in the 
next chapter. Although the following definition is in terms of individual arguments, I discuss it in this 
chapter on confirmations as the reflected argument is in the same confirmation as the reflector.
Definition 5.8.1. Let A  be a knowledgebase o f  labelled assumption formulae and let I  : a, 
J . p ,  K:->/3 e  arguments (A). The set o f  reflected confirm ing argum ents, denoted 
reflectedConfirmingArguments(/f J : /? ,  I : a ,  A ), arising from  the canonical undercut o f  l . a  by
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J : P and the direct rebuttal o f  J  :(3 by K  :->(3 is such that:
reflectedConfirmingArguments(/f:
=  { L : a  G argum ents(A ) | J: /3  e  canonicalU ndercuts(/:a , A ),
K : G directArgumentRebuttals( J  : (3 , I :a ,  A ) and L C  K } .
In this definition I  : a , J : ( 3 , K : 7  g argum ents( A ) might have been placed within the conditional 
part of the definition after the |, however it is clear that if they participate in the two attacks J  : 0  G 
argumentAttacks(7 : a ,  A ) and K  : 7  G argumentAttacks( J  : (3, A ) where attack was defined earlier in 
Definition 3.9.2, then they are surely arguments. The same cannot be said fox L  . a  G arguments(A) and 
so it is an explicit condition.
I now give an example o f a Type HI Reflection, i.e. o f a reflected confirming argument.
Example 5.8.1. Type HI Reflection. Let A  =  {a : 7r, 6  : 7r —► oc,c: X, d :  A —> - <7T, e : p , f  : p  —► 7r}. 
Let I  =  {a, b}, J  =  { c ,  d},  K  =  {e, / ,  b}. Thus I  : a , J  : ->(tt A  (7r —> a ) ) ,  I : it A (7r —> a ) ,  K  : 
7r A (7x —* a ) , K  : a  e  argum ents(A ). Therefore J  : ->(7r A  (7r —> a ) )  G canonicalUndercuts(/ : 
a , A )  and I : it A (n  —* a )  G reflectedArgumentRebuttal( J  : ->(7r A (n  —* a)) ,  I : a ,  A ). However, 
K  : 7r A  (7r —► a )  ^  reflectedArgu ment Rebuttal ( J  : -«(7r A (7r —>• a ) ) ,  /  : a ,  A), because K  % I, 
because {6 , e, / }  £  { a ,  6 }. Additionally K : n  A  (n  —> a )  $  reflectedArgumentRebuttal( J : —>(77 A (7r —> 
q ) ) , / ^  : a ,  A ), because J  : -*(7r A (7r —> a ) )  ^  canonicalUndercuts(A' : a ,  A ). Thus it is the case 
that K  : tc A (n  —► a )  G directArgumentRebuttals(J : -i(7r A (7r —» a ) ) ,  /  : a ,  A). Additionally 
K: t x  A (7t —* a )  G directArgumentRebuttals( J : ->(7r A (7r —► a ) ) ,  /<":a ,  A ). This allows the conclusion 
that K : a  G reflectedConfirmingArguments(/f :7r A (7r —► a ) ,  J :-> (7r A (7r —> a ) ) ,  7 : a ,  A).
To provide clarity on the mechanism at work here the above example also includes a reflected 
argument rebuttal which always exists but does not partake in the reflected confirming argument. The 
example makes clear the direct argument rebuttals and hence the reflected confirming argument. This 
example uses the =  part o f C from the last line of Definition 5.8.1. Here one argument is reflected off 
one argument, so this can be called an exact reflection.
Differences between Type I and Type HI Reflections are as follows. Type I has an input of two 
arguments in a chain, while Type HI has an input o f three. Type I results in a new argument at the tail 
of the chain, whereas the Type HI results in a new argument at the head of the chain. Thus Type I can 
be said to flow down the chain (in the direction from head to tail), while the Type HI flows up the chain 
(from tail to head). Type I yields an attacking argument, while Type IH yields a confirming argument.
5.8.1 Properties of Reflected Confirming Arguments
Given their prerequisites reflected confirming arguments always exist, however absent any one prerequi­
site and they don’t exist. This observation is addressed by the following two propositions.
Proposition 5.8.1. Let A  be a knowledgebase o f  labelled assumption formulae and let I : a , J : (3, K  :
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->0 e  arguments(A).
I f  J : 0  e  canonicalUndercuts(7:a ,  A ) and K : ->0 e  rebuttals(J :0 , A ) 
then reflectedConfirmingArguments(K : ->0, J : 0 , I : a ,  A ) ^  0.
Proof. The three argument attack chain of canonical undercut, J  : 0  e  canonicalllndercuts(7 : a , A ), 
followed by rebuttal, K  : ^ 0  e  rebuttals(J : 0 , A ), always yields a reflected confirming argu­
ment, L : a , as follows. Given J : 0  6  canonicalUndercuts(7 : a , A ) it is known that ->0 =  
AstripAssumptions(formulae(label(7 : a ) , A )). Clearly stripAssumptions(formulae(label(7 : a ) , A )) t- 
a . Given K  :~>0 e  arguments(A) it is a simple fact that
stripAssumptions(formulae(label(7C : ->/?), A )) h  ->0, so given K  : -*0 e  rebuttals(J : 0, A) it fol­
lows that stripAssumptions(formulae(label(7f : ~^0),A)) I— i->/\stripAssumptions(formulae(label(7 : 
a ) , A )). Thus stripAssumptions(formulae(label(/f : ->0),A)) b a, i.e. that given these relationships 
{->/?} I- a , therefore K  : a  e  deductions(A). K  may not be minimal, so let L C K ,  hence there 
exists minimal L :a  €  arguments(A). Therefore there exits L :a  € reflectedConfirmingArguments(Tf: 
->0, J : 0 ,1  : a, A). Note, regardless o f whether K  : ->0 e  directArgumentRebuttals( J : 0, A ) or 
K  : -i0  G reflectedArgumentRebuttal(J : 0, A ), it follows that K  : ~>0 e  rebuttals(J : 0, A ). If this 
rebuttal is reflected then the reflected confirming argument L : a  is the same as 7 : a  -  still non-empty. 
So given the necessary prerequisites reflectedConfirmingArguments(7f: ->0, J : 0 ,1 : a, A) ^  0. □
Thus if the prerequisites are not met then reflected confirming arguments do not exist. The pre­
dictable nature of reflected confirming arguments establishes that they are not just a minor novelty, but 
rather that they should have a major impact on the design of debate-tracking trees. It is not that they 
sometimes exist and are therefore tolerable -  rather it is that they always exist and therefore should al­
ways be considered in professional debate. I thus argue that these reflected arguments need to be pruned 
out o f or removed from any debate tracking tree (however at this stage of the thesis I have not shown 
how to prune them out).
Now I return to the detailed behaviour: if  the second argument in the attack chain is a reflected 
argument rebuttal then no new argument is produced. There is a reflection, but it contributes nothing 
new to the debate. There is hence no redundancy.
Proposition 5.8.2. Let A  be a knowledgebase o f  labelled assumption formulae and let I : a , J : 0 , K  : 
0  e  arguments(A).
{reflectedConfirmingArguments(7(': ->0, J : 0 , I : a , A )  \
J : 0  e  canonicalUndercuts(7:a, A ),
K  :-<0 e  reflectedArgumentRebuttal(J:/3,7:a, A )}
=  ( ' : * } •
Proof. Because K  :~>0 is reflected it must be the case that K  C  7 and specifically because K  :->0 e 
reflectedArgumentRebuttals(J : 0 , 1 : a ,  A ) it follows that K  = I . From Definition 5.8.1 of reflected
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confirming argument, L  C  K ,  so L  C  I .  Given that 7 : a  G arguments(A ) there cannot exist an L  Q I  
such that L : a  G arguments( A ) otherwise I : a  would not be minimal. So it is not the case that L  C  I  
thus L  — I .  Therefore the whole set equals I  : a . □
Referring back to Figure 5.9, one might think that each reflected confirming argument, L : a , would 
then act as a reflector that would transform the direct argument rebuttal K  :->(3 at the tail of the attack 
chain into a reflected argument rebuttal. This is generally not the case as the middle of the attack chain 
does not usually attack the reflected confirming argument, L  : a , except for the one situation when the 
assumption formulae are identical. Thus it is always the case that the existence of a reflected confirming 
argument, given that its assumption formulae are not identical to the reflector argument, does not turn a 
direct argument rebuttal into a reflected argument rebuttal.
P roposition 5 .8 3 . Let A  be a knowledgebase o f  labelled assumption formulae and let I : a , J : (3, K  : 
~'{3,L:a  G argum ents(A ).
I f L . a e  reflectedConfirmingArguments(/(r: ->(3, J : (3 , I :  a , A) 
and  ^stripAssumptions(formulae(label(7:a), A )) ±  
stripAssumptions(formulae(label(L: a ) , A )) 
then K : ->(3 & reflectedArgumentRebuttal( J :(3, L :a ,  A ).
Proof Clearly for L  : a  G reflectedConfirmingArguments(K  : ->(3, J  : (3,1 : a , A ) it must be the 
case that J  : 0  G canonicalUndercuts(J : a , A ) and that K  : -<(3 G directArgumentRebuttals(J : 
(3 ,1 : a, A ). Thus K  % I  and ->(3 =  /\stripAssumptions(formulae(label(7 : a ) , A )). Also because 
L  : a  G reflectedConfirmingArguments(7C : ~ /^3, J  : (3,1 : a, A ) it follows that L  C K .  Therefore 
L C K < £ I  so L j t l .  Furthermore if constraint / \  stripAssumptions(formulae(label(7 : a ) , A )) *  
/ \  stripAssumptions(formulae(label(L: a ) , A )) is met then ->(3 ^  / \  stripAssumptions(formulae(label(7v: 
a), A )) therefore in general J  : (3 G canonicalUndercuts(L : a, A ). The only exception to the general 
case is when /\stripAssumptions(formulae(label(7 : a ) , A )) =  /\stripAssumptions(formulae(label(L : 
a ) , A )). Thus if L  : a  G reflectedConfirmingArguments(7f : ->(3,J : (3,1 : a , A ) and 
/\stripAssumptions(formulae(label(7:a), A )) ^  /\stripAssumptions(formulae(label(L:a), A )) then it 
is always the case that K : ->(3 & reflectedArgumentRebuttal( J  :(3,L:a, A ). □
If it were the case that /\stripAssumptions(formulae(label(7:a), A )) =  
f \ stripAssumptions(formulae(label(L: a ) ,  A )) then in addition to J : (3 G canonicalllndercuts(7: a ,  A ) 
it would also be the case that J  : (3 G canonicalUndercuts(L : a ,  A ). So if it were not for the use of 
labels to allow two experts to state the same formulae, the proposition would be simplified to just that 
‘the existence of a reflected confirming argument does not transform a direct argument rebuttal into a 
reflected argument rebuttal.’
I use the term ‘mutual destruction’ to describe this rare situation where what would normally be a 
reflected confirming argument is not because it turns the direct argument rebuttal in the attack chain into 
a reflected confirming argument. Mutual destruction occurs when two arguments 7: a , J : a  are such that
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I , J  G X :q  and stripAssumptions(formulae(label(/ : a ) , A ) )  =  stripAssumptions(formulae(label(J : 
a ) ,  A )) and the other conditions are met.
5.9 Type IV Reflection -  Reflected Confirming Confirmations
I now extend the reflectedConfirmingArguments() function from the level o f individual arguments to that 
o f confirmations. I classify reflected confirming confirmations as a fourth type of reflection, which I 
call Type IV Reflection, as the following definition and properties show them to materially differ from 
the earlier reflection Types I to III. The confirmation graph in Figure 5.10 below provides an overview 
of Type IV Reflection. The additional circle indicates a confirmation for a  with confirmation label of 
V U X. Definitions 3.4.2 of preclusive undercut and 5.6.1 o f direct confirmation rebuttal are reused here.
Reflected Confirmation For all N  G V there is an M  G U such that N  C  MV i a
X i a
( Y : /3, W , X : a )  G preclusivellndercuts(X: a ,  A)
U : ->(3 G directConfirmationRebuttals(Y: /?, W , X : a ,  A) 
Reflector Confirmation U : -'(3
Figure 5.10: Type IV Reflection is reflectedConfirmingConfirmations(U: ->(3, Y  :(3, W , X :a , A )
Definition 5.9.1. Let A  be a knowledgebase o f  labelled assumption formulae, let M  i ->/3, N  i a  G 
arguments( A ) and let U : —>/3, W : a ,  X : a ,  Y : (3 G 0 (A ). The reflected confirming confirmations, de­
noted  reflectedConfirmingConfirmations(U: ->/?, Y : 0 ,  W , X : a ,  A), arising from  the preclusive undercut 
o f X : a  by Y :  (3 and the direct rebuttal o f Y  : ( 3byU:  ->(3 is a set o f  confirmations such that:
reflectedConfirmingConfirmations(U: ->(3, Y : /3, W , X : a ,  A)
=  { V :q  G 0 (A )  | (Y : j3, W , X : a )  G preclusiveUndercuts(X:a , A ),
U : ~>/3 G directConfirmationRebuttals(Y: /3, W , X : a , A ) and 
fo r  all N  G V there exists an M  €  U such that N  C M }.
I call U : the reflector confirmation and V : a  the reflected confirmation. Because preclusive
undercuts can be multi-target it is not possible to define reflected confirming confirmations solely in 
terms of reflected confirming argument, which is Definition 5.8.1, hence the above form is needed. Thus 
we have here and require a fourth type of reflection, Type IV Reflection.
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5.9.1 Properties of Reflected Confirming Confirmations
One implication of X being relatively unconstrained in this definition is that none, some or all of the 
reflected arguments N : a  are such that N  e  X  for the head of the attack chain X : a .  Thus it can be the 
case that V : a  is such that V  C X or V  n  X /  0. It depends on the inputs to the reflected confirming 
confirmations function. So supports N ,  i.e. the argument labels label(iV : a ) ,  can be both part of the 
input and the output to this function. Likewise none, some or all of N  G W . The above definition 
allows X : q  ^  top (0(a , A )). Furthermore V : a  is allowed to be a power set o f confirmations and not 
just a single confirmation. The function is defined so that the output is {V : a  £  0(c*, A )}, the reason 
being that 0 0  V. There is no stipulation in the definition that V : a  U W : a  =  top(0(a, A )), nor that 
V : a  U X : a  =  top (0(a , A )). None of the confirmations in the attack chain can be labelled with the 
emptyset as that is prohibited by the definitions reused here.
Example 5.9.1. Reflected confirming confirmation. Let A  =  {a : 7 , 6  : 7  —> a , c : 7r, d : it —> a , e :
—>7r V - 17, / :  7r A a} . Also Let I  = {a, b } , J  =  {c, d}, K  =  {e}, L  =  {a, b, c, d},  M  = {&, d , / } ,  N  =  
{6 , / } ,  O  = {d,  / } .  Consequently I : a , J  : a , N  : a , 0  : a , K  : -> (7  A ( 7  —► a )  A 7r A (n  —» a ) ) ,  L  : 
7  A ( 7  —► a )  A 7r A (7r —► a ) ,  M : 7  A ( 7  —► a )  A 7r A (7r —► a )  G arguments(A). Additionally let T  =  
{L} ,  U =  {Af}, V =  { N , 0 } ,  W  =  { / ,  J } ,X  =  { / ,  J , N yO } , Y  = { K} .  So V : a ,  W  : a ,X  : a ,  Y : 
-> (7  A ( 7  —* a) A n  A ( n  —» a ) ) , T : 7 A ( 7  —> a )  A 7r A (ir —► a ) ,  U 1 7  A ( 7  —* a )  A 7r A (7r —► a )  € 0 (A ). 
It thus follow s that (Y  : -> (7  A ( 7  —♦ a )  A 7r A (-7T —» a ) ) ,  W , X : a )  €  preclusiveUndercuts(X: a ,  A). 
Also  U : 7  A ( 7  —► a )  A tt A (n  —» a )  e  directConfirmationRebuttals(Y: -> (7  A ( 7  —+ a )  A 7r A (x  —► 
a ) ) ,  W , X : a ,  A). As an aside, there is also a Type II  Reflection T  : 7  A ( 7  —» a )  A 7r A (7r —> a )  G 
reflectedConfirmationRebuttals(Y : -> (7  A  ( 7  —* a )  A  7r A  (7r —» a ) ) ,  W , X : a ,  A ) as L  C I  u  J . 77ie 
mam pam f 0/ this example is that V : a  G reflectedConfirmingConfirmations(U: 7  A  ( 7  —» a )  A  7r A (7r —* 
a ) ,  Y : -< (7  A  ( 7  —► a )  A  t t  A  (n  —* a ) ) ,  W , X : a ,  A ) because N  C M  and O  C M . So looking ahead 
to tracking a professional debate, the two confirmations in this example that would have to be pruned 
out are the reflected confirmation rebuttal T : 7  A  ( 7  —> a )  A  7r A  (7r —> a ) and the reflected confirming 
confirmation V  :a .
Given the prerequisites o f an appropriate attack chain, i.e. a direct confirmation rebuttal attacking 
a preclusive undercut, where all three vertices in the chain are valid confirmations, reflected confirming 
confirmations always exist.
Proposition 5.9.1. Let A b e  a knowledgebase o f  labelled assumption formulae and let U : —>/?, W : a ,  X : 
a , Y : /? G 0 (A ).
I f  (Y  :/3, W , X :a ) G preclusiveUndercuts(X:a , A ) and
U : ->I3 G directConfirmationRebuttals(Y: 0, W , X : a , A) 
then reflectedConfirmingConfirmations(U: -i/3, Y : /?, W, X : a, A ) /  0.
P roo / Given the preclusive undercut (Y : /3, W , X : a )  G preclusivel)ndercuts(X : a , A ) it is known 
that 0  =  -> /\stripAssumptions(formulae(label(W : a ) , A )), where W : a  is the target confirmation.
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Also for each M  e  U it must be the case that stripAssumptions(formulae(label(M : —«/3), A.)) h 
->(3. Therefore for each M e  U it follows that stripAssumptions(formulae(label(M : ->/3), A )) h 
/\stripAssumptions(formulae(label(W :a), A )) and therefore that stripAssumptions(formulae(label(M: 
->/?), A )) h  a .  That M  may not be minimal, so suppose an N  C  M  and it follows that given the above 
attack chain, for each M e  U there exists a valid argument N : a  e  arguments(A). All of these resultant 
N  : a , N  C M  form a confirmation V : a ,  where N  e  V. Therefore V ±  0. Thus if (Y : 0, W, X : 
a ) e  preclusiveUndercuts(X : a , A ) and U:->j(3e directConfirmationRebuttals(Y: /?, W, X : a , A ) then 
reflectedConfirmingConfirmations(U: ->/?, Y : (3, W , X : a ,  A ) /  0. □
It is not quite so simple to say that otherwise reflectedConfirmingConfirmations(U: ->/3, Y : /?, W , X : 
q , A ) =  0 because if the second attack in the attack chain is a reflected confirmation rebuttal (rather than 
a direct one) then the reflected confirmation is the same as the reflector confirmation and hence not the 
emptyset. If the preclusion is absent, however, the result is the empty set.
Given that these reflections always exist, given their prerequisites, the next question is how many 
arguments are there in the reflection.
5.9.2 Scaling and Reflected Confirming Confirmations
I now introduce a variation o f the reflection scaling factor o f Definition 5.7.4 to extend the concept of that 
function to also cover reflected confirming confirmations. I append the function name with the words 
‘up tree’ to avoid ambiguity.
Definition 5.9.2. Let A b e  a knowledgebase o f  labelled assumption formulae and let U : ->/?, W : a ,  X : 
a ,  Y : 0  e  0 (A ). The up tree reflection scaling factor, denoted reflectionScalingFactorUpTree(U : 
->t3> Y : /?, W , X : a ,  A ), is a rational number such that:
reflectionScalingFactorUpTree(U: ->(3, Y : /?, W , X : a ,  A )
|label(top(reflectedConfirmingConfirmations(U: ->(3, Y : ( 3 , W ,  X :a ,A ) ) ) l
|label(U :-i/3)|
The definitions of the key words for the amount o f scaling also need to apply to the different domain.
Definition 5.93 .  Let A  be a knowledgebase o f  labelled assumptions and  U : W : a ,  X : a ,  Y : (3 e
0 (A ).
I f  reflectionScalingFactorUpTree(U: ->/?, Y : (3, W , X : a ,  A ) <  1
then reflectedConfirmationConfirmationsU: ->/3, Y : /?, W , X : a ,  A ) is a reduced reflection.
(freflectionScalingFactorUpTree(U: — Y : (3, W , X : a ,  A ) =  1
then reflectedConfirmationConfirmations(U: ->/?, Y : 0 , W , X : a ,  A) an exact reflection.
reflectionScalingFactorllpTree(U: -*(3, Y : [3, W , X : a ,  A ) >  1
then reflectedConfirmationConfirmations(U: -»/3, Y : (3, W , X : a , A )  an enlarged reflection.
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Now a slightly modified example to illustrate why the earlier definition of reflected confirming 
arguments uses L  C K  rather than L  =  K  (which would have yielded only one reflected argument of 
K : a ) . W hat this example shows is enlargement, exactly as with Type I Reflections. Here the C is active.
Example 5.9.2. Enlarged reflected confirming confirmation. Let A =  { a : a ,  b : 7  —> a ,  c : A, d :
\  e : 7r A a , /  : a  A (7r —> a )} . Let I — {a , 6 }, J  =  {c, d}, K  =  { e . / } ,  L =  {e}, M  =  { / } .
77j«5 I : a , J : ->'), J  : -> (7  A  (-> 7  —> a ) ) , /  : 7  A ( 7  —> a ) , A" : 7  A ( 7  —> a ) ,L  : 7  —♦ a , L : 
a , A/ : a  e  arguments(A). Thus J : -> (7  A ( 7  —> a ))  e  canonicalUndercuts(7 : a , A). A/50  I : 
7 A ( 7  —► a ) , i f  : 7  A ( 7  —► a ) € rebuttals( J  : - 1 (7  A ( 7  —> a )) , A). It is the case that 1 : 7  A ( 7  —► 
a )  G reflectedArgumentRebuttal( J  : -> (7  A  ( 7  —► a )) , I : a , A ), because obviously I  C  I. It is also 
the case that K  : 7  A  ( 7  —► a ) e  directArgumentRebuttals(J : -> (7  A ( 7  —> a )) , /  : a , A), because 
K  % I. Given this attack chain of three arguments, it follows that there are two reflected confirming 
arguments, namely reflectedConfirmingArguments(/f : 7  A  ( 7  —> a ) , J : -> (7  A ( 7  —► a )) , I : a , A) =  
{L : a , M  : a }  where L £  i f ,  M  £  K. Now two checks to ensure the safety of this result. Firstly 
K : 7  A  ( 7  —» a )  ^ reflectedArgumentRebuttal( J : - * (7  A  ( 7  —► a )) , L : a , A ), because J : -> (7  A  ( 7  —> 
a ))  £  canonicalUndercuts(L : a , A ). Secondarily K  : 7  A  ( 7  —► a) $  reflectedArgumentRebuttal( J  : 
-> (7  A ( 7  —* a ) ) , M  : a, A), because J  : -> (7  A  ( 7  —► a ))  ^ canonicalUndercuts(M : a , A). So the 
reflection off the one argument K  : 7  A  ( 7  —► a) has yielded two arguments L : a  and M  : a, giving 
an enlarged reflection. Thus reflectionScalingFactorUpTree({ i f } : 7  A ( 7  —> a ) , { J }  : -> (7  A  ( 7  —> 
a ) ) , { i } , { i } : a ,  A ) =  \ {L,M}\  -  | { i f } |  = 2 - 1  =  2.
The above proves by example that Type i n  and IV Reflections are not always exact reflections. 
They can be enlarged. This example suggests problematic behaviour would arise if reflected confirming 
arguments were used to stand in for the direct rebuttals they are reflected from.
A further implication is that the existence of reduced reflections is also inevitable. Just as shown 
before for preclusive undercuts, the $  part o f C allows support shortening (e.g. a reflector with support 
o f {a, 6 , c} giving rise to reflections with supports such as {6 , c}). Consequently two different shortened 
subsets (e.g. reflectors {a, b, c}, {b, c, d}  yielding reflections {b, c}, {b, c}) which then go on to merge 
(to be just {6 , c}). Hence a reduced reflection. Here is an example of one.
Example 5.93. Reduced reflected confirming confirmation. Let A =  {a : 7 , 6 : 7  —► a ,  c : A, d :
A -» ~>7 , e : 7T A  /i A a ,  /  : 7r -*  7 , 9  : p  -> 7 }- Let I  =  { a , b } , J  = { c , d } yK  -  { e , /} ,L  -  
{e, p}, M  =  {e}. Therefore I : a , J  : -> (7  A  ( 7  —► a ) ) ,  /  : 7  A  ( 7  —♦ a ) ,  M  : 7  —► a ,  i f  : 7  A ( 7  —► 
a ) , L  : 7  A ( 7  —> a )  €  argum ents(A ). So J  : -> (7  A  ( 7  —* a) )  e  canonicalUndercuts(7 : a ,  A ) 
and K  : 7  A ( 7  —► a ) ,  L  : 7  A  ( 7  —♦ a )  €  directArgumentRebuttals(J : - 1(7  A ( 7  —► a)) ,  I : a,  A )  
-  these two arguments are direct because K  % I  and L  % I. Naturally there is also I  : 7  A ( 7  —► 
a )  G directArgumentRebuttals( J : - > ( 7  A ( 7  —* a ) ) ,  I : a ,  A). Now fo r  the point o f  this example: firstly 
M : a  € reflectedConfirmingArguments(/f : 7  A  ( 7  —► a ) ,  J  : -> ( 7  A  ( 7  —> a ) ) ,  / ,  /  : a ,  A) because 
M  £  / f  and secondly M : a  e  reflectedConfirmingArguments(L : 7  A  ( 7  —» a ) , J  : - < ( 7  A ( 7  —> 
a ) ) ,  /  : a ,  A ) because M  £  L. So although there are two reflectors at the tail o f  the argument chain 
there is only one reflected argument at the head. Because |{M } | <  |{ i f ,  L}\ this a reduced reflection.
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Consequently reflectionScalingFactorUpTree({I/} : 7  A ( 7  -> a ) , { J}  : - . ( 7  A ( 7  -» a )) , { / } ,  { / }  : 
a , A ) =  |{M } | 4- \ {K,L}\  =  1 -5- 2 =  0.5.
As enlarged and reduced reflected confirming confirmations have been shown, it follows that a 
combination of the two mechanisms can be employed to yield exact reflections.
5.9.3 Direct Confirming Confirmations
By symmetry, the next and final step in this pattern of reflected and direct functions is the topic of 
direct confirming arguments and direct confirming confirmations. If small steps were used the steps 
would be direct confirming argument, then direct confirming confirmation leading to a maximal direct 
confirming confirmation. Similar ground has been covered several times already so it is practical to move 
immediately to maximal direct confirming confirmations, which for short I call direct confirmations. This 
definition leverages Definition 5.9.1 of reflected confirming confirmations.
Definition 5.9.4. Let A b e  a knowledgebase o f  labelled assumption formulae, let L : a  G arguments( A) 
and let U : —</3, V : a ,  W  : a ,  X : a ,  Y : (3 G 0 (A ). The set o f  direct confirmations, denoted 
directConfirmations(X : a,  A ), which is devoid o f  reflected confirming confirmations from  any reflec­
tor is the set o f  confirmations such that:
directConfirmations(X: a,  A )
=  { T : a  G 0 (A )  | fo r  every L g T  there does not exist an L  G V such that
V : a  =  top(reflectedConfirmingConfirmations(U: ~>/3, Y : /?, W , X : a, A )),
(Y : /?, W , X : a )  G preclusivellndercuts(X: a ,  A ) and 
D:->/3 G directConfirmationRebuttals(Y:/3, W ,X :a , A )}.
The set o f direct confirmations for a  is a power set of confirmations directConfirmations(X: a ,  A ) C 
0 ( a ,  A ). It is a filter or pruning function because T  C X. In the definition W is such that W C X.
A direct confirmation for a  is not necessarily the maximum cardinality confirmation for a , but it is 
maximal in the sense that it takes into account all possible reflectors. The directConfirmations(X: a ,  A) 
does require the input parameter o f A  as it ensures that there do not exist any reflectors that could give 
rise to reflected arguments in the output.
To look ahead for a moment, to be free of reflections, the root node of a debate tracking tree therefore 
intuitively has to be the contradiction (X, Y ) : a  where :
X : a — top(directContirmations(top(0(a, A ), A ). 
Y : ->a =  top(directConfirmations(top(0(~,a , A ), A )).
5.10 Conclusion for Reflected and Direct Confirmations
The ten principal functions from this chapter, plus three more included for context, are summarised in 
Table 5.1. This table is a close parallel to the one at the end of Chapter 4, with the exclusion of abstract 
reflections and the inclusion of maximal reflections. It also includes the up-chain reflections arising
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from the combination of rebuttal and undercut. The key difference with the previous summary table, 
Table 4.3, is o f course that the one from the last chapter is at the level o f individual arguments whilst the 
table below is at the level o f sets o f arguments, i.e. confirmations. This analysis of reflection on the level 
of confirmations uncovers a number of properties that bear on the automation of debate.
The two maximal direct functions and the direct confirmation are the ones used in the next chapter - 
on debate tracking trees. All o f the functions in the above table return power sets of confirmations, with 
the maximalDirectConfirmationRebuttal() being a special case as it always returns a singleton set -  hence 
its singular name.







confirmationRebuttals(X: a ,  A ) 
preclusiveUndercuts(X: a ,  A ) 




Rebuttal Reflected Only 
Undercut Reflected Only 
Attacks Reflected Only
reflectedConfirmationRebuttals(Y: /?, V, X : a ,  A ) 
reflectedPreclusiveUndercuts( Y : (3, V, X : a ,  A ) 




Rebuttal Direct Only 
Undercut Direct Only
directConfirmationRebuttals(Y: 0 , V , X : a ,  A ) 
directPreclusiveUndercuts(Y: /?, V, X : a ,  A )
5.6.1
5.3.1
Rebuttal Direct, Maximal 
Undercut Direct, Maximal
maxima!DirectConfirmationRebuttal(Y: (3, X : a ,  A ) 
maximalDirectPreclusiveUndercuts(Y: (3, A )
5.6.2
5.3.2
Undercut Reflected Only 
then 
Rebuttal
Undercut Reflected Only 
then 
Rebuttal
Undercut Direct, Maximal 
then 
Rebuttal
reflectedConfirmingArguments(K : ->/?, J: (3t I : a ,  A ) 
reflectedConfirmingConfirmations(U: ->(3, Y : /?, W , X : a ,  A) 




Table 5.1: Summary of Reflected and Direct Confirmation Attacking Functions
Reflections can flow both up and down a chain of arguments, with the reflected undercuts and 
rebuttals all being down chain. The reflected confirming arguments, however, flow up the chain from 
leaf to root. The reflection scaling factors which occur with confirmations undercutting and rebutting 
each other are shown in Table 5.2 below.
This chapter has uncovered the principle properties of reflections amongst confirmations, many of 
which might not be intuitively expected and all o f which bear on the automation of professional debate. 
Further research may uncover further forms of reflection and certainly further properties of those forms 
defined here. A key observation from this and the last chapter is that reflections are subject to scaling
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Reflected E n larged Exact Reduced
Preclusive Undercut: Exist 
Example 5.7.3 




















Table 5.2: Summary of Scaling Factors Found With Confirmation Reflections
and thus can result in enlarged, reduced, exact or even distorted reflections -  except, as shown in the 
previous chapter, for reflected argument rebuttals which are only ever exact. An area for further research 
is to examine more closely the role of labels in scaling and see which scaling situations in Table 5.2 
would not occur if labels were removed.
There are two mechanisms that can cause enlarged preclusive reflections (mono-pair and multi-pair 
enlarged reflection), but only one one mechanism for reduced reflection (support merging). Scaling in 
general, and distortion in particular, show the notion that arguments in a debate can be counted by count­
ing their reflections to be impractical or unworkable. The targets of all reflected preclusive undercuts are 
always mono-attack.
One possible area for future research would be to investigate more fully the properties o f an abstract 
confirmation attacks functions, including reflected confirmation attacks, direct confirmation attacks and 
maximal direct confirmation attacks. Such an approach might build on the work of Dung, working at 
at abstract level o f 'attacks’, but employing confirmations rather than individual arguments as the graph 
nodes.
This chapter lays the foundations for constructing debate tracking trees in the next chapter and 
therefore to judging debates in the chapter after that.
Chapter 6
How to Track a Debate
This chapter establishes that an effective way to track a debate, the whole debate and nothing but the 
debate is to use a tree of contradictions with all o f the reflected arguments pruned out of the tree, leaving 
just the direct arguments. This proposal is based on a critical analysis of trees in the literature, with a 
specific analysis o f the tree in (Besnard & Hunter, 2001) and a general analysis that includes the trees of 
(Prakken & Sartor, 1997; Amgoud & Cayrol, 2002; Garcia & Simari, 2004; Dung et al., 2006). My 
examination shows that the question o f how to handle reflection in argument graphs is a general problem 
in the literature not limited to any one particular publication.
6.1 Overview of the Chapter
I develop this chapter’s evaluation o f how to track a debate in seven stages. It moves from showing issues 
with approaches in the literature to proposing a new approach that responds to these issues.
Debate Tracking in the Literature Section 6.2 describes various approaches found in the litera­
ture and then picks one for detailed analysis o f the effects o f reflection.
Argument Trees are Incomplete Section 6.3 shows several distinct mechanisms that lead to ar­
gument trees lacking necessary arguments making them incomplete.
Argument Trees are Inordinate Section 6.4 shows that there are additional mechanisms which 
result in argument trees containing excessive, i.e. unnecessary or redundant, arguments.
Further Argument TVee Behaviours Section 6.5 shows i) the proxy arguments that argument 
trees contain do not accurately represent the arguments that are excluded, ii) that argument trees 
are sensitive to the way the knowledgebase is written down and iii) they can be asymmetrical.
Rationale for Matt Opaque Contradiction Trees Section 6 .6  provides a reasoned path from 
the problems I identify with debate tracking in the literature to the justification of the new ap­
proach of the subsequent section.
Definition of Debate Trees Section 6.7 starts with a series of helper functions to succinctly de­
fine this new debate tracking structure so that it is free from reflection. I call this matt opaque 
contradiction tree a debateTree(a, A ) or just ♦ * (a , A ) for short (see Definition 6.7.7).
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Properties of Debate Trees Section 6 .8  rounds out the chapter by examining the behaviour and 
establishing a number of properties of these new trees.
I propose that my debate tree is a practical solution to the problem of how to track a professional debate. 
For any particular debate a necessary prerequisite to correctly judging the outcome is thus, I would argue, 
to populate the debate tree data structure.
6.2 Debate Tracking in the Literature
The examples of debate tracking covered so far in this thesis, notably in Section 2.7.2 on simple illustra­
tive judges, take the elementary approach o f relying on a single contradiction. Works in this area include 
(Benferhat et al., 1993; Krause et al., 1995; Elvang-Gpransson & Hunter, 1995). For further use of a 
single contradiction to track a debate in the informal literature see (Willcox & Bridgewater, 1977) and 
descriptions in (Krause et al., 1998) and (Fox & McBumey, 2002). The limitation of tracking with a 
single contradiction is that undercut cannot be taken into account and as shown in Section 3.2.2 under­
cuts can change debate outcomes, so including them is prudent. Consequently a more sophisticated data 
structure is warranted and there is an established consensus in the literature that some form of graph, tree 
or forest is appropriate. To create a graph to track a debate, it is necessary to make a choice for what the 
graph vertices represent and another choice for the graph edges.
Vertex representation. W hile graphs in the literature tend to use arguments for the vertices, my 
finding and recommendation is that sets o f arguments, namely confirmations, or even better contradic­
tions, are better suited as the nodes in a debate-tracking graph. Each contradiction then isolates a point 
o f classical inconsistency. Much of this thesis is a justification for mapping vertices to contradictions. 
The thesis touches upon five different argument definitions (see Table 6.1), which are the main five to 
be found in the literature (excluding the related field of priorities or preferences). My focus is on classi­
cal logic labelled mincons as I find them well suited to tracking contributions in debates. These vertex 
representations are summarised as Table 6 .1. The citation is the earliest formal definition I have located.
Argument Earliest Use Reference
1 . Abstract argument (Dung, 1993) Definition 3.9.1
2 . Semi-abstract (Bondarenko et al., 1997) Definition 4.3.1
3. Defeasible rule (Pollock, 1992) Not defined in thesis
4. Mincon (Doyle, 1979) Definition 2.4.2
5. Labelled mincon (Gabbay, 1991) Definition 2.4.2
6 . Contradiction this thesis Definition 2.6.1
Table 6 .1: Candidates Forms for Vertices in Debate Tracking Graphs
Edge representation. Now to turn to the question of what the inter-nodal links should be. There 
is a general consensus in the non-bipolar majority o f the literature that the edges should be some form 
of attack, but what kind of attack is not agreed upon. In this thesis, I analyse at least seven different
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definitions that could be seen as attack, m ost o f which are used in debate tracking structures in the 
literature, as summarised in Table 6.2.
Attack Citation Reference
1 . Abstract attack (Dung, 1993) Definition 3.9.1
2 . Rebuttal only (Benferhat et al., 1993) Section 2.7
3. Undercut only (Pollock, 1992) Definition 3.2.2
4. Rebuttal or undercut (Amgoud & Cayrol, 1998) Definition 3.9.2
5. Direct rebuttal This thesis Definition 4.8.1
6 . Direct canonical undercut This thesis Definition 4.5.1
7. Direct preclusive undercut This thesis Definition 5.3.1
Table 6.2: Candidates Forms for Edges in Debate Tracking Graphs
Given the lists o f possible vertices and edges the question arises: in what ways have these been 
combined and explored in the literature? Prior to doing further detailed research, can it be said which 
ones may contain reflection and are there any where reflection can definitely be ruled out?
Publication Vertices Edges Name
1 . (Pollock, 1992) Defeasible rule Undercut or rebuttal Defeat graph
2 . (Dung, 1993) Abstract argument Abstract attack Dung graph
3. (Prakken & Sartor, 1997) Defeasible rule Undercut or rebuttal Dialogue tree
4. (Besnard & Hunter, 2001) M incon Canonical undercut Argument tree
5. (Amgoud & Cayrol, 2002) Abstract argument Abstract attack Dialogue tree
6 . (Garcia & Simari, 2004) Defeasible rule Undercut or rebuttal Dialectical tree
7. (Dung et al., 2006) Semi-abstract Undercut only Dispute tree
8 . This thesis Contradiction Direct preclusive undercut Debate tree
Table 6.3: Summary of Debate Tracking Graphs or Trees
Table 6.3 provides a representative sampling o f debate tracking structures found in the literature and 
additionally in this thesis. I now comment on each o f these leading debate tracking forms in the literature 
before making some more general observations about reflection in these various trees of arguments.
Defeat graph of (Pollock, 1992). The defeat graph from (Pollock, 1992) is based on defeasible 
logic with the modus ponens proof rule dominating in examples. What is not clear is exactly what proof 
rules are available and thus what forms o f reflection are present. It would appear that contraposition is 
probably not allowed, however that does not rule out reflection as several other forms of reflection, e.g. 
Type HI, are not dependent on contraposition.
Dung graph of (Dung, 1993). W hile the writings of Dung do not major heavily on graphical 
visualisations of arguments, those commenting on his works, such as(Prakken & Vreeswijk, 2002) do 
make extensive use of such graphs. The vertices are single abstract arguments and the edges denote are
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one argument attacking one argument with an abstract attack of unspecified form. Clearly out of scope 
are vertices covering more than one argument and attacks attacking more than one argument. The Dung 
graphs are quite different from the other lines in this table as a) they are the only one that is a graph not 
a tree and b) the vertices and edges are abstract rather than concrete.
Dialectic tree of (Prakken & Sartor, 1997). This is another defeasible logic tree with an existential 
judge building on the work of Pollock. Priorities are included together with a novel feature for debating 
priorities. They make a distinction between i) deciding whether an individual argument is justified with 
a ‘proof theory’ which I would call a debate tracking structure plus judge and ii) a ‘semantics’ which 
identifies sets o f justified arguments in the style of Dung. Their undercuts are similar but not identical to 
Wigmore undercuts, and do not involve priorities, whereas their rebuttals do. This landmark paper has 
clearly provided some inspiration to at least (Amgoud & Cayrol, 2002; Garcia & Simari, 2004).
Argument tree of (Besnard & Hunter, 2001). The existence of reflection is acknowledged in this 
paper and the tree features a no-recycling constraint (NRC) and an edge choice that appear to have been 
influenced by this understanding. The removal of reflection is partial. Another strength of this paper is 
that it is explicit in stating how the outcomes of multiple trees are combined - an area I would suggest is 
underdeveloped in the literature. It uses the full classical logic , setting it apart from the body of papers 
which limit themselves to a smaller set o f proof rules.
Dialogue tree of (Amgoud & Cayrol, 2002). The dialogue tree of (Amgoud & Cayrol, 2002) is 
presented as a proof procedure to establish if  a particular argument A is acceptable. The argument A 
is placed at the root o f the tree and each attack on A, and each attack on those attackers etc., analysed. 
W hile this paper contains a discussion of mincon arguments and Wigmore undercuts, the vertices of the 
dialogue tree are defined as abstract arguments based on (Dung, 1993), augmented with priorities in the 
style of (Amgoud & Cayrol, 1998). The edges are thus abstract attacks meaning that it is not possible 
to say precisely whether the tree does or does not contain reflection. The implications of following 
through with the mincon and W igmore undercut specifics for dialogue tree and its judgements would be 
an interesting area for further research.
Dialectical tree of (Garcia & Simari, 2004). This is another defeasible tree employing priorities 
and an existential judge (gaining at least some inspiration from Prakken). The proof rules are limited 
and contraposition is explicitly excluded. As with Prakken the undercut-like attack is not one analysed 
in my earlier Chapter 3, but unlike (Besnard & Hunter, 2001) and perhaps (Dung et al., 2006), the attack 
is arguably more general as it includes rebuttal. The root of each tree is still a single argument yielding 
a forest of trees for a claim.
Dispute tree of (Dung et al., 2006). I established in Section 4.3 that the semi-abstract ABA frame­
work allows reflection, which would suggest that reflection exists in the trees of (Dung et al., 2006), as 
these trees are based on the same semi-abstract approach. This 2006 paper builds on the approach of 
(Prakken & Sartor, 1997; Amgoud & Cayrol, 2002) and others in treating the tree as the recording of a 
dialogue between proponent and opponent. In contrast, the approach of (Elvang-G0 ransson & Hunter, 
1995; Besnard & Hunter, 2001; Fox & McBumey, 2002), others and this thesis is to build the tree
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from a single knowledgebase, where all allowed arguments and attacks are computed and automatically 
included as part o f the debate. W hile edges o f the tree are specifically undercuts only, the authors present 
an argument as to why they believe rebuttals are also catered for. The theme of (Dung et al., 2006), I 
would argue, is probably one of the most promising area for future research in argumentation - where 
Dung-style semantics are integrated with concrete assumption-based argumentation.
Debate tree of this thesis. . Later on in this chapter I define the debate tree as a debate tracking 
structure which overcomes the shortcomings I identify with trees in the literature. The vertices of my 
debate tree are contradictions and the edges are preclusive undercuts between contradictions. The tree is 
so defined as to be devoid o f reflected arguments. All o f the arguments in one debate can be tracked in a 
single tree, rather than in a forest o f trees, as is the situation with for example with (Besnard & Hunter, 
2001; Garcfa & Simari, 2004; Dung et al., 2006).
More recent note-worthy existing research on trees of arguments includes the further analysis of 
defeasible trees by (Prakken et al., 2005) and classical trees by (Amgoud et al., 2004). The differences 
between these two approaches, defeasible and classical, are relatively small, when contrasted with the 
abstract Dung and semi-abstract ABA approaches.
Observation on reflections in trees. One m ight think that various mechanisms in these trees would 
ensure that reflections were absent, however each such conjecture is not robust:
1. Defeasible logic. In many defeasible logics the set o f proof rules is more restrictive than in clas­
sical logic and in some contraposition, > *s specifically excluded, e.g. (Garcfa & Simari,
2004). It might be thought that without contraposition reflection would not be possible, however 
there are two responses to that idea.
•  Although my proof of Base Proposition One (Proposition 4.2.1) uses contraposition, other 
the predictable existence of forms of reflection, including Base Proposition Two (Propo­
sition 4.7.2), Type HI (Proposition 5.8.1) and Type IV do (Proposition 5.9.1) not rely on 
contraposition. Hence, ruling out the contraposition proof rule does not rule out reflection.
•  Furthermore, the same outcome can be achieved by using a combination of different proof 
rules, e.g. t p y h » a » *a^ ( 3  yields ^  contrapositive, but doesn’t use contraposition. 
Some would argue, however, that this sequence of proof rules is still contraposition.
2. Wigmore undercut. W hile the bulk of my analysis o f reflection uses canonical undercuts, many 
of these trees employ a form of Wigmore undercut instead, e.g. (Amgoud & Cayrol, 2002; Dung 
et al., 2006). It might be thought that that switch would prohibit reflection, however Proposi­
tion 4.3.1 shows reflection always existing even with Wigmore undercut.
3. Excluding rebuttal. The trees o f (Besnard & Hunter, 2001; Garcfa & Simari, 2004; Dung 
et al., 2006) have already excluded all or most rebuttals and hence it would appear plausible that 
reflection (off rebuttals to undercuts) was already catered for. The counter to this suggestion is 
provided in Base Proposition Four showing that even with undercuts alone reflection occurs.
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4. No-recycling constraint (NRC). Some of these trees employ a device to keep them finite, which is 
commonly called a no-recycling constraint. Some NRCs are simple in that they prevent repetition 
of an argument in a path from leaf to root (e.g. (Prakken & Sartor, 1997; Amgoud & Cayrol, 
2002), while others NRCs, such as that in (Besnard & Hunter, 2001), are more sophisticated 
in preventing the reuse of supports. Given the absence of support reuse it might be thought that 
reflection would be excluded. The counter is that even by excluding undercut to undercut reflection 
there are other kinds, such as rebuttal to undercut and up-tree, that are not excluded.
Furthermore, none o f the trees in the literature appear to contain any explicit device to exclude all 
reflection. Some appreciation o f reflection appears to have affected the forms in (Besnard & Hunter, 
2001) and seems to have influenced the intuitions o f (Dung et al., 2006). The conclusion has to be drawn 
that all o f the trees o f arguments in the literature probably do contain reflection and that a body of further 
research is needed to confirm or refute that opinion.
As all o f the approaches in the literature appear to lack a full appreciation of reflection so all o f them 
are likely to yield arbitrary judgem ents for some knowledgebases. O f these debate tracking approaches, 
the classical forest approach of (Besnard & Hunter, 2001) is arguably the most promising as it has at 
least some consideration o f reflection, however it too also exhibits a number of properties which could 
be problematic in mapping to professional debate. To perform a detailed analysis of all of the forms of 
reflection in all o f the trees o f arguments in the literature would be too broad a topic for this thesis so I 
pick one and document that detailed analysis as follows.
6.2.1 Argument Trees and Argument Structures -  Classical Logic Forests
The argument tree was defined by (Besnard & Hunter, 2001). The same definition is also to be found in 
several follow on papers, notably (Cayrol & Lagasquie-Schiex, 2002; Hunter, 2004a; Hunter, 2004b). 
I now recap the standard definition o f an argument tree, first using the notation of the original:
Definition 6.2.1. (Besnard & Hunter, 2001)'s Definition 6.1. An  argument tree fo r  a  is a tree where 
the nodes are arguments such that:
1. The root is an argument fo r  a,
2. Fornonode  ($ ,/3 ) with ancestor nodes ( $ i , / ? i ) , . . . ,  ( $ n >/?n) is $  a subset o f  $  i U  . . .  U  $ n,
3. The children nodes o f  a node N  consist o f  all canonical undercuts fo r  N  that obey 2.
Clause 2. is called the no-recycling constraint. When a graph is cast into a tree it is the NRC 
that ensures the resultant tree is finite. The next step, as in the original, is to allow argument trees to be 
collected together to form argument structures or forests with the aim of tracking the whole debate.
Definition 6.2.2. (Besnard & Hunter, 2001) ’s Definition 8.1. An argument structure fo r  a formula a  
is a pair o f  sets ('P , C) where V  is the set o f  argument trees fo r  a  and C is the set o f  argument trees fo r  
-> q .
The above two definitions build on the same standard classical logic mincon argument and canonical 
undercut definitions as I employ, except they do not use a labelled deductive system (LDS). A key to
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understanding the two definitions above is Besnard and Hunter’s argument that canonical undercuts can 
stand in for, or represent, rebuttals. Hence they track no rebuttals (apart from at the root) and only track 
undercuts.
A minor challenge with the above definition of argument tree is that the vertices do not form a set. 
In standard graph theory, a graph comprises a set o f vertices and a set of edges. In the above, however, it 
is allowed that a particular argument may appear m ore than once in the tree and hence as more than one 
vertex. (Dung et al., 2006) observe the same issue in their tree and use a mapping function somewhat 
akin to the one I describe below (in that they refer to labelling a node with an argument, rather than the 
node being the argument), but (Garcfa & Simari, 2004) follow the same approach as (Besnard & Hunter, 
2001). Here is an example of this minor challenge:
Example 6.2.1. Repeated vertices in an argument tree. Let A  =  {a:/3,b:(3  —> a, c : cr , d:a  —»
7, / :  7  -»  9  : ^ 7  A -«<r, h : 7  V  a}.  Let  I  = {a,  b}, J  = {c, d},  K  = {e, / } ,  L  = { g } , M  =  {h}.
Members o f  arguments(A) appear as nodes in the resultant argument tree fo r  a  below. The argument 
M  : - ’( - ’7  A  ~icr) appears twice as two separate nodes in this argument tree showing vertex repetition. 
Figure 6.1 shows this repetition using the fo rm  o f  an argument graph (Definition 3.9.3).
I : a
J:-n(/J A (/? -> < *)) K : ->(/? A (/? —► a))
L : -i(<t A (0 —► ~<P)) L : - i ( 7  A ( 7  —> -./?))
M 7  A -i<t) M 7  A -i(j)
Figure 6 .1: Repeated Vertices in an Argument Tree
A minor nomenclature improvement would thus be to have a set that represents vertices, a further 
set that represents arguments and then use a third device, a suijective function to map many vertices to 
single arguments, so that each vertex has attached to it a specific argument.
To facilitate subsequent definitions and overcome the above minor challenge I now rewrite the 
definition of argument tree in my notation to use such a mapping function. Certainly by doing so I add 
the possibility of additional behaviour due to labels, but that is not my motivation, and certainly not the 
cause of the properties established below. So here is the argument tree adapted to have unique vertices 
and edges.
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Definition 6.23. Let A b e  a knowledgebase o f  labelled assumption formulae. An  argument tree fo r  an 
argument fo r  a , I  :a , denoted  argumentTree(7 : a ,  A ) =  (V, £ , arguments(A), / ) ,  where V is a set o f
vertices, £ is a set o f  edges a n d / : V h >  arguments( A ), is such that:
1. The root v root €  V o f  a tree fo r  I . a i s  such that f { v root) G arguments(a, A ),
2. Vchild € V is a child o f  v  G V
i ff  ( / (vchild) € canonicalUndercuts(/(u), A ) and
\abe\(f (vchud))  £  la b e l(/(v i))  u  . . .  U  label(/(vn)), 
where v \ , . . .  , v n G V are the ancestors o f  vchud)-
The last two lines together comprise the no-recycling constraint which is a mechanism to ensure 
that the tree is finite and free from cycles, i.e. closed walks, of repeated arguments.
I use the above definition when documenting my analysis of reflection in argument trees below. 
In this definition every v  G V has one and only one / ( v) G arguments(A), that is, every node 
maps to an argument, rather than being an argument. Also any edge, representing a canonical under­
cut, is (Vchud, v ) €  £ . To avoid repeating Definition 6.2.2, I now state that forests of argument trees 
argumentTree(7: a , A ) can also be held in the argument structure of Definition 6.2.2.
In the following three sections I establish that argument trees have several behaviours that do not 
map well to professional debate, namely that they are incomplete, inordinate and inchoate. Thus argu­
ment trees exist which lack necessary arguments, which contain unnecessary arguments and where the 
arguments they do contain do not accurately represent the ones that are absent. Consequently there will 
exist judge functions for these argument trees that will yield debate outcomes that are different from 
those commonly or intuitively expected by professional debate.
The definitions o f inordinate and incomplete address establishing both the existence and the right 
number o f arguments. If  the right number are present, but they do not behave as they should then that is 
inchoate tree behaviour. I employ a graphical notation in the following examples where on the left I place 
an argument graph (Definition 3.9.3) portraying an argument structure (Definition 6.2.2) and on the right 
the intuition o f a robust professional debate portrayed as a contradiction graph (see Definition 3.9.6). The 
right side trees are, in fact, debate trees as defined later, but for now they should be viewed as informal 
structures that build motivation for the later formalism.
A slightly different graphical form is used in (Besnard & Hunter, 2001) for the visual presentation of 
argument trees. In contrast to my argument graphs they show less information about the claim and more 
about the support. My view is that these mathematical presentational differences are not fundamental 
as i) they have no impact on the underlying formalisms, ii) that the undercuts’ claims can be inferred 
from the attacked supports and vice versa, iii) that the point a debater is making with an argument is 
of more primary or immediate importance than the set o f assumptions they use to backup their point 
and iv) to help someone appreciate and genuinely understand the parts of a debate I would suggest that 
a considerably more sophisticated and adjustable graphical user interface (GUI) is required - see for 
example the illustrations in the book Visualizing Argumentation by (Kirschner et al., 2003).
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6.3 Argument Trees are Incomplete
The first o f these properties o f argument trees is that they are incomplete. I use the term incomplete to 
mean that necessary arguments are missing. An argument tree is incomplete if the A  is such that one of 
the four following situations occurs.
6.3.1 Type A Incomplete - Non-root Rebuttals Excluded
Argument trees, by definition, exclude all rebuttals below the root, and hence exclude all direct rebuttals 
below the root. I hold a contrary position, that direct rebuttals are a legitimate and necessary part of 
professional debate. The following example highlights this difference of approach.
Exam ple 6 3 .1 . Type A Incom plete. This example illustrates Type A  Incompleteness by providing a 
graphical representation o f  the earlier Example 4.8.1 o f  a direct argument rebuttal, see Figure 6.2.
I:oc 0 <{/},0):<*
m
J : —1(7r  A  (7r  -»• a))  ( { J } ,  { L } ) : A  (n —► a))
Incomplete Argument Structure Complete Professional Debate
Figure 6.2: Type A Incomplete - Non-root Rebuttals Excluded
The direct argument rebuttal L : rr A  (tt —> a )  would be part o f a complete professional debate but 
would be excluded from an argument tree. Here the argument tree has fewer arguments than I deem is 
necessary.
The argument o f (Besnard & Hunter, 2001) is that their exclusion of rebuttals from argument trees 
is legitimate because these absent rebuttals are represented by their reflected canonical undercuts. My 
counter-argument to that defence is that the resultant Type B Incompleteness (and the inordinate be­
haviours discussed in the next section) bring more disadvantages than advantages.
63.2 Type B Incomplete - Reduced Reflections from Excluded Direct Rebuttals
Reflected canonical undercuts arising from direct rebuttals are not good representatives of those rebuttals 
due to changes in the scaling factor o f the reflection. Type B Incompleteness arises when there is a 
reduced reflection o f reflected canonical undercuts, reflected off two or more direct argument rebuttals. 
In this situation the debate tracking, as recorded in an argument tree, has fewer arguments than I deem 
necessary.
To illustrate Type B Incompleteness I revisit Example 5.7.1. Even though it uses preclusive notation 
it is still about mono-target attacks and hence about canonical undercuts. The use of confirmation and 
preclusion notations makes it easier to describe and see the incomplete behaviour.
Exam ple 63 .2 . Type B Incom plete. Let A  =  { a : / ? ,  b :0  —* a , c : i , d : ' y  —> -•/?, e: ->' yAn/ \XAoA0,  f :  
7r -► (0 —> a ) , g : \  (0  -► a) ,  h : a  -► (0  - »  a ) } .  Let  I  = { a ,  6 } , J  = { c , d } , K  = { e , / } , L  =
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{e, g }, M  = {e, /i}, N  =  {e}. So I : a , J : -./? V -.(/? a ) , J : -.(/? A (/5 -> a )) , X : 0  A (0  -»  a ) , L :
0  A ( 0  —> a) ,  M  : 0  A (0  —► a ) , AT: -1 7  V -> (7  —> -> 0 ) ,N : 1 ( 7  A -> (7  —> ->/?)) €  arguments(A). 77ie 
roof 0/  f/jz's argument tree fo r  a  is I : a . The root has one child which is a direct canonical undercut, 
namely J  : ->(0 A (0  —* a ) )  G directCanonicalUndercuts(7 : a , 0, A). 77h's direct canonical undercut 
has three direct argument rebuttals, i.e. K  : 0  A (0  —> a ) , L  : 0  A (0  —> a ) , M  : 0  A (0  —> a ) G 
directArgumentRebuttals( J  : ->(/? A (0  —> a )) , I : a , A ). 77ie.se f/iree direct rebuttals are not part o f  
the argument tree, but they would be part o f  a professional debate. I f  it is the case that these direct 
argument rebuttals can be represented by their reflected canonical undercuts, then that turns out to be 
ju st N : - 1 ( 7  A - 1(7 —► -i/3)) e  reflectedCanonicalUndercuts( J : ->(0 A ->(0 —► a )) , K : 0  A (0  —► a ), A). 
I f  the representation was 1:1 there should be three reflected canonical undercuts, but in fac t there is only 
one fo r  all three reflectors -  because also N  : -> (7  A - 1(7 —► ~>0)) €  reflectedCanonicalUndercuts( J  : 
->(0 A (0  —► a )) , L : 0  A (0  —» a ) , A ) and N : -> (7  A -< (7  —> ->0 )) G reflectedCanonicalUndercuts( J : 
-i(0  A (0  —> a )) , M :0  A (0  —► a ) ,  A). This reduced  reflection occurs as N  £  M ,N  £  L ,N  £  K . So 
the only child o f  J : -«(0 A (0  —> a ) )  in the argument tree is N : -> (7  A -> (7  —> ~'0)). Thus, as shown in 
Figure 6.3, this argument tree fo r  a , quantitatively has two arguments missing, relative to professional 
debate, and is thus an incomplete tree.
I . a
J : ^ { 0  A (/? —> a ) )
N : ~ 1(7 A ( 7  —► ~'0))
Incomplete Argument Tree Complete Professional Debate
Figure 6.3: Type B Incomplete - Reduced Reflections from Excluded Direct Rebuttals
A counter argument to my position is that reflections with support shortening are good as they are a 
more economical or more conservative way of expressing the same information. This counter argument 
is present in (Besnard & Hunter, 2001) via the definition of a ‘more conservative’ argument meaning 
one having a subset of the support and inferring the same conclusion as another argument. To match 
ordinary English, I would suggest the (Besnard & Hunter, 2001) definition of more conservative would 
be better phrased as ‘as conservative as or more conservative than’. Thus by being reflected does not 
automatically make an argument more conservative. In practice, and as can be seen from the examples 
of this thesis, it is much more common place that the support of the reflection is equal to the full support 
of the reflector, so reflections are rarely ‘more conservative’ than their reflectors. In any case, I would 
argue that the relative benefit of a slightly shorter support is out weighed by the effect reflection has on
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the outcome of judgem ent (be that existential or quantitative). This favouring an economy of support 
as more important than other considerations is a key rationale for defending argument trees against a 
variety of the criticisms made in this chapter.
Whilst the above two forms o f incompleteness have nothing to do with the NRC, the next form is 
entirely due to Besnard and Hunter’s choice of NRC.
6 3 3  Type C Incomplete - Premise Reuse Prohibition
In a professional debate it is acceptable to reuse the premises of a previous argument as long as a dif­
ferent claim (or point) is being made. A barrister might be cautioned ‘are you repeating material that 
you covered earlier?’, to which he or she replies ‘no, I am making a new point’. The following example 
illustrates what I would argue is the legitimate reuse of premises, something which is not allowed with 
argument trees. The kind o f premise reuse I focus on here is within a chain of arguments from one spe­
cific leaf to the root; a second kind o f premise reuse called ’divergent arguments’ is discussed in (Walton, 
1989) and refers to reusing a premise from anywhere in the tree. Within argument trees, divergent ar­
guments drawing on premises from other paths are allowed. In debate trees all divergent arguments are 
allowed.
Example 6 3 3 .  Type C Incomplete. Let A  =  {a : (3 A 7 , b : ((3 —► a )  A ( 7  —» ->A), c : 7r, d : tt —> 
->0, e : A, / : A  —> —<7r}. Let I  — { a ,6 } , J  =  { c , d } , K  — { e ,/} .  The arguments, confirmations and 
contradictions are as shown in Figure 6.4. Here the support I  is legitimately reused to make the point 
-i (A A (A —*■ ~"|7r)) as the previous use o f  I  was in support o f  a different claim, i.e. a.
I . a
J : -i(/3 A 7  A (0 —► a)  A ( 7  —> ->X)) ( { J } ,  0): ->(0 A 7  A (0 -* a) A ( 7  —► --A))
U }
K : ->(7T A (7T —► -<0)) ( {K } , 0 ): -i(7r A (7T —* - 10 ))
m
( { / } ,0 ) : - i ( A  A (A -*• —i7r))
Incomplete Argument Tree Complete Professional Debate
Figure 6.4: Type C Incomplete - Premise Reuse Prohibition
In any of these trees, an argument can never reuse the full support of its immediate parent because if 
it did then the support would have to be inconsistent; and hence not would not be a valid argument. My 
analysis shows that in any tree an argument should not be allowed to reuse even a subset of the support
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of its grandparent, with no other premises added, because if it did it would be reflected. Additionally I 
argue that the support o f a grandparent’s grandparent should not be allowed to be reused (even a subset 
thereof) because of reflection. This grandparent’s grandparent constraint can be legitimately applied 
repeatedly all the way up to the root (or child of the root). However, as shown in the example, I hold that 
it is perfectly acceptable in professional debate to reuse the support o f a great grandparent. For longer 
chains each legitimately reusable vertex’s grandparent is also legitimate. While these reuse properties 
could be formally established and do constitute an area for further research, my point is that the (Besnard 
& Hunter, 2001) NRC does not accurately mirror professional debate. My point is made by the above 
Example 6.3.3; these additional observations are only made to reinforce that point.
This completes the identification of types of incompleteness in argument trees, allowing me to now 
move on to types o f inordinateness.
6.4 Argument Trees are Inordinate
The second accuracy issue with argument trees is that they are inordinate. By inordinate I mean that 
unnecessary arguments are present. The word inordinate has a dictionary definition of ‘unusually or 
disproportionately large; excessive’, for example ‘He placed an inordinate amount of butter on his bread’. 
I use the term inordinate to mean specifically that the tree contains more arguments than necessary to 
track the debate and hence contains unwanted redundancy.
6.4.1 Type A Inordinate - Root Reflected Canonical Undercuts
A reflected canonical undercut which is an immediate child of the root, reflected off other contradicting 
roots within the argument structure, see Example 6.4.1 is Type A Inordinate. The argument is counted 
once as a rebuttal o f the root (existing as the root o f another tree in the argument structure) and counted 
a second time as a reflected canonical undercut.
Example 6.4.1. Type A Inordinate. Let A  =  { a : 0 ,  b : 0  —> a , c : ' y , d : y  —> ->a}. Let I  =  { o ,6 }, J  =  
{c,d}.  Consequently I  : a , J  : -> a,J  : ->((3 A (0  —► a ) ) ,  /  : -> (7  A ( 7  —» ->a)) € arguments(A). 
The root o f  the tree fo r  a  is I  : a . Likewise the tree fo r  ->a has a root o f  J  : ->a. It follows that 
J  : ->(0 A (0  —> a ))  €  reflectedCanonicalUndercuts(7 : a , J  : ->a,A) and I : -> (7  A ( 7  —► ->a)) G 
reflectedCanonicalUndercuts(J : ->a, I : a , A ). A s these two immediate children o f  the roots are utterly 
predictable arguments these are inordinate trees. See Figure 6.5.
I  :a  J ' .—'Ot ({-^}> { ^ } ) :a
Ordinate Professional Debate 
Root Reflected Canonical Undercuts
J : ->(/? A (0  —♦ a )  I  : -> (7  A ( 7  —» -* * )  
Inordinate Argument Trees
Figure 6.5: Type A Inordinate -
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Any argument structure (V,  C) with a non-empty V  and a non-empty C will contain reflected canon­
ical undercuts. Here I refer back to my Definition 6.2.2 of Argument Structure, which is adapted from 
(Besnard & Hunter, 2001).
Proposition 6.4.1. Let  {P,C)  be an argument structure, with nodes u , v , w  where f ( u ) , f ( v ) , f ( w )  6  
arguments(A) where A  is a knowledgebase o f  labelled assumption formulae.
I f V  ^  0 and C ^  0
then there exists w  child o f  u
such that f ( w )  6  reflectedCanonicalUndercuts(/(u), f ( v ) ,  A ), 
where u  is root o f  a tree in V  and v  is m ot o f  a tree in C.
P m o f  Let the root o f an argument tree in V  be I : a  = f ( v ) ,  likewise for C let J : ->a =  f ( u ) ,  where 
/ :  a , J : -ia  €  arguments(A) and A  is a knowledgebase of labelled assumption formulae. Consequently 
there exists K:<f> e  reflectedCanonicalUndercuts( J : a,  J : ->a, A ). It follows that K : </> =  f ( w )  always 
exists as I:ct ,  J : —>oc €  arguments(A) and I :a  e  attacks( J : ->a, A ). □
By symmetry, swapping around v  and u, it can be seen that just as their exists x  child of v, so also 
there will also exist y  child o f u  such that f ( y )  e  reflectedCanonicalUndercuts(/(u), f ( v ) ,  A ).
Another form of redundancy in an argument tree is from an expanded reflection of canonical un­
dercuts off one or more off-tree direct argument rebuttals. By ‘off-tree’ I am referring to arguments 
which are in arguments( A ) but not in the vertices of argumentTree(7: a , A ) or debateTree(a, A ) (see 
Definition 6.7.7), depending upon context. Such ‘off-tree’ arguments are not part of the tree due to some 
part o f the tree definition: they may be excluded by the NRC, or excluded as they are reflected, or simply 
because the definition does not deem them to be part o f the debate. Such off-tree arguments can still have 
an influence on a debate, notably where they act as reflectors, relaying the effects to on-tree arguments 
across the tree. Expanded reflections of canonical undercuts off rebuttals may occur from a mixture of 
mono-pair and multi-pair enlargement, so I describe this as two mechanisms.
6.4.2 Type B Inordinate - Mono-Pair Enlarged Canonical Reflection
An enlarged reflection of canonical undercuts from an off-tree direct argument rebuttal, caused by a 
mono-pair enlarged reflection, see Example 4.6.2, is Type B Inordinate. The number of reflected canoni­
cal undercuts is greater than the number of off-tree rebuttals, hence each off-tree rebuttal is counted more 
than once. The following example illustrates Type B Inordinate behaviour by providing a graphical rep­
resentation of a mono-pair enlarged reflection. The following example in focussing on the mono-pair 
enlargement does not diagram every argument in the trees.
Exam ple 6.4.2. Type B Inord inate . Let A  =  {a : (3, h : (3 —► a ,  c : 7r, d : n  —► --a , e : cr, /  : a  —> 
-</?,<? : 0  A —>cr, h : ( 0  —* a)  A ->o}. Let I  =  {a, 6 }, J  =  { c , d } , K  = { e , /} ,L  =  {g, h} , M  =  
{p}, N  =  {h}. Therefore I : a , J  : ->a, K  : ->0, K  : ->(0 A  (0  —► a ) ) ,  L  : 0  A (0  —» a ) ,  M : ->(cr A 
(a  —> -i0 )), N  : -i(<t A (cr —* ->0)) €  argum ents(A ). It follows that {M , N }  : ->(o A (o  —> -i0 )) e  
monoPairEnlargedReflection(J : -<(0 A (0  —► a ) ) ,L  : 0  A  (0  —► a ) ,  A). It might be thought that
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L  : ->(cr A  (cr —► ->0)) e  reflectedCanonicalUndercuts(if : ->(0 A  (0  —> a ) ,  L  : 0  A (0  —► a ) ,  A), but 
that is not the case as L : ->(cr A  (c r —> ->0)) is not even an argument as its not minimal. Also note that 
L : 0  A  (0  —> a ) is not part o f  the argument tree fo r  a  and hence is ‘off-tree ’. See Figure 6 .6 .
I . a  J  :->a
m
K : - ( / ?  A  (D a))  ( { K } , {L} ) : - ( 0  A  (0  -  a ) )
A
M  A ( o —>-i0))  N  :->(& A ( a —> ~>0))
Inordinate Argument Trees Ordinate Professional Debate
Figure 6 .6 : Type B Inordinate - M ono-Pair Enlarged Canonical Reflection
In professional debate neither o f the reflected undercuts, M : —«(cr A  (o  —* ->0)) and TV: ->(<r A (cr —» 
->0)) would be allowed, but the direct rebuttal L : 0  A (0  —* a )  would be. Mono-pair enlarged canonical 
undercut reflection is thus one o f the several mechanisms that leads argument trees to contain superfluous 
arguments. It also endorses rejection of the notion that ‘reflection is good because it leads to fewer 
arguments and is therefore more efficient or conservative’ as in Type B Incompleteness; rejection because 
reflection can just as easily give rise to more arguments than less.
6.4.3 Type C Inordinate - Multi-Pair Enlarged Canonical Reflection
An enlarged reflection of canonical undercuts from off-tree direct argument rebuttals, caused by a multi- 
pair enlarged reflection, see Example 5.7.4, is Type C Inordinate. Again, the number of reflected canoni­
cal undercuts is greater than the number of off-tree rebuttals, leading again to over counting of the effect 
of the off-tree rebuttals.
Example 6.43. Type C inordinate. Let A =  { a : 0 , b : 0  —► a ,  c : 7r, d : 7r —► —«/3, e : 0 , f : 0  -> a ,  g : 
A, h : A —> ->0, i : 0  —► a } . Also let I  = { a , b } , K  =  {c, d},  L  = {e , / } ,  M  — {(?, /i}, TV =  {e, *}. 
Therefore I  : a , K  : ->(0 A (0  —> a ) ) ,  M  : -<(0 A (0  —> a) ) ,  L  : 0  A (0  —► a ) ,  N  : 0  A (0  —> a ) , L  : 
-»(A A (A —► -</?)), TV :->(A A  (A —► ~>0)), L  : ->(n A (n  —► ->0)), TV:->(7t A  (n —> ->0)) €  arguments(A). 
The arguments L : 0  A (0  —+ a )  and L : 0  A (0  —> a )  are direct rebuttals; fo r  an argument tree they are 
‘o ff tree ’. See Figure 6 .7.
6.4.4 Type D Inordinate - Reflected Confirming Argument
Another form of redundancy is when an exact reflected confirming argument and a reflected canonical 
undercut both attempt to stand for a single direct argument rebuttal off-tree reflector. The reflected 
confirming argument can be viewed as a reflection flowing up the tree (i.e. the reflection is nearer to the
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I . a
/ \ m
K : ^ ( p  A ( 0 ^ a ) )  M :->(/? A (0 a ) )  { L , N } )  -.^(0 A (0  -  a ) )
/ \
A (7r —> ~>/J)) N  7T A (7T —> - 1/?))
L : - .( A A (A -*  -./?)) AT: -(A  A (A -» -/? )) 
Inordinate Argument Tree Ordinate Professional Debate
Figure 6.7: Type C Inordinate - M ulti-Pair Enlarged Canonical Reflection
root than the reflector), whilst the reflected canonical undercut is a reflection flowing down the tree (i.e. 
the reflection is further from the root than the reflector).
This taxonomy o f kinds of incomplete and inordinate behaviour is somewhat arbitrary as if increas­
ingly subtle distinctions were made further kinds o f undesirable behaviour could be delineated. For 
example, an enlarged reflected confirming argument where there is no reflected canonical undercut from 
the direct argument rebuttal due to the NRC would be another kind of inordinate behaviour. Many re­
flected confirming arguments would be attempting to stand for a single off-tree direct argument rebuttal.
Argument trees are inchoate (as defined below), are sensitive to the way the knowledgebase is written 
and are asymmetrical.
6.5.1 Argument Trees are Inchoate
The third undesirable property of argument trees is that they are inchoate. I define inchoate as meaning 
that those arguments present in the tree do not accurately represent those arguments missing from the 
tree.
Just suppose that all reflections were exact reflections and thus that the counting of reflected argu­
ments would accurately stand for the counting of direct arguments. Or imagine that some corrective lens 
could be constructed so that enlarged and reduced reflected arguments were again transformed back into 
an exact mirror of the originals -  at least to satisfy the purposes of existence and counting. In either of 
these situations, judging of debates would still be arbitrary -  because the reflected arguments can behave 
differently from their reflectors. This I call inchoate behaviour.
The dictionary definition of inchoate means ‘not fully formed or developed’ and the term definitely 
does not extend to mean chaotic, confused or incoherent. I use the term to clarify the situation where an 
argument A is proposed as a proxy, representative or substitute for an argument B. However B can only
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proxy for A if B is a fully formed, fully developed version of A. If  A does not behave in the same way 
as B then A is an inchoate form o f B and thus not a robust proxy for B.
I now give an example to show reflected arguments that behave differently from their reflectors. 
Here a reflected canonical undercut behaves differently from the off-tree direct argument rebuttal it was 
reflected off. The terms ‘reinstated’ and ‘undefeated’ are used here informally; the latter part of this 
example is revisited more formally in Section 7.4.
Exam ple 6.5.1. Inchoate. Let  A  =  {a:  /3,b: /3 —► a,  c : 7 ,  d : 7  —► ->/?, e : (3 A 7r A ->7, / :  it —> ((3 —> 
V  ->7r V  7  V  -i(7r - * ( 0 - *  a ) ) } .  Let I  =  { 0 , 6 } ,  J  =  { c ,  d } , K  = { e , / } , L  =  { e } , M  =  {g}. 
Therefore I : a , J:~>(0 A (0  —* a ) ) ,  K : 0  A (0  —> a ) , L : - > ( 7  A ( 7  —» ->0)) ,M:-^(0  A 7r A ->7 A (7r —> 
(/3 —*• a ) ) )  € arguments(A). Consequently J  . ^ ( 0 A ( 0  —► a ) )  €  directCanonicalUndercuts(J:a ,  0, A ) 
and K  : 0  A (0  —> a) e  directArgumentRebuttals(J : ->(/? A (0  —► a ) ) ,  /  : a ,  A). Furthermore 
L  : - 1 ( 7  A ( 7  —» ->/?)) e  reflectedCanonicalUndercuts(J : -i(/3 A (0 —* c t ) ) ,K  : 0  A (0  —► a ) ,  A). 
Additionally M : -y{0 A  n  A  A  (n  —> ( 0  —> a ) ) )  €  directCanonicalUndercuts(K : 0  A  (0  —> a) ,  J : 
-i(/5 A (0  —> a ) ) ,  A ). However canonical Undercuts(L: -< (7  A ( 7  —> ->/?)), A ) =  0. So fo r  the argument 
tree the attack chain is L : - 1 (7  A ( 7  —► ->0)) attacks J : ~>(0 A  (0  —> a ) )  attacks I :a . 77ie chain contains 
three arguments. The attack on I  : a  is direct, the other reflected. For the professional debate, the chain 
is M : -i(0  A 7r A -> 7  A (7r —+ (0  —> a ) ) )  attacks K : 0  A  (0  —* a )  attacks J : ->(0 A  (0  —» a ) )  attacks 
I : a . Thus this chain contains fo u r  arguments and all attacks are direct. The attack o f K : 0  A  (0  —* a)  
on J : ~>(0 A (0  —► a ))  in the debate tree is a direct rebuttal, whereas all the other attacks fo r  both trees 
in this example are canonical undercuts. Imagine a simple judge function that takes i) the existence o f  an 
attack to mean that the attacked argument is defeated and ii) an attack on an attack as reinstatement and 
thus not defeat (i.e. concordant with the intuition o f  (Dung, 1995). So in the argument tree I : a  is not 
defeated, whereas in the professional debate I  : a  is defeated - exactly the opposite outcome. Therefore 
argument trees are inchoate, in that they do not behave as intuitively expected. See Figure 6 .8 .
I . a  ( { /} ,0 ) :a
m
J : ~'{0 A (/? —► a ))  ({J } , {K }): - ( 0  A (0  -> a ) )
{ K }
L : - - ( 7  A ( 7  —» ->/?)) ( { ^ } >  0 ) : A  7r A - 1 7  A ( 7r —> ( 0  —* a ) ) )
Inchoate Argument Tree Choate Professional Debate
Figure 6.8: Inchoate - Present Arguments Do Not Represent Absent Ones
This example, in particular its idea of a simple judge function, is revisited and formalised in Chap­
ter 8 in Examples 7.5.1 and 7.5.2.
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I now give a proposition that examines the notion that further down the tree one could conjecture 
the existence of reflected canonical undercuts where the reflector is the grandparent canonical undercut. 
However such a conjecture does not hold as the NRC o f Definition 6.2.1 rules them out.
Proposition 6.5.1. Let A  be a knowledgebase o f  labelled assumption formulae, let 
argumentTree(7: a ,  A )  =  (V, £ , / ,  argum ents(A )) be an argument tree and let u, v  €  V.
I f  f ( u )  €  canonicalUndercuts(/(v)) and (v ,u)  e  £
then re flec tedC anonicalllndercu ts(/(u),/(u ), A ) =  0.
Proof The NRC used in the argument tree definition clause 2. is ‘For no node (<3>, 0) with ancestor nodes 
($i» 0 \ ) ,  • • •, Pn) is $  a subset o f U . . .  U $ n ’. Now suppose reflectedCanonicalUndercuts(A': 
<f>, L  : 7 , A ) ^  0. However, for such a M : ip e  reflectedCanonicalUndercuts(.ftT :(f>,L: 7 , A ) it would 
have to be the case that M  C  L a s  that is a requirement for reflection. Having M  C  L  is the same 
as having a node with label M having an ancestor with label L, which is forbidden by the NRC. So the 
supposition is false and thus if K : <f> e  canonicalUndercuts(L: 7 ) e  £ , f ( u )  = K:<i>, f ( v )  =  L : 7  and 
(uy v)  e  £  then it is always the case that reflectedCanonicalUndercuts(A': L : 7 , A ) =  0. □
So the form of NRC in the definition o f argument tree does not just prevent repetition of arguments it 
also rules out reflected canonical undercuts that have a canonical undercut as their reflector. What it does 
not rule out is reflected canonical undercuts having a rebuttal as their reflector, i.e. Type A Inordinance. 
As there are no rebuttals in the tree below the root then the only direct argument rebuttals in the tree are 
at the root.
6.5.2 Sensitivity To The Way the Knowledgebase is Written
The fourth undesirable behaviour of argument trees, beyond incomplete, inordinate and inchoate, is that 
they are sensitive to the way that the knowledgebase is written. This sensitivity that argument trees have 
to the way that the knowledgebase is written down means that two logically equivalent knowledgebases 
tracked as argument trees can give entirely different results. For example { a : a  A 0 }  C  A, will give a 
different debate outcome from the logically equivalent { a :a ,  b:0}  C  A.
Consider the situation where two police clerks take the same verbal statement from a witness. One 
clerk encodes the statement as A  =  {a : a ,  b : 0,  c : 7 , . ..}  whereas the second uses Al to write the 
logically equivalent A  =  { a : a A / ? A 7 A . . . } .  In the second case the witness would not be allowed 
to defend themselves against any attack as the argument tree NRC would prohibit it. In a professional 
debate, however, assumptions can be reused as long as a new claim is being made. So an argument tree 
can result in arbitrary judgements because it is sensitive to the way the knowledgebase is written down.
In defence of argument trees here, it should be pointed out that all mincon systems display syntax 
sensitivity - as this class of behaviour is commonly called. The framework of this thesis too is not 
immune from the effects o f syntax sensitivity, so the open question, meriting further research, is the 
matter o f degree.
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6.5J Pro and Con Reflections Do Not Cancel
The final point is not an undesirable behaviour, but rather the analysis of a possible (but incorrect) 
intuition about reflection in these trees. It might be thought that even though reflections exist in argument 
structures that the reflections would be symmetrical and thus that those for a  balance out and cancel those 
for -iQ; giving no net effect. The analysis o f Section 4.6.1, however, shows that while reflection has a 
symmetry of existence it does not have a symmetry of cardinality.
Relating this asymmetry back to the current theme of analysis, I now draw Example 4.6.3, see below 
in Figure 6.9, as a pair o f argument trees, also known as an argument structure. Study of the arguments 
derivable from that exam ple’s A  (with | A | =  4) shows that there are no other arguments for /3 or ->(3 and 
hence no other argument trees that belong in this argument structure.
I:(3 J  : - ,0
N : ->(a A (a  —► /3) M : —«(o: A (a  —> (3) K  : A - iq )  A ( 7  —> - 1/?) A ->a)
Figure 6.9: Asymmetry - o f Reflected Cardinality in an Argument Structure
This diagram shows that the reflected canonical undercuts to be found in a pair o f argument trees 
can be asymmetrical. Thus any suggestion that the reflected canonical undercuts cancel each other out 
is not well founded.
That concludes the comparative analysis o f argument trees and professional debate trees. I now 
move on to the formalisation of the debate tracking tree as a form that better meets the criteria (the 
debate, the whole debate and nothing but the debate) outlined so far.
6.6 Rationale for Matt Opaque Contradiction Trees
I use the term ‘m att’ tree or graph to mean one devoid of Type I and II Reflection and ‘opaque’ to 
mean free of Type HI and IV Reflection. The structures I have mentioned so far, notably including 
defeat graphs (Section 6.2), defeasible trees (Section 6.2), argument trees (Section 6.2.1) and argument 
structures (Section 6.2.1), would appear to not be matt or opaque. The goal of this chapter is to define 
robustly a debate tracking tree that is both matt and opaque (see Section 6.7). The word ‘graphs’ would 
have been more general in the title o f this chapter, with the understanding that trees are a kind of graph, 
however to prevent the infinite cycles that can arise in graph traversal I will focus exclusively on trees 
from here on, as does the bulk of the literature.
I start by summarising the key points o f my critique of the argument trees and argument structures 
approach, which may be extended to critique other argument aggregation trees in the literature, notably 
(Pollock, 1992; Simari et al., 1994; Prakken & Sartor, 1997; Amgoud & Cayrol, 2002; Garcia & 
Simari, 2004; Dung et al., 2006). This informal analysis, running through the rest of this section, moves 
from critiquing the literature to the introduction of a new tree.
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I have presented examples and discussion showing that argument trees contain reflections (see Ex­
amples 6.4.1, 6.4.2 and 6.4.3) and thus that they are not matt opaque trees. The reflections can thus give 
rise to ‘double counting’ in the argument-aggregation functions of (Besnard & Hunter, 2001) (which 
they call categoriser and accumulator functions). This double, or even multiple counting, will be of 
an argument and its reflections. My examples also show that even though their NRC removes some 
reflections it by no means removes all.
My analysis shows that the argument tree NRC attempts to do two jobs, namely to prevent cycles 
(so as to make the tree finite) and to prevent reflection. I would argue that it over achieves at the first 
job and underachieves at the second, suggesting that using a single tool to do two jobs here yields sub- 
optimal results on both. Consequently I define, shortly, a separate (and different) NRC, which is not 
burdened with the job  o f removing any reflections and is thus a) more akin to professional debate and 
b) able to make the tree finite. The NRC of (Besnard & Hunter, 2001) introduces somewhat puzzling 
behaviour (see my Example 6.3.3), however none o f these NRCs has a strong theoretical basis so from 
that perspective they are equally valid. The (Besnard & Hunter, 2001) NRC is fully effective at removing 
grandparent reflections. Reflections from rebuttals coming from the roots of other trees, however, are 
not removed by the NRC.
Base Proposition Four, also called the grandparent relationship, shows that in a tree of arguments 
reflections can occur from any node to the level o f its grandchildren. Prior to Base Proposition Four, 
with only Base Propositions One and Two at hand one might have conjectured that all reflections were 
off-tree rebuttals and thus somehow not necessary to include in the debate. Base Proposition Four shows 
such a conjecture to be less than the full story as these off-tree rebuttals cause reflections back into 
the main body of the tree, regardless whether the off-tree rebuttals are formally part of the tree or not. 
The immediate children of the root o f an argument tree or will also be subject to Base Proposition One 
reflections.
Reflections can be enlarged, reduced or distorted. Any attempt to rationalise the counting of re­
flected arguments with scaling factors is problematic as the number of reflections can be a smaller or 
larger number than the original. Even for one confirmation, parts o f it can be enlarged and parts reduced 
creating distorted reflections, ensuring that scaling-based approaches to judgement would be complex 
and problematic. I am not claiming that such scaling-based approaches are impossible, but rather that 
any such definition would be long, inelegant and hard to understand by professional debaters.
Argument tree edges are a mix of direct and reflected canonical undercuts. The reflected ones are 
repetitions of other attacks in the tree. Therefore it is sensible to exclude all reflected canonical undercuts 
from any such tree. The remaining edges would thus all be direct canonical undercuts.
My use of a different undercut definition is, I argue, helpful. I hold that (Besnard & Hunter, 2001 )’s 
canonical undercuts do not tell the full story of human debating, however they do provide a robust under­
cutting mechanism that has the advantage of being simpler than mine while still covering the majority of 
cases in professional debate.
Argument trees exclude direct argument rebuttals - apart from at the root. Direct rebuttals exist
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and do not arise from reflection. In evaluating or judging a debate, direct rebuttals have or should 
have a definite effect on the outcome. They should be included. The reasoning underpinning (Besnard 
& Hunter, 2001) would appear to be that they do address argument rebuttals by means of reflection. 
However if one accepts the earlier point about distorted reflections rendering reflection-unaware judging 
schemes impractical, then this suggestion o f leveraging Type I Reflections to represent rebuttals is also 
likely to be impractical.
Direct argument rebuttals are also reflectors for Type HI and IV Reflections. These reflections are 
subject to distortion, rendering them too as unhelpful to represent rebuttals. If no distortion was present 
Type HI and IV Reflections could have been sound representatives of the direct rebuttals; however that 
is not the case. If  distortion was absent direct rebuttals might be assesed indirectly by looking at the 
arguments that reflect off them. Both Type I and II Reflections are not limited to exact reflections and 
thus proscribe indirect counting or assessment.
Therefore I conclude that it is necessary to include all direct argument rebuttals in the tree. Con­
sequently, to build on the discussion of Section 3.9, it is clear that the most practical attack assumption 
is the union of direct rebuttal and direct undercut. This inclusion of direct rebuttal is necessary to make 
counting-based judges viable and, it would appear, to prevent all judges from giving incorrect answers. 
Even existential judges, which do not use integers to count arguments, are sensitive to the existence of 
arguments involved in attacks and thus sensitive to reflection. Note that although the edges of the trees 
of (Pollock, 1992; Prakken & Sartor, 1997; Garcia & Simari, 2004) encompass both rebuttal and un­
dercut they also include both direct and reflected arguments making them somewhat different from my 
proposal.
There are two ways that this inclusion of direct argument rebuttals could be achieved, one enhancing 
the vertex definition, the other enhancing the edges. If  vertex enhancement is adopted then the tree 
nodes need to be contradictions. Such an approach is arguably more compact and succinct, yielding 
a simpler notation. It could be argued, however, that vertex enhancement is making an excessive or 
perhaps artificial distinction between rebuttal and undercut. If  the vertices are contradictions then the 
edges would need to be direct undercuts.
If  edge enhancement is used then the edges would be direct attacks, where a direct attack is defined 
as either a direct argument rebuttal or a direct canonical undercut. Edge enhancement has appeal as it 
is closer to an intuitive view o f attack. This approach has a weaknesses in that when the edges include 
preclusive undercuts then what the edge labels for the rebuttal arcs should be becomes unclear. One 
could just use blank for rebuttal edge labels, but even that is unintuitive. It could also be argued that 
there is a weakness in that the two nodes and one edge representing two confirmations and their direct 
rebuttals between the confirmations could be more succinctly represented by the functionally equivalent 
and more compact notation of the contradiction - o f Definition 2.6.1.
A point that applies to either approach is that any judge function traversing any of these refined 
trees would have to know the difference between undercut and rebuttal because multi-target preclusions 
need counting in a different way from mono-target preclusions. In either case there is no need for
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argument structures, or any kind of pairing of trees or forests (i.e. one or more for a  plus one or more 
for ->a). A tree including rebuttal (using either the edge or vertex approach) would be just a single tree 
for the entire debate, which is a strong advantage for visualisation, comprehension and simplicity of 
judgement. Regarding the edges in an edge enhanced tree, these direct attacks could arise from undercut 
or rebuttal. The undercuts are preclusive undercuts and similarly the rebuttals are confirmation rebuttals. 
Thus the attacks are direct confirmation attacks. Direct confirmation attack removes all Type I and Type 
jQ Reflections. It does not however remove any Type HI Reflections - which require a different approach 
for their removal. In either case (vertex or edge enhancement) it is necessary to exclude Type HI and 
IV Reflections (that is the up tree reflections coming off direct rebuttals and appearing as confirming 
arguments).
Given this motivation it is now possible to progress to a robust definition of a reflection-free tree 
where direct rebuttals are included at every level o f the debate (not just the root) thus adopting the vertex 
enhanced approach.
6.7 Definition of Debate Trees
I select the approach of vertex-enhanced trees as superior to edge-enhanced trees for tracking debates, 
based on the rationale of the last section. Thus I leave edge-enhanced trees as an area for further research. 
My vertex-enhanced trees have each vertex map to a contradiction. Thus some of the attacks are intra- 
node, whilst others are inter-node. The intra-node attacks are rebuttals, while the inter-node attacks are 
undercuts.
Six helper functions are required to succinctly define the debate tree. These retrace the steps of the 
last three chapters, but manipulate contradictions instead of confirmations and build on Definition 6.7.1 
of preclusive undercut between contradictions. Just as the analysis of reflection and undercut moved 
from the level o f individual arguments to confirmations, it is necessary now, for the sake of complete and 
ordinate debate tracking, to move on again to the level o f contradictions. The six helper functions that 
lead to the debate tree, Definition 6.7.7, are:
1. the preclusive undercuts between a pair o f contradictions, Definition 6.7.1,
2. the matt function that removes or prunes out Type I and Type II Reflections, Definition 6.7.2,
3. the opaque function that prunes out Type III and IV Reflections, Definition 6.7.3,
4. a defending path function that aids in identifying the ancestors of a vertex, Definition 6.7.4,
5. an ancestors function required to support the definition of the NRC of the debate tree, Defini­
tion 6.7.5 and finally
6. an ancestor arguments function which provides the set of all of the arguments in the ancestor 
vertices, Definition 6.7.6.
The naming of the opaque and matt functions continues the optical metaphor used so far with 
reflection. For an arbitrary vertex, v, in a tree, Type I and H Reflections allow one to partially observe
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vertices nearer to the root than v. The analogy here is that if v  was painted with matt paint then it would 
not give rise to such reflections. The situation in an argument tree thus is akin to gloss paint which gives 
rise to reflections of things above the painted layer, closer to the observer. Type III and IV Reflections 
allow one to see something of vertices further from the root -  consequently if v  was painted with opaque 
paint it would not allow one to see through to the descendants of v. For argument trees the situation is 
thus akin to transparent paint where things below the painted layer, further from the observer, become 
visible. Thus to avoid redundancy in the tracked debate the paint to use in this metaphor is opaque matt 
paint.
The first helper function I now define is a variation of the original preclusive undercuts function, 
which was Definition 3.4.2, this time between contradictions rather than between confirmations.
Definition 6.7.1. Let A  be a knowledgebase o f  labelled assumption formulae, let (V, W ) : <p, (X, Y ) : 
a  6  4(A) and let Z G C. The set o /preclusive undercuts between contradictions attacking (X, Y ) : a  
derivable from  A, denoted  preclusivellndercutsBetweenContradictions((X, Y) :a , A) is such that:
preclusiveUndercutsBetweenContradictions((X, Y) :a , A )
=  { ( ( V ,W ) :0 ,  Z, ( X ,Y ) :q  ) |
I f  Z C  X t h e n  (V:<p, Z, X :a )  G preclusivellndercuts(X:a, A ),
else (V :</>, Z, Y :->a) G preclusiveUndercuts(Y: ->a, A ), 
and  W : -><p =  top(confirmationRebuttals(V: 0, A ))} .
For a preclusive undercut between two contradictions, which is o f the form of a 3-tuple ( (V, W ) : 
(p, Z, (X, Y ) : a  ), I call (V, W ) : <p the attacking contradiction, I call V : <p the attacking confirmation, 
I call Z the target confirmation label and I call (X, Y ) : a  the defending contradiction. If Z C  X then 
I call X : a  the defending confirmation, else Z C  Y  and I call Y  : a  the defending confirmation.
I call the contradiction (V, W ) : <p a preclusive undercut of a contradiction (X, Y) : a  iff ((V , W) : 
<p, Z, (X, Y ) : a )  e  preclusivellndercutsBetweenContradictions((X, Y ) :a ,  A ).
This definition is not essentially a new kind of undercut. Rather, it is exactly the same preclusive 
undercut, or process o f attack, from earlier, now with more information on the context of the attacker 
and the attacked.
One feature of the definition o f preclusive undercut between contradiction is that attacks on reflexive 
arguments, Definition 2.4.7, appear twice -  as illustrated in the following example.
Exam ple 6.7.1. Preclusive u n d ercu t betw een contradictions. Let A  =  { a : a ,  b : 7 , c : 7  —> ->a} and 
I  =  {a}, J  =  {b,c}.  Then I : a ,  J  : a  G argum ents(A ) where I : a  is a reflexive argument. Fur­
thermore { /}  : a ,  {J }  : ->a G 0 (A ). Thus ({ /} , {J } ) : oc, ({«/}, { /} ) :  ~,c* € 4(A )- It can be s^en that 
J  : —<a G canonicalUndercuts(7 : a ,  A ) and also J  : ^ a  G rebuttals(7 : a , A). So ({J }  : ->a, {7}, {7} : 
a)  G preclusiveUndercuts({7} : a ,  A ) and also { J }  : ~^a G confirmationRebuttals({7} : a ,  A). 
So now, using Definition 6.7.1, it is clear that ( ({«7},{7}) : ->o;, {7} ,({ 7 } ,{ J} )  : a  ) G 
preclusivellndercutsBetweenContradictions(({7}, { J} ) : a ,  A). The reflexive argument {7} : a  is at­
tacked once by { J } :  ->a visible in the defending contradiction, where the attack is a rebuttal, and again
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by {J }  : ->a in the attacking contradiction where the attack is an undercut. There is also a further  
reflection in this example, not due to reflexivity, where I  : a  appears a second time in the attacking 
contradiction.
This feature of reflexive arguments appearing twice is not a problem as removing reflections re­
moves the second (i.e. if traversing from root to leaf, the undercutting) occurrence. The instance of 
J : - iq  that undercuts I : a  is a reflection of the instance of J : -<a that is rebutted by and rebuts I  : a , so 
J : ->a G reflectedAttacks(J: a , J : ->a, A ).
The following matt function, thus, not only removes reflected arguments, but also double attacks 
arising from reflexivity. Given a child node and the context o f its parent (it will have only one parent, 
being in a tree), it is possible to filter that child node to yield direct arguments only and no Type I or II 
Reflections. The definitions reused here are Definition 5.3.2 for maximal direct preclusive undercuts and 
Definition 5.6.2 for maximal direct confirmation rebuttal.
Definition 6.7.2. Let A  be a knowledgebase o f  labelled assumption formulae and let ( (V, W ) : 
<f>, Z, (X, Y ) : a  ), ( ( T ,U ) : 0 , Z, (X, Y ) : a )  g  preclusiveUndercutsBetweenContradictions((X, Y ) : 
a ,  A). The matt function, denoted  matt( ( (V, W ) : <f>, Z, (X, Y ) : a ), A), given a preclusive undercut 
between two contradictions, removes Type I  and II Reflections from  the attacking contradiction, such 
that:
m att«  (V , W ) :<f>, Z, (X, Y) :<* ), A )
=  {(T , U) :</> G 4 (A )  | 
i f  Z C X
then ( T : Z, X : a )  G maximalDirectPreclusiveUndercuts(X:a, A ),
U : —>(f) =  maximalDirectConfirmationRebuttal(V: 0, X : a ,  A )), 
else (T:<f>, Z, Y :-> a) G maximalDirectPreclusiveUndercuts(Y: - a ,  A )),
U :-></> =  maximalDirectConfirmationRebuttal(V: <f>, Y : ->a, A )}.
Thus the input to the matt function is a single preclusive undercut between contradictions, ( (V, W ) : 
<£, Z, (X, Y ) : a ,  (plus the knowledgebase A ) and the output is a single contradiction (T, U ) : (j>, such 
that T C  V and U C W . If  T  C V then I say V has been p ru n ed  to yield T . Likewise if U C W  then 
I say W  has been p ru n ed  to yield U. This process of pruning removes Type I and Type II Reflections 
from the input (V, W ) : f>, thereby ensuring that all o f the arguments in the output (T, U ) : 4> are direct. I 
say that the members of V \T  and W \U  have been pruned out. If  T  =  V and U =  W  then no pruning is 
needed.
The function is defined to consider a chain of two contradictions, where the attacking contradiction 
is (V, W ) : ((> and the attacked contradiction is (X, Y) : a . The definition does not explicitly state or 
require that these contradictions are in a tree, however visualising them as such can help understanding. 
Thus, the matt function can be viewed as considering an arbitrary vertex (X, Y) : a  in a tree of con­
tradictions, along with one of its children (V, W ) : f>. The input tree contains reflection. The function
6.7. Definition o f  Debate Trees 181
then describes how to remove some of the arguments, i.e. the reflected arguments, from the child vertex 
(V, W ) : </> to yield the equivalent direct child vertex (T , U) : </>. Applying this definition repeatedly, 
in a recursive fashion, prunes out all o f the Type I and II Reflections from a tree containing reflection, 
yielding a matt tree.
The definition has been written with a certain economy of style, whereby although there 
are two defending confirmations X a ,  Y  ->a in (X ,Y ) : a  there is only one tar­
get confirmation label Z. For both of the input attacks, ( (V, W ) : (f>, Z, (X, Y) : a  ) G 
preclusiveUndercutsBetweenContradictions((X, Y ) : a ,  A ) and the output attack ( (T, U ) : <£, Z, (X, Y ) : 
a )  G preclusiveUndercutsBetweenContradictions((X, Y ) : a ,  A ) it is thus always the case that for the 
‘then’ clause, above, Z C X and for the ‘else’ clause, Z C Y.
So far this commentary has focussed on the default case where pruning occurs, however if a reflector 
is empty then some reflections will not occur and will thus be absent. So if the attack is on X, it follows 
that Y  is the reflector; thus if Y  =  0 then if follows that T  =  V and no pruning of V occurs. Likewise 
if the attack is on Y , it follows that X is the reflector; so if X =  0 it follows that U =  W  and no 
pruning of W  occurs. An additional step o f analysis is needed for reflected rebuttals; one might think if 
X were subject to preclusive undercut and X =  0 then there would be no reflected rebuttal arguments 
in W : -></>, however a preclusive undercut cannot attack an empty target and hence this conjectured case 
cannot occur. One might also conjecture that a further way for reflection to be absent is if  no attack 
has occurred, however that too cannot be the case as a prerequisite for this function is a valid preclusive 
undercut. Hence given a non-empty attacked reflector, then T  C  V, U C  W  and pruning is definite. 
Thus summing up these various situations, it is the case that T  C  V and U C  W , i.e. that the matt 
confirmation labels will always be a subset or equal to the confirmation labels that include reflection.
Furthermore, the matt function always returns a unique top, or maximum cardinality contradiction, 
containing only direct arguments. Suppose V =  { J i , . . . ,  Jn }, then each / ,  6  V  is either direct or 
reflected, (here the reflector is fixed as (X, Y ) : a).  Hence the direct subset of V, i.e. T  =  I m } C
V =  { / i , . . . ,  7n } is unique, likewise for U C  W . This maximum cardinality behaviour follows from the 
use of the maximal versions of the direct confirmation rebuttal and direct preclusive undercut functions.
Now that Type I and II Reflections are removed it is necessary to move on to Type HI and IV Re­
flections. The opaque function has an input o f a contradiction. Its output is again a single contradiction, 
but now devoid of Type HI and IV Reflections. I reuse the direct confirmation function, Definition 5.9.4, 
as it removes Type HI and IV Reflections from a confirmation.
Definition 6.7.3. Let A b e  a knowledgebase o f  labelled assumption formulae and let (X, Y ) :q G  ♦ ( A). 
The opaque function, denoted opaque((X , Y ) : a ,  A ), given a contradiction fo r  a, delivers the maximum
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cardinality contradiction fo r a  that is free from reflected confirming confirmations such that:
opaque( (X, Y ) : a ,  A )
=  { ( V ,W ) :a  G 4 (A )  |
V : a  =  top(directConfirmations(X:o!, A )),
W : ->a =  top(directConfirmations(Y: - a ,  A ))}.
The opaque function cannot add arguments to X or Y , in that it only prunes or removes arguments. 
It will always be the case that V  C X, W  C Y which is why I call opaque() a pruning function. If X : a  
is not subject to any preclusive undercuts then V =  X, likewise if Y : -><* is not subject to any preclusive 
undercuts then W  =  Y.
The order in which the matt and opaque functions are applied, in principle, makes no difference, 
as set difference is commutative: A  \  B  \  C  = A \ C  \  B . My specific definitions, however, require 
different input parameters to provide the correct reflectors and thus it is not straightforward to show this 
commutativity as a property.
Finally I come to the last three helper functions needed for the debate tree which are all graph theory 
related:
Definition 6.7.4. Let (V, £ ) be a tree where V is a set o f  vertices and £  a set o f  edges. Let 
v , v i , V 2 ,v n ,v root e  V and (v, t>i), ( v i , v 2), (vn , v r0 ot) €  S. The defending path, denoted  
defendingPath(v, V, £), is the set o f  continuously connected edges from  v to the root vroot such that:
defendingPath(v, V, £ ) = { ( v , v i ) , ( v i , v 2) , . . .  , ( v n , v root)}.
Given this set of edges the next step is to extract the vertices from the edges, giving a set of vertices.
Definition 6.7.5. Let (V, £)  be a tree where V  is a set o f  vertices and £  a set o f  edges. Let 
v, v \ ,  v2, . . . ,  vn , v root £  V. The ancestors function, fo r  a vertex v  €  V in the tree (V, £), is the set 
o f vertices between v  and the root, including the root, denoted  ancestors (i;, V, £) such that:
ancestors(u, V, £ )  =  {u i, v 2, . . . ,  vny vroot | defendingPath(v, V, £)}.
Clearly v \  is the parent o f v. Observe that the vertex v  is not included within its ancestors. While 
the above two definitions could apply to any tree, the next one only applies to trees where the vertices 
are mapped to contradictions.
Definition 6.7.6. Let A  be a knowledgebase o f  labelled assumptions. Let (V ,£ , 6 (A ) , / )  be a tree 
where V is a set o f  vertices, £  is a set o f  edges and f  : V •—* 6 (A ). The ancestor argum ents function, 
denoted ancestorArguments(v, (V ,£ , 6 (A ) , / ) ) ,  provides the set o f  all the arguments present in the 
vertices above v to the root in the tree (V, £ , 6 (A ) , / ) ,  such that:
ancestorArguments(v, (V ,£ , 4 (A ) , / ) )
=  {Jfc :a fc ,. . .  , / £  : a ky J* , J ™ : ^ a k  \
fo r  each Vk 6 a n c e s to rs^ , V, £)  
it is the case that f ( v k ) =  ({ /£ , • • •, /£ } , V l ,  J™})
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The new matt, opaque and preclusive undercut for contradictions definitions, plus the other tree- 
related helper functions, can now be used in defining the debate tree, which is free of all reflections.
Key definitions reused here are: contradiction Definition 2.6.1, my shorthands for contradiction 
Definitions 2.6.2 and 2.6.3, maximum cardinality contradiction Definition 2.6.6, plus the six helper func­
tions just defined.
The assertion /  : V >—> # (A ) establishes that each vertex in the tree is mapped onto a contradiction. 
Thus the arbitrary vertex v  e  V is such that f ( v )  =  (U, V) : ip €  ♦ (A ), where ip is any formula. It 
would be untrue to say that each vertex is a contradiction as the vertices of a tree form a set, any given 
contradiction may appear more than once in a tree and repeated members are not allowed in sets. Thus 
for each vertex v  €  V there exists one and only one contradiction (U, V ) : ip G ♦ (A ). However for each 
contradiction in 4 (A )  there may or may not exist a corresponding vertex or vertices v  G V.
The edges in an edge-labelled tree are three element tuples (u, Z, v),  where u  is the vertex the edge 
is incident from, v  the vertex the edge is incident to and Z the edge label.
Definition 6.7.7. Let A  be a knowledgebase o f  labelled assumption formulae, let (V, W ) :<p, 
( { I i , . . . ,  7n }, {J i , . . . ,  J m }) '• <P €  ♦ (A ) and  Z G C. The debate  tree  fo r  a  derivable from  A, denoted 
debateTree (a , A ) =  (V, £ ,  6 (A ) , / )  where V  is a set o f  vertices, S  is a set o f  labelled edges and 
/ : V ~ * (  A), is an edge-labelled contradiction tree devoid o f  reflection such that:
1. the root v root e V h a s  f ( v root) =  opaq u e(to p (6 (a , A )), A ),
2. fo r  each v  G V \  {vroot }>
fo r  each ((V , W ) :<p, Z, f ( v ) )  €  preclusiveUndercutsBetweenContradictions(/(v), A ), 
where (V, W ):<p =  top(♦(</>, A )), 
i f  there exists { { h , . . . ,  / n }, {J i ,  • . . ,  dm})  -(p such that
opaque(m att(((V , W ) :<p, Z, f ( v ) ) ,  A ), A ) =  ( { I l y . . . ,  /„ } , { J u . . . ,  J m })-(p 
and I \  : a , . . .  , / n : a ,  J \  :->a , . . .  & ancestorArguments(v, (V ,£ , 6 (A ), / ) ) ,
then there exists a child vertex vchUd 6  V o fv  such that 
fiVchild) ~  ( { l i t  • • • i 7n}i {*7l> . . . , «7m}) :(P'
I use the shorthand of ♦ * (a , A ) =  debateTree (a , A ) =  (V, £ , 4 (A ), / )  as an option for shorten­
ing subsequent notation. Each edge is annotated with an additional piece of information that is the target 
confirmation label, however that is not needed to define the tree. So for the labelled tree vchud and v  are 
connected by edge (vchudi Z, v) e  £ . Now the debate tree has been defined it is possible to state which 
earlier examples were in fact debate trees -  they are Examples 6.3.1, 6.3.2, 6.3.3, 6.4.1, 6.4.2, 6.4.3 and
6.5.1 . The Examples 5.7.2, 5.7.3, 5.7.4 and 5.7.5, while showing trees of contradiction vertices with 
preclusion edges are not debate trees as they contain reflection.
The NRC, which is the sixth line of clause 2. above, disallows reusing an argument that appears 
anywhere in the parent contradictions from the vertex in question up to the root. An area for further 
research would be to explore variations on this NRC where only arguments in the targets between the
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vertex and the root are counted towards no-recycling. I would defend the approach taken here as being 
somewhat conservative and robust; it is clearly intolerant o f repeated arguments.
While arguments( A ) can hold many attacks o f many types on a reflexive arguments, the debate tree 
only holds one type o f attack because the undercutting arguments are pruned out as a reflection of each 
rebutting argument.
This tree tracks the debate on the level o f contradictions, thereby ensuring that direct rebuttals are 
included in the tracking. The tree can be understood on two levels: that of contradiction and that of 
confirmation. On the level o f contradiction, the central feature is that (V, W ) : (p undercuts (X, Y ) : ip. 
On the level of confirmation there are two possible undercuts: V : <p undercuts either the defending 
confirmation X : ip with a target confirmation o f Z : t/;; or the defending confirmation Y : ->ip with target 
confirmation of Z : -rip. The definition of preclusive undercut ensures Z C X or Z C Y.
Reflections can arise off any argument, be that argument a direct argument or a reflected argument. 
Thus a reflector may itself be direct or reflected and that distinction makes no difference to its ability to 
act as a reflector. Thus to make sure that the direct argument is devoid of reflections it is necessary to 
include reflections in the reflector confirmation. Consequently two different confirmations are needed for 
these two different purposes. The confirmation that is a part of the tree has to be the direct confirmation. 
The reflector confirmation used to compute the direct confirmations has to be a maximum cardinality 
confirmation.
The approach to building a debate tree is the same for immediate children of the root as it is for 
vertices further down the tree. One might think that the notion of grandparent reflections, which could 
affect further down the tree, would not occur for the immediate children of the root. Such immediate 
children o f the root have no grandparents. In reality, however, the behaviour is the same at any level 
of the tree below the root as grandparent reflections (appearing as a chain of two undercuts) are always 
intermediated by a rebuttal.
6.8 Properties of Debate Trees
I now examine the properties of debate trees, starting with some introductory observations most of which 
can be established directly from the tree’s definition and then move on to formal properties with more 
complicated proofs. The key property I build the rationale for is that debate trees are finite.
6.8.1 Introductory Observations
The early portion o f this chapter criticised trees from the literature for not adhering to a number of 
properties deemed to be desirable. Each of these cases was proven by example, with each example 
giving not just an argument tree, but also the corresponding a debate tree. These examples can be re­
examined to show that debate trees are:
•  Debate trees are not Type A Incomplete as non-root rebuttals are included - given that they are 
direct, rather than reflected rebuttals.
•  Debate trees are not Type B Incomplete as they contain no reflected arguments and hence no 
reduced reflections.
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•  Debate trees are not Type C Incomplete as premise reuse is allowed within a path from leaf to root 
(and also between paths).
•  Debate trees are not Type A Inordinate as they contain no reflected arguments and hence no root 
reflected canonical undercuts.
•  Debate trees are not Type B Inordinate as they contain no reflected arguments and hence no mono­
pair enlargement.
•  Debate trees are not Type C Inordinate as they contain no reflected arguments and hence no mono­
pair enlargement.
•  Debate trees are not Inchoate as all necessary arguments are included and all unnecessary argu­
ments excluded, so there is no possibility of proxy arguments misrepresenting the arguments they 
proxy for.
•  Debate trees are considerably less sensitive to the way the knowledgebase is written, relative to 
argument trees.
Before establishing properties requiring proofs there are a number of observations that can be made 
simply by pointing them out in the definitions.
The debate tree is a single tree, in contrast to the argument tree and argument structure approach 
which requires a forest to track a debate. The debate tree could be viewed as taking the definition of a 
(Besnard & Hunter, 2001) argument structure and applying it uniformly to every vertex in the tree rather 
than just at the root. Nowhere in the literature can I find anyone tracking a complete debate as a single 
tree.
P roposition 6.8.1. Let A  be a knowledgebase o f  labelled assumption form ulae and let ♦*(«*, A ) be a 
debate tree.
|{r(a,A)}| = l.
Proof. The root o f the tree maps to a maximum cardinality contradiction and building on Proposi­
tion 2.5.9, it follows that there is only ever one maximum cardinality contradiction for a given formula 
a. Given the root a  and the knowledgebase A  the rest o f the tree is uniquely determined. Therefore 
[|{f*(a,A )} | =  l. □
The debate tree is devoid of reflections, regardless of whether the reflection is a Type I, II, HI or 
IV Reflection. Hence it is ordinate, complete and choate. Thus the possibility of judges counting an 
argument twice is avoided.
Because the debate is modelled by a tree not a graph, it follows that there are no parallel edges. In 
a conjectured graph, if a vertex vchud attacks two targets, V, W  in parent v, then the result would be 
parallel edges {vchud, V , v),  (vchtid, W , v) e  S.  In a debate tree, however, v  would have two children
Vchildl 7^  Vchild2  where f  (Vchildl) — f{ychild2 ) and V, u), (t,chi/d2) tj) £
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Clearly any graph can contain infinite cycles, while a finite tree, by definition, cannot contain infinite 
cycles. Additionally the NRC ensures that there are no repeated arguments and thus no repeated chains 
of arguments in the tree. A third feature of some graphs is loops, that is arguments that attack themselves 
(as seen with Dung). Loops cannot occur with mincons, but can with abstract arguments. Hence the 
debate tree clearly has no loops, cycles nor parallel edges.
Debate trees include preclusive undercuts - unlike the debate tracking structures in the literature. 
Additionally debate trees track which expert contributed which knowledge (due to the use of a Labelled 
Deductive System).
There is no dependable mapping between argument trees and debate trees. Sometimes it is possible 
to derive one from the other, but not always. Specifically, the examples of incomplete argument trees 
are ones where there is not enough information to construct a debate tree. Furthermore, the examples 
of inordinate argument trees provide ones which cannot be constructed (at least not in a straightforward 
mapping fashion) from the debate tree for the same a  and A.
I now look at repetition within a debate tree in more detail. In any formally defined tree, including 
debate trees, a vertex cannot be repeated as the vertices form a set and hence are unique. My / ( v)  =  
(X, Y ) : 0  mapping construct ensures this vertex uniqueness. Similarly in a well formed tree, including 
debate trees, edges cannot be repeated.
A contradiction, however, can be repeated in a debate tree and that is acceptable and normal in 
professional debate. As a contradiction can be repeated in the tree, so also can its parts: confirmations, 
arguments, supports, claims and assumptions. On a path from leaf to root, however, the NRC ensures 
that an argument cannot be repeated, and hence on such a path no confirmation or contradiction can be 
repeated either.
Within a path from leaf to root it is still allowable to repeat a support, a consequent or assumption, 
as long as no entire argument is repeated. Now to touch on the empty set.
Example 6.8.1. Let A  =  0. The debate tree ♦ * (a , A ) is (0 ,0 ) :  a. The set o f  arguments fo r  a is the 
empty set. Note that {0} : a  would mean that a was a tautology, which it is not the case here. Here 
V =  (0 ,0 ): a  and £  =  0.
6.8.2 Vertex Size
The number of arguments in an arbitrary vertex in any debate tree is finite.
Proposition 6.8.2. Let IS. be a knowledgebase o f  labelled assumption formulae and let ♦ * (a , A ) =  
(V, £ , 6 (A ), / )  be the debate tree fo r  a derivable from  A.
0 <  ( |X| +  |Y| ) <  midLattice(A), where v e V , f ( v )  =  (X ,Y ):<f>.
Proof. If the number of arguments for 0  derivable from A is zero, then |X| = 0 .  Likewise if there are no 
arguments for -><j> then |Y| =  0, hence the lower limit is zero. The support for one argument for 0  can 
never be a subset of the support for another argument for 0. Thus the maximum number of arguments 
for 0  is midLattice(A). Any argument can be for 0  or for —»0, but never for both. Thus regardless of the
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distribution of arguments between <p or ~^<f> the total maximum is still always midLattice(A). Hence the 
upper limit for the number of arguments in any vertex of a debate tree is midLattice(A). □
If some of the arguments for cp or for ~><p are reflected then the upper limit will not be reached. Thus 
although this property is for a debate tree, it is essentially about the size of contradictions.
6.8.3 Branching Factor
The number of edges incident upon an arbitrary vertex v  in any debate tree ♦ * (a , A ) is finite.
Proposition 6.8.3. Let A  be a knowledgebase o f  labelled assumption formulae and let ♦ * (a , A ) =  
(V, £ , 6 (A ), / )  be the debate tree fo r  a  derivable from  A.
0 < \ { ( u , W , v )  e £  \ u , v  € V , W  e c ,  f ( v )  =  (X, Y ) : - 0 } |  <  2*x * +  2 |Y| -  2.
Proof. A leaf vertex will have no edges incident on it, so the lower bound is 0. Any edge incident 
on a vertex v  represents a preclusive undercut with defending confirmation X : ip or Y : ~^ ip where 
f ( v )  =  (X, Y ) : ip. Each edge will have a unique target confirmation label W C X o r W C Y .  Any 
subset o f X or Y  can be a valid target confirmation label, except for the emptyset. Here u e  V is  any 
child vertex of v  and W  any valid target confirmation label. Hence the upper limit for the number of 
targets is 2 ^  — 1, so the upper limit for the contradiction taken as a whole is 2 'x l +  2'Y' — 2. □
This proposition is the same as asking how many preclusive undercuts can be incident upon a 
confirmation and then doubling it to get the answer for a contradiction.
6.8.4 Path Length
To look at the path length from vertex v  to the root, where v  and root are part o f the path, it is helpful to 
define odd and even levels in the tree. Thus the root is odd, given that its path length, x , is 1.
Definition 6.8.1. Let (V, £)  be a tree where V is its set o f  vertices and £  its set o f  edges, v  €  V.
X  X
v is even i f  ( — — trunc(—) =  0 else v is odd, where x  =  |ancestors(v, V ,£ ) | +  1.
W hile the following proposition could be stated more formally it is unambiguous and avoids the 
introduction of further helper functions.
Proposition 6.8.4. Let A  be a knowledgebase o f  labelled assumption formulae and let ♦*((*, A ) =  
(V, £ , 4 (A ), / )  be the debate tree fo r  a  derivable from  A . Let v  €  V and I  :<p,J -.ip € arguments( A).
I f  I : (p exists at an odd [even] level in the tree,
then no J  .ip, J  C I  can exist on any other odd [even] level 
o f  the same path further from  the root.
Proof. If such a J : ip, J  C I  did exist it would be pruned out by the matt() function. The same applies 
to even levels. □
The number of ancestors for a given vertex is finite.
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Proposition 6.8.5. Let A  be a knowledgebase o f  labelled assumption formulae and let ♦ * (a , A ) =  
(V, £ , 4 (A ), / )  be the debate tree fo r  a  derivable from  A .
0 <  | ancestors(v, V ,£ )  | <  ( 2 ^  -  l ) 2 -  2 ^ .
Proof The NRC states that any argument added to the tail of an argument chain must not already exist 
in its ancestors. Hence the longest chain will use up as few arguments as possible in the ancestors and 
therefore have one argument only per vertex which will be mono-attack. For two arguments I  :(j>,J: ip 
to be different, either support I  ^  J ,  or claim (p ^  ip or both support and claim differ. If an argument 
I  : <p is child of an argument J  : ip then, from the definition of preclusive undercut, it is known that 
<p =  * / \  stripAssumptions(formulae(label( J  : ip))). The number of arguments derivable from A with 
different supports is 2^* , however 0 as a support cannot attack or be attacked, so the practical number 
for creating chains is 2 ^  — 1. Hence any o f 2^AI — 1 supports can combine with any of 2^AI -  1 claims. 
Furthermore loops are disallowed so a support ({ /} :  <p, { /} , { /} : <p) g  preclusiveUndercuts({/}: </>, A ). 
So the upper limit is (2^AI — l ) 2 — 2lAL □
One might think that the odd /  even behaviour of Proposition 6.8.4 would constrain the maximum 
path length, but it does not. The reason there is no constraint is that it is possible to have a sequence of 
subsets o f A  that starts with the shortest support length (for the root) and proceeds to longer supports 
whereby none are subsets o f those nearer the root.
6.8.5 Debate Trees are Finite 
Proposition 6.8.6. Debate trees are finite.
Proof. There are just three ways that a debate tree could be conjectured to be infinite: 1) the number 
o f arguments in a vertex could be unbounded; 2) the branching factor could be unbounded; 3) the path 
length could be unbounded. However, it is established 1) that vertex contents are finite by Proposi­
tion 6.8.2, 2) that the branching factor is finite by Proposition 6.8.3 and 3) that path lengths are finite by 
Proposition 6.8.5. Therefore debate trees are finite. □
That completes the analysis o f the key properties of debate trees. Further research is warranted to 
deepen this picture of how debate trees behave and also how well and in what ways they do and do not 
map to professional debate.
6.9 Conclusion for How To Track a Debate
The main conclusion of this chapter, and indeed of the thesis, is that to track a debate, the whole debate 
and nothing but the debate requires a debate tree, or something similar with the same properties of being 
complete and choate. The debate tree, denoted ♦ * (a , A ), has each vertex mapped to a contradiction 
and each edge representing a preclusive undercut. The two main differences between argument trees 
and debate trees are that a) debate trees include all necessary arguments (e.g. direct rebuttals below the 
root) and b) exclude all unnecessary arguments (e.g. reflected arguments). The NRC of the debate tree 
is simpler than that for argument trees as it is only doing one job (preventing repetition of arguments) 
rather than two (preventing repetition and some reflection).
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The following table summarises areas where argument trees and argument structures do not map 
well to professional debate. In each of these areas, debate trees provide a more precise mapping to 
professional debate. Even so there are several areas where debate trees are lacking; these are discussed 
in Chapter 8.
B ehaviour Type C onfirm ation  A ttacks Function Section
Incomplete A Non-root rebuttals excluded 6.3.1
Incomplete B Reduced reflections from direct rebuttals 6.3.2
Incomplete C Premise reuse prohibition 6.3.3
Inordinate A Root reflected canonical undercuts 6.4.1
Inordinate B Mono-pair enlarged canonical reflection 6.4.2
Inordinate C M ulti-pair enlarged canonical reflection 6.4.3
Inordinate D Reflected confirming argument 6.4.4
Inchoate Present arguments do not represent missing ones 6.5.1
Additional Sensitivity to way knowledgebase is written 6.5.2
Additional Asymmetry in reflections do not cancel 6.5.3
Table 6.4: Summary o f Comparison of Argument Trees with Professional Debate
The definition of debate trees is preceded by six helper functions, notably 
preclusiveUndercutsBetweenContradictions() that is still fundamentally between confirmations, matt() 
which excludes Type I and II Reflections, opaque() which excludes Type IQ and IV Reflections and 
three more helper functions to facilitate defining the NRC.
The properties of debate trees are mostly self evident from examining the definitions. Namely they 
include undercuts, specifically preclusive undercuts, and exclude all reflected arguments. As they are 
devoid of reflection they thus exclude unnecessary arguments. Non-root direct rebuttals are included, 
which is part o f the way that they include necessary arguments. The key property established is that 
debate trees are finite. It is conceivable that further research could identify additional forms of reflection 
in which case the definition o f debate tree would have to be refined.
Chapter 7
How To Judge a Debate
The chapter is less formal than those that precede it, so many of the terms and concepts discussed or 
introduced here are not formally defined. Formalisation of these concepts is suggested as one area for 
future research.
7.1 Overview of Chapter
The focus o f this chapter is on how to judge a debate and draws out a preliminary result indicating 
that reflection skews or modifies judge outcomes. Judgement was defined informally in Chapter 1 and 
formally in Chapter 2, with the existential and quantitative distinction covered in both places. The body 
of this chapter comprises six sections:
Judge Selection Section 7.2 raises the need for a theoretical basis for the design of judge func­
tions and selection of a particular judge for a specific application.
Judge Properties Section 7.3 provides an informal but fairly comprehensive discussion of judge 
properties including such matters as awareness of undercuts, reflection and confirmation.
Reflection and Judge Outcomes Section 7.4 provides a motivational and reasoned discussion of 
the question of whether reflection alters judge outcomes. As not removing any reflection leaves an 
infinite and not sensibly judgeable tree the choice becomes between removing some and removing 
all reflection.
Reflection and Existential Judge Outcomes Section 7.5 shows that, given certain assumptions, 
reflection can change debate outcomes when judged with an existential judge, and therefore that 
reflection should be considered in the deliberations.
Judging a Debate Tree Section 7.6 introduces a new judge function that is designed to judge the 
reflection free debate tree while also taking into account preclusive undercut and the filtering of 
noise.
Reflection and Quantitative Judge Outcomes Section 7.7 shows the indication that quantita­
tive judges, like qualitative or existential judges, can be skewed by reflection.
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A question at the core of this thesis is: does reflection make a difference to the outcome of debates? 
The preliminary result o f the four key examples of this chapter (namely Examples 7.5.1,7.5.2, 7.7.1 and
7.7.2 in Sections 7.4 through 7.7) suggest that the answer is yes, reflection does alter debate outcomes. 
It would appear that the outcomes from both existential and quantitative judging schemes are affected by 
reflection. Therefore, in my view, reflection ought to be taken into account by judge functions, regardless 
of whether they are existential or counting judges.
7.2 Judge Selection
Some facets o f judge selection have been begun to be explored in the literature, while other facets, I 
would suggest, are less well developed. A topic which has received attention is that of semantics in the 
abstract argumentation literature, and to some degree in the semi-abstract literature. There now exists a 
a broad and growing range of semantics from Dung and those building on this work. How to select the 
optimum semantics for a particular application is, however, I would suggest, under developed, not least 
because abstract argumentation is a theoretical rather than an applied discipline. The need to develop 
this area I call judge selection has been recognised by (Caminada & Amgoud, 2007). Certain general 
guidelines do exist for the most well known half dozen abstract semantics regarding which semantics are 
good for what jobs, but formal analysis is not so developed. Just by casting a graph of arguments into a 
tree, thereby removing attack cycles will always cause agreement between grounded, preferred and stable 
semantics (Dung, 1995). An important and recent classification of semantics is (Baroni & Giacomin, 
2008) which shows that for seven well known semantics, (grounded, preferred, stable, complete, CF2, 
semi-stable and ideal) that there are just 14 equivalence classes, or situations, out o f a possible 120 where 
the semantics give the same result as each other.
Judges based on concrete argumentation, in contrast, have in the main lacked an underlying theo­
retical framework and thus selecting one over another has been somewhat arbitrary. The comparison and 
selection of particular concrete judges for particular applications is not well developed in the literature. 
Questions such as ‘for what particular applications would a Benferhat judge be better than a Franklin 
judge?’ are yet to be thoroughly explored.
The literature on argumentation semantics provides functions where the output is a set (or a set of 
sets) o f arguments that is a subset (or are subsets) o f the input set o f arguments. My judge functions, in 
contrast, seek an output that is a) a proposition rather than an argument and b) a single item not a set of 
items, nor a set o f sets o f items.
In the ABA framework, attack is constrained to Wigmore undercut and by definition excludes re­
buttal. Hence in ABA, due to the absence of an explicit rebuttal, it is impossible to attack a claim formula 
in isolation. On page 7 of (Dung et al., 2006) the authors provide their perspective of how undercut can 
be said to imply rebuttal. That view in turn hinges its justification on (Kowalski & Toni, 1996) and illus­
trates the notion with an example. The view o f (Kowalski & Toni, 1996) is also argued on the basis of an 
example. I would suggest that more research is warranted to investigate how these examples, which rely 
on different logics from my classical mincon analysis, compare and contrast to reflection and reflexivity 
as presented herein.
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Both the ABA and (Besnard & Hunter, 2001) frameworks limit attack in this way and thus create 
one tree per argument for a  or ->a. Additionally (Besnard & Hunter, 2001) offer a way to aggregate 
all of these trees together, by means of the argument structure. There are some indications of more 
recent ABA research venturing into this territory of judging propositions rather than arguments. Because 
the ABA framework appears to be built on certain unstated assumptions about reflection, it becomes 
more challenging to map its semantics to professional debate. Professional debate requires judgement 
of a motion not o f individual arguments, and also requires recognition of rebuttal as a valid form of 
argumentation, rendering most o f the work on semantics, I would suggest, to be not as helpful as it 
might initially appear to be for clarifying judge selection.
Clearly, there are many possible concrete judges, which may be categorised in various possible 
ways. Common to them all is the same issue as to why to choose a particular judge for a particular 
application. As different judges can give different outcomes for the same debate (as demonstrated, for 
example in Sections 2.8.6 and 3.2.2) some suspicion about automated judgement is natural.
One approach to tackling this lack of basis is by means of what I call the properties approach, 
another by means o f what I all the inner workings approach; I now describe these two approaches. The 
properties approach has five steps.
1. Formally define desirable or possible judge properties.
2. Formally define judge functions.
3. Use logical proof to establish the precise properties for each judge.
4. Then for a particular application decide what judge properties, picked from the list immediately 
above, are required for that application.
5. Hence, select the best judge for the job, accepting that compromise is often inevitable.
The inner workings approach instead seeks to define the safest judge possible, whereby the way 
that it reaches conclusions is as impeccable as it can be, i.e. as free from the prospect of criticism as 
possible. A  feature of courts o f law is the appeal (see Section 1.1 point 5), and if in the appeal some flaw 
or weakness can be established that brings into question the way that the conclusion was reached then 
that can cause the original judgem ent to be ‘thrown out’ or rejected. Therefore if the goal is to achieve 
safety in cases of appeal then it is prudent to focus the design on impeccability of judge inner workings. 
However, safety on appeal, i.e. safety of inner workings, is arguably just another judge property so even 
here, I would say, the theoretical basis is not robust. A  focus on impeccability rather than on resolving 
inconsistency may suggest the use of an existential judge. A focus on resolving inconsistency, thereby 
reducing the frequency of stalemates, suggests counting judges.
7.3 Judge Properties
This section informally introduces a number of desirable judge properties leaving their formal definition 
as an area for further research. More formal discussions of judge properties can be found in (Manor &
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Rescher, 1970; Benferhat et al., 1993; Elvang-G0ransson & Hunter, 1995; Cayrol & Lagasquie-Schiex, 
1995). This literature is strong forjudge properties linked to the parts of prepositional logic covered in 
discrete mathematics text books, but not, I would argue, in entertaining the notions of confirmation, 
preclusion and reflection. Additionally there is a strong literature on the semantics for selecting subsets 
of arguments from a larger set of given arguments, which in my view is not so pertinent to the current 
discussion because professional debates have a formula as the motion, not a set of arguments. The 
nine properties I now outline are rebuttal awareness, existential judging, quantitative judging, undercut 
awareness, reflection awareness, confirmation awareness, cumulativity, bipolarity and metaknowledge 
awareness.
7.3.1 Rebuttal Aware
Arguably the most basic o f judge properties is that a judge should consider rebuttal arguments and thus 
take them into account when reaching a conclusion. The rebuttals (or pros and cons, or arguments for 
and against) in a debate can be tracked using a single contradiction. Judges 1.0 and 2.0 of Chapter 2 are 
rebuttal aware judges, each relying on a single contradiction as the basis for their judgement. Rebuttal 
awareness appears to be the most widely accepted and prevalent judge property in the literature, but is 
not universal (see (Dung et al., 2006) for example).
73.2 Existential
The simplest, and arguably the most robust, way to reach a conclusion is to look at only the presence 
or absence of arguments - and nothing else. Existential judges thus never count arguments, nor perform 
any subtler evaluations such as weighing or considering probabilities or priorities. The Benferhat judge, 
judge 1.0, of Chapter 2 is an example of an existential judge, as also is the judge of (Garcia & Simari,
2004), which is defined shortly as judge 3.0 in Definition 7.5.1. Existential judges are strong on appeal, 
but their ability or power to resolve inconsistencies or stalemates is weak. They can also deliver a lot 
of null results (i.e. the empty set rather than a  or ->a) making them unsuitable for some applications. 
Section 7.4 looks at the effect o f reflection on existential judges.
7 3 3  Quantitative
A quantitative judge is sensitive to the number o f arguments and takes these counts into consideration 
when reaching conclusions. The Franklin judge, judge 2.0, of Chapter 2 is an example of a quantitative 
judge. Another quantitative judge is the example judge in (Besnard & Hunter, 2001) to be found on their 
pages 222 and 223 and provided below as Definition 7.6.1. A benefit of counting arguments is that the 
judge’s ability to resolve inconsistencies, which I call its resolving power, is considerably enhanced. A 
downside of quantitative judges is that they make more assumptions about the nature of argumentation 
than existential judges and are hence weaker on appeal. Other complaints are that different arguments 
can have different weights (or degrees of worth in influencing a conclusion) and that the meaning of 
counts is unclear. Generally speaking a judge is either existential or quantitative. Section 7.7 touches on 
the effect o f reflection on quantitative judges.
I would argue that existential judges are particularly robust for applications that only ever have zero,
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one or perhaps occasionally two arguments for a claim and hence where inconsistency and consequently 
stalemate are rare. For applications with larger and more complex knowledgebases producing a large 
number of arguments for claims then there may be more of a value in employing counting schemes; 
more value as inconsistencies can be resolved and do not automatically result in stalemates.
The following quotation provides the suggestion that quantitative judges, if properly formulated, 
could be of considerable value, but also acknowledges the challenges that appear to be inherent in their 
delineation.
‘The notion o f  confirmation plays a central role in scientific practice, and is therefore a 
most important task fo r  philosophers o f  science to clarify and perhaps systematise and im­
prove this notion, or, in other words to construct a theory o f  confirmation. Unfortunately 
it has proved surprisingly difficult to develop confirmation theory. It is not even clear how 
we should set about this task, or what a successful confirmation theory would look like.’ 
(Gillies, 1998).
A further point I would like to make on quantitative judges is that they would appear to offer an 
approach to living with, resolving and taking advantage of inconsistency. Existential judges, in compar­
ison have a tendency, after identifying the existence o f inconsistency and avoiding ex falso quodlibet, to 
deliver the empty set, which is almost as unhelpful. One o f the most frequently cited papers in the field 
of inconsistency raises exactly this issue of how to live with inconsistency, rather than just attempting to 
delete or avoid it (Gabbay & Hunter, 1991).
Finally, quantitative judges that deliver not just set membership judge outputs, but also numeric 
strength of the net support for the motion, are useful for deciding between different motions. In the Soft 
Systems Methodology it is common to examine a challenging problem, formulate a small number of 
possible solutions and then debate the merits o f each one. Quantitative judges delivering numeric output 
could be of assistance in conducting such trade-off debates.
7.3.4 Undercut Aware
For a judge to be undercut aware requires that a consideration of undercut to be taken into account in 
its workings to reach a conclusion. Both judges 1.0 and 2.0 introduced in Chapter 2 are not undercut 
aware. However judges 3.0 onwards, introduced below, are undercut aware. Section 3.2.2 showed that 
undercuts can change debate outcomes, and therefore that including them in deliberations is prudent to 
obtain what would generally be agreed to be accuracy or the avoidance of errors.
I use the term ‘undercut aware’ as a general term without tying it specifically to Wigmore, Pollock, 
canonical, preclusive or some other kind of undercut. A judge that relies on a single contradiction to 
track a debate cannot be undercut aware. On the contrary, undercut awareness requires that the debate 
tracking structure is some kind of a tree (or possibly a graph). Undercut aware judges in the literature 
are almost all also rebuttal aware, but less so vice versa.
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7.3.5 Reflection Aware
For a judge to be reflection aware it must include an understanding of reflection in its deliberations. If a 
judge is rebuttal aware, but not undercut aware, as are many in the literature - for example (Fox & Das, 
2000), then there is no need or option to be reflection aware. Undercut aware judges, however, should, in 
my view, all be made to be reflection aware. There is no current known proof or sound theoretical basis 
that would make reflection awareness a mandatory requirement for a judge to be a valid judge. Judge 6.0 
is reflection aware, while the judges in this thesis prior to 6.0 are not.
73.6 Confirmation Aware
Another judge property developed in this thesis in that of confirmation - in that professional debates are 
often so structured as to only consider confirmed arguments, such as { / ,  J }  : a . Any claim for which 
there is only one argument, i.e. where to p (0 (a , A )) =  { /}  : a ,  will be removed from consideration 
in such a debate. Journalists are taught to check their facts through confirmation and not to submit for 
publication unconfirmed, i.e. unsubstantiated, stories. Surgeons also commonly seek a ‘second opin­
ion’ from another surgeon before conducting a major operation to ensure that the procedure is properly 
warranted. In some professions and professional practices the number of arguments required for a claim 
increases beyond two to larger numbers. This number, or variable threshold (documented as threshold in 
judge 6.0), for the required level o f proof or evidence is another input to a debate and hence best treated 
as an item of metaknowledge (see Section 7.3.9). The workings of juries, parliaments and senates can 
be understood in this light o f confirmation thresholds. The benefit of using such a threshold is that it 
filters out noise, i.e claims for which there is a paucity o f compelling evidence. Noise is not the same as 
inconsistency.
7.3.7 Cumulativity
The ability of a judge to determine the outcomes o f multiple debates without the set of conclusions taken 
together implying inconsistency is called cumulativity and was discussed in the light o f Definition 2.7.2. 
Almost all of the judges in the literature lack this property of cumulativity, however in professional debate 
this property is deemed to be important. See Example 2.7.2 and the whole of Section 2.7 for further 
discussion of cumulativity. I would suggest that cumulativity is likely to be a fruitful yet challenging 
area for future research. The judges of (M anor & Rescher, 1970) and of (Dung, 1993) share the feature 
of judging more than one claim or arguments at a time, but neither do it in a way that appears to be 
directly transferrable to make non-cumulative judges cumulative.
7.3.8 Bipolar
The term ‘bipolar’ in the argumentation literature (Amgoud et al., 2004; Cayrol & Lagasquie-Schiex,
2005) has become associated with the notion of not just having an attacks or negative relationship be­
tween arguments but also having an assisting, supporting or positive relationship. Typically there is seen 
to be a kind of inverse symmetry between attacking and assisting. I introduced this notion in Section 1.3 
where I pointed out that my confirmation function, 0 (c*, A ), can be viewed as a form of positive relation­
ship between arguments. I revisited the notion in Section 2.4.1 and will touch on it again in Section 8.4.
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W hile some papers deal with this symmetry on the level o f abstract arguments (Cayrol & Lagasquie- 
Schiex, 2005), my examination is at a concrete level. Therefore, in addition to my confirmations being a 
form of bipolar positive argument, I formally propose, in Section 8.4, a second kind of positive relation­
ship, which I call an assisting argument. With confirmations the positive relationship is to an argument’s 
claim; in assists it is to the support. For a judge to be a bipolar judge it must take a consideration of 
both positive and negative argument relationships into account. Confirmation and assisting arguments 
can thus be seen as two aspects of bipolarity.
7.3.9 Metaknowledge Aware
John Locke is credited with the view that when drawing conclusions on a subject it is prudent not just 
to use the logical knowledge we know about that subject, but also to draw into consideration everything 
else we know about the matter (Krause & Clark, 1993). Benjamin Franklin also argued that not just the 
number of arguments for and against but also their weights (he called them weights) was of importance. 
Accordingly, a dominant use of metaknowledge is to hold information about weights of arguments, be 
that using some from o f priorities, possibilities or probabilities. O f these various weighing approaches 
that of priorities, e.g. see (Cayrol et al., 1992; Prakken & Sartor, 1997; Amgoud & Cayrol, 1998; 
Modgil, 2007), is the one gaining most attention in the literature and I would suggest as likely to be the 
most fruitful for further research as it assumes less about a domain than other approaches. Other kinds of 
metaknowledge include thresholds and domain specific ontologies, see (Williams & Hunter, 2007). For 
a judge to be a metaknowledge aware judge it must take a consideration of at least some metaknowledge 
into account in its deliberations.
Beyond these judge properties touched on here there are naturally many others meriting further 
research, as cited earlier.
7.4 Reflection and Judge Outcomes
A fundamental question raised by this thesis is ‘Does reflection change judge outcomes?’, be they exis­
tential or quantitatively judged. I now share some observations stemming from this question in a narrative 
style akin to that o f the earlier Section 6.6, where in both cases I provide motivation by arguing for a 
specific interpretation and approach.
This question can be paraphrased as ‘Does there exist a knowledgebase A, a motion a ,  meta­
knowledge 0  and a pair o f judges judgewith reflection K  A , ©) and judgewithout Election (a > A , 0 )  such that 
judge^th reflection(a > A , ©) ^  judgewithout r e f l e c t i o n  (« , A , © )?’ As this is a question of existence it can be 
addressed with proof by example. The example requires two judge functions to be contrasted for the 
same A , a  and ©. I will stop mentioning © now in this section as it is typically the empty set for simple 
judges and is not material to my main argument. Recall that it was established in Section 2.8.6 that 
two different judges can give different outcomes for the same A  and a ,  and this distinction was prior 
to any consideration of reflection. One challenge is that if the two judges are different then how can 
there be confidence that a difference in outcome is due to reflection and not just due to differences in
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the approach to judgement? My analysis, outlined in this section and detailed in Section 7.6.2, aims to 
address this challenge. Putting aside, for the moment, the issues of defining the two judges, the main 
path to addressing the question is to provide examples with and without reflection, both with the same 
A , a  and 0 .
The situation with reflection is not easy to assess as for any of the many worked examples I have 
done I keep discovering more and more reflections with increasingly complex logic involved in their 
derivation. Much proliferation still occurs, in my experience, even with constraints that are intended to 
limit the number of reflections.
An immediate observation is that if a computer is used to generate a tree of arguments and display it 
for a user or users then that tree will be cluttered, complicated and difficult to understand if any reflection 
is involved or allowed. The kinds of automation I have in mind here is tools such as (Efstathiou & Hunter, 
2008) for computing arguments and Araucaria (Reed & Rowe, 2004) or Argumed (Verheij, 2003) for 
displaying them. I thus draw the conclusion that even just for the purpose of clarity and understandability 
in argumentation visualisation it is necessary to remove or prevent reflections. Even if the tool only 
validates arguments, or even only records arguments, it will still become cluttered and unmanageable if 
reflected arguments are introduced, i.e. are allowed to or can be introduced, by one or more debaters. 
O f course the human facilitator could provide a filter to reject reflected arguments, according to some 
‘common sense’ definition of reflection. In truth I believe that is what happens, to quite a degree, in 
practice with computer-assisted debates - that it is the facilitator intervening to provide the intelligence. 
Clearly it is modelling this human intelligence to apply ‘common sense’ that is at the heart of my thesis.
In earlier sections I have proven that given their prerequisites reflections always exist. Proposi­
tion 4.4.1 shows that every attack is subject to a reflected undercut. Propositions 4.7.2 shows that every 
attack is also subject to a reflected rebuttal, which is trivial if the attack is a rebuttal, but not if the attack 
is an undercut. Furthermore, Proposition 5.8.1 shows the existence of additional up-tree reflections. 
The proofs just referenced show that the attack chains are not just long, they are infinite (which is not 
disputing the proof in (Besnard & Hunter, 2001) that argument trees are finite). In doing examples by 
hand to identify all o f the reflections even just two or three attacks away from the root, I have found the 
exercise to be considerably harder than one might expect: there are so many reflections. There also may 
be other forms of reflection involved that I have not discovered. More research is needed to identify if 
any other types of reflection exist and ideally to prove completeness, i.e. that all possible types have 
been discovered.
Infinite attack chains cannot be easily judged, certainly not, I would suggest, by any sensible, mean­
ing fitting with a easily understandable motivational intuition, deterministic existential judge. (I do note 
at this point that an admissible semantics, such as the grounded semantics (Dung, 1995), can handle 
infinite attack chains but is non-deterministic.) In an existential judge alternating levels of the tree, (in 
terms of number of vertices between a vertex and the root), are alternately defeated or undefeated. So the 
question arises: are the attack chains even or odd. Is infinity an even or an odd number? (It is neither). 
Therefore for existential judges to have any credibility some no-recycling constraint (NRC) must be used
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to make judged trees finite. W hile it is not the case that an NRC removes all reflection, it is the case that 
the existence of a judge with decidable outcomes means that some form of NRC must have been used to 
make the infinite finite. Thus the choice of NRC is intimately tied up with the question of how to handle 
reflection. (I still argue that pruning out reflection and the choice of the NRC are separable concepts, 
even though I acknowledge they are related).
Given the points so far, I am now able to move to another main point regarding how much reflection 
to remove. Logically there are just three possible situations relating to the inclusion or participation of 
reflection in judgement and debate outcome: none, all or some. Option A, none means that the tracking 
and judgement are such that all reflections are removed and thus that no reflections are considered. This 
is the aim o f this thesis, this is the matt-opaque situation. The second option, option B is that the tracking 
and judgement is such that no reflections are removed and thus that all reflections are considered. This 
option I have shown to be impossible as infinite structures cannot be sensibly judged. Or alternatively 
option C has the tracking and judgement being such that some reflections are removed and thus that some 
reflections remain and are considered by the judge. It is this ‘some’ situation that I believe is the only 
logical alternative to all, and which I have shown, by analysis in the last chapter, to exist in the literature.
A further key conclusion is that the question here thus becomes ‘What are the merits of removing 
some reflections versus removing all'. Simply disregarding reflection is not an option as it leads to 
infinite structures and undecideability. This suggestion of undecideability deserves a proof, which is 
a matter for further research. Consequently the issue of NRC is fundamental to the question of does 
reflection alter judge outcomes. The choice of NRC is somewhat confounded by the approach I outline 
here to address the core question of this section. I do not know of a superior approach, however it remains 
that there are difficulties in the way the NRCs of (Garcia & Simari, 2004; Besnard & Hunter, 2001) and 
of this thesis interact with reflection in the approach outlined. To sum up my position so far: my debate 
tree is free from all forms of reflection known to me, is finite and thus is judgeable. Any tree with all 
reflections present is simply not sensibly judgeable. Thus to be judgeable at least some reflections need 
to be removed, which begs the question as to which reflections and how many should be removed. Where 
does one stop?
Returning now to my core question from the first paragraph of this section (does reflection change 
debate outcomes), the challenges are that a) with my tree there is no reflection, so with what to compare 
it to be able to say that the removal of reflection makes a difference? My analysis has clearly selected 
the argument tree as the reflection-containing debate tracking structure of focus. So how to judge the 
argument tree? The (Garcia & Simari, 2004) existential judge would appear to be an obvious choice for 
the judge. But then the question arises about how to handle the differences between the trees of (Garcia 
& Simari, 2004) and (Besnard & Hunter, 2001). The (Garcia & Simari, 2004) tree includes rebuttals as 
edges, which I accept as a robust approach, however the (Besnard & Hunter, 2001) tree does not include 
rebuttals as edges - except at the root where rebuttals do appear, by courtesy of their argument structure 
(of Definition 6.2.2). The (Garcia & Simari, 2004) tree uses defeasible logic and the set of proof rules 
available is defined as limited, so the resultant reflections would appear to be still extant, but not as
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prolific as in other examples. In contrast, the paper (Besnard & Hunter, 2001) and its successors do not 
appear to provide an existential judge function. Thus this comparison is still somewhat unsatisfactory: 
my set of casting and connecting devices seems at best to be complex and at worst unnecessarily complex 
and implausible. W hat I describe can thus only be described as inspired by (Garcia & Simari, 2004) and 
not as a map or accurate portrayal of their work. Clearly, further research is warranted to understand 
the effects of reflection on judgement. W hat I can offer is early results that suggest the answer to the 
question is that reflection can alter debate outcomes.





judge3 o() is Definition 7.5.2 
from (Garcia & Simari, 2004)
Quantitative Judge 
judge6 o() is Definition 7.6.4 
from this thesis
With Reflection argument structure - Definition 6.2.2 
o f argument trees - Definition 6.2.3.
Example 7.5.1 with its Figure 7.1 
is judged by judge3 0(). 
Outcome: a
argument structure cast 
to be a tree of contradictions 
by cast two.
Example 7.7.1 with its Figure 7.3 
judge6 0()+  cast two =  judge7 0() 
Outcome: a
Without Reflection debate tree cast 
to be a tree o f arguments 
by cast one - Definition 7.5.3. 
Example 7.5.2 with its Figure 7.2 
judge3 0()+  cast one =  judge4 0() 
Outcome: 0
debate tree - Definition 6.7.7 
(same situation as 
implementation of Section 8.5). 
Example 7.7.2 with its Figure 7.4 
is judged by judge6 0(). 
Outcome: 0
Table 7.1: Analysis Showing that Reflection Changes Debate Outcomes
Given this preamble I now examine the outcome of debates with and without a consideration of 
reflection. The current section is thus directly parallel to Section 3.2.2 ‘Undercuts can change debate 
outcomes’. The question of whether refection can change outcomes has two aspects, i.e. the two kinds 
of judge: existential (considered in the immediately following section) and quantitative (considered in 
Section 7.7). Table 7.1 summarises my analytical approach and preliminary findings. The example I 
have selected to focus on for this ‘proof by example’ is Example 6.5.1 with its Figure 6.8.
The data structures o f the argument tree, argument structure and debate tree have already been de­
fined in the last chapter and provide debate tracking with and without reflection. I will subsequently 
define two tree-to-tree casting functions, which I call cast one and cast two, to allow like-to-like compar­
isons whereby the same judge can be applied to virtually the same tree with and without reflection.
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7.5 Reflection and Existential Judge Outcomes
The following existential judge function for a tree o f arguments is adapted from (Garcia & Simari, 2004). 
While the tree of (Garcia & Simari, 2004) uses defeasible logic, their judge appears to be more widely 
applicable. I say ‘appears to be’ as it is not fully apparent exactly how it is to be applied to argument trees 
and further research is warranted. This interpretation of (Garcia & Simari, 2004) to obtain an existential 
judge for trees from (Besnard & Hunter, 2001) is somewhat speculative and not as robust as the main 
body of this thesis.
I now restate (Garcia & Simari, 2004)’s Procedure 5.1 and follow it with an existential judge that 
seeks to turn their Procedure 5.1 into a judge function.
Definition 7.5.1. Let T{A,a) be a tree, where the vertices are arguments derivable from  A, the edges are 
attacks and the root vertex argument is (A , a )  having support A  and claim a . Let T*A be the same 
tree, but with each vertex being able to be marked as ‘D ’ fo r  defeated or ‘U ’ fo r  undefeated. The process 
to mark the tree is such that:
1. A ll leaves in T(a ,o)  are marked as ‘U ’s ’’ in T ’a ,«Y
2. Let {B , q) be a non-leaf vertex o fT ( A,a)-
(B , q) will be marked as ‘U ’ in T*AtCC)
iff  every child o f ( B ,  q) is marked as ‘D ’ in T*A a y  
(B , q) will be marked as ‘D ’ in T*A,a)
iff  it has at least one child marked ‘U ’ in T*a ,o) •
In reusing the above for other trees, how to make the jum p from marking one Garcia and Simari 
tree that has a root argument for a ,  and edges of rebuttal and undercut, to judging all trees for a  and 
->a where edges are just undercut requires some interpretation. A quotation from (Garcia & Simari, 
2004) is that ‘In DeLP a literal h  will be warranted i f  there exists a non-defeated argument structure 
{A, h).’ This quotation is then defined as their Definition 5.2 on their page 119 as follows ‘Definition 5.2 
(Warranted literals) Let (A , a ) be an argument structure and T*A ^  its associated marked dialectical 
tree. The literal h is warranted iff  the root ofT*A is marked as ‘U \ We will say that A is a warrant fo r  
h.J I interpret that quotation to mean ‘In DeLP, a literal a  will be warranted if there exists a non-defeated 
argument (A, a)  at the root of a tree T*A .’
The Garcia and Simari root is only one argument for a ,  so given that a professional debate may 
have multiple arguments for a  and -<a there will be two forests of trees, one forest for a  and one forest 
for ->a. Any one of the Garcia Simari trees for a  will take into account all of the trees for ->a as the 
roots of those trees for ->a will appear as rebuttal attacks on the root of the tree for a. How one (Garcia 
& Simari, 2004) tree for a  should stand for all the other trees for a  is I suggest an open question. In 
lieu of further research I follow the quote above so that if there exists an undefeated tree for a  then a  is 
warranted, regardless of the state of any other trees for a  or ->a.
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Definition 7.5.2. Let A be a knowledgebase of labelled or unlabelled assumption formulae. The 
judge3 0  (a , A , 0) procedure for judging T(A,a) is such that:
If the root of at least one tree for a  is ‘U’ then judge3 0(a , A, 0) =  a .
An implication of Definition 7.5.2 is that if i) the roots of all trees for a  are ‘D ’ or there are no 
trees for a  and ii) the roots of all trees for ->c* are ‘D ’ or there are no trees for - ia  then given i) and 
ii) judge3 0(a , A ,0 )  =  0. However, we know that if the root of at least one tree for a  is ‘U ’ then 
judge3 0(a , A, 0) =  a .  Therefore if the marking for one root is ‘U ’ the markings of other roots become 
irrelevant (courtesy of the inclusion of rebuttals as edges in the Garcia Simari tree). Also aggregating 
together the markings for many roots is probably not necessary. I use this judge3 0(a, A , 0) in my later 
analysis, even though I am not entirely comfortable with its application to argument trees, as they do not 
include rebuttals as edges.
7.5.1 Situation with Reflection and Existential Judgement
I now revisit my earlier Example 6.5.1, which showed that argument trees are inchoate, and judge it with 
judge 3.0. This is a manageable example to use as it has no arguments for ->a and thus has considerably 
less reflection than if that were the case.
Example 7.5.1. This example reuses the knowledgebase of Example 6.5.1. See the left side of Fig­
ure 6.8 for the resultant unmarked argument tree. This example then judges that tree with the existential 
Garcia and Simari-like judge 3.0. The resultant marked tree is shown as Figure 7.1 below. As the 
root is undefeated the judge outcome is that the motion is undefeated so the marked tree shows that 
iudge3 0 (a , A , 0) =  a.
{ I : a } v
{ J : - ( 0 h ( 0 ^ a ) ) } D
Figure 7.1: Marked Argument Tree - Contains Reflection - Outcome a
To see if reflection affects the outcome it is now necessary to look at the same knowledgebase but 
without reflection.
7.5.2 Situation without Reflection and Existential Judgement
In order to apply judge 3.0 to reflection free debate trees in a way that permits direct comparison to its 
application above to argument trees I propose the approach of i) not changing the judge itself, ii) casting 
the debate tree into a form suitable forjudge 3.0 and then iii) applying judge 3.0 directly to that cast tree.
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Hence the comparison should be like-with-like. To cast a debate tree into a tree of arguments that is in 
a form suitable forjudge 3.0 the following procedure is used. First I establish some basic nomenclature 
to label the parts o f a tree of contradictions and parts o f a tree o f arguments. The nomenclature shown in 
Table 7.2 below is used in subsequent definitions to refer to different parts of a contradiction tree. The 
nomenclature and analysis focusses on an arbitrary vertex v  in the tree.
1. Let v  e  V  be an arbitrary vertex in a contradiction tree ♦*(cc, A ) =  (V, 8 , / ,  ♦ (A )).
2. Let f ( v )  =  (X, Y ):<pe 4 (A ) , where I j  <E X =  { I u . . . , / * }  e  C, 
and where Jk e  Y  =  {J \ , J m } €  C.
3. Let the children vertices of v  be v \ hlld, . . . ,  v ^ f xld, where v^hxld e  { v f 111*1, . . . ,  
with each child connected to v  by a labelled edge (v^hxld, Zif v) 
equating to an intra-contradiction preclusive undercut (f { v f htld), Z*, f {v) ) .
4. Showing these nomenclature points diagrammatically as part of a contradiction tree gives:
Arbitrary vertex v,  where 
f ( v )  = ( X , Y) : <P= ( { h , . . . , I l } , { J u . . . , J m } ) : < P , I j  e X , J fce Y
..child . . . ..child . . . ..child 
V 1 v i vn
Table 7.2: Tree Nomenclature: An Arbitrary Vertex v  in a Debate Tree
Definition 7.5.3. Let ♦* (a , A ) be a debate tree. The cast one function casts a debate tree into a forest 
o f trees o f  arguments as follows:
1. Starting with the root o f  the debate tree apply the following procedure fo r  an arbitrary vertex 
thereby creating one cast tree fo r  each argument I j  :<p or Jk in that debate tree root.
2. Procedure fo r  an arbitrary vertex. For each argument I j  :<p or J k ’.-><p in the arbitrary vertex v o f  
the debate tree, fo r  each attack on that argument:
I f  the attack is a multi-target preclusive undercut then do not create any child argument in 
the cast tree fo r  that attack,
I f  the attack is a mono-target preclusive undercut then fo r  each argument J: ip in the attack­
ing confirmation Z : i p , J  £  Z create a child vertex mapped to the argument J : ip in the cast 
tree (the connecting edge is a canonical undercut),
I f  the attack is a rebuttal then fo r  each argument attack create a child vertex mapped to the 
reflected canonical undercut from  the reflecting rebutting argument.
3. Repeat fo r  each vertex in the debate tree working down from the root towards the leaves, using 
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reached. Apply the no recycling constraint of the argument tree as each new prospective child 
node is identified.
I use the identifier judge4 0(« , A , 0 )  for the combination of cast one with judge3 0 (q, A , 0 ) ,  and 
give no separate definition. As this fourth judge reuses the third judge the two can be directly compared 
and contrasted to see the effects o f reflection. Note that all attacks in the cast tree are mono-target and 
thus edge labels do not add information and are therefore excluded. I now show the marked cast debate 
tree after being judged by judge 4.0. As the root is defeated the outcome is that judge4 0(a , A , 0 )  =  0.
Example 7.5.2. This example reuses the knowledgebase of Example 6.5.1 and the resultant debate tree 
seen on the right of Figure 6.8. This example then uses the cast one function to cast that debate tree 
into a forest of trees of arguments, which in this case is a single tree, and then judges that tree with the 
existential Garcia and Simari-like judge. The combination of cast one and judge 3.0 is judge 4.0. The 
resultant marked tree is shown as Figure 7.2. As the root is defeated the judge outcome is that the motion 
is defeated so the marked tree shows that judge4 0 (a , A , 0) =  0.
{ I : o t }D
{ K : / 3  A (0  —> a ) } D
{ M : A  7r A  -1 7  A  (n —> (0 —► a)))}u
Figure 7.2: Marked Argument Tree - Without Reflection - Outcome 0
Thus the implication is that reflection can change debate outcomes. The question remains is this 
modification of outcome by reflection unique to existential judges or does it also occur with quantitative 
judges.
7.6 Judging a Debate Tree
Having covered existential judges I now move on to quantitative judges. My purpose is to enquire if 
quantitative judges, like existential judges are also sensitive to reflection. Before introducing my own 
reflection-aware judge function I start by providing some context from the literature. This published 
function is relevant as it provides some of the inspiration for the structure of my judge 6.0.
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7.6.1 Undercut Aware Quantitative Judgement in the Literature
This quantitative discussion from the literature has the property of being undercut aware. The categoriser 
function below delivers a normalised real number in the range 0 to 1. The Besnard Hunter judge 5.0 is 
defined in four steps using the accumulator and categoriser functions of Definitions 8.10 and 8.11 in 
(Besnard & Hunter, 2001).
Definition 7.6.1. Let A be a knowledgebase of labelled assumption formulae. The Besnard Hunter 
quantitative judge, denoted judge5 0 (a , A , 0), is a judge such that:
1. Given a tree of arguments, with root R being an argument for a, the h-categoriser function, 
denoted h, returns a real number h(R ) €  K defined recursively by:
=  i  +  /i(jv i) +  . . .  +  /i( jv i)’
where N \ , . . .  ,Ni are the children vertices for N, and 
if I =  0 then h(Ni)  +  . . .  +  h{Nt) =  0.
2. Applying the h-categoriser to each argument tree in an argument structure provides a categorisa­
tion /or a, which is a pair of multisets of real numbers, written
(lX1, . . . , X n),[Yu . . . , Y n}), whereXu . . . , X n,Yu . . . 1Yn e R
3. Given the categorisation for a, the log accumulator function, denoted l((X,  Y )) returns two real 
numbers a + ,a~  €  R such that:
l ( (X , Y)) =  (log( 1 + X l +  . . .  +  X n), log( 1 + Y1 +  . . .  +  Ym)) =  { a + ,a~} ,
where X  =  [X l t . . . ,  X n] and Y  =  \Yl t . . . ,  Yn].
4. The two real numbers determine the membership o/judge5 0 (a , A , 0), such that:
I f a+ > a~ then \udge5 0(a,  A ,0 ) =  a.
I f a+ < a~ then judge5 0 (a , A ,0 ) =  ->a.
I fa+ — a~ then judge5 0 (a , A ,0 ) =  0.
A feature o f this judge is that finite chains of defeaters never fully defeat the argument at the head of 
the chain. Furthermore there is no binary distinction between odd and even length chains, so this judge 
presents a contrast to judges 3.0 and 6.0, which do provide such a binary distinction.
7.6.2 Quantitative Judge Aware of Confirmation, Preclusion and Reflection
I now define a judge function that processes the debate tree. It thus automatically excludes reflected 
arguments from its deliberations. It also includes consideration of preclusive undercut and applies a 
threshold-based filter to exclude uncorroborated points or noise. This tree judge is an extension of or
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elaboration upon the Franklin judge described earlier coupled with the intuition that in essence an attack 
by an undercut has the same force as an attack by a rebuttal. It is a recursive function defined in two 
steps, firstly to determine the argumentative strength of a vertex in the tree and then secondly to use that 
within a standard judge function. First a simple helper function to set negative numbers to zero and some 
further nomenclature for trees of contradictions.
Definition 7.6.2. Let r e  R  The positive function, denoted pos(r), takes a real number of any value 
and returns a non-negative real number such that ifr  <  0  then pos(r) =  0  else pos(r) =  r.
The arguments in (X, Y):(f> = f ( v )  are subject to attacks from the children of v,  however not every 
child attacks every argument in the parent. The arguments that are attacked are as followed:
1. Let argument I j  be undercut by each v$htld e  {{Vphtld, . . . ,  v^hlld} 
C  {v{hild, . . . ,  v*hild} | I j  C  Zr C  X}.
2. Let argument J* be undercut by each v^hdd e  {{Vghtld, . . . ,  v^htld} 
C { v f ildy. . . ,  v*hild} | I j  C  Zu C  Y}.
3. These distinctions of which child vertices attack which arguments area clarified by the graph:
v, where
f ( v )  =  (X,Y):<j>
..child . child . . . ..child child . . . ,,child . . . ..child vp Ur uq Us Vu Vt
Table 7.3: Tree Nomenclature: Attacks on an Arbitrary Vertex v  in a Debate Tree
Given this nomenclature is it now possible to succinctly define a judge function for the debate tree. 
The two steps o f definition are, firstly to define the strength o f a vertex (which is the same as the strength 
o f the claim of the stripped contradiction of the vertex) and then secondly to use that function in judge 
6.0 .
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Definition 7.6.3. Let A  be a knowledgebase of labelled assumption formulae and let v  € V be 
a vertex in a contradiction tree ♦*((*, A ) =  (V, £ , / , ♦ ( A)). The strength of the proposition 
stripContradiction(/(v)), denoted strength (v, ♦ * (a , A )), is a real number showing the argumentative 
strength of <j> — stripContradiction(/(v)) in its context in the tree such that:
strength (v, ♦*(<*, A ))
=  P° s ( 1 “  P°s(strength(v®/liW, ♦*(<*, A ))) - r  |Zr |)
j =  1 r=p
fc=m u=t
-  ^  pos(l -  2^ pos(strength(v^<w, ♦*(a , A ))) -h |Z„|).
fc=l u=s
The strength of an argument in a leaf vertex v is always 1 (prior to the consideration of rebuttals) 
as it is never weakened by any undercuts. The strength of a leaf vertex, however, is an integer that can 
be either positive, zero or negative depending on rebuttals, i.e. on the cardinalities of X and Y where 
f ( v )  =  (X, Y ) : <j>. Thus the strength o f a leaf vertex in isolation is a direct parallel to the earlier Franklin 
judge.
I now extend the signature of the judge function to include an item of metaknowledge as a third 
parameter that can be passed in. Metaknowledge refers to any additional knowledge available about the 
situation which is not contained in A. Keeping 0  as separate from A  allows A to be the same for all 
judge functions, while the nature of 0  is allowed vary depending on the subscript j .  In the following 
judge, where j is 6.0, the metaknowledge is a threshold which is a real number controlling the filtering 
of noise.
Definition 7.6.4. Let A  be a knowledgebase of labelled assumption formulae, let vroot € V 
be the root vertex in a contradiction tree ♦* (a, A ) =  (V, £ , / ,  6 (A )) and let threshold € R. The 
debate tree judge, denoted judge6 0 (q , A , threshold), is a judge function such that:
a  €  judge6 0 (a , A,threshold) iff strength(vroot, ♦ * (a , A )) >  threshold,
-iq e  judge6 0 (a , A , threshold) iff strength(vroot, A )) >  threshold.
It follows that if strength{vroot, ♦ * (« , A )) <  threshold then a  judge6 0 (q, A , threshold). Like­
wise if strength(vroot, A )) <  threshold then ^  judge6 0(a , A , threshold), so the judge can
never imply inconsistency. The judge threshold thus acts as a filter to remove uncorroborated evidence.
One criticism of this judge, and its underlying strength function, is that it could be said to read more 
into the information relayed by a preclusive undercut than is perhaps strictly valid. A preclusion says 
A or B may be false, which I interpret as meaning that A and B are equally weakened. However when 
more information becomes available it could be that B is flawless and A is false. I would argue that my 
scheme allows for that new information to affect the debate tracking and outcome, but that I make best 
use of the available information.
It would also be valuable to extend this judge to be cumulative. In judging a debate tree a non- 
cumulative judge will look at only one motion a  and may produce an outcome that is inconsistent with
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other debates run on the same knowledgebase. A cumulative judge would have to be more sophisticated 
in examining many motions and hence is left as an area for future research.
7.7 Reflection and Quantitative Judge Outcomes
I approach this question of ‘Are quantitative judges skewed by reflection?’ in two steps, firstly by looking 
at the situation with reflection and then without reflection. While I focus on Example 6.5.1 to show 
the impact o f reflection, further examples of reflection changing judge outcomes when judged with a 
quantitative judge involve applying my judge to Examples 6.3.1 and 6.3.3. In Example 6.3.1 the outcome 
with reflection, following the approach of an argument tree cast into a tree of contradictions by cast two 
and judged with my judge is the empty set, but once reflection is removed the outcome changes from 0 
to a  - effectively the chain of two arguments becomes a chain of three arguments. In Example 6.3.3 the 
outcome changes from a  with reflection to 0 without.
7.7.1 Situation with Reflection and Quantitative Judgement
Rather than give a formal definition of cast two the following example should be simple enough for the 
mapping to be clear - and as proof by example is being used a general cast two function is not required. 
If there is a future need for such a cast two function in the further research of reflection then clearly a 
general definition would be necessary. Judge 7.0 is defined as the combination of cast two and judge 6.0.
Example 7.7.1. This example reuses the knowledgebase of Example 6.5.1 and the resultant argument 
tree on the left of Figure 6.8. Thus A  =  { a : (3, b : (3 —» a , c : 7 , d : 7  —» ->(3, e : (3 A 7r A -<7 , / :  ir —> ((3 —►
a),g:->0 V ^ 7r V 7  V -i(7r -► (/?-> a ) ) }  and I  =  {0 , 6}, J =  { c , d } , K  =  { e , f } , L  =  {e}, M  =  {p}. 
This example then casts that argument structure into a tree of contradictions using the cast two function. 
It is not a debate tree as it contains reflection. The casting in this case produces a single tree. The 
example then judges that tree with the quantitative judge 6.0 of Definition 7.6.4. The resultant tree, 
annotated with vertex strengths, is shown as Figure 7.3. As the mot strength is 1 the judge outcome is 
that the motion is carried so the annotated tree shows that judge7 0 (a , A , 0) =  a.
Vrooti f  {Vroot) — ({-0» ® str6 ngth(vroo$, ^ (ck, A )) =  1
v i j ( v i )  =  < { J } , 0 ) : - ( / ?  A ( / ? - > a O )  strength(vi, ♦*(<*, A )) =  0
V2 J M  =  < { L } , 0 } : - ( 7  A (7 -► -./?)) strength^ , ♦* (a, A )) =  1
Figure 7.3: Argument Structure cast by Cast Two - Contains Reflection - Outcome a
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7.1.2 Situation without Reflection and Quantitative Judgement
Now I provide the final example in this set of four.
Exam ple 7.7.2. This example reuses the knowledgebase o f  Example 6.5.1 and the resultant debate tree 
seen on the right o f  Figure 6 .8 . Thus A  = {a: (3, b:(3 —► a ,  0 :7 , d : j  —> -i/3, e : ^ A 7rA-<7 , / : 7r —> {(3 —> 
ai),g:->0 V  ->7r V 7  V  - .(*  —► (/5 —► a ) ) }  and I  = { a , b } , J  =  { c , d } , K  =  { e , / } , L  =  { e } , M  =  {5 }. 
77ns example covers the normal situation that I  recommend fo r  professional debate and also as is used 
fo r  my design o f  Section 8.5. It is my standard debate tree judged by my judge. No casting is involved.
Vroot, f  (Vroot) =  ({ /} , 0) strength (vroot, ♦*(<*, A )) =  0
{/}
v i J M  = { { J } , { K } ) : ^ ( ( 3  A ( 0  -► a)) streng th^!, ♦* (a , A )) =  1
{ K }
V2 , f ( v 2 ) =  ({M } ,0 ) A 7r A - 1 7  A (7r —» (0  —► a))) strength(v2, ♦ * (a, A )) =  1
Figure 7.4: Debate Tree - W ithout Reflection - Outcome 0
These two examples show quantitative judge outcomes of a  with reflection and 0 without reflection, 
establishing that quantitative judgement too is affected by reflection.
That concludes this outlining of the need for further research into the effects of reflection. The 
next chapter will touch on another possible source of reflection, that o f extending an argumentation 
framework to have a ‘bipolar’ nature.
7.8 Closing Remarks and Conclusion for How To Judge a Debate
This chapter provides the preliminary result, given certain assumptions, that reflection can change debate 
outcomes - as illustrated by reanalysis o f earlier Examples 6.3.1, 6.3.3 and 6.5.1. The existence of 
changes to debate outcomes appears to be the case regardless of whether quantitative or existential judges 
are used. More research is warranted to go more deeply into this point. Even in the simplest o f debates 
the nature and number of all the reflections becomes a complex matter that is hard to compute manually 
in a way that provides confidence o f completeness. A computer is thus required even for relatively simple 
debates.
It is my ‘matt opaque contradiction tree’, which for short I call a ‘debate tree’ that I propose as a 
practical tool for tracking all o f the arguments in a debate whilst avoiding redundancy. The debate tree 
is the basis of the mature judgement o f Section 7.6 and the tool design of Section 8.5.
The above list summarises the judge functions defined and discussed in this thesis. Another judge 
of importance in the literature and not in the above list is called ‘net support’. Net support is documented
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Judge Function Definition Reference N ature
judge10(a , A ,0 ) Definition 2.7.4 (Benferhat et al., 1993) Existential
judge2 0 (a , A ,0 ) Definition 2.7.5 Franklin (Willcox & Bridgewater, 1977) Quantitative
judge2 i(a ,  A ,0 ) not formally defined Franklin plus undercut Quantitative
judge3 0(a , A , 0) Definition 7.5.2 (Garcia & Simari, 2004) Existential
judge4 0 (a , A ,0 ) cast one + judge3 0() Extends (Garcia & Simari, 2004) Existential
judge50(a , A ,0 ) Definition 7.6.1 (Besnard & Hunter, 2001) Quantitative
judge6 0(a , A , threshold) Definition 7.6.4 This thesis Quantitative
judge70(a , A , 0) cast two + judge6 o() Extends Definition 7.6.4 Quantitative
Table 7.4: Judge Functions in Thesis; 1.0 and 2.0 are Undercut Unaware
in (Fox & Das, 2000) and mentioned in several earlier papers by Fox et al. Net support is an enhanced 
from of the Franklin judge, judge2 0(<*, A , 0). W hile this judge is not undercut aware it has been used in 
production argumentation applications for the U K ’s National Health Service.
Finally I would suggest that identifying and proving potential applications for the quantitative 
argumentation-based debate tracking and judging functions described in this thesis would be a area 
of future research warranting attention. This quantitative approach has the key benefit of being better 
able to resolve stalemates, i.e. inconsistencies, than approaches which ignores the number of arguments 
and are only sensitive to the existence of arguments. Clearly more work is needed on the theoretical 
underpinnings of the quantitative approach, however the use of quantitative methods in practical debates 
is a good motivation for further investigation and application.
Chapter 8
Conclusion and Discussion
This first part o f this chapter summarises areas for further research and dwells on the framework refine­
ment of assisting arguments drawn from the bipolar approach. The chapter then touches on the design 
of an implementation. The latter part o f the chapter goes on to draw conclusions about the contributions 
made herein. This is a discussion chapter so any new concepts introduced are not particularly formal, 
thereby leaving their formalisation as an area o f further research.
8.1 Overview of Chapter
The body of this chapter is made up o f six sections:
Further Research Section 8.2 summarises, with a little discussion, areas for further research 
drawing from the many earlier suggestions throughout this thesis.
Short List Section 8.3 provides a short list of areas, taken from the previous section, that are 
likely to be particularly interesting and fruitful for research. These topics could potentially provide 
valuable contributions to the field.
Assisting Arguments Section 8.4 describes a possible and desirable framework refinement to 
cover an assisting relationship between arguments to compliment the more established attacking 
relationship.
Implementation Section 8.5 outlines the design of a tool that tracks and judges debates. It is 
intended to be operated by a skilled facilitator in support o f a group of professionals engaged in a 
professional debate.
Design Rationale Section 8 . 6  suggests the utility of this tool for the areas of decision rationale, 
design rationale, decision trade-off and design trade-off. A worked example is given of decision 
rational taken from the field of corporate acquisition.
Contributions and Limitations Section 8.7 summarises the various contributions made by this 
thesis and examines their strengths and weaknesses. A useful angle for describing the weaknesses 
has been to identify the limitations of contributions, which in turn folds back to the areas of further 
research.
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O f these areas I am most drawn to developing an implementation and using it in real professional 
debates, with the aim of then clarifying requirements and obtaining insight into which areas for future 
research that would be most useful.
8.2 Areas for Further Research
I now summarise the areas for further research identified in earlier chapters. I then pick out a few which I 
feel are particularly important. The sequence of presentation here is the same as the sequence of chapters 
in the thesis, and is not sorted by gravity or import.
Introduction - Chapter 1. The introduction made clear that several topics are outside the scope of in­
vestigation of this thesis. They can therefore be seen as major topics for further research.
Computational Complexity. There are a number of facets to the computations presented herein 
that would merit investigation. Finding all o f the arguments for a claim is crucial, however if 
there is also a need to find all o f the confirmations or all of the contradictions for a particular 
knowledgebase then these too would merit quantification. A starting place likely to yield 
results would be to map the work of Dunne and Bench-Capon onto that of this thesis.
Algorithms and Heuristics. Algorithms and heuristics is a promising argumentation topic as it 
appears to be possible to transform apparently intractable problems into ones that are man­
ageable. Work here could commence by investigating the research by Efstathiou and Hunter, 
integrating it in with that of this thesis.
Dialectical Analysis. The idea of optimising the winning of debates by controlling the choice 
and sequence of arguments presented merits further research. Further work could either 
follow the legal path, building on writings o f Prakken and Sartor or it could take a purer form 
following in the wake of such authors as Dung, Kowalski and Toni.
Priorities or Preferences. Again a huge area for future research in argumentation, priorities 
could be worked into the approach of this thesis. Leaders in this field to draw from would be 
Modgil, Amgoud and Cayrol.
Probabilities or Possibilities. Casual observers from outside the academic discipline of argu­
mentation often comment that its greatest weakness is not being able to handle different 
weights o f arguments. The idea that one argument can be stronger than another, and to pro­
vide some numeric ratio of their strengths is not well developed in the formal argumentation 
literature. Clearly my thesis touches a little on this topic by determining the weight of a 
proposition, however, observers talk of adding weights to the knowledgebase and also to 
the arguments derived from the knowledgebase, not just to the conclusions of debates. This 
facet o f argumentation is particularly under-developed, with only elementary pointers for fu­
ture direction having been provided by such authors as McBumey, Chesnevar, Simari, Godo, 
Haenni, Kohlas and Lehmann.
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Basic Framework - Chapter 2. The most useful area for further research in this chapter is probably the 
notion of extending the basic framework to other logics, notably first order predicate logic. Others 
include the following:
•  Explore the algebra of labels within this labelled deductive system, especially for explanation 
and provenance.
•  Subsume other published argumentation frameworks.
•  Extend the framework to cover first order predicate logic. This may be a challenging piece 
of work, however it could yield valuable results.
•  Extend the framework to cover other logics, such as defeasible, temporal and modal logics. 
This would be likely to be a large piece of work which could yield interesting results.
•  Use a part of each assumption label to track which agent or expert originated that assumption.
•  Relate confirmation to the concept o f ‘extensions to a theory’ in abstract argumentation. The 
basic insight here for this item o f research is minor, however any insights into how to better 
link abstract and concrete argumentation are likely to be welcomed by the field.
•  Identify a more succinct way to define confirmations and related aggregations. While im­
proving the basic definitions here is a good idea this point is unlikely to yield profound 
results.
•  Exploring differences, similarities and a possible integration between a) judge functions as 
proposed herein and b) Dung semantics would be a particularly useful area for further re­
search.
Undercut Framework - Chapter 3. It is surprising to me that the literature contains so little consensus 
on precisely what constitutes an undercut. I would be keen to know just how useful or constraining 
the various approaches to undercut documented in this thesis are when applied to professional 
debates with human debaters.
•  More research could be done to further compare and contrasting Wigmore, Pollock, canoni­
cal and preclusive undercuts.
•  Review the literature further to see if  there are any other published forms of undercut.
•  Analyse bridging assumptions between concrete and abstract argumentation approaches. 
This examination could focus on bridges to and from the mincon classical form of con­
crete argumentation. The initial investigation of bridging assumptions could be without a 
consideration of reflection.
•  How abstract argumentation could be extended or refined to incorporate the practical reality 
of preclusion is an interesting question. I call this idea ‘abstract preclusion’.
Reflection Between Arguments - Chapter 4. I find it surprising that no one else has documented re­
flection before, albeit that there are pointers in this direction coming from Besnard, Hunter, Dung,
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Kowalski and Toni. It is the implications of reflection for judging debates or evaluating semantics 
that I find most fascinating. Specific points identified earlier for further research are:
•  Questions around the existence or possible existence of reflection in other argumentation 
frameworks from the literature are likely to be quite important. The ABA framework is a 
valuable place to start as this thesis examines only one instance of ABA. Note that the bulk 
of this thesis, except for Section 4.3, is not precisely an instance of ABA due to differences 
in the definition to attack.
-  W hat other forms of reflection exist within the ABA framework?
-  W hat are the minimum sets o f proof rules needed for each form of reflection?
-  W hat alternative minimum sets of proof rules can be used to show each reflection?
-  Which of the non-monotonic logics that are special cases of the ABA framework permit 
which forms of reflection?
-  Which semantics are affected by the observation that given the right prerequisites each 
attacked argument is automatically subject to counterattack and thus reinstatement?
-  Which of the semantics referred to in ABA papers are affected by the existence o f which 
forms of reflection and what is the effect?
•  Defeasible logics may also contain reflection and therefore also warrant such evaluation.
•  An area for further research would be to generalise all o f the reflection functions in this thesis 
to include Wigmore and Pollock undercuts as well as canonical and preclusive undercuts. 
W hile this would make the topic tidier from an intellectual perspective it could, however, 
make it even more complicated and harder to understand.
•  It would be worth deepening the understanding of bridging assumptions in the light of re­
flection between arguments.
Reflection Between Confirmations - Chapter 5. It should be emphasised that what gives reflection 
merit for further research is the behaviour of reflections between confirmations.
•  O f key interest is the question of whether there are further forms of reflection beyond those 
described herein.
•  Proving that all forms of reflection have been identified would be of particular value.
•  Deepening the understanding o f the various forms of reflection, both identified herein and 
possible others, is important.
•  One specific question is to examine more closely the role of labels in scaling and see which 
scaling situations would not occur if labels were removed.
•  A broader question is to return to the issue of scaling and see if there are any robust ways of 
catering for it while still allowing reflected arguments to exist within the debate tracking. I 
have to admit that I feel this is unlikely theoretically, and unlikely to be helpful in applications
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as a) filtering out reflections is fundamentally easy and b) including them clutters debates 
making them hard to follow.
•  One possible area for future research would be to investigate more fully the properties of 
an abstract confirmation attacks functions, including reflected confirmation attacks, direct 
confirmation attacks and maximal direct confirmation attacks. Such an approach might build 
on the work of Dung, working at at abstract level of attacks, but employing confirmations 
rather than individual arguments as the graph nodes. This point would build on that of 
abstract preclusion mentioned earlier in this section.
Tracking a Debate - Chapter 6. From the perspective of the application of argumentation to profes­
sional debate, the question of how best to track a debate is particularly important. The survey 
(Kirschner et al., 2003) shows a variety of ideas in this field, and comparison of that survey with 
the more formal research, for example at COMMA ’08, shows quite a contrast between informal 
and formal approaches.
•  Study the debate tracking trees and graphs in the literature and establish definitively which 
contain which types of reflection and which, if any, are free of such reflections. I flag this 
item as important.
•  This analysis should clearly include any further forms of reflection not described herein.
•  A  more robust approach, with a stronger theoretical basis, is needed to select the form of the 
vertices and edges of the optimum debate tracking tree.
•  As is common in Al, one form of tree and graph may not be ideal for all applications, so it is 
worthy to qualify under what conditions which form is most suited.
•  The properties o f the debate tree should be better understood.
•  One specific focus is to investigate the dialogue tree of (Amgoud & Cayrol, 2002) and see if 
the abstract proof procedures presented there can be more closely combined with the concrete 
argumentation and attack forms discussed in the same paper.
•  The question of what no recycling constraint (NRC) is best to keep a debate tracking tree 
finite merits work.
-  Should the NRC be distinct from the mechanism that filters out reflection or is overlap 
acceptable?
-  Is one form of NRC good for all applications or are different NRCs best for different 
situations?
-  How profoundly and in what specific ways does the choice of NRC affect the behaviour 
and properties of debate tracking trees?
•  The topic of syntax sensitivity merits further research: to what degree and in what ways does 
the way the knowledgebase is written affect the form of the debate tracking tree or graph?
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Judging a Debate - Chapter 7. My own view is that the definition of judge functions and the way to 
select the optimum judge function for a particular application is surprisingly underdeveloped in 
the literature. I suggest that the role of reflection in the process of judgement is a fundamental step 
to get right, before other subtleties of judgem ent can be properly evaluated.
•  Does reflection affect debate outcomes?
-  When judged with a quantitative judge?
-  How to best structure an existential judge for a tree or forest?
-  When judged with an existential judge?
-  How to better cast between different forms of debate tracking tree?
-  How to better cast between debate tracking graphs and trees?
•  How can these questions be proved definitively for all cases and not just with an example of 
a single case?
•  Assuming there is a provable effect, can the situations and boundaries where the effect occurs 
and doesn’t occur be better understood?
•  Are there ways to better motivate, formalise and place on a stronger theoretical under-footing 
the area of judgement, judge properties and metaknowledge.
•  Identify and formalise further judge properties, both desirable and undesirable.
•  Deepen the understanding of cumulativity.
8.3 Further Research Shortlist
Although a number of these items suggest building stronger bridges with the abstract and semi-abstract 
forms of argumentation I would suggest the particularly interesting areas are where the work of this 
thesis takes a radically different direction from abstract and semi-abstract work. This thesis brings to 
awareness and even to question several basic assumptions which the abstract and semi-abstract work 
appears to be making. These apparent abstract assumptions which I ponder over include:
Abstract preclusion. In abstract argumentation an argument can only attack one argument, not more 
than one argument. My preclusive undercuts, however, attack more than one argument.
Confirmation graphs and contradiction graphs. Vertices in a debate tracking graph should be single 
arguments, not confirmations or contradictions. The debate tree and related motivational work on 
preclusions brings this assumption into question.
Graded defeat. An argument is either fully defeated or fully undefeated. This rigid binary simplicity 
does not seem to fit well with the intuitions of quantitative judges both herein and in the informal 
and formal literature.
Judgement of claims. Judging arguments is considered to be important in the abstract literature, 
whereas judging claims is not. Professional debates and the judges discussed focus on the claim 
or motion not on any particular argument or set of arguments.
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There appears to have grown up an acceptance of the ‘semantics’ approach with its ‘extensions to 
a theory’ as the way to judge debates. In contrast, theoretical work on judging motions in professional 
debates is considerably less developed. I agree that the work on semantics has a profound mathematical 
elegance, however, from the needs of applications I would suggest more be done to create robust formal 
underpinnings for quantitative judging with its graded defeat and preclusions.
My view is that papers on the semantics approach are perhaps a bit too ready to accept stalemates 
yielding the empty set and not so well equipped in resolving stalemates and hence in resolving inconsis­
tency. If there are many arguments both for and against a claim then I would suggest that the full defeat 
of a subset of individual arguments via undercut should not be the only mechanism available to decide 
the overall status of that claim.
In concluding this shortlist, I flag this area that questions the underpinnings of abstract argumenta­
tion and its semantics as probably the most valuable one for future research highlighted by this thesis.
8.4 Assisting Arguments
The topic of catenate inferences and what I call assisting arguments, touched upon in Sections 2.4.1 and 
7.3.8, merits further development not least because it is quite prevalent in the informal argumentation 
literature. Wigmore appears to have been the first to introduce the distinction between ‘affirmatory and 
negatory’ forces of arguments within a debate (Wigmore, 1937; Twining, 1985; Reed & Rowe, 2006). 
Also, see the more recent (Kirschner et al., 2003) for an argumentation visualisation survey with many 
examples of works using informal assisting arguments. This notion has also begun to be explored in 
the formal argumentation literature (Amgoud et al., 2004; Cayrol & Lagasquie-Schiex, 2005) where the 
topic is now commonly referred to as ‘bipolarity’. As outlined in Section 7.3.8 my conceptual approach 
to ‘bipolarity’ is to view confirmation as one form of positive argument interaction and assist as a second 
form of positive argument interaction, as summarised in Table 8 .1 below.









Table 8.1: Summary of Bipolar Functions
Thus rebuttal can be viewed as a claim-to-claim negative relationship and confirmation as a claim- 
to-claim positive relationship. Likewise undercut is a claim-to-premises negative relationship and assist 
a claim-to-premises positive relationship. The following brief but formal examination shows these as­
sisting arguments to have some perhaps counter-intuitive properties that make them not quite as straight­
forward as might initially appear. My findings reinforce the general controversy in the literature over the 
wisdom of including bipolarity into an argumentation framework. My suggestion is that although, from 
a user requirements perspective, they are highly desirable (see (Kirschner et al., 2003) for support for 
this point of view), more work is required to create a concrete bipolar argumentation framework where
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assisting arguments have intuitive behaviour.
The avenue I suggest pursuing in this formalisation is that of ‘assisting arguments’ as follows: 
given an argument {/3, /? —* a }  K a  then the argument {7 , 7  —» 0 }  b  0  is an assisting argument. It is an 
assisting argument because it reinforces one of the assumptions of the original argument.
Assisting argument definitions could be formalised to match and extend any or each of the undercut 
definitions covered in Chapter 3. The Wigmore assist would be a variant on the Wigmore undercut, see 
Definition 3.2.1, the Pollock assist a variation o f the Pollock Undercut, Definition 3.2.2, the canonical 
assist would build on the canonical undercut o f Definition 3.3.2 and the preclusive assist would build on 
preclusive undercut Definition 3.4.2. To transform one of these undercut definitions into an assist defi­
nition would primarily be a matter of removing the negation symbol. This simple approach in isolation 
might not be that satisfactory for canonical and preclusive assists as the assisting argument would need 
a consequent of the conjunction o f all the premise formulae of the assisted argument, which would be 
a challenging requirement to meet in real world debates. Hence the subset or equals sign approach of 
the Pollock undercut would seem to be more appropriate than the conjunction of the full support of the 
suggested canonical and preclusive assists. Hence:
Definition 8.4.1. Let A  be a knowledgebase o f  labelled assumption formulae, and let I : a , J  :<j> 1 A . . .  A 
4>n €  arguments(A).
J : <f>i A . . .  A (f>n is a Pollock assist o f  I : a  iff{4> 1 , . . . ,  (f>n} Q stripAssumptions(formulae(/, A )).
I call J : <f>i A . . .  A (f>n the assisting argument and I : a  the assisted argument. I say that this pair 
I : a , J  : (f>\ A . . .  A (f)n form an assisting chain of arguments. Given this intuitive definition of assist, 
which would appear to match the informal usage in (Kirschner et al., 2003) for example in its Villawood 
‘one person one jo b ’ example, it can be seen that several issues arise. These issues would need to be 
addressed before such assists could become part o f the framework and part of some yet to be defined 
‘bipolar debate tree’. The first issue is the potential o f inconsistency in the chain of assisting arguments 
as illustrated in Example 2.4.5, which I call catenate inconsistency. The second issue is that of a form 
of reflection that could be called a Type V Reflection, which I define as follows:
Definition 8.4.2. Let A  be a knowledgebase o f  labelled assumption formulae. The set o f  reflected 
arguments of the fifth type arising from  the assist o f  J : (3 on I : a, denoted reflects( J  : (3 , I :a ,  A), is 
such that:
reflects(J:/3 ,1  :a , A )
=  { K : a  e  arguments(A) |
I : a , J : 0 £  arguments(A),
J  :0  is a Pollock assist o f  I  .a ,
K  C  (7 U  J) a n d K ^ I } .
In this definition it can be seen that the reflected argument K  : a  and the argument at the head of 
the chain I : a  have the same claim, a.  Thus there are at least two members, { / } :  a , { K } : a,  of 0(c*, A)
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making it appear that there is more evidence for a  than there actually is - which is an issue. Here is an 
example:
Exam ple 8.4.1. Let  A  =  { a : 0 , b : 0  —> a ,  c : 7 ,  d : 7  —> 0}. Given the assisted argument {a, 6}: a  and 
the assisting argument {c, d ] : 0  there exists the Type V reflected argument { b, c, d } : a. So in this example
0  is both an assumption o f  one argument {a, 6}: a  which is the assisted argument and a claim o f another 
{c, d } : 0  which is the assisting argument. Furthermore it can be seen that {{&, c, d } } : a , {{a , b } } : a  E 
0 ( a ,  A ) thereby suggesting that there is more evidence fo r  a  than might be intuitively thought.
As shown earlier, any such redundancy can have an effect on the conclusions of existential or 
quantitative judges. If  the chain of assisting arguments is longer than two members the number of Type 
V Reflections permutations increases rapidly.
Further research is needed to analyse this and other possible kinds of reflection that may occur with 
assists and to prove that they always exist, given their prerequisites. Further research is also needed on 
the optimal nomenclature to show assisting arguments. A useful destination for this further research 
would be to provide a bipolar debate tree, together with any supporting definitions needed to make it 
robust in practical use.
8.5 Implementation
1 now propose a software design to implement my theory as a tool to support professional debate. My 
tool’s goals are, relative to manual methods, to reach conclusions that are a) better-thought through and
b) less error prone, with c) a documented audit trail in d) a more efficient fashion. The emphasis is not 
on either side trying to win, but rather on ensuring that all involved are well informed and on deepening 
the collective understanding of the problem at hand.
There exist several implementations of automated argumentation tools, for example Oscar by 
Pollock, (Pollock, 1992; Pollock, 2000), Verheij’s Argue! (Verheij, 1998) and ArguMed, (Verheij, 
1999), Reed’s Araucaria (Reed & Rowe, 2004), Gaertner and Toni’s CaSAPI (Gaertner & Toni, 2007), 
Krause, Bryant and Vreeswijk Argue tuProlog (Bryant et al., 2006) and the Aspic software from 
www.argumentation.org. All o f these tools have applicability to debate tracking and judging, however 
none of them appear to incorporate reflection as analysed herein.
The only absolute distinction between my design and others that have been developed in this area 
is thus that this one is aware of reflection. Relative distinctions are that my design is more automatic 
than most (users only have to provide assumptions) while at the same time having more attention to 
argument visualisation and ease of use. Consequently this tool should have a greater ability to resolve 
inconsistency and filter out uncorroborated evidence, making it, arguably, closer to professional debate 
in practice.
O f the broadly comparable tools in the literature, some emphasise the user interface and provide less 
automatic underpinnings (Zeno by (Gordon & Karacapilidis, 1997), Argue! and ArguMed by (Verheij, 
1998; Verheij, 1999; Verheij, 2003) and Araucaria by (Reed & Rowe, 2004)) than my proposed tool. 
In others emphasis is placed on interoperability (Rahwan et al., 2007), which is a worthy but separate
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goal. Yet other tools in the literature have strong automation but less apparent emphasis on ease of 
use via argumentation visualisation (e.g. CaSAPI (Gaertner & Toni, 2007)), or additionally having the 
automation cover the full classical prepositional logic rather than the subset of defeasible reasoning (e.g. 
Oscar (Pollock, 1992; Pollock, 2000)). An area of further research is to obtain copies of these and 
comparable tools and further study their strengths and weaknesses. Two areas (Prakken & Sartor, 2002) 
not tackled by the proposed tool are those of a) automating the procedural control over the flow of the 
debate and b) helping optimise the choice of arguments presented using rhetoric and other means to 
maximise persuasion. The design aim of my tool is also to provide a superior visualisation of the debate, 
both because a) my theory allows a single tree to cover a full debate arguably more richly (by including 
preclusion) and simply (by excluding reflection) than others and b) leveraging recent developments in 
the theory and user interface tooling for argumentation visualisation and information visualisation.
In the proposed tool, the computer does the work of building the tree from assumptions, notably 
computing arguments, confirmations, contradictions (and hence rebuttals), preclusive undercuts, build­
ing the debate tree vertices and edges and also deciding the outcome of the debate. In contrast to some 
approaches in the literature the tool does not require the distinction of proponent and opponent or pros­
ecution and defence. Instead all of the users are debaters, recognising that many professional debates 
involve a large number of stakeholder parties whose needs often form a relatively complex web of com­
plimentary and contradictory points. The tool has no procedural controls thereby avoiding the constraints 
of dialectical approaches with their use o f alternating moves by two players.
I now describe system design in two stages, describing i) the system exterior and ii) the system 
interior. The system exterior section describes the functionality delivered by the tool to its users. I 
use the Unified Modelling Language (UML) approach of use cases to document the system functions. 
The system interior is documented as the components or modules that are needed to deliver the desired 
function. I employ the UML approach of the package diagram to show the system interior. These two 
provide the high level system design, that as a next step must be complimented with a detailed low level 
design, prior to building the system itself.
8.5.1 System Exterior - Use Cases
Each use case is a task or job  performed by a user with assistance from the computer - it is a unit 
of functionality documented here at a fairly high level o f abstraction. I start with a use case diagram 
showing the actors, system boundary, use cases and functional flows that occur outside the system.
Maintain Knowledgebase. A key job  of the facilitator is to maintain the knowledgebase. He or she 
does this by listening to proposed assumptions from the debaters and then mapping the assumptions into 
the language of the knowledgebase. Within this use case there are several aspects including maintaining 
the list of debaters, each with the debater’s full name and initials. Each assumption in the knowledgebase 
is associated with the initials of the debater who proposed it and a unique assumption label number. An 
assumption is built from a combination of one or more ‘atomic formulae’ connected by zero or more 
logical operators to make a ‘compound formula’. All atomic formulae are also valid compound formulae. 
The logical operators are ‘and’, ‘or’, ‘negation’ and ‘implication’. Brackets are also available to show
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Propose Assumption 
Propose View Change 




Maintain Debate Motion 
Modify Presentation View 
(plus all other user cases)
View Knowledgebase 
View Arguments 
View Debate Tree 
View Judgement
Figure 8.1: Use Case Diagram o f a Debate Facilitation Tool
precedence explicitly. Each atom has a symbol plus a linguistic gloss, where the gloss is a phrase or 
sentence o f ordinary English. Thus each assumption also has a gloss built up from the gloss of the atoms
cover adding, editing and deleting assumptions.
Maintain Debate Motion. Each and every debate has to have a motion. The motion is an atomic 
or compound formula, which is separate from the knowledgebase and from the set of arguments as the 
motion is neither an assumption nor a deduction. The default situation is to have one motion, however 
it is also possible to have more than one motion under debate at a time, with the given that all motions 
under debate are underpinned by the same knowledgebase. It is typically only at the outset of the debate 
that the facilitator selects the motion. One way to select a motion is to enter one or more assumptions into 
the knowledgebase, allow the system to create the desired argument from those assumptions and then 
use the resultant claim as the motion of the debate. Hence selecting the motion is not a time consuming 
part of the facilitators job.
Modify Presentation View. Another key part of the facilitator’s job is to modify the presentation 
view seen by all users, i.e. the single view that is shared by the debaters and facilitator. I envision that 
a projector, or more specifically a bank o f three projectors, be used to show the debate tracking on walls 
or large screens so all see the same information. Controlling the view assists in controlling the focus and 
flow of the debate. The presentation view is modified i) by changing which window is at the front and 
therefore not obscured and ii) by panning (i.e. scrolling) and zooming. When a three dimensional view 
of the debate tree is employed then it is also possible to move the position of the viewer and to modify 
the direction the viewer is looking in.
The view has the following windows or visible items: 1) list of debaters (with short name and 
full name), 2) list of atomic formulae (with symbol and gloss), 3) knowledgebase 4) arguments (with 
assumptions and claim), 5) confirmations built from arguments with the same claim, showing maximum 
cardinality confirmations, 6) contradictions showing rebuttals between confirmations and hence rebuttals 
between arguments, 7) preclusive undercuts and most importantly 8) the debate tree.
and logical operators it is comprised of. The word ‘maintain’ in the title of this use case is used here to
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The facilitator also has access to all o f the other user cases in the system and may give verbal 
instructions to the debaters to pause or continue debating while he or she catches up with the data entry 
and view adjustment.
Mew Knowledgebase. The knowledgebase is a list o f assumptions represented as compound for­
mulate built from atomic formulae and logical connectives (each having proposer, compound logic sym­
bols and computed gloss). The knowledgebase is displayed as a table and a choice may be made to see 
a more textual or a more mathematical view. A fully textual view would require further work in the area 
of natural language, but a more mathematical view might confuse some users. One workaround would 
be to allow the facilitator to edit the textual gloss of assumptions and arguments to make them into more 
everyday English.
View Arguments. Given the set o f assumptions, the system determines what arguments follow. 
The list of arguments can be filtered to either show a) by default, just those direct arguments that actually 
appear in the debate tree or trees under debate or b) those in a) plus all o f the reflected arguments that 
have been pruned out o f debate tree or trees under debate or c) all practical arguments that are derivable 
from the knowledgebase. More research will be needed to define the term ‘practical’; here I mean for 
example that if I : a  e  arguments( A ) then /:c*V /3, /  :a:V/?V 7  and I : a  V 7  V @ may not be ‘practical’. 
As the automated derivation of arguments is time consuming any of these lists may not necessarily be 
complete. New arguments are added to the displayed list and may affect the tree and other windows in 
real time as they are computed.
Mew Debate Tree. Central to the abilities o f the system is the display of the debate tree. Different 
levels of granularity of display are available with the ability to focus on contradictions, confirmations, ar­
guments, assumptions, linguistic gloss, claims, assumption labels, deduction labels, confirmation labels, 
rebuttals or preclusive undercuts. The strength of each proposition is shown on the display as computed 
in real time by the judge function. I envision that brightness, seen by the eye as rear illumination by a 
small light bulb, is used to represent the strength o f an argument and strength of a vertex within the tool’s 
visual language.
Mew Judgement. The most important feature of the system is that it shows, in real time, who is 
winning the debate. Whenever a new argument is added to the debate tree then the judgement is re­
evaluated and re-displayed. The judge outcome can be that the motion is carried, defeated or that the 
there is no outcome. No outcome may be due to a stalemate, the absence of compelling evidence (where 
threshold has done its noise filtering work) or just the absence of evidence.
Debaters have no direct hands-on way to control the debating tool, hence they must provide their 
inputs to the facilitator who then enters them into the tool. Proposing assumptions for inclusion in the 
debate is the main way that debaters are allowed to contribute. The system does not allow an argument 
to be entered directly as it derives them from the assumptions given. Debaters are encouraged not to 
propose complete arguments, but if they do it is the facilitators job to break these arguments down into 
assumptions. Debaters may also request the view to be changed. If contributions are occurring more 
rapidly than the facilitator can absorb then the facilitator must request the debaters to pause and be quiet
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until he or she has caught up; a visual cue might assist this pausing.
8.5.2 System Interior - Packages
Now that the system exterior has been described I turn to the system interior and document its high 
level design as a series of packages. The UM L approach of the package diagram is akin a modular or 
component design diagram. My design bridges a) an emphasis on a rich argumentation visualisation 

















Figure 8.2: Package Diagram of a Debate Facilitation Tool
In describing the system interior I relate it to use cases so that the sequence of messaging from 
package to package is explained. Package names here begin with a capital letter. The design within 
the packages is assumed to be an object-oriented class structure. The package to package lines in the 
diagram are somewhat informal as some represent ‘contains’, some the flow of data and others the flow 
of control. Also the direction of flow and whether it is a one way or bidirectional flow is not shown. The 
diagram also does not show the concurrent nature o f multiple processes, with requests passing one way 
and various argument aggregations passing the other along process pipelines.
The tool starts with an empty Knowledgebase and an empty Repository. The Repository contains 
the Knowledgebase and also holds all o f the other information about the debate, most of which can be 
seen listed as other package names.
Motion. The debate motion is initially empty and has to be specified. The motion is held within 
the Repository, but not in the Knowledgebase as that holds only the set of labelled assumption formulae. 
Adding a motion starts with the Data Entry package, and ends with Visualisation displaying the debate’s 
motion. The Data Entry package then talks to the Model, with that communication mediated by Visual­
isation. Model then puts the motion into the Repository for the sake of persistence. Once the motion is
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in Model then the view aspect of Visualisation picks it up and the users see it. At this stage the argument 
generating engine has no assumptions to work on and is thus dormant. The motion does however prime 
the argument generating engine by putting requests in to Argument for sets of assumptions that prove 
or disprove the motion. Throughout this design the passing of events and requests will be handled by 
the observer software design pattern, with listeners registering their interest in classes of event when that 
listener is instantiated.
Model - View - Controller (MVC) Pattern. The MVC pattern is an established way of addressing 
the underpinnings for a rich user interface. The controller, here split between View Control and Data 
Entry, listens to events, namely input events from user input devices, such as mouse and keyboard and 
interprets that input using a state machine that tells it what to do with that input. The Model package 
contains the data to be displayed in a format that is readily accessible and closely matching that needed 
for display. On the one hand the Model can contain everything in the Repository, but it also enhances 
and unpacks that information particularly populating a representation of the virtual three dimensional 
space visible* to the users. The view of MVC manages the display and in this tool takes the form of 
the Visualisation package. The other event driving the controller is when the model changes due to 
argumentation computations. A candidate tool for underpinning the MVC is the Struts package from the 
Apache Software Foundation. MVCs event management will also use the observer pattern.
Visualisation. The visualisation package is built on the metaphors of argumentation visualisation 
and information visualisation to provide an easy to understand graphical user interface. Information 
visualisation, see for example (Chalmers, 2003), is a collection of user interface design techniques that 
deliver an information-rich display of many inter-related series of data at one time. Thus there are multi­
ple dimensions o f data shown concurrently, some of which are visually modelled as the three dimensions 
of space. Such visualisation allows users to more quickly gain an intuitive grasp of complex data sets. 
The information involved in tracking and judging a debate is a good example of such a complex data 
set. Argumentation visualisation can be seen as specialisation within information visualisation focussed 
on how to best display the debate tracking and judging information so that it is a) usable, i.e. easy 
to understand and b) useful, i.e. that productivity gains are achieved from the system. The landmark 
book (Kirschner et al., 2003) provides several user interface metaphors; I particularly like the displays 
of Chapter 5 on the Villawood example, especially the one on page 113, as one way of seeing the debate 
tree. Much of the argument tool literature focusses on the level of showing isolated or individual argu­
ments, but an important exception is (Reed & Rowe, 2006) that advocates using Wigmore’s approach to 
tracking a debate in a diagram.
The ArgDF documentation (Rahwan et al., 2007) suggests a rich three-dimensional way of show­
ing a tree of arguments is to have the root at the centre of a sphere and the other vertices positioned to 
be spread neatly across the surface o f a series of concentric spheres. I propose adopting visualisation 
that builds on the sphere style and within that the simplicity of the Villawood approach. OpenGL is a 
candidate graphics library to support these two and three dimensional display metaphors, because of its 
support for lighting and perspective. OpenGL provides an application programming interface (API) for a
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rich library of graphics primitives and has bindings to the prevalent languages. Another candidate graph­
ics library is the more recent evolution on top of OpenGL contained in the Apple Macintosh Leopard 
operating system, known as Core Animation.
Adding Assumptions to Knowledgebase. The next step in the debate is for assumptions to be 
added. The MVC takes care of assumption entry along the same lines as motion entry, with the distinc­
tion that assumptions are stored in the Knowledgebase. There is merit in using an extensible mark-up 
language (XML) format for arguments, notably Argument Markup Language (AML) originating from 
SRI International, as used in Araucaria and employed by Douglas Walton, the Open University and oth­
ers. While the main benefit is interoperability, the use of XML also makes for easy to understand and 
evolve persistence. The Repository, and its sub-components Knowledgebase and Motion, are therefore 
sensibly to be implemented with XML. I am minded to use an XML database, noting however that 
the compute intensive, more real-time, elements of the system probably should not be making frequent 
accesses to XML. A candidate XML database is the open source Xindice from the Apache Software 
Foundation. As assumptions are added to the Knowledgebase the argument generating engine is able to 
move from dormant to active.
Connection Graph. The construction of arguments begins with the Connection Graph package, 
passes through Support Tree and delivers its result as instances of Argument. The pattern employed 
here is factory. The connection graph concept was introduced by (Kowalski, 1975). The main purpose 
of the Connection Graph package is to transform the knowledgebase into a structure which is more 
amenable to searching for the basis of arguments. A basic feature of classical logic is that any formula, 
however complex, can be represented as an equivalent disjunction of literals, known as a clause, where 
a literal is an atomic formula or the negation of an atomic formula. The support of any argument can 
then be represented as a conjunction of these disjunctive clauses; this standardisation or normalisation 
of formulae is commonly known as conjunctive normal form (CNF). Thus the first step of processing 
in the Connection Graph package is to use a small set o f standards proof rules to render a copy of the 
knowledgebase into CNF, and to maintain a map between the elements in knowledgebase and CNF items.
The second step of processing in this package is to build a graph, called the connection graph, see 
(Kowalski, 1975), with the CNF formulae as its vertices. The graph edges are provided by a preattacks 
function, which means that there is a potential logical relationship between the two vertices. If, for 
example, one vertex only referred to n  and p  and a second vertex only referred to A and 7  then there 
would be no edge between them. Having a preattacks relationship is necessary but not a sufficient 
condition for participation in a valid argument. W hile the paper (Efstathiou & Hunter, 2008) describes a 
number of graphs and trees involved in the production of arguments, the special feature of the Connection 
Graph is that it is the only one that is common to all arguments and all claims. Thus maintaining this 
data structure as separate from the claim specific structures has merit.
Whenever the knowledgebase is changed the contents of Connection Graph have to be automatically 
updated so that the two remain synchronised. Change here could mean the addition or deletion of a 
formula or the revision of an existing formula. The Connection Graph is persisted over the life of the
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debate. In a typical debate the assumption formulae can be expected to arrive in an asynchronous fashion 
with many seconds or minutes between each change. Hence the computational task is not to build a 
large graph from scratch, but rather to incrementally grow and revise an existing graph, and hence the 
compute times for revision can be expected to be slightly better than the complete computation times 
given in (Efstathiou & Hunter, 2008); I would suggest that benchmarking is warranted, particularly for 
the range 100 >  | A | >  30.
Support TVee. The Support Tree package has inputs of i) the connection graph and ii) the claim of 
arguments to be found and an output o f valid mincon arguments for that claim. A feature of this package 
is that it is able to find all o f the arguments for a given claim derivable from the knowledgebase. The 
output can of course can be no arguments. The package is able to tell when it has the complete set of 
arguments for a claim. The package is also able to compute arguments in a considerably more efficient 
fashion than brute force examination of every subset o f the knowledgebase.
Whenever the knowledgebase changes this package recomputes the set of arguments for each claim. 
Usually that recomputation yields additional arguments, but if formulae have been deleted or revised in 
the knowledgebase then this recomputation can result in the removal of previously valid arguments. A 
second aspect o f this computation is that for large knowledgebases (with say in excess of 50 formulae) 
it can take a long time so additional arguments for a claim can be produced at virtually any time during 
a debate. A benchmark presented in (Efstathiou & Hunter, 2008) is that the computation time of the 
work I have described for the Connection Graph and Support Tree packages moves from the human 
perception of instantaneous processing time to that o f perceivable processing time at around 30 formulae 
on a modest computer. My own evaluations of professional debate shows that 40 formulae is a more 
typical average size for a modest but practical debate, so the process of use of this system will have to 
tolerate the late arrival o f some arguments.
Within Support Tree the processing o f the connection graph is performed in a series of steps, as 
described in (Efstathiou & Hunter, 2008). These steps, if  viewed as a Venn diagram, consist o f a set of 
concentric circles (with the odd exceptions) with the outer circle being the connection graph. Each step 
thus computes a subset o f the output o f the previous step. In order o f increasing specificity the steps are 
called 1) connection graph, 2) attack graph, 3) closed graph, 4) focal graph, 5) query graph, 6 ) presupport 
tree, 7) consistent presupport tree, 8 ) minimal presupport tree, 9) support tree. Consistent support tree 
and minimal support tree are both subgraphs of presupport tree. A support tree is a presupport tree that 
is both consistent and minimal.
One branch of a support tree yields the support for a valid argument for the given claim. Recalling 
Definition 2.4.2 of the mincon argument, consistency of the support is ensured by step 7) above, mini­
mality by step 8 ) and implication of the necessary claim by step 6 ). The chain of responsibility pattern 
is employed in the Support Tree package to underpin this pipeline.
A rgum ent. The first way to understand the Argument package is as a structural element recording 
or holding the form of part of a debate tree. The overall structural form is that one debate tree (in Tree) 
starts with a single formula as its motion (in Motion). The debate tree, recalling Definition 6.7.7, has
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contradictions mapped to vertices (in Contradiction) and preclusive undercuts as edges (in Preclusion). 
The intra-package links are thus part o f the form of the debate tree, showing the relationships between 
structural elements. The next level o f detail is that one contradiction contains one to many arguments (in 
Argument). Each of these structural element packages also contains processing functions, but they relate 
to getting, setting, mapping and the like rather than to the compute intensive tasks. Thus the debate tree 
itself is formed by Tree, Motion, Contradiction, Preclusion and Argument.
The second aspect of the Argument package is that it marshals the creation of arguments, their 
filtering by Reflection and the process o f growing the tree. Each argument is aware of its status as either 
having all of its confirmations, undercuts and rebuttals identified or not. If  it has more of these yet to 
be identified it issues requests to Support Tree to find and instantiate them. Argument is able to create 
many parallel threads, one per claim for arguments sought. Further recent theoretical work in speeding 
and approximating the computation o f arguments is also noted, e.g. (Besnard & Hunter, 2006).
Reflection. The Reflection package examines the tree looking for reflections and then flags each 
argument to show which kinds of reflection it is free from. Only arguments that are free from all kinds 
of reflection from all reflectors are allowed in the tree that is displayed and judged. Thus as Reflection 
examines Tree it interacts with two trees, one that contains reflection and one that is matt-opaque. Conse­
quently Reflection is able to not only examine each part of the reflection-containing tree, but also to issue 
commands to flag each argument with its reflected or direct status, by each type of reflection. These flags 
then control the instantiation of the matt opaque tree. Reflection runs as another asynchronous process 
moving data along one of the pipeline steps from the Knowledgebase to the Visualisation.
Tree. The implemented debate tree corresponds exactly to my mathematical debate tree, with its 
vertices mapped to Contradictions and its edges existing as Preclusions. Edges in the tree are labelled 
to show which target confirmation is attacked within which defending confirmation. All of these links 
between items are achieved with object-oriented references between instantiated objects and also are 
persisted within the XML of the Repository. The recursive composite pattern is used to hold the tree 
itself and thus act as a springboard for recursive programming in population of the tree. The tree also 
delivers the no-recycling constraint checking which is at least a fifth check on argument validity, beyond 
the mincon three and reflection, for validity in a given tree. The constraints to be valid confirmation, 
rebuttal or undercut argument could be seen as further integrity checks. As mentioned under reflection, 
within the Tree packages are two instantiations of contradiction trees, one without reflection (i.e. matt 
opaque) and one with reflection.
Preclusion. The main feature o f the Preclusion package is that each instance creates a pair of links 
to two contradictions, showing the attacker and the defender. A preclusive undercut is also linked to the 
various confirmations of importance: for attacker, target and defending confirmations. Thus edge labels 
are accomplished by means of links. There are separate objects for the three confirmations involved, 
attacker, target and defender, each with a hierarchy of sub-objects for their confirmation, argument and 
assumption labels.
Contradiction. One Contradiction comprises many Arguments. Within Contradiction is confirma­
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tion (not shown in the package diagram). A feature of the Contradiction package is the generation of 
requests to the argument factory as to what claims are being sought. These claims if they result in viable 
arguments will deliver i) confirmations of existing arguments ii) rebuttals of existing arguments and iii) 
preclusive undercuts of existing arguments. Thus each Contradiction (X, Y ) : <j>, exploiting its status as 
part of the tree, has its own ability to increase the cardinalities of X and Y. Each Contradiction also has 
the ability to create new children for itself and thus link those child Contradictions into the Tree. Once a 
Preclusion is validated as being an appropriate part of the tree the established Argument transforms itself 
into a confirmation and then that confirmation transforms itself into a Contradiction. As touched on 
under Reflection, each Argument within each Contradiction has contextual flags to indicate its reflection 
status, so while these flags are manipulated by Reflection they are part of the Tree data structure. Note 
that a particular Contradiction can appear more than once is a Tree and may thus be instantiated more 
than once.
Judgement. The Judge package reads the tree in a parallel way to Reflection, however it is only 
able to see the matt-opaque tree not the one containing reflection. Judge is another asynchronous process 
that recomputes its outcome each time the tree changes, again triggered by the observer pattern. Not all 
of the lines are shown on the package diagram. The main point is that the judgement is not stored as part 
of the Tree, but rather resides in the Model that contains the Tree. Some obvious but unobstructive way 
of showing the current state of the Judgement is necessary within the Visualisation.
8.5.3 Implementation - Next Steps
Interesting follow-on questions are: i) Can the tool and facilitator keep the data entry of assumptions in 
synchronisation with such a team of professionals without too much frustrating pausing? - i.e. do the 
debaters have to wait for data entry? ii) Can the tool give an indicative debate outcome in near-real time 
as the debate develops? - i.e. do the debaters have to wait for the computation of the debate tree? iii) 
W hat is the probability that the outcome is right after four hours? iv) What is the probability that the 
outcome is right after seven full days o f computation? v) What is the probability that the outcome will 
change purely as a function of the computation from debate end to a week or a fortnight later? Other 
key questions are: vi) W hat exactly is the best user interface metaphor to show the debate tree and its 
parts? vii) Do users find the tool-facilitator combination easy to work with? viii) Do users find the tool- 
facilitator combination as useful overall? - i.e. does it increase productivity and improve the quality of 
analysis? Is it perceived as useful ix) during the debate?, x) only at the end of the debate, xi) at the end 
of say a week when more computation has been done and the debate has been written up and xii) some 
time later when the debate tracking and judgement are required for audit or reuse?
These questions have the character o f research rather than development, and require answers before 
widespread application of such debate facilitation tools is likely.
8.6 Decision and Design Rationale and Trade-off
I suggest the areas of decision and design rationale and trade-off as ones likely to be fruitful for applica­
tion of this tool and for further research. Decision rationale can be seen as establishing and documenting
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the reasons or arguments as to why a particular decision takes the form that it does. Likewise design 
rationale documents the justification for a particular design. Design trade-off, in contrast, involves the 
design rationale for more than one design with the aim of finding the optimum design solution for a 
given problem. Decision trade-off is a new part o f the more established field of decision support.
Design rationale and trade-off are aspects of systems engineering which appear to be under­
developed parts of the literature and extant tooling. Existing work (Buckingham-Shum, 1994) suggests 
good potential utility for a tool such as that proposed here. By documenting the reasons for a design or 
decision several benefits may be achieved, notably:
1 . improved efficiency of the design or decision team in their work as their mental processes become 
explicit, recorded, sharable and more quickly appreciated by other team members,
2 . improved speed and quality of design or decision modification in the face of changed requirements,
3. easier reuse and adaptation of similar designs or decisions and
4. faster and smoother communicatidn to independent auditors, assessors or advisors as to the nature 
of a design or decision and its justification.
I now give a small example of such a decision or design rationale exercise, focussed on the area 
of corporate acquisition, commonly known as mergers and acquisitions or M&A. This example comes 
from an actual occurrence and has not been fabricated; only the company name has been changed. The 
motion of this small debate is a  with a linguistic gloss of ‘Buy WarmHouse’, i.e. that we should buy 
the company WarmHouse Corporation. The following Table 8.2 shows the atomic formulae involved 
together with their equivalent linguistic glosses. Appreciate that Table 8.2 is not the knowledgebase, but 
rather just ingredients that the knowledgebase may be built from. The knowledgebase is provided in 
three steps, A i, A 2 and A 3 , below.
W hile the approach of this thesis is monological in nature, I present this example as a series of steps 
that could be taken as having a dialectical flavour. This step by step presentation does not change the 
debate outcome versus starting with the full knowledgebase as no arguments are held back.
An initial business analysis of the situation yielded the initial knowledgebase, A i, showing what 
was known about the situation at that early stage.
A i =  { a : 0 , b : 7 ,  c : 6 A e, d : (0  A 7  A 8 ) —> a ,  e : £, / :  77, g : 9, h : i : k , j  : (£ A 77 A 6 A t A k ) —* 
A, k : n, I: (A A fi) —» —► a } .
At first sight, with A i, the purchase of WarmHouse appeared to be attractive. There are two ar­
guments, see Table 8.3, in favour of purchasing the company and thus these form a confirmation of the 
motion a .
Further due diligence analysis yielded additional basic information for the knowledgebase giving 
A 2 which is A 2 =  A iU  some additional assumptions.
A 2 =  A i U  { o: £ , p : £  —> 7r ,q:£  —> p, r : (7r A p) —► ->£, s : c r , t : T , u : T  —» v,  v : ( c r  A v)  —> ->r)}.
These additional assumptions provide two undercuts, again see Table 8.3, that attack one of the 
confirming arguments in favour o f the motion. These undercuts are shown in Table 8.3 first as Wigmore








a Buy the company WarmHouse Corporation
a,d,x P I want to get into the energy conservation business
b,d 1 A way to get into the energy business is to buy an existing firm, e.g. a heating firm
c,d 5 A local heating firm, WarmHouse, is available
c,x e My brother is an employee at WarmHouse
e,j,r,z c WarmHouse has a valuable asset of a vehicle
f,j,v,z 9 WarmHouse has a valuable asset of existing service contracts bringing in 
£2,000 2 month by direct debit
gd>z 9 WarmHouse has a valuable asset of a customer database going back fifteen years
h,j,z i WarmHouse has a valuable asset of many stickers and fridge magnets in the field 
with their phone number on
i»j*z K WarmHouse has a valuable asset of accumulated goodwill 
from its customers and prospects
j,l,n,z,aa,cc A The assets o f WarmHouse are worth over £100,000
k,l,n,aa,cc P WarmHouse is for sale for £100,000
l,m V A company X ’s assets are worth more than its sale price
m,n,bb,cc tjj Buy that company X
o,p,q a The vehicle is old
P*r 7T The vehicle is only worth a few thousand
q»r P The vehicle could breakdown on the way to a service call
s,v O The service contracts incur considerable routine cost for each visit
t,u T Many of the boilers under contract are old
u,v V The service contracts could soon require many of the boilers to be replaced
aa,bb <t> A company X ’s assets plus projected revenues over 10 years are worth less 
than its sales price
w,x X My brother knows the home heating business very well
y.x U) Start one’s own company from scratch
Table 8.2: Atomic Formulae and their Linguistic Equivalents for WarmHouse
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undercuts then as canonical undercuts. The tool should probably only show end users the Wigmore 
undercuts, keeping by default the canonical undercuts undisplayed and for internal tracking of the debate. 
At this point there is still an undefeated argument in favour of the motion and no arguments against, so 
the motion a  still carries.
Additional research into company valuation and startup strategy added further assumptions yielding 
A3. I’ve adopted the common legal practice of having aa, bb, c c , . . . follow on from a, b, c ,. . . after z 
is reached and the alphabet is exhausted. When listening to a speaker, aa is easier to distinguish from 
earlier set members than the alternative approach of ab, a c ,  Here is the final knowledgebase:
A 3  =  A 2  U {w :x ,  x : {(3 Ae A x )  —► y :w —* ~<a, z : (-> £  A -177 A 0 A t  A k )  —> —«A, aa: (->A A y)  —>
<f>,bb:(f> —* cc: (->A A/jA -up) —> -ia}.
These final assumptions allowed a pair rebuttals to be formed, see Table 8.3. Observe that 
there is some somewhat informal logic in the two areas where the quantifiers of first order pred­
icate calculus would have been useful, notably around u,ip and <j>. Let I  = { a , b , c , d } , J  = 
m , n } , K  =  { a , c , w , x , y } , L  =  { g , h , i , k , o , p , q , r , s , t , u , v , a a , b b , c c } , M  = 
{ o , p , q , r } , N  =  {s ,f ,u ,v} .
Some of the reflected arguments in the debate have also been shown in Table 8.3. Here is the 
resultant debate tree, which by definition does not include any reflections.
{ { I , J } , { K , L } ) : a
{■J}
({M,Ar},0):-nrt7
Figure 8.3: Debate Tree of the Buying WarmHouse Debate
It can be seen that there are six arguments of merit in the debate. Depending on the judge style used 
one of the undercuts does not play an active role. Table 8.3 shows twelve reflected arguments, and that 
is only a sampling of the total - so the number of reflected arguments outnumbers the direct arguments 
here by at least a factor of three to one. Separate from the question of skewing of the debate outcome by 
reflection, it is clear here that if reflected arguments were included in Figure 8.3 then it would be much 
harder to see and understand the essence of the debate.
At the conclusion of the debate there are two undefeated arguments for not buying WarmHouse and 
one undefeated argument for buying WarmHouse. Thus using either an existential or a quantitative judge 
the conclusion is not to buy WarmHouse. This argumentation example therefore crisply documents the 
decision rational for not buying the company. If a similar situation to this presented itself in the future 
this documentation would allow the earlier work to be adapted more effectively and easily to the new 
situation. Even if no similar situation arose the documentation provides an audit trail for shareholders, 
tax auditors, accountants and others.
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No. Argument Comment
1. I :a  = {a,b,c,d}:a £ arguments^!) 
i.e. {a:P,b:'y,c:S A e,d:(0 A 7  A 6) —> a }  b a
Argument for motion.
2 . J :a  =  {e,f,g, h, i,j,  k, l ,m ,n } : a  G arguments^!) 
i.e. {e:£, f  :rj,g:d,h:i,i:K, j  :(£ Ap  A 6 A l A k) —> A, 
k : p , I : (A A p) —> u, m : v —> 0 ,  n : (A A p  A 0 )  —> a }  b  a
Confirming argument for motion.
3. M :->£ =  { o ,p ,q , r } : ^  £  arguments(A2) 
i.e. {o:£,p:£ 7r,q:£ ->  p ,r:(?r A p ) - < }  ^ “<
1 st Wigmore undercut 
of argument 2 .
4. N:->r) = {s, £, u , v } : -<77 6  arguments(A2) 
i.e. { s : (7, f : t ,u :r  —► v , v :(<7 Av)  —► - 177} 1— 177
2nd Wigmore undercut 
of argument 2 .
5. Let m = £ Ar] Ad A l A k A ((£ A t] A 6 A l A k) —> A) 
Ap A ((A A n) —> 1/) A ((A A p  A u) —> a )
M : -io7 =  {o,p, <7, r } : ->07 G arguments(A2) 
i.e. {o: t ,p: t->n,q:£  -> p,r:(7r A p) -♦ ^<} h - .0 7
1st canonical undercut 
of argument 2 .
6 . TV: ->07  =  { s , u ,  v } :-izz7 G arguments(A2) 
i.e. {s:o,t:TjU:T —* v,v:(cr Av)  —> ->77} 1— 107
2 nd canonical undercut 
of argument 2 .
7. K:->a = {a,c,w,x,y}:->a G arguments(A3) 
i.e. {a:/?,c:<J A e ,w :x ,x :(0 A e A x) —> u , y - u  —* "'a} 1— <a
1st rebuttal
of arguments 1 and 2 .
8 . L : ->a =  {g, h, i, k , 0, p, <7, r, s, t ,u ,v ,  aa, bb, cc} :  ->a: 
G arguments(A3) 
i.e. { p : 0 , /&:<,,«:«, f c :p ,o :£ ,p :£  -»  7r,g:£ -»  p, 
r : (7r A p) —► ->£, s:cr,t:T,u:T —> v,v:(cr Av)  —> -177, 
a a : ( iA  A p) —> 0 , bb: 0  —> ->0, 
cc: (—>A A p  A ~>0) —» —iQ:} 1---- >0 ;
2 nd rebuttal











7 : 0 7 ,
J ' .V J ,
K : ->(/? A 7  A  £ A  € A  ((/? A  7  A  5) —> a ) ,
L :->(0 A 7  A <5 A e A ((/3  A 7  A 5 ) —» a ) ,  
77 :^07 ,
L : ->07,
I  :->(/? A 5 A e A x  A ((/3 A e A x) ->  w) A (w 
J : ->(/? A <5 A e A x A ((/5 A e A x ) ->  w )  A (w  - ,cO), 
/:-> (#  A l A k A fi A £,p:£ —> 7 r, # :£  —>pA 
((7r A p) —> -<£) A a  A t  A (r  - >7;) A ((cr A t;) ->  —>77) A 
(~>A A p) —» 0) A (0  —► ->0) A ((~>A A p  A —>0) —♦ ->a), 
J :->(0  A 1 A k A p A £,p:£ —► 7r,q:£ —> pA 
((7T A p) —> ->£) A a  A r  A (r  -* v) A ((a A v ) - >  _|77)A 
(—>A A p) —» 0) A (0  —► —>0)A 
((->A A p  A ->0 ) —► ->a) G arguments(A3)
Reflection, rebuts {M , iV }: ->07. 
Reflection, rebuts {M , iV}: ->07. 
Reflection, undercuts I : a. 
Reflection, undercuts I  : a. 
Reflection, undercuts J : a. 
Reflection, undercuts J : a. 
Reflection, undercuts K : ->a. 
Reflection, undercuts K : ->a.
Reflection, undercuts L : ->a. 
Reflection, undercuts L : ->a.
Table 8.3: Arguments Derived from Knowledgebase for WarmHouse
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8.6.1 Design Rationale within Private Finance Initiatives (PFIs)
In the UK and elsewhere today many advanced systems are being developed under the Private Finance 
Initiative (PFI) funding rules and these mandate that an ‘Independent Technical Advisor’ (ITA) is in­
volved in checking all the major decision rationales, design rationales and design trade-offs for the 
project (see HM Treasury guidelines Standardisation o f  PFI Contracts (SoPC4)). In today’s large PFI 
projects the ITA work can take two years and thus there is room for greater efficiency if the right tool­
ing could be found. PFI contracts require that before payments are made for completed construction 
or delivery of physical assets, that an Independent Qualification Body (IQB) assess that construction or 
delivery for quality and fulfilment of requirements. It is common practice to have the IQBs appointed as 
part of the overall initial contract signing process. Thus for each candidate IQB there is a decision akin 
to the above example as to why they were or were not appointed (clearly appoint is akin to buy). The 
proposed tool would not only facilitate the conduct and conclusion-drawing of each decision or design 
debate, but could also provide documentation for an audit trail.
8.7 Contributions: Strengths and Limitations
This section summarises the contributions of this thesis, effectively drawing out the strengths of the 
thesis as a whole. In addition this section outlines the limitations of the contributions to put them into a 
broader perspective. I present this summary of contributions in a chapter by chapter fashion:
Basic Framework Chapter 2’s contributions are not significant in themselves, but rather are 
helpful for expressing the ideas of later sections.
•  Confirmation is the main contribution of this chapter. It is helpful in that it introduces and 
formalises the positive relationship between arguments with the same claim. A limitation is 
that the other positive relationship of claim to support is not addressed in the basic framework 
and is only touched upon in the final chapter.
•  A formal framework for describing argument aggregation is provided. This is a fully concrete 
framework and as such is akin to only one instance of the many possible frameworks that can 
be derived from the ABA or Dung abstractions. An advantage of such a concrete approach 
is that allows a very specific understanding about properties that will be encountered in an 
implementation.
•  Contradiction is a minor contribution and may be viewed as simply one step in the common 
set of steps of aggregating arguments.
Undercut Framework Chapter 3’s contribution is preclusive undercut.
•  Preclusive undercut is the main contribution of this chapter and one of the relatively useful 
contributions of this thesis.
•  Of particular interest with preclusion is that given that it is well motivated in professional 
debate, is the observation that it does not fit easily with the abstract approach of Dung.
8.7. Contributions: Strengths and Limitations 233
Thus preclusion provides a different and complementary research direction from the abstract 
aspect of the argumentation literature.
•  The chapter also contributes a literature survey showing that there is a lack of consensus in 
the literature as to what constitutes an undercut. As the field matures such a consensus should 
be expected to emerge.
Reflection Between Arguments Chapter 4 introduces and provides the central contribution of 
the thesis, that given a chain of two arguments with one attacking the other, then provided certain 
simple assumptions there will always exist a third argument. Given notions of defeat and rein­
statement which are prevalent in the literature, e.g. (Prakken & Vreeswijk, 2002), there is logic to 
show that every defeated argument will inevitably be reinstated.
•  This analysis demonstrates that if reflection is not taken into account then practical imple­
mentations of various theoretical semantics are likely to give counter-intuitive results.
•  The key contribution of the thesis is to identify predictable repetitions of arguments that occur 
when arguments are chained together in simple lines of two or three attacking arguments.
•  This basic reflection between two arguments takes on four forms which I call Base Proposi­
tions One, Two, Three and Four. Undercut engenders rebuttal. Rebuttal engenders undercut. 
Rebuttal also engenders rebuttal and Undercut engenders undercut.
•  While the existence of reflected arguments and their various properties are quite remarkable 
it is difficult to say exactly what their importance or relevance must be to the larger field 
of argumentation and aggregation. Abstract argumentation approaches, because they ignore 
any inner structure of arguments, are able to avoid questions of reflection.
•  If a debate tracking tool relies on humans to compose the arguments then it appears that 
humans use their intelligence to filter out the reflected arguments. If an automated tool is 
employed to generate all of the arguments that logically follow from a knowledgebase then 
reflection becomes crucial.
•  What is needed is to filter out or remove all reflected arguments and reflected attacks, leav­
ing only direct arguments and direct attacks. This chapter establishes this requirement and 
Chapter 6  provides a data structure to meet that requirement.
In this context I mention that a management consulting exercise I did for a London investment 
bank found for a practical, reasonably small but non-trivial professional debate that filtering out 
all reflections while leaving in all direct arguments becomes difficult to do manually.
A limitation of this analysis of reflection is that I have not been able to prove that I have found 
all of the forms of reflection. It is usually safe to say in scientific endeavours such as this that the 
chances are that there are further forms yet to be discovered -  which could then possibly alter the 
understandings established herein.
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Reflection Between Confirmations Chapter 5’s contribution is to deepen the appreciation of 
reflection, showing in particular that when the notions of reflection and preclusion are analysed 
together then more sophisticated patterns and behaviours are seen.
•  Reflections between confirmations, independent of the notion of preclusion, exhibit a form 
of expanded reflection I call multi-pair enlargement. As shown in the worked example of 
Section 8.6  even a simple debate can lead to a large amount of multi-pair enlargement.
•  There are thus a variety of mechanisms that can cause expanded or reduced reflection, all of 
which can interact in even simple examples to give quite complex reflection patterns.
•  While all of the reflections of the previous chapter fitted a particular template I called Type 
I reflection, the inclusion of preclusion adds a subtler form of reflection mandating the need 
for Type II reflections.
•  In addition to Type I and IE reflections which can be said to flow from head of a chain toward 
the tail, (i.e. from nearer the root a some debate tracking tree to nearer a leaf) there is another 
form of reflection that flows up chains of arguments from tail to head. I call these Type HI 
reflections and show that they have distinct and noteworthy properties.
•  When the notion of preclusion is analysed in combination with these Type IQ reflections it is 
seen that a fourth distinct form of reflection, Type IV, is found. Given that there is much to 
know about Type I reflection (e.g. Base Propositions One, Two, Three and Four) then there 
is likely to be more to know about these more advanced forms of reflection.
•  It is also apparent that direct and reflected arguments can be intermingled in a single confir­
mation so mechanisms are needed to separate them.
•  In the work of the previous chapter, reflected arguments were analysed specific to a given 
reflector and thus had a relative flavour to their behaviour. In contrast, in this chapter analysis 
is provided to cover all possible reflectors, thereby moving the understanding of reflections 
from a relative footing to what could be called an absolute form.
•  Even if a confirmation contains only direct arguments and they are direct relative to all pos­
sible reflectors, then it still may not contain all such direct arguments. Consequently it is 
necessary to introduce maximal forms that ensure that all appropriate direct arguments are 
included in a confirmation.
As with the last chapter it is unfortunate that it has not been possible to prove that all forms of 
reflection have been unearthed and thus some of these characteristics could change in the light 
of further analysis. Another non-ideal aspect of this chapter is that while distorted reflections are 
established as existing, it is not immediately clear a) if that is really a problem or b) if it is a 
problem then what to do about it. I follow the theme of arguing that it is a problem and that the 
solution must be to prune out or remove all reflected arguments, but my theme is not a proven 
result.
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Tracking a Debate Chapter 6 describes how to create and populate a data structure to record the 
passage of a debate. The focus here is on tracking all relevant or pertinent arguments while at the 
same time excluding all irrelevant or duplicated arguments. Clearly value judgements are entailed 
in defining what constitutes the debate, the whole debate and nothing but the debate. Thus a merit 
of this thesis is that a proposal is put forward for tracking the debate, the whole debate and nothing 
but the debate and a limitation is there must exist alternatives which have not been analysed here.
•  The chapter starts by analysing debate tracking structures from the literature, particularly 
trees, to show the indication that they all may well, or appear to, contain reflection.
•  The chapter then goes on to pick a particular tree for detailed analysis and shows a number of 
ways in which this tree is problematic. Reasoning is presented to persuade that the problems 
described are not unique to this particular tree, but rather there is every likelihood that they 
occur across the literature -  nowhere in the literature is there description of a mechanism to 
stop them from occurring.
•  One of the things I like most about this thesis is that is practically grounded in providing a 
way to track debates that is free from the reflection problems identified.
•  While my debate tree structure has the plus of excluding reflection it has the drawback of 
being not as simple as those in the literature -  its definition takes more lines of logic.
•  On the other hand an advantage of my debate tree is that it tracks a whole debate as a single 
tree rather than as the forest of trees provided by various other authors.
An interesting puzzle that this debate tree raises is how to best portray it to users. It would appear 
that a three layer approach is warranted where the bottom layer is the mathematical formalism 
presented herein, the top layer is some easier-to-understand visual language and the middle layer 
is a mapping between the two.
Judging a Debate Chapter 7 describes how to draw a conclusion from a debate, recorded as a 
debate tree, as to whether the motion carries or is defeated. My judge functions differ from abstract 
semantics in that they a) deliver a single item rather than a set of items or set of sets and b) that 
single item is a proposition rather than an argument. In this way I argue that judges map more 
closely to the needs of professional debate than do semantics.
•  Judges in the literature can be categorised into two main groups: existential and quantitative. 
Existential judges only attend to the existence of arguments, while quantitative judges are 
sensitive also to the number of arguments. This thesis dwells on and advocates the quantita­
tive approach as it resolves more types of inconsistency than does the existential approach.
•  While this section does provide an illustrative judge that works with the debate tree of the 
previous chapter, this judge has various limitations. Considerably more research is war­
ranted, I would suggest, to provide intelligent judge functions that are not subject to these 
limitations.
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•  A particularly challenging, but desirable, property of judge functions is that the outcomes of 
a series of debates are consistent when taken together. This property is called cumulativity 
in the literature and merits further research. I do not provide it.
•  A key question asked by this chapter, which lies at the core of this thesis, is does reflection 
change the outcome of debates? Rather frustratingly even though there is an indication that 
reflection changes the outcomes of both existential and quantitative judges I have not been 
able to rigourously prove that this is a fact.
This chapter has the limitation of being not as formal as those that precede it and much of its de­
scriptions of desirable judge properties is only textual narrative. From that perspective the chapter 
is rather unsatisfactory as there is no way of seeing if my proposed judge is definitively any better 
or worse than alternatives. It appears to be better as it takes into account reflection, preclusion 
and confirmation, but there are clearly so many possible judges that how to pick the best or most 
suitable is a puzzle.
I would like to say in conclusion, my opinion is that the field of argumentation within artificial 
intelligence should keep itself tied to solid motivations drawn from professional debate and thus to forms 
of theory that can be mapped to applications. It should answer the questions of a) where do arguments 
come from and b) given an arbitrary item x, is x an argument or not? Certainly I support and welcome 
theoretical and abstract work, but do question when this takes paths that inhibit its inter-linking with 
professional debate. In contrast, what I like about my thesis is that it starts with theoretical research 
and then maps that into something very concrete and practical. I like that it leads to and proposes an 
implementation that can be used in facilitating real-world professional debates.
8.8 Closing Remarks and Conclusion for Discussion
This chapter has covered the topics for further research, assisting arguments, the design for an imple­
mentation, an example of a debate and a summarisation of the contributions of this thesis as a whole.
An interesting aspect of this thesis is that it raises questions about some of the assumptions under­
pinning the abstract school of argumentation that is playing such a dominant role in the current argu­
mentation literature. This questioning has the key points of:
•  Should an argument attack be allowed to attack more than one argument? I provide practical 
motivation and a formalism for this approach, showing how it occurs in professional debates. In 
contrast the abstract argumentation literature confines itself to an attack being on one and only one 
argument. Certainly one abstract argument can attack several arguments, but there is no linking to 
show the dependency or disjunction between the attacks.
•  Should graded or partial defeat be allowed? The preclusive undercut would suggest that graded 
defeat has its applications in professional debate.
•  Should judge functions be allowed to count arguments? Again there is practical motivation here,
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for example from the writings of Benjamin Franklin and John Fox, however the current abstract 
literature does not embrace the notion of quantitative judgement.
A second and central notion in this thesis is of course that of reflection. I would suggest that once 
reflection is understood and appreciated then taking it into account is not particularly problematic. The 
challenges and issues arise if reflection is not taken into account.
The relationship of reflection to the abstract argumentation literature is somewhat paradoxical, be­
cause without a concrete form for arguments there is no way of saying whether reflection occurs or not. 
If every attacked, and therefore defeated, argument is automatically subject to a counter-attack, then 
some of the semantics in the literature would behave differently. Without a consideration of reflection, 
however, there appears to be an impact on various semantics and this, I would suggest, warrants further 
research.
Clearly my line of investigation in this thesis parts company from the mainstream of the argumenta­
tion literature, i.e. the abstract and semi-abstract approaches with their various semantics. My direction 
could be described as focussing on the counting of arguments and on thus on approaches that part com­
pany even from the mainstream of logic. I would argue back that I employ classical logic for individual 
arguments and that to aggregate arguments in a way that fits with professional debate then quantitative 
approaches are clearly motivated and warranted. The crucial benefit of the approach I give here is that 
it appears to be considerably better at resolving inconsistency than approaches which rely solely on the 
existence of arguments and not on their numbers.
I feel the threshold I introduce also has its charm in that it adds a new dimension to argument 
aggregation, that of filtering out noise or weakly argued claims. Certainly in law, in preparation for trial, 
there is a crucial need to sort through the evidence and arguments to separate the strong from the weak. 
Graded defeat would thus appear to be an unavoidable aspect of argumentation if it is to mirror practical 
situations.
Weights of arguments, stemming from weights of assumptions, while not addressed in this thesis 
is the requirement of professional debate that must not be forgotten going forward. All arguing, based 
on equal strength or flat knowledgebases must be accepted as limited. From this perspective my work is 
perhaps weaker than those who embrace priorities or preferences in their argumentation. I would argue 
however, than the ability of my judge function to order a set of motions from strongest to weakest is a 
useful step in the direction of graded defeat. I would also hold that in lieu of an improved theoretical basis 
for deciding where weights originate from and what they mean that my classical logic based approach 
has the level of integrity that is necessary for professional debate. The core issue for weights is that 
one must decide where the weights come from and how to formulate or construct them. Likewise, the 
abstract literature does not address where argument come from or how to formulate them. The minimal 
consistent subset approach to argumentation, with classical logic proof rules, does show where arguments 
come from and does allow a robust treatment of reflection. To be clear about reflection you have to be 
clear about the proof rules, so I would suggest also the semi-abstract ABA approach in its pure form is 
also not well suited to professional debate.
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As my final point of conclusion I would argue that practical implementations of argumentation tools 
need to be used in real-world professional debates to clarify the requirements of the field of argumenta­
tion as a whole. All such tools must be based, of course, on solid theory, but without the tools it is hard to 
evaluate the appropriateness of the underpinnings of these various theories. Let the next step be profes­
sional debate tools based on the theory herein or similar, to clarify and refine the requirements needed for 
artificial intelligence based argumentation to be deeply accepted within the realm of professional debate.
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p ro p e rtie s , 1 2 5 -1 2 6  
a tta c k in g  a rg u m e n t, see a rg u m e n t, a t ta c k in g  
a tta c k in g  c o n f irm a tio n , see c o n f irm a tio n , a tta c k in g  
a tta c k in g  c o n tra d ic tio n , see c o n tra d ic tio n , a tta c k in g
B a s e  P ro p o s itio n s , 89 , 9 0  
O n e , 9 0 , 162 
T w o , 9 1 , 129 , 134 
T h re e , 9 5 - 9 6
F o u r, 9 6 , 9 7 , 101, 169, 174, 176 
B B C , 7 2 - 7 4  
B D K T , 18
b ip o la r , 1 9 5 ,2 1 6 -2 1 8  
b ra n c h in g  fa c to r, 187 
b r id g in g  a s s u m p tio n s , 8 3 , 8 4 ,1 1 9
c a n o n ic a l en u m e ra tio n , 6 4 , 6 9 , 102, 127 
e x a m p le , 6 4  
c a n o n ic a l o rd e r in g , see c a n o n ic a l e n u m e ra tio n  
c a n o n ic a l u n d e rc u t, 6 4 -6 9  
d e f in itio n , 6 4  
e x a m p le , 6 5 ,6 8 ,6 9  
p ro p e r tie s , 6 5 -6 8
d ire c t, see d ire c t  c a n o n ic a l u n d e rc u t 
la b e ls , e f fe c t o f, 68
Index 251
re flec te d , see re fle c te d  c a n o n ic a l u n d e rc u t  
re flex ive , 98
ca rd in a lity , 2 6 ,3 2 ,3 8 ,4 0 - 4 2 ,4 4 - 4 5 ,  5 5 ,7 1 ,8 1 ,1 0 4 ,  
110, 112 , 1 2 5 -1 2 9 , 137, 175 
C aS A P I, 2 1 8 ,2 1 9  
c a s t  o n e , 1 9 9 ,2 0 2 , 2 0 3 ,2 0 8  
c a s t  tw o , 1 9 9 ,2 0 7 , 2 0 8  
ch a in , 8 4 ,9 2 ,9 6  
a s s is t in g , 2 1 7  
d o w n , 8 4 , 156 
h e a d , 9 8  
in fin ite , 93  
m id -p o s i tio n , 98  
o f  a rg u m e n ts , 8 4 ,8 9 - 1 2 1  
o f  c o n f irm a tio n s , 86, 1 2 2 -1 5 7  
ta il ,  8 4 , 98  
u p , 8 4 , 1 4 7 ,1 5 6  
c la im , 13, 3 0
p re d ic ta b le  b y  re flec tio n , 91 
re p e ti tio n , see re p e ti tio n  o f  c la im  
re p e t i tio n  o f , 15 
c la s s ic a l  lo g ic , 15, 2 3 , 2 4 , 2 7 , 2 9 , 9 8 - 1 0 0 ,  102, 161, 
163
c o m b in a t io n s ,  33
c o m p u ta t io n a l  co m p le x ity , 1 6 ,2 2 4  
co n f irm a tio n , 3 5 - 4 2  
d e f in it io n , 3 5 , 36  
e x a m p le , 3 7 , 3 9 ,4 2 ,  53  
p ro p e r t ie s ,  3 5 -4 2  
a t ta c k in g , 7 0 , 86, 179 
a tta c k s , see a t ta c k  b e tw e e n  c o n f irm a tio n s  
a w a re  ju d g e ,  195 
d e fe n d in g , 7 0 , 86 , 179 
in c o n s is te n t, 3 9 ^ 1 0 ,7 4 ,  7 8 - 8 0  
la b e l, 2 4 , 2 8 , 3 5 , 3 7 , 4 1 , 4 8 , 7 0 , 86 , 132 , 138, 
151, 179, 180 
su b s e t o r  eq u a l to , 7 0 ,7 9 ,  180 
su p e rse t, 7 0  
m a x im u m  c a rd in a lity , 4 1 - 4 2  
se lf , 35 , 3 7 ,5 3 ,7 6  
s h o rth a n d , 3 6 , 37 
ta rg e t, 7 0 ,1 7 9
ta u to lo g ic a l, 3 5 ,3 8 ,4 1 ,4 4 ,7 1 ,  80  
u n fo u n d e d , 2 5 , 2 7 , 35 , 38 , 4 1 ,4 3 ,4 4 ,4 8 ,7 1  
c o n s c io u s n e s s , 15 
c o n tra d ic tio n , 4 2 - 4 9  
d e f in itio n , 4 2  
e x a m p le , 4 3 ,4 4 ,5 3  
p ro p e rtie s , 4 3 - 4 6  
a tta c k in g , 179 
ca rd in a lity , 4 4  
d e fe n d in g , 179 
em p ty , 43  
g ra p h , 86
m a x im u m  c a rd in a lity , 45  
s h o rth a n d , 42  
c ro ss  e x a m in a tio n , 7 4  
c u m u la tiv ity , 5 0 - 5 2 ,1 9 5 ,  2 0 6
d e b a te , 1 5 8 -2 0 9
d e d u c tio n s  to  e x c lu d e , 2 9  
e ffec t o f
co n f irm a tio n , 3 5 ,5 1 ,  1 9 3 ,2 0 3 - 2 0 8  
re fle c tio n , 1 9 6 -2 0 8  
u n d e rc u t, 5 9 -6 2  
in fo rm a lly  in tro d u c e d , 13 
ju d g in g , 1 9 0 -2 0 9 , see ju d g e  
m o tio n , 14, 15, 5 4 , 196, 2 0 1 , 2 0 3  
o u tc o m e , 5 9 , 132, 165, 174, 191, 1 9 8 -2 0 0  
p ro fe s s io n a l, 13, 39 , 5 5 , 7 1 -7 6 ,  8 7 -8 8 ,  105, 
132 , 143, 149, 156 , 163, 1 6 5 -1 7 5 , 195, 
2 18
su p e rflu o u s  a rg u m e n ts  in c lu d e d , 16 
tra c k in g , 4 2 , 1 5 8 -1 8 9  
tra c k in g  g ra p h , 1 5 9 -1 6 2  
v ita l a rg u m e n ts  ex c lu d e d , 16 
d e b a te  tree , 162, 170 
d e f in itio n , 183
e x a m p le , 136, 1 6 6 ,1 6 8 -1 7 0 ,  173, 183, 186
p ro p e rtie s , 1 8 4 -1 8 8
im p le m e n ta tio n  o f, 2 1 8 -2 3 2
n o m e n c la tu re , 2 0 2 ,2 0 5
sh o rth a n d , 183
v isu a lisa tio n  o f, 2 1 9 -2 2 4
Index 252
d ec is io n  ra tio n a le , 227  
d e d u c tio n , 2 7 -2 9  
de f in itio n , 27  
e x a m p le , 2 7 - 3 0 ,5 2  
p ro p e rtie s , 2 7 - 2 9  
d e fe a t g ra p h , 160
d e fen d in g  a rg u m e n t, see a rg u m e n t, d e fe n d in g  
d e fe n d in g  c o n f irm a tio n , see c o n f irm a tio n , d e fe n d in g  
d e fe n d in g  c o n tra d ic t io n , see c o n tra d ic t io n , d e fe n d ­
in g
d e fe n d in g  p a th ,  182 
D e m p s te r -S h a fe r , 43  
d e s ig n  ra tio n a le ,  2 2 7  
d e s ig n  tra d e -o ff , 221 
d ia le c tic , 13, 2 0 0 , 2 1 9  
d ia le c tic  tre e , 161 
d ia lo g u e  tre e , 161 
d ire c t a rg u m e n t, 106, 118 
d ire c t  a t ta c k  b e tw e e n  a rg u m e n ts , 119 , 177 
d e f in it io n , 120 
p ro p e r t ie s , 120 
d ire c t  c a n o n ic a l  u n d e rc u t, 1 0 6 -1 0 8  
d e f in it io n , 106  
e x a m p le , 107, 166 , 173 
p ro p e r tie s , 1 0 6 -1 0 8  
d ire c t  c o n f irm a tio n , see d ire c t  c o n f irm in g  c o n f irm a ­
tio n
d ire c t  c o n f irm in g  a rg u m e n t, 155 
d ire c t  c o n f irm in g  c o n f irm a tio n , 155 
d e f in it io n , 155 
d ire c t  p re c lu s iv e  u n d e rc u t ,  1 2 7 -1 3 2  
d e f in it io n , 127 
e x a m p le , 127 , 130 , 132 
p ro p e rtie s , 1 2 8 -1 3 1  
d irec t re b u tta l  b e tw e e n  a rg u m e n ts , 1 1 8 -1 2 0  
d e f in itio n , 118
e x a m p le , 118, 148, 154 , 166, 173 
p ro p e rtie s , 1 1 8 -1 2 0  
d ire c t re b u tta l b e tw e e n  c o n f irm a tio n s , 1 3 6 -1 3 8  
d e f in itio n , 136 
e x a m p le , 1 3 7 ,1 5 2  
d isp u te  tre e , 161
d is to r te d  re fle c tio n , 1 2 2 ,1 3 8 ,1 4 5 - 1 4 6 ,1 5 7 ,  176 
d ia g ra m  o f, 146 
D u n c a n  S m ith , Ia in , 72  
D u n g  fra m e w o rk , 4 2 , 8 3 ,1 5 7 ,  159 
D u n g  g ra p h , 160
e d g e , 8 5 - 8 7 ,1 5 9 - 1 6 5 ,1 7 6 - 1 8 8 ,1 9 8 - 2 0 3 ,2 1 9  
e d g e  la b e l, 8 2 ,8 6 ,1 7 7 ,1 8 3 ,2 0 3  
e n la rg e d  re flec tio n , 1 0 8 -1 1 2 , 116 , 120 , 136, 139, 
1 4 1 -1 4 6 , 1 5 3 ,1 5 6 , 1 7 0 -1 7 1  
d ia g ra m  o f, 142 
e n la rg e m e n t m e c h a n ism , 1 0 8 ,1 4 2  
m o n o -p a ir , 1 0 8 -1 1 2  
d e f in itio n , 110 
e x a m p le , 109 
p ro p e rtie s , 110-112 
m u lti-p a ir , 1 4 2 -1 4 5  
d e f in itio n , 142 
e x a m p le , 144 
p ro p e rtie s , 1 4 3 -1 4 6  
d ia g ra m  o f, 145 
e v id e n c e , 1 4 ,7 3
a b se n c e , 2 4 , 2 7 ,4 3
a p p e a ra n c e  o f  m o re  th a n  th e re  is , 2 1 8
c o m p e llin g , 221
c o n tra d ic tio n s  in , 75
eq u a l, see s ta le m a te
e q u a lity  o f , 38
ex p la n a to ry , 58
le v e ls  fo r  c u m u la tiv ity , 52
n o n e  n e e d e d , 75
re p e titio n  o f, see re p e titio n  o f  a s su m p tio n s  
th re s h o ld , 15, 195, 1 9 6 ,2 0 4 ,2 0 6 ,2 2 1  
e x  fa lso  q u o d lib e t, 15, 2 8 , 29  
e x a c t re flec tio n , 120, 139, 141, 145 , 146, 148, 153— 
1 5 6 ,1 7 1 ,1 7 2 ,1 7 7  
d ia g ra m  o f, 141 
e x is te n tia l  ju d g e , 51 , 161, 1 9 3 ,2 0 0 -2 0 3
F ra n k lin , B e n ja m in , 5 1 , 196
g ra n d p a re n t re la tio n s h ip , see B a se  P ro p o s itio n s  F o u r  
g ra p h  th e o ry
Index 253
a n c es to r, see a n c e s to r  
ch a in , see ch a in  
e d g e , see e d g e
fo re s t, see a rg u m e n t s tru c tu re  
p a th , see p a th
tre e , see a rg u m e n t tre e , d e b a te  tre e  
v e r te x , see v e r te x  
g ro w in g  th e  c la im , 6 7 , 8 2 , 83
h an g  y o u rs e lf  a rg u m e n ts , 3 9  
h e a d  o f  c h a in , 8 4 , see c h a in , h e a d  
H o lm e s , S h e r lo c k , 7 3  
H o o n , G e o ffre y , 75  
H u tto n  e n q u iry , 7 4
Ia in  D u n c a n  S m ith , 72  
ig n o ra n c e , 43
In c h o a te  d e b a te  tra c k in g , 1 7 2 -1 7 4  
In c o m p le te  d e b a te  tra c k in g , 1 6 6 -1 6 9  
T y p e  A , 166  
T y p e  B , 1 6 6 -1 6 8  
T y p e C ,  1 6 8 -1 6 9  
in c o n s is te n c y , 1 5 ,4 4
re s o lv in g , 15, 2 2 ,6 2 ,  192 
in c o n s is te n t
k n o w le d g e b a s e , 28  
c o n f irm a tio n , 3 9 - 4 0 ,7 4 ,7 8 - 8 0  
e v id e n c e , 15
ju d g e  o u tc o m e s , see c u m u la tiv ity  
p re m is e s , 2 9  
re a s o n in g , 31 
in o rd in a te , 1 6 9 -1 7 2  
In o rd in a te  d e b a te  tra c k in g  
T y p e  A , 1 6 9 -1 7 0  
T y p e  B , 1 7 0 -1 7 1  
T y p e C , 171 
T y p e D , 1 7 1 -1 7 2  
in v a lid a tio n , 7 0
ju d g e
q u a lita tiv e , see e x is te n tia l  ju d g e  
q u a n tita tiv e , see q u a n tita tiv e  ju d g e  
ju d g e  1.0, B e n fe rh a t, 5 1 -5 2 ,  5 4 , 194, 2 0 8
d e f in itio n , 51 
e x a m p le , 5 1 ,5 4  
ju d g e  2 .0 , F ra n k lin , 5 1 - 5 2 ,5 4 ,  5 9 - 6 1 ,6 3 ,  194, 208  
d e f in itio n , 51 
e x a m p le , 5 1 ,5 9  
ju d g e  2 .1 , F ra n k lin  p lu s  u n d e rc u t, 6 0 - 6 1 ,  2 0 8  
ju d g e  3 .0 , G a rc ia  S im a ri, 193, 1 9 8 -2 0 3 , 2 0 8  
d e f in itio n , 200 
e x a m p le , 201 
tre e  m a rk in g , 200 
ju d g e  4 .0 , ex te n s io n  o f  G a rc ia  S im a ri, 1 9 9 ,2 0 3 ,2 0 8  
d e f in itio n , 2 0 3  
e x a m p le , 203  
ju d g e  5 .0 , B e s n a rd  H u n te r , 2 0 4 ,2 0 8  
d e f in itio n , 2 0 4  
ju d g e  6 .0 , th is  th e s is , 195, 1 9 9 ,2 0 3 -2 0 8  
d e f in itio n , 2 0 6  
e x a m p le , 2 0 7  
s tre n g th , 2 0 6  
ju d g e  7 .0 , e x te n d s  th is  th e s is , 199, 2 0 7 -2 0 8  
d e f in itio n , 2 0 7  
ex a m p le , 2 0 7  
ju d g e , c o m m o n  fo rm , 4 9 -5 2  
d e f in itio n , 4 9 , 50  
ex a m p le , 5 1 ,5 4  
p ro p e r tie s , 1 9 2 -1 9 6  
in fo rm a lly  in tro d u c e d , 14
k n o w le d g e b a se , 2 3 -2 7 ,  174 
in fo rm a lly  in tro d u c e d , 14
la b e lle d  d e d u c tiv e  sy s te m , 2 3 , 163 
la b e lle d  fo rm u la e , 2 4  
la n g u a g e  C, 2 3 ,2 8 ,  3 2 ,9 9  
L D S , see la b e lle d  d e d u c tiv e  sy s te m
m att, 1 7 8 ,2 2 6
d e fin itio n , 180 
in fo rm a lly  in tro d u c e d , 175 
m o tiv a tio n , 1 7 5 -1 7 8  
u s e  in  d e b a te  tree , 183 
m a x im a l d ire c t c o n f irm a tio n  re b u tta l, 1 3 7 -1 3 8  
d e f in itio n , 137
Index 254
u se  in  m a tt fu n c tio n , 180 
m a x im a l d ire c t  c o n f irm in g  c o n f irm a tio n , 155 
m a x im a l d ire c t p re c lu s iv e  u n d e rc u t, 1 2 9 -1 3 1  
d ef in itio n , 130  
e x a m p le , 130 
d ia g ra m  o f, 129 
m o tiv a tio n , 107 
u se  in  m a tt  fu n c tio n , 180 
m e ta k n o w le d g e , 15, 1 8 ,1 9 5 ,  196  
a w a re  ju d g e ,  1 9 6 ,2 0 6  
m in c o n , 1 7 ,2 9 - 3 5 ,  5 8 ,1 0 9  
c o m m o n  n o ta tio n , 3 4  
L D S  n o ta tio n , 30  
m in im a l c o n s is te n t  a rg u m e n t, see m in c o n  
m o n o -a tta c k , 7 1 ,7 6 - 7 8 ,9 0 ,1 0 3 ,  124 , 157 
m o n o -p a ir  e n la rg e m e n t, see e n la rg e m e n t , m o n o -p a ir  
m o n o -ta rg e t, 7 1 ,7 6 - 7 8 ,9 0 ,1 2 4 ,1 2 5 ,1 2 8 ,  132, 143, 
1 6 6 ,1 7 7 ,  202  
m o tio n  o f  a  d e b a te , 1 4 ,1 5 , 5 4 ,1 9 6 ,  2 0 1 , 2 0 3  
m u lti-a tta c k , 7 1 ,7 6 - 7 8 ,  103 
m u lti -p a ir  e n la rg e m e n t, see e n la rg e m e n t, m u lti -p a ir  
m u lti- su p p o r t, see e n la rg e m e n t, m u lti -p a ir  
m u lti- ta rg e t, 7 1 ,7 6 - 7 8 ,1 2 5 ,1 2 7 ,  1 3 1 ,1 3 2 ,1 3 6 ,  151, 
177, 2 0 2  
m u tu a l d e s tru c t io n , 150
n e g a tio n , 2 3 , 4 3 ,4 4 ,  5 5 , 6 2 , 6 4 , 7 2 , 127, 2 1 7  
n o -re c y c lin g  c o n s tra in t, 1 6 1 -1 6 5 , 1 6 8 -1 6 9 , 1 7 4 -  
176, 183, 186, 197 
n o d e , see v e r te x
n o ise  filte r, 15, 5 4 , 190, 195 , 2 0 4  
n o n -m o n o to n ic , 16, 83 , 101 
N R C , see n o  re c y c lin g  c o n s tra in t
o f f  tree , 1 7 0 -1 7 3 , 176 
on  tree , 170 
on to lo g y , 15, 196 
o p aq u e , 1 7 8 ,2 2 6  
d e f in itio n , 181 
m o tiv a tio n , 1 7 5 -1 7 8  
u se  in  d e b a te  tree , 183 
O sc ar, 2 1 8 ,2 1 9
p a th
d e fe n d in g , 182 
le a f  to  ro o t, 1 6 3 ,1 8 6  
le n g th , 1 8 7 ,1 8 8  
P o llo c k  u n d e rc u t, 6 2 -6 4  
p re c lu s io n , see p re c lu s iv e  u n d e rc u t
ta u to lo g ic a l, see ta u to lo g ic a l p re c lu s io n  
p re c lu s iv e  u n d e rc u t, 6 9 - 8 3 ,1 7 9 - 1 8 3  
d e f in itio n , 7 0  
e x a m p le , 7 0 ,7 8 ,8 1 ,1 3 0  
p ro p e r tie s , 7 6 -8 1  
c a n d id a te , 6 9 ,7 0 ,8 2  
d ire c t, see d ire c t p re c lu s iv e  u n d e rc u t 
in v a lid a tin g , 7 1 ,8 2 ,1 3 2  
m o tiv a tio n , 7 2 - 7 6
re fle c te d , see re fle c te d  p re c lu s iv e  u n d e rc u t  
ta u to lo g ic a l, 7 4  
p re c lu s iv e  u n d e rc u t b e tw e e n  c o n tra d ic tio n s , 1 7 9 -1 8 3  
d e f in it io n , 179 
e x a m p le , 179 
p ro fe s s io n a l d e b a te , see d e b a te , p ro fe s s io n a l 
p ro p o se r , 38
p ro x y , 123 , 1 3 9 ,1 5 8 , 1 7 2 -1 7 4
q u a lita tiv e  ju d g e ,  168, see e x is te n tia l  ju d g e  
q u a n tita tiv e  ju d g e , 1 5 ,5 1 ,  168, 193, 2 0 4 -2 0 8
re b u tta l, 4 6 - 4 9
d ire c t  c o n f irm a tio n , see d ire c t  p re c lu s iv e  u n d e r­
c u t , d ire c t  re b u tta l  b e tw e e n  c o n f irm a tio n s , 
d ire c t  c o n f irm in g  c o n f irm a tio n  
d ire c t  c o n f irm a tio n  fu n c tio n , see d ire c t  re b u tta l 
b e tw e e n  c o n f irm a tio n s  
a w a re  ju d g e ,  193
d ire c t  a rg u m e n t, see d ire c t re b u tta l  b e tw e e n  a r­
g u m e n ts  
d ire c t  e x c lu d e d , 166 
e n g e n d e rs  re b u tta l, 95  
e n g e n d e rs  u n d e rc u t, 9 0  
e q u a l to  an  u n d e rc u t, 68 
in fo rm a lly  in tro d u c e d , 16 
n o n -ro o t e x c lu d e d , 166
re f le c te d  a rg u m e n t, see re f le c te d  re b u tta l  b e ­
tw e e n  a rg u m e n ts
Index 255
re fle c te d  co n firm a tio n , see re f le c te d  re b u tta l  b e ­
tw ee n  c o n f irm a tio n s  
re so lv e  in co n s is ten cy , 61 
re b u tta l b e tw e en  a rg u m e n ts , 4 6 - 4 8  
d efin itio n , 4 6  
ex a m p le , 4 6  
p ro p e r tie s , 4 6 - 4 7 ,6 7  
re b u tta l b e tw e e n  c o n f irm a tio n s , 4 8 - 4 9  
d e f in it io n , 4 8  
p ro p e r tie s , 4 8 - 4 9  
r e d u c e d  re f le c tio n , 120 , 1 3 9 -1 4 0 , 146 , 1 5 3 -1 5 7 , 
1 6 6 -1 6 8  
d ia g ra m  o f, 140 
re f le c te d  a rg u m e n t, 8 9 - 1 2 1 ,1 2 3 ,  132 
a c t in g  a s  p ro x y , 1 3 9 ,1 5 8 , 1 7 2 -1 7 4  
a c t in g  a s  re flec to r , 184  
re f le c te d  a tta c k
a s su m p tio n -b a s e d  (A B A ), 100  
re f le c te d  a t ta c k  b e tw e e n  a rg u m e n ts , 9 2 - 9 5  
d e f in it io n , 9 2  
e x a m p le , 98  
p ro p e r t ie s , 9 3 - 1 0 2  
d ia g ra m  o f , 92  
re f le c te d  a t ta c k  b e tw e e n  c o n f irm a tio n s , 1 3 8 -1 4 6  
d e f in it io n , 138 
re f le c te d  c a n o n ic a l u n d e rc u t, 1 0 2 -1 0 5  
d e f in it io n , 102 
e x a m p le , 102, 107 
p ro p e r t ie s ,  1 0 3 -1 0 5  
d ia g ra m  o f, 105
m o n o -p a ir  e n la rg e m e n t , 1 0 8 -1 1 2  
m o tiv a tio n , 105 
re flec te d  c o n f irm a tio n , 1 2 2 -1 5 7  
re flec te d  c o n f irm in g  a rg u m e n t, 123 , 1 4 7 -1 5 1  
d e f in itio n , 147 
e x a m p le , 148, 154 
p ro p e rtie s , 1 4 8 -1 5 1  
d iag ra m  o f, 147 
re flec te d  co n firm in g  c o n f irm a tio n , 123 , 1 5 1 -1 5 5  
d e f in itio n , 151 
e x a m p le , 1 5 2 ,1 5 4  
p ro p e r tie s , 1 5 2 -1 5 5
d ia g ra m  o f, 151 
re f le c te d  p re c lu s iv e  u n d e rc u t, 1 2 3 -1 2 6  
d e f in itio n , 123
e x a m p le , 124, 1 3 0 ,1 3 2 , 140, 141, 145 
p ro p e rtie s , 1 2 4 -1 2 6  
d ia g ra m  o f, 123
m u lti-p a ir  e n la rg e m e n t, 1 4 2 -1 4 5  
re fle c te d  re b u tta l  b e tw e e n  a rg u m e n ts , 1 1 2 -1 1 8  
d e f in itio n , 113 
e x a m p le , s im p le , 113 
e x a m p le , 154 
p ro p e rtie s , 1 1 4 -1 1 8  
d ia g ra m  o f, 114 
m o tiv a tio n , 1 1 3 -1 1 4  
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